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The saints confute the logicians, but they do not confute them by logic but 
by sanctity.  They do not prove the real connection between the religious 
symbols and the everyday realities by logical demonstration, but by life.  
Solvitur ambulando, said someone about Zeno’s paradox, which proves the 
impossibility of physical motion.  It is solved by walking.  Solvitur 
immolando, says the saint, about the paradox of the logicians.  It is solved by 
sacrifice. 
 
—Austin Farrer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
1. A perennial (if controversial) concern in both theology and philosophy of 
religion is whether religious belief is ‘reasonable’.  Austin Farrer (1904-1968) is 
widely thought to affirm a positive answer to this concern.  Chapter One surveys three 
interpretations of Farrer on ‘the believer’s reasons’ and thus sets the stage for our 
investigation into the development of his religious epistemology. 
2. The disputed question of whether Farrer became ‘a sort of fideist’ is 
complicated by the many definitions of fideism.  Chapter Two thus sorts through 
these issues so that when ‘fideism’ appears in subsequent chapters a precise range of 
meanings can be given to it, and the ‘sort of fideist’ Farrer may have become can be 
determined more accurately. 
3. Although Farrer’s constant goal was to develop ‘a viable and sophisticated 
natural theology,’ an early moment of philosophical illumination involved recognising 
the limits of reason.  Chapter Three begins with a sketch of Farrer’s life, looks at his 
undergraduate correspondence where some ‘fideistic’ themes are first articulated, and 
then focuses on his classic text of ‘rational theology,’ Finite and Infinite (1943).   
4. In subsequent years, Farrer became increasingly open to placing a greater 
emphasis on faith.  And yet, he continued to press the question: ‘Can reasonable 
minds still think theologically?’  Chapter Four argues that, stimulated by Diogenes 
Allen’s doctoral dissertation and citing it explicitly, Farrer’s Faith and Speculation 
(1967) attempts to blend Allen’s more fideistic position with a continuing concern for 
legitimate philosophical critique. 
 5. The fifth chapter evaluates the significance of Farrer’s final position in the 
context of contemporary religious epistemology and the current wide-spread interest 
in spirituality.  In conclusion, Farrer finally seems to locate theistic evidence not 
primarily in nature or reason, but in holy lives and our own attempts to live by faith: 
‘It is solved by sacrifice.’  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Although primarily historical in nature, this dissertation in philosophical 
theology also has modest constructive ambitions.  Historically, it traces, analyses, and 
contextualizes the development of the religious epistemology of Austin Marsden 
Farrer (1904-1968).  Constructively, it concludes by defending an interpretation of at 
least one phase of this development as still worthy of serious consideration.  
Historically, it argues that Farrer’s thinking on the proper relation between faith and 
reason oscillated over a forty-year span between rationalistic and fideistic poles, 
finally to stop at the time of his early and unexpected death in what may be called a 
‘moderate methodological fideism’.  Constructively, it argues that such moderate 
methodological fideism is not to be despised, particularly in light of the postmodern 
chastening of ‘reason’ and the increased contemporary interest in what is now often 
called ‘spirituality’. 
While Farrer was constantly rethinking his philosophical and theological 
commitments on a wide range of issues—and so may well have continued to change 
and develop had he lived longer—his biographically final position was at least 
approximate to some of his earliest statements made in correspondence with his father 
while still an Oxford undergraduate in the late 1920s.  So while there was oscillation 
there was also continuity.  And while Farrer continually sought to fuse his 
philosophical, doctrinal, and devotional convictions into a single perspective, he was 
(inevitably) imperfectly successful in doing so, with one or another voice normally 
being dominant.  However, in his final epistemological position we see an intensified 
drive toward a unified balance and harmony of all three.  
 2 
The motivation and goal of this dissertation may perhaps best be seen by 
considering a review of the last major monograph published on Farrer, Charles 
Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism, written by Jeremy Morris.1  Morris begins by 
noting that although Farrer has ‘received relatively little serious scholarly attention,’ 
he remains ‘a fascinating figure, who cannot be bracketed easily in the European 
tradition of systematic theology, and yet whose oeuvre embraced almost the whole 
spectrum of Western theology, from metaphysics and philosophical theology to 
biblical studies and devotional writing.’2  Farrer’s singular and provocative work 
across a broad range of disciplines thus both deserves and needs further study. 
Morris then turns to Conti’s book by highlighting its central question: ‘how 
was it that the austere metaphysics of [Farrer’s first book] Finite and Infinite (1943) 
had mutated into the much more personalist and (to some critics) fideist stance of the 
later works, especially [Farrer’s last book] Faith and Speculation (1967)?  Conti’s 
central assumption is that, despite a change of emphasis, there was absolute continuity 
in Farrer’s theological method: he sought to demonstrate the conceivability of theism 
by uncovering the metaphysical presuppositions of being.’3  But Conti’s continuity 
thesis, however plausible it may prove to be, is prima facie challenged by the great 
difference between these two books.  As Morris puts it, in Faith and Speculation 
Farrer ‘was read—by Basil Mitchell, initially, amongst others—as having transformed 
himself in effect into a fideist, renouncing the possibility of his earlier rational 
theology in favour of a defence of the believer’s subjective experience of God.’4   
                                                 
1 Jeremy Morris, Review of Charles Conti, Metaphysical Personalism: An Analysis of Austin Farrer’s 
Theistic Metaphysics (Clarendon Press, 1995), in The Journal of Theological Studies 47 (1996), 792-
796. 
2 Ibid., 793. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 794. 
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Morris confesses that he himself tends—or, at least, tended—toward this 
fideistic interpretation of the later Farrer.5  ‘But,’ he continues, ‘the great merit of 
Conti’s book is that it roots Faith and Speculation very firmly in the context of 
Farrer’s lifelong theological project, and demonstrates how its principal aim was not 
to subserve a subjectivist view of religion with a metaphysical apologetic—a view the 
“fideist” reading assumes—but instead to defend the intelligibility of religious 
language and the rationality of religious belief by demonstrating the identity of the 
metaphysical presuppositions of human being and divine being.’6  Thus, on Conti’s 
reading, Farrer’s method remained primarily metaphysical and traditionally rational. 
But Morris also notes that, while Conti argues for a fundamental continuity of 
method between the early and later Farrer, he is equally concerned to establish the 
precise nature of the unquestioned change in emphasis between 1943 and 1967.  
Specifically, Conti argues that while Farrer’s method remained metaphysical, he 
revised his metaphysics from a classical to a neo-classical position.  As Morris puts it, 
in Conti’s view, ‘Farrer was awakened to the deficiency of his earlier, static 
conception of God by his reading of process theology, especially Charles Hartshorne.  
Farrer received, and acknowledged, Hartshorne’s criticism of the unattainability of the 
Scholastic idea of God….[T]hus, Conti argues, Farrer’s later philosophical theology 
fitted in much more closely with a process “Becoming” model of God than with a 
static, Scholastic “Being” model.’7  Conti even has a very specific candidate to credit 
for this process influence on Farrer, namely John Glasse of Vassar College, New 
York, who engaged Farrer in correspondence and wrote a very significant essay on his 
                                                 
5 Ibid.  See Morris’s essay, which will be considered further in Chapter Five of this dissertation, 
‘Religious Experience in the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer’, in The Journal of Theological 
Studies 45 (1994), 569-592. 
6 Ibid., 795. 
7 Ibid. 
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work which Farrer read and commented on in manuscript prior to its publication.8  
Farrer does indeed cite Glasse in the preface to Faith and Speculation, and Conti 
provides samples of correspondence from Farrer to Glasse in an appendix that 
confirms aspects of his argument.9 
However, while accepting some elements of Conti’s thesis, Morris 
nevertheless thinks ‘it is possible that Conti rather overstates the similarity [between 
Hartshorne and Farrer], leaning too heavily on what seems to be largely his own 
importation of the language of “Becoming”’.10  In other words, Conti may have 
exaggerated the influence of Hartshorne’s process theology on the later Farrer.  
Another reviewer of Metaphysical Personalism, Charles Taliaferro, registers a similar 
concern, observing that Conti’s text ‘reflects the enthusiasm of a partisan’ and ‘seems 
decidedly aimed at the process camp.’11  And it is an entirely separate question, which 
I cannot begin to enter into here, whether Conti’s process perspective on the ‘static’ 
‘Being’ model of so-called ‘classical theism’ is at all fair to that tradition; many 
would argue that it is not.12  But both Morris and Taliaferro acknowledge that, while 
Conti’s own commitment to process thought may well have coloured his judgement, 
he does not in fact argue that Farrer went all the way into the process camp himself, 
however much Conti may possibly wish that Farrer had. 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 794 and 795.  See John Glasse, ‘Doing Theology Metaphysically: Austin Farrer’, in Harvard 
Theological Review 39 (1966), 319-350.  Like Morris in 1996, Glasse wrote exactly thirty years earlier 
that, although Farrer’s brilliance was widely recognised, ‘little sustained examination of his work has 
appeared.’ (319)  The situation remains much the same in 2009.  
9 Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (A. & C. Black, 1967), vi; 
and Conti, Metaphysical Personalism, Appendix 2 (265-269). 
10 Morris, Review of Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism, 795 
11 Charles Taliaferro, Review of Charles Conti, Metaphysical Personalism, in The Journal of Religion 
78 (1998), 143-144 (these two citations from 143). 
12 See, out of very many examples, Fergus Kerr’s defence of a ‘dynamic’ and ‘active’ Thomism against 
standard critiques in After Aquinas: Version of Thomism (Blackwell, 2002). 
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Having summarised the themes and arguments of Conti’s book, Morris then 
wonders whether any kind of metaphysical argument, however revised, is sufficient to 
establish the rationality of religious belief in the way that Farrer—on Conti’s 
reading—apparently still thought that it both could and must.  That is, the whole 
project of building philosophical theology on metaphysical foundations, process or 
otherwise, may well be a mistake.  Morris begins the last paragraph of his review by 
stating that ‘Conti’s book makes large claims for the importance of Farrer’s work in 
healing the breach between philosophy and theology, and the continuing interest that 
some evince in it demonstrates how fertile [Farrer’s] approach may be.  But it is 
significant in itself that [Farrer] remains, nevertheless, a minority interest in 
contemporary theology, and this reviewer at least regrets that the depth and 
complexity of Farrer’s metaphysical achievement did not result in a dogmatic 
structure of like richness and coherence.’13 
More germane to the focus of this particular dissertation, Morris also worries 
that Farrer’s work implies ‘a reliance on a view of rationality that cuts little ice in a 
theological world dominated by the play of critical theory, hermeneutics, and 
contextual theologies.’  Morris thus concludes that Conti’s decision to focus his book 
on Farrer’s metaphysics ‘deprives the reader of what could be a very revealing 
analysis of Farrer’s admittedly slender dogmatic theology and its relation to his 
philosophical theology.’  Granting that Conti’s text ‘no doubt will become the 
standard guide to its subject and remain so for many years,’ Morris nevertheless holds 
that to ‘demonstrate convincingly the continuing relevance of Farrer’s approach 
would require a book rather different in scope from the one under review.’ 14 
                                                 
13 Morris, Review of Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism, 795-796.  Morris’s preference for a ‘rich’ 
dogmatic theology is indicative of the contemporary dominance of, e.g., Barth and von Balthasar. 
14 All citations in this paragraph from ibid., 796. 
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As stated above, Morris’s review of Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism is 
perhaps the best way to introduce the motivation and goal of this dissertation.  First of 
all, it accurately summarises the argument of the last significant monograph on 
Farrer’s philosophical theology and so helps to establish the state of play in 
contemporary Farrer interpretation.  Second, Morris well expresses some of my own 
reservations about Conti’s book, particularly its preoccupation with metaphysics as 
the controlling category through which to interpret Farrer’s thought, and its over-
emphasis on the influence of Hartshorne’s process theology on the later Farrer.  I 
could add several other concerns of my own, not the least being that I believe Conti 
reverses the personal dynamic driving Farrer’s academic work.  That is, Conti seems 
to see Farrer as a professional philosopher seeking somewhat awkwardly to make 
room for Christian faith (very oddly described by Conti as ‘a religion of [Farrer’s] 
youth’), whereas I tend to read Farrer as a Christian priest seeking to make room for 
philosophy.15  Third, Morris notes that while these metaphysical questions are indeed 
highly pertinent, they do not address all of the problems facing contemporary 
philosophical theology, leaving crucial epistemological and dogmatic issues 
untouched.  Fourth, Morris raises the exegetical question—associated with Basil 
Mitchell—as to whether Farrer’s later work exemplified a ‘sort of fideism’.  Fifth and 
finally, Morris’s review brings to the fore an important aspect of Conti’s argument, 
namely the role of Vassar’s John Glasse in bringing Hartshorne to Farrer’s attention. 
In this dissertation, I address most of these issues identified by Morris as either 
problematic or germane to Conti’s interpretation of Farrer.  In particular, I wish to 
move Farrer studies away from its metaphysical bias.  Conti is hardly alone in this 
approach, as the only other major monograph on Farrer—Jeffrey Eaton’s The Logic of 
                                                 
15 See Conti, Metaphysical Personalism, vii.  Taliaferro’s review also notes Conti’s reluctance to 
acknowledge Farrer’s respect for and basic commitment to orthodox Christian doctrine (144).  
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Theism—is also metaphysically focused, as are most other treatments of Farrer’s 
philosophical theology.16  Farrer was undoubtedly a great metaphysician, and it may 
well be that in historical terms his most significant original contributions will be seen 
to belong to that field.  But as Morris and others have noted, despite the enthusiasm of 
devotees such as Conti and Eaton, expositions of Farrer which focus on his 
metaphysics have been singularly unsuccessful in convincing the wider theological 
and philosophical community to pay any attention to him.  Of course, this may well 
be because in theology the anti-metaphysical tendency has only intensified in the past 
four decades, while in philosophy the discipline has undergone such a radical 
transformation that Farrer’s work is difficult for contemporary metaphysicians to 
appropriate.  Whatever the explanation, the obvious failure of the metaphysical 
approach to Farrer to convince others of his value itself warrants another strategy. 
I thus propose to approach Farrer from an epistemological rather than a 
metaphysical angle.  In particular, I begin with the issue raised by Basil Mitchell and 
noted by Morris: namely, ‘did Farrer become a fideist?’  This question, I believe, is of 
greater value in the present theological and philosophical climate than the far more 
frequently canvassed discussions of Farrer’s theory of ‘double agency,’ or ‘Farrer’s 
shift away from essence-existence arguments to activity-existence arguments.’17  That 
there is indeed great value in these metaphysical questions I do not for a moment 
deny, and my intent here is not to disparage the work previously done by John Glasse, 
Jeffrey Eaton, Charles Conti, and many others.  But it is work that has already been 
done, and the time is ripe for another interpretative strategy.  This dissertation is thus 
                                                 
16 See Jeffrey C. Eaton, The Logic of Theism: An Analysis of the Thought of Austin Farrer (University 
Press of America, 1980); Glasse’s essay cited in note 8 above; and many other works that will be cited 
in due course. 
17 Morris, Review of Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism, 795.  The Aquinas-inspired ‘double agency’ is 
perhaps the concept most associated with Farrer in contemporary philosophical theology. 
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meant to complement, rather than replace, these earlier studies.  As will be seen in due 
course, I am hardly the first person to consider Farrer’s epistemology, but I believe 
this is the first full-length study primarily concerned with epistemological questions 
and which makes them the starting point and hermeneutic grid through which Farrer’s 
thought and significance is assessed. 
This dissertation also seeks to complement Conti’s book in one other very 
specific way.  As noted above, Conti argues that John Glasse of Vassar College 
convinced Farrer to take Hartshorne more seriously, and was thus instrumental in the 
transition from the ‘early’ to the ‘later’ Farrer.  Farrer did indeed cite Glasse in the 
preface to Faith and Speculation, and Conti indeed provides corroborating samples of 
Farrer’s correspondence with Glasse in an appendix to Metaphysical Personalism.  
There is, I think, little reason to doubt the basic accuracy and significance of this 
account—but it tells only half the story.  For in fact Farrer cites two figures in this 
preface: 
Among the many philosophical friends who have given me food for thought I 
will mention Dr Diogenes Allen of Princeton [Seminary], and Professor John 
Glasse of Vassar.  The latter persuaded me to do the rethinking of scholastic 
positions which runs through my seventh, eighth, and ninth chapters; the 
former I have plundered in my first.18 
 
And in this first chapter, ‘The Believer’s Reasons,’ Farrer also does something he 
almost never does in any of his academic work: he provides a footnote, specifically to 
Allen’s article ‘Motives, Rationales, and Religious Beliefs’: ‘For a careful exposition 
of the believer’s sufficient reasons, see…’19 
                                                 
18 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, vi. 
19 Ibid., 10.  Allen’s article was published in American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1966), 111-127, and 
will be discussed further in Chapter Four.  Farrer’s commentators frequently bemoan the lack of 
references, notes, and indexes in his books.  His biographer, Philip Curtis, says that ‘in writing he 
seldom refers to others by name—perhaps only Wittgenstein quotes less’ (‘The Rational Theology of 
Doctor Farrer’, Theology LXXIII [1970], 249).  And in his contribution to Curtis’s biography—a 
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It is thus indeed striking that Conti does not mention Allen or Allen’s 
influence on Farrer even once in Metaphysical Personalism.  This is particularly 
striking when one realises that—in addition to the evidence in Faith and Speculation 
itself—Conti also had access to Farrer’s correspondence with Allen, correspondence 
which specifies the extent of Allen’s influence on the first chapter of Faith and 
Speculation.20  While one may indeed wonder at this omission, there is a very simple 
possible explanation: Allen’s influence on the first chapter of Faith and Speculation 
does not fit into the metaphysical story Conti wants to tell in the aptly named 
Metaphysical Personalism.  For Allen’s influence, while having metaphysical 
implications, is primarily epistemological.  Nor, again, is Conti alone in neglecting 
Allen’s influence here—it is strangely, inexplicably, almost universally absent from 
Farrer scholarship, despite (like Poe’s purloined letter) being hid in plain sight.  
Indeed, after a thorough survey of the secondary literature, aside from a passing 
mention in Allen’s Festschrift and a footnote in Eaton’s Logic of Theism, the only 
discussion of it that I have seen is not in a study of Farrer at all but in a general work 
by the late Baptist theologian James McClendon.  All other treatments of Farrer’s 
philosophical theology—its changes and influences—that I have read proceed as if 
Farrer had not publicly confessed to ‘plundering’ Allen in Faith and Speculation. 21 
                                                                                                                                            
chapter titled, ‘Farrer the Biblical Scholar’—Michael Goulder writes, ‘Farrer contemned [sic] the 
footnote.  He wrote with authority and not as the scribes, and the scribes did not appreciate this’ (in 
Philip Curtis, A Hawk Among Sparrows: A Biography of Austin Farrer [SPCK, 1985], 193).  Diogenes 
Allen has, in fact, helped to remedy the lack of indexes by providing them for eight of Farrer’s books in 
philosophical theology: see ‘Indexes to the Main Works of Austin Farrer’ in Brian Hebblethwaite and 
Edward Henderson (eds.), Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin 
Farrer (T. & T. Clark, 1990), 230-281. 
20 See the ‘Study Notes’ to Austin Farrer, Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by 
Charles C. Conti (SPCK, 1972), where Conti cites this correspondence twice, on 223 and 224. 
21 See the introduction to Eric O. Springsted (ed.), Spirituality and Theology: Essays in Honor of 
Diogenes Allen (Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 3; Eaton, 68 note 126; and James Wm 
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If for no other reason than this mysterious neglect over the past four decades, 
the story of Allen’s influence on Faith and Speculation needs to be told, and I do this 
in Chapter Four.  Indeed, like Conti’s publication of Farrer’s letters to Glasse, I also 
provide an Appendix in which Farrer’s unpublished letters to Allen are for the first 
time made available for a wider audience.  But Allen’s influence is significant here 
for two other reasons.  First of all, it fits into my general desire to approach Farrer 
from an epistemological angle.  By influencing ‘The Believer’s Reasons’—the first 
chapter in Faith and Speculation—Allen helped Farrer move to the possibility of a 
non-metaphysical foundation for philosophical theology, indeed perhaps to a non-
foundational position altogether.  Thus, the starting point of Farrer’s last book may be 
perceived to shift, and the undoubtedly metaphysical chapters that follow may then be 
seen in a different light and serving a different function than either Conti or Morris 
assume.  This has immense implications for both the question of Farrer’s possible 
fideism and for the rationality of religious belief. 
Second, Allen later provided his own interpretation of Farrer’s religious 
epistemology, an interpretation that is important in its own right, but perhaps doubly 
so once Allen’s influence on Farrer is given due regard.22  Brian Hebblethwaite and 
Edward Henderson, two of Farrer’s most distinguished commentators, observe that 
‘Allen does not claim here to give us a complete theological epistemology, of course.  
                                                                                                                                            
McClendon, Jr (with Nancey Murphy), Witness: Systematic Theology, Volume 3 (Abingdon Press, 
2000), 278-281.  I am very grateful to Diogenes Allen for bringing McClendon’s discussion of his 
work and his influence on Farrer to my attention, as I am sure I would not have found it otherwise.  My 
conviction that Allen’s influence was both important and neglected in Farrer studies was formulated 
prior to reading McClendon, but McClendon’s brief analysis of it provided both confirmation and 
insight.  It will be discussed further in Chapter Four.  
22 Allen’s interpretation of Farrer’s religious epistemology is provided in his book Christian Belief in a 
Postmodern World: The Full Wealth of Conviction (Westminster / John Knox Press, 1989), and his 
essay ‘Faith and the Recognition of God’s Activity’, in Hebblethwaite and Henderson (eds.), Divine 
Action, 197-210.  I discuss these texts further in Chapter One. 
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But inasmuch as his and Farrer’s Augustinian view appears importantly different from 
classical foundationalism, from the Wittgensteinian view that belief in God is a form 
of life, and from [Alvin] Plantinga’s view that belief in God is properly basic, the 
effort to develop the idea in the context of a larger epistemology would seem well 
worth making.’23  Hebblethwaite and Henderson’s comment thus neatly moves us 
from an exclusive concern with Farrer interpretation into the wider world of 
contemporary religious epistemology, and thus from the historical to the constructive 
ambition mentioned in the first sentence of this introduction.  In the final chapter of 
this dissertation I seek to address this constructive aim by briefly exploring the 
coherence and strength of Farrer’s final position on ‘the believer’s reasons’ in relation 
to the other perspectives mentioned above.  I conclude that one major advantage of 
Farrer’s position is the place it provides for a living spirituality and for the epistemic 
value of ‘saints.’ 
Morris says of Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism that to ‘demonstrate 
convincingly the continuing relevance of Farrer’s approach would require a book 
rather different in scope from the one under review.’  Morris’s own clear preference is 
for a book that takes greater account of Farrer’s ‘admittedly slender dogmatic 
theology and its relation to his philosophical theology.’24  While I indeed plan to take 
up that particular challenge in another, complementary research project, I hope that 
the present work, with its rather different scope from all previous monographs on 
Farrer, will at least ‘demonstrate convincingly the continuing relevance of Farrer’s 
approach’ to religious epistemology—if not yet to anything else. 
                                                 
23 Hebblethwaite and Henderson, ‘Introduction’ to Divine Action, 18.  Hebblethwaite does not, in fact, 
agree with Allen’s interpretation, either as a reading of Farrer or as a viable position in religious 
epistemology, as I will soon demonstrate in Chapter One. 
24 Morris, Review of Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism, both citations from 796. 
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CHAPTER ONE: ‘THE BELIEVER’S REASONS’ 
 
 A perennial concern in both theology and philosophy of religion is whether 
adherents of a specific religious tradition have sufficient justification, evidence, or 
warrant to hold their beliefs ‘reasonably’.  The Anglican philosophical theologian 
Austin Farrer is widely thought to defend an affirmative answer to this concern, but 
three contemporary figures associated with his legacy raise significant questions over 
the correct interpretation of Farrer’s religious epistemology.  Basil Mitchell wonders 
whether Farrer may have become a fideist; Brian Hebblethwaite argues against such a 
possibility; and Diogenes Allen defends a ‘moderate fideist’ reading of Farrer’s final 
position.  This chapter both contextualises and surveys these three interpretations of 
Farrer on ‘the believer’s reasons’ and so sets the stage for our investigation into the 
development of Farrer’s thought on the correct relation between faith and reason.  
   
I. Mitchell’s Concern 
Basil Mitchell (b. 1917) is perhaps the leading contemporary figure most 
closely associated with the legacy of Austin Farrer.1  In his first major academic 
appointment, from 1947 to 1967, Mitchell was Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at 
Keble College, Oxford.  As Farrer was Warden of Keble from 1960 until his early and 
                                                 
1 See Mitchell’s autobiographical essay, ‘War and Friendship’, in Kelly James Clark (ed.), 
Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers (InterVarsity Press, 1993), 
23-44; Brian Hebblethwaite, ‘Basil Mitchell: Anglican Philosopher’, in Theology CXII (2009), 260-
269; and the Festschrift for Mitchell edited by William J. Abraham and Steven W. Holtzer, The 
Rationality of Religious Belief: Essays in Honour of Basil Mitchell (Clarendon Press, 1987).  
Hebblethwaite’s article was published a year after I wrote the first draft of this section: it covers many 
of the same details of Mitchell’s life, career, and relationship with Farrer, and thus provides a helpful 
corroboration of my independent findings. 
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unexpected death in 1968, Mitchell worked directly with and under him for seven 
years in the same college (dedicated to one of the founders of the Oxford Movement).  
However, their association went back much further than that, to 1946, when the young 
Mitchell—aged twenty-nine, just beginning his philosophical career, and struggling to 
define his personal religious beliefs—taught for one year at Christ Church, Oxford.  
There he was drawn into an informal philosophical and theological discussion group 
called ‘The Metaphysicals’.   
Originally convened by Eric Mascall, then Student of Christ Church, this 
group shared ‘a common dissatisfaction with the restrictions which tacitly governed 
philosophical discussion at a time when “metaphysical” was the rudest word in the 
philosopher’s vocabulary.  In an atmosphere thick with inhibitions, [they] wanted to 
be free to ask what questions [they] liked, even if some of them turned out to be 
“ultimate questions” of an allegedly unanswerable and, indeed, unaskable sort.’2  In 
addition to Mascall and Mitchell, over the course of this group’s long history its 
members included such distinguished figures as I. M. Crombie, Michael Foster, R. M. 
Hare, J. R. Lucas, Iris Murdoch, Dennis Nineham, Helen Oppenheimer, Ian Ramsey, 
G. C. Stead, O. P. Wood—and Austin Farrer.3 
                                                 
2 Basil Mitchell, ‘Introduction’ to Basil Mitchell (ed.), Faith and Logic: Oxford Essays in 
Philosophical Theology (George Allen & Unwin, 1957), 1.  Mitchell states that the group began in 
1946 (his first year teaching philosophy): see his ‘Staking a Claim for Metaphysics,’ in Harriet A. 
Harris and Christopher J. Insole (eds.), Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical 
Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion (Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 21. 
3 This list is drawn from the table of contents in Faith and Logic, cited above, some additional names 
provided by Mitchell in his introduction on page 8, and page 21 of ‘Staking a Claim for Metaphysics,’ 
also cited above.  In addition to these texts, Mitchell discusses the Metaphysicals further in his 
autobiographical essay, ‘War and Friendship,’ cited in note 1, and in his introduction to Brian 
Hebblethwaite and Douglas Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in God’s World: Studies to 
Commemorate the Austin Farrer Centenary (SCM Press, 2006), 1-13.  Eric Mascall, the founder of the 
Metaphysicals and a Priest of the Oratory of the Good Shepherd, culminated his career as Professor of 
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A. ‘The Reasonable Man’ 
Writing much later, Mitchell says that Farrer was ‘the central figure’ of the 
Metaphysicals, adding that ‘a major reason for the rest of us in the early days to go on 
meeting was to make sure that Farrer continued to work seriously in philosophy and 
not spend too much of his time in New Testament exegesis.’4  Indeed, he says, ‘Farrer 
was conspicuous among us for actually doing the sort of metaphysical theology whose 
possibility we wished to vindicate.’5  Clearly the young Mitchell and the other 
Metaphysicals greatly respected Farrer’s philosophical acumen and desired it to 
inform not only their own discussions but also the broader, rather brittle 
conversation—or non-conversation—between philosophy and theology in post-World 
War II Britain.6  In a Festschrift for Mitchell, Oliver O’Donovan wonders whether his 
                                                                                                                                            
Historical Theology at King’s College, University of London.  For brief surveys of his life and work, 
see John Macquarrie, ‘Mascall, Eric Lionel (1905-93)’, in Alister E. McGrath (ed.), The SPCK 
Handbook of Anglican Theologians (SPCK, 1998), 170-172, and Brian Hebblethwaite, ‘Mascall, Eric 
Lionel (1905-1993)’, in The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Volume 37 (Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 136-138.  Mascall’s own contribution to natural theology will be discussed briefly in 
Chapter Three. 
4 Mitchell, ‘Staking a Claim for Metaphysics,’ 25.  On page 21 of this essay, Mitchell says that the 
group continued to meet until 1984, the year he retired, in which case it lasted for 38 years.  In The 
Divine Trinity, David Brown reports that he owes a debt ‘to colleagues who have been subjected to 
previous versions of sections at various seminars,’ including the Metaphysicals.  As Brown’s book was 
published in 1985, this material would have been among their final discussions.  See David Brown, The 
Divine Trinity (Duckworth, 1985), vii.  
5 Mitchell, ‘War and Friendship,’ 42. 
6 According to Gilbert Ryle in the 1950s, ‘In our half century, philosophy and theology have not been 
on speaking terms’ (cited by Mitchell on page 2 of his introduction to Faith and Logic).  For a 
somewhat more theological perspective that considers the relation between these two disciplines from 
the middle of the 20th century to the contemporary scene, see Daniel W. Hardy, ‘Theology Through 
Philosophy’, in David F. Ford (ed.), The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology 
in the Twentieth Century, Second Edition (Blackwell, 1997), 252-285.  And for an extremely useful 
(and witty) survey of 20th century philosophical and theological trends on both sides of the Atlantic that 
relates them explicitly to Farrer’s work, see Julian Hartt, ‘Austin Farrer as Philosophical Theologian: A 
Retrospective and Appreciation’, in Jeffrey C. Eaton and Ann Loades (eds.), For God and Clarity:  
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emphasis on the ideal Aristotelian ‘reasonable man,’ even in his more secular work in 
ethics, was inspired by ‘the memory of a model who was of especial importance to 
Mitchell at a time when he was discovering what it meant to be a Christian thinker—
that of Austin Farrer?’7   
When Mitchell first met Farrer in 1946, Farrer was forty-two, Chaplain and 
Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, and primarily known for a brilliant but formidably 
idiosyncratic and intellectually challenging work of theistic metaphysics, Finite and 
Infinite, published three years earlier.8  In this text, which will be considered in 
greater detail in the third chapter of this dissertation, Farrer set out to deal with four 
interrelated tasks essential to the successful practice of what he called, not ‘natural 
theology’ or ‘philosophy of religion,’ but ‘rational theology’—which he defined as 
the study of God through ‘philosophical enquiry and not something else’.9  Or, spelled 
out more explicitly, ‘a reflective cognitive activity appropriated to the knowledge of 
God from universal grounds.’10  The four tasks of rational theology are: 
(1) ‘To state the whole mechanism of the mind in working with the scheme of 
the Analogy of Being or, as I have called it, the Cosmological Idea.’ 
 
(2) ‘To show the involvement of theology with an at least implicit doctrine of 
finite substance, and to re-state the doctrine explicitly.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                            
New Essays in Honor of Austin Farrer (Pickwick Publications, 1983), 1-22.  Loades covers this period 
herself with biographical attention to many of the figures mentioned above in ‘The Vitality of 
Tradition: Austin Farrer and Friends’, in David Hein and Edward Hugh Henderson (eds.), Captured by 
the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer (T. & T. Clark International, 2004), 15-46; and 
also with a more conceptual focus in ‘Philosophy of Religion: Its Relation to Theology’, in Harris and 
Insole (eds.), Faith and Philosophical Analysis, 136-147. 
7 Oliver O’Donovan, ‘The Reasonable Man: An Appreciation,’ in Abraham and Holtzer (eds.), The 
Rationality of Religious Belief, 12. 
8 Austin Farrer, Finite and Infinite: A Philosophical Essay (Dacre Press, 1943). 
9 Ibid., v. 
10 Ibid., vii. 
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(3) ‘To show how far down in our common thinking the question of faith 
enters.’ 
 
(4) ‘To show what the traditional arguments for God’s existence are, and are 
not; to classify them in an intelligible manner and to find a principle for 
distinguishing between valuable and absurd types.’11 
 
In a revised preface for the second edition of this book, Farrer says that when 
he wrote Finite and Infinite he ‘was possessed by the Thomist vision, and could not 
think it false’.12  Charles C. Hefling, Jr describes it as ‘a classic in metaphysical 
theology, three hundred pages of unrelentingly difficult—and equally brilliant—
philosophical theism.’13  And no less of a philosopher than Anthony Kenny says that 
when he first read Finite and Infinite in 1952 as a student at the Gregorian University 
in Rome it provided him ‘a rich and stylish introduction to the discipline of natural 
theology.’14  Likewise, the young Basil Mitchell read and learned much from this 
book about the enterprise of rational theology and the relation between theology and 
philosophy.   
It seems, however, that the work of Farrer’s that had the greatest impact on 
Mitchell in this period was not Finite and Infinite, but Farrer’s 1948 Bampton 
                                                 
11 Ibid., vi-vii. 
12 Austin Farrer, Revised Preface for the Second Edition, Finite and Infinite: A Philosophical Essay 
(Dacre Press, 1959), ix.  Farrer’s relation to Thomism will be considered further in Chapter Three. 
13 Charles C. Helfling, Jr, Jacob’s Ladder: Theology and Spirituality in the Thought of Austin Farrer 
(Cowley Publications, 1979), 127. 
14 Anthony Kenny, The Unknown God: Agnostic Essays (Continuum, 2004), 1.  In his autobiography, A 
Path From Rome (Oxford University Press, 1986), Kenny provides more detail regarding his first 
encounter with Farrer’s work as a student at the Gregorian, his correspondence with Farrer on the 
content of Finite and Infinite, and their amused / anguished  exchange about the different pedagogies of 
the Gregorian versus Oxford (see pages 48-50).  Commenting that his ‘provincial seminary’ 
(Upholland, near Liverpool), was ‘an enlightened intellectual regime’ compared to the ‘academic 
monstrosity’ of the Gregorian, Kenny reports that one of Farrer’s previous students from Oxford ‘wrote 
to his former tutor to lament the hardships of studying in a university ruled by Deus Scientiarum 
Dominus [1931].  The Pope, replied Farrer, “should be persuaded to write a new encyclical: Deus 
Artium Magister”’ (50).   
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Lectures.  Delivered just five years after Finite and Infinite in the University Church 
of St Mary the Virgin on the theme of divine inspiration and revelation—what Farrer 
called ‘the form of divine truth in the human mind’—these lectures represented a 
radical shift in both genre and style.15  If Finite and Infinite was defiantly and 
exclusively metaphysical, Farrer famously announced in the preface to The Glass of 
Vision that he actually had three abiding—and interacting—intellectual interests 
rather than simply one: 
the sense of metaphysical philosophy, the sense of scriptural revelation, and 
the sense of poetry.  Scripture and metaphysics are equally my study, and 
poetry is my pleasure.  These three things rubbing against one another in my 
mind, seem to kindle one another, and so I am moved to ask how this 
happens.16 
 
Describing the transition from Finite and Infinite, with its reformulated 
Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics and highly abstract treatment of substance, will, 
and agency, to The Glass of Vision, with its ‘remarkable theology of imagery,’ Peter 
Sedgwick writes that ‘Farrer changed direction dramatically.  His rational theology 
was not repudiated for a moment, but it was now seen to be the prolegomena to an 
investigation of biblical symbolism and imagery.’17  These lectures made a profound 
impression on Mitchell—as well as many others.  In an autobiographical essay written 
forty-five years later, Mitchell says: 
If there was a moment in my new life at Oxford at which I experienced a 
conversion, or rather realized that a conversion had occurred, it was while 
listening to Austin Farrer’s Bampton Lectures, given in St Mary’s Church for 
the Michaelmas term 1948 and published under the title The Glass of Vision.  
The restrained delivery, the precision of utterance, the controlled imagination, 
together with the capacity, without apparent alteration of pace or emphasis, to 
raise the discourse to the most intense level of religious contemplation without 
                                                 
15 Austin Farrer, The Glass of Vision (Dacre Press, 1948).  The quotation expressing the theme of the 
lectures comes from page 1.   
16 Ibid., ix. 
17 Peter Sedgwick, ‘Anglican Theology’ in David Ford with Rachel Muers (eds.), The Modern 
Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918, Third Edition (Blackwell, 2005), 183. 
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loss of philosophical substance, were unlike anything I have ever experienced 
before or since.18 
 
In his address at Farrer’s memorial service in Keble College Chapel on 1 February 
1969, Mitchell said of these lectures that ‘surely St Mary’s had seen and heard 
nothing like it since John Henry Newman occupied that pulpit.’19 
Several months before Farrer’s death in 1968, Mitchell was appointed as the 
Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Oxford University, and 
Fellow of Oriel College, a position he held until his retirement in 1984.  During this 
time he published his own major contribution to the philosophy of religion, The 
Justification of Religious Belief, and established himself as one of the world’s leading 
figures in this discipline.20  Also during this time, Mitchell published four essays or 
                                                 
18 Basil Mitchell, ‘War and Friendship’, 38-39.  Mitchell places the delivery of the lectures in the 
Michaelmas (or Autumn) term of 1948, but the book’s preface, Farrer’s correspondence, and his 
biographer all agree that they were delivered earlier in the year.  See The Glass of Vision, xi; Philip 
Curtis, A Hawk Among Sparrows: A Biography of Austin Farrer (SPCK, 1985), 133; and Oxford 
University, Bodleian Library, MS Eng. Lett. c. 272, folios 71-73.  In folio 71, in an undated letter, 
Farrer tells his father that he has just finished writing the Bamptons and that the first will be given on 8 
February; and in folio 73, he writes to his mother on 8 March 1948 to say that he has now given three 
lectures (out of eight), and that the number of those attending have remained high.  Farrer’s 
correspondence with his parents, particularly with his father, contains a wealth of interesting 
information that sheds much light on his philosophical and theological development.  Although Curtis 
provides extensive citations in his biography, his transcriptions are occasionally inaccurate.  In 
subsequent chapters I will cite from the original letters and provide page numbers from Curtis when 
possible.    
19 Basil Mitchell, ‘Austin Marsden Farrer,’ in Austin Farrer, A Celebration of Faith, edited by Leslie 
Houlden (Hodder and Stoughton, 1970), 16.  The date of Farrer’s memorial service is given in the 
editor’s preface on page 9.  Curtis also notes the excitement and crowds generated by these lectures, 
which he says made Farrer ‘famous.’  See page 125, 127, and 133 of A Hawk Among Sparrows.  
20 Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief (Macmillan, 1973).  See also the multi-author 
anthology The Philosophy of Religion in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy series—long a standard, 
widely-used source-book—which Mitchell edited (Oxford University Press, 1971).  Mitchell’s other 
major contribution to religious epistemology was published after he retired, Faith and Criticism 
(Clarendon Press, 1994).  William J. Abraham and Robert W. Provost also edited a post-retirement 
collection of some of Mitchell’s shorter, or less academic, or unpublished essays, curiously titled How 
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articles related to Farrer that cemented Mitchell’s reputation as the pre-eminent 
British advocate of Farrer’s legacy: 
• his address as Farrer’s memorial service, published as ‘Austin Marsden Farrer’ 
in the first posthumous collection of Farrer’s sermons, A Celebration of Faith, 
edited by Leslie Houlden (Hodder and Stoughton, 1970), 13-16; 
• ‘Austin Farrer’, in P. G. Wignall (ed.), The Anglican Spirit (Ripon College, 
Cuddeston, 1982), 41-44; 
• ‘Austin Farrer: The Philosopher’, in New Fire, Volume 7, Number 57 (Winter 
1983), 452-456;  
• and ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion’, in Jeffrey C. Eaton and 
Ann Loades (eds.), For God and Clarity:  New Essays in Honor of Austin 
Farrer (Pickwick Publications, 1983), 117-190.21 
Of these, the third, on Farrer the philosopher, is of considerable interest for 
understanding Farrer’s philosophical background, assumptions, and methodology, and 
will be considered further in due course.  But the most immediately interesting text is 
the fourth one, on ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion.’ 
 B. Did Farrer Become a Fideist? 
This essay, published in the very first collection of essays on Farrer’s work, 
raises the question that the rest of this dissertation will seek to answer: namely, did 
Farrer—‘the reasonable man’—abandon rational theology and become a fideist?  
Although written in 1983, the essay begins with an anecdote from around 1965 or 
                                                                                                                                            
to Play Theological Ping-Pong and Other Essays on Faith and Reason (Hodder & Stoughton, 1990).  
Some of this material will be considered shortly.   
21 As indicated in note 3 above, Mitchell has since written another significant essay on Farrer, the 
introduction to The Human Person in God’s World.  This will be considered further in Chapter Three.   
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1966, when Farrer was still alive and had not yet published his final book, Faith and 
Speculation.22  Mitchell writes: 
When Austin Farrer lent me the MS of Faith and Speculation and asked me 
for my criticisms, I am ashamed to say that I returned it to him without 
comment.  I cannot remember what excuse I made, but in retrospect I think I 
can detect the reason why I was so very unhelpful.  I had expected an 
improved version of the sort of rational theology that Farrer had first 
developed in Finite and Infinite and revised and corrected in various of his 
occasional writings.  Instead, in the opening chapter of the new book [‘The 
Believer’s Reasons’], he appeared to deny the need for precisely the kind of 
justification of religious belief that I had been looking for…. Farrer, it seemed, 
had become a sort of fideist, content to rest the truth of Christianity upon the 
believer’s sense of being nourished by the tradition in which he had been 
raised.23 
 
This statement is of considerable interest for at least three reasons.  First, it 
provides direct evidence for how one of Farrer’s closest friends and philosophical 
colleagues initially viewed the contrast between the Farrer of Finite and Infinite with 
the Farrer of Faith and Speculation.  Despite two decades of intense intellectual 
discussion on the basic questions of the philosophy of religion, decades in which 
Farrer was undoubtedly the senior and more influential figure in the relationship, and 
indeed decades in which Farrer at least still seemed to Mitchell to be charting more-
or-less the same course, Mitchell nevertheless found himself completely bewildered 
by and out-of-sync with Farrer’s latest manuscript, which seemed to him to abandon 
any attempt to rationally justify religious belief in favour of embracing fideism.  The 
argument in Faith and Speculation is often structured in a dialogue form, and in the 
opening chapter to which Mitchell refers—‘The Believer’s Reasons’—the dialogue 
takes place between a ‘philosopher’ defending reason and a ‘believer’ defending faith.  
Mitchell writes, ‘At the time I found myself in complete agreement with the 
                                                 
22 Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (A. & C. Black, 1967). 
23 Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 177. 
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protestations of the philosopher in the little dialogues with the believer that occur 
throughout the chapter.’24 
As the phrase ‘at the time’ indicates, Mitchell goes on to state that in the 
intervening years between 1965 and 1983, apparently due—at least in part—to the 
work of the ‘Reformed epistemologists’ Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
he concluded that the case for Farrer’s later approach ‘seems to me now much 
stronger than it did when I first read Faith and Speculation.’25  It is extremely 
interesting to note how long it took Mitchell to arrive at this conclusion, and under 
which influences.  The subsequent body of the essay is an extended comparison 
between the ‘two approaches to the philosophy of religion’ of the title: namely, the 
‘rationalist’ approach—exemplified by Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God—
and the ‘fideist’ approach—exemplified by Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Reason Within the 
Bounds of Religion.26  Although by 1983 Mitchell is now more open to the ‘fideist’ 
approach, he still says, ‘I am as reluctant as I ever was to give up on the first 
[‘rationalist’] approach entirely.’27  Rather oddly, he does not take this opportunity to 
deal directly and at length with the text that caused the initial offence and confusion 
for him, the first chapter of Farrer’s Faith and Speculation (which would have been 
most illuminating), but primarily deals with Wolterstorff instead.  Farrer’s ‘The 
Believer’s Reasons’ will be considered in Chapter Four of this dissertation.  
But if Mitchell responded to Farrer’s text in this self-professed ‘unhelpful’ 
way circa 1965, it is not difficult to imagine that less sympathetic contemporary 
                                                 
24 Ibid.   
25 Ibid., 178. 
26 (Clarendon Press, 1979) and (Eerdmans, 1976), respectively; both authors subsequently issued 
second editions of these books.  Further discussion of Swinburne, Plantinga, and Wolterstorff will 
occur in due course. 
27 Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 178. 
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readers would have been even more impatient and even hostile—as indeed some 
were.28  In seeking to come to grips with Farrer’s religious epistemology in Faith and 
Speculation, particularly as expressed in ‘The Believer’s Reasons,’ it is important not 
to forget or underestimate that, despite the ‘official’ collapse of logical positivism, 
even in the late 1960s rigid empiricism and logical rigorism were still deeply 
entrenched in philosophy on both sides of the Atlantic.  If Faith and Speculation 
seems less purely ‘fideistic’ to some in the present context (including Mitchell 
himself) than it did to Mitchell in 1965, that is because vast changes in our intellectual 
landscape have moved us in the direction of Farrer’s argument.29 
Second, Mitchell’s description of his initial response to Faith and Speculation 
raises interesting questions about memories of influence and actual influence, 
particularly as these memories shift according to various contexts and criteria.  The 
sixty-six year-old Mitchell in 1983 remembering the forty-eight year-old Mitchell in 
1965 emphasises that when he read Farrer’s manuscript he ‘had expected an improved 
version of the sort of rational theology that Farrer had first developed in Finite and 
Infinite and revised and corrected in various of his occasional writings.’30  As this 
event occurred just three years before Mitchell became Nolloth Professor of the 
Philosophy of the Christian Religion, and just eight years before Mitchell published 
his own book on The Justification of Religious Belief, and as this retrospective 
                                                 
28 Reviews of Faith and Speculation will be cited in Chapter Five. 
29 Those changes are many and various and cannot be fully discussed here.  But one way to illustrate 
this shift is to compare Faith and Speculation with another book published the very same year by 
another Christian philosopher dealing with the relation between philosophy and religious belief: not 
Wolterstorff’s Reason Within the Bounds of Religion (1976), but Alvin Plantinga’s God and Other 
Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Cornell University Press, 1967).  This 
specific comparison will be made briefly in Chapter Four. 
30 Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 177. 
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description was written while Mitchell still held his chair and was deeply engaged 
with such questions, such an expectation and concern is not surprising.   
However, this epistemological focus on the rational theology of Finite and 
Infinite is rather different from how the seventy-six year-old Mitchell in 1993, writing 
a spiritual autobiography, remembered what the thirty-one year-old Mitchell in 1948 
had found most helpful about his first encounter with Farrer’s work.  And this was not 
primarily related to Finite and Infinite but to The Glass of Vision, particularly the way 
in which those lectures managed ‘to raise the discourse to the most intense level of 
religious contemplation without loss of philosophical substance’.31  And this more 
religious and contemplative concern is likewise not surprising when one considers 
that the thirty-one year-old Mitchell had long been on a personal spiritual quest that 
involved the serious study and attempted practice of both Sufi and Hindu mysticism, 
and had only very recently re-identified himself as a practicing Christian and member 
of the Church of England.32  As he stated about hearing Farrer’s Bampton Lectures in 
1948, this was the moment in which he ‘experienced a conversion, or rather realized 
that a conversion had occurred’.33  But it is striking that, after describing how 
Farrer’s lectures so perfectly fused religious contemplation with philosophical 
substance, Mitchell then added: ‘Here at last was the mystical vision to which Sufi 
teaching at its best had inclined me, but a vision that acknowledged and enhanced the 
reality of the created order and the significance of human history and was intimately 
involved in the lives and loves of individual persons.’34  Leaving aside, for the 
moment, how remarkable it is that the work of any Oxford philosopher or Anglican 
                                                 
31 Mitchell, ‘War and Friendship’, 39.   
32 See ibid., 24-30 and 36-39 for more details.  Mitchell was involved with the International Sufi 
Movement, founded by Hazrat Pir-o-Murshid Inayat Khan (1882-1927), not traditional Sufi Islam. 
33 Ibid., 39 (emphasis added). 
34 Ibid. 
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theologian in the 1940s could be compared (even remotely!) with Sufi mysticism, it 
is, again, unsurprising that Mitchell wrote these words after he had retired from 
professional philosophical work and had entered a more ruminative phase of life—the 
earlier, more profound layers of influence perhaps now emerging more clearly. 
The third point of interest in Mitchell’s statement about Faith and Speculation 
in ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion’ is that it expresses a particular 
understanding of the nature of fideism: ‘Farrer, it seemed, had become a sort of 
fideist, content to rest the truth of Christianity upon the believer’s sense of being 
nourished by the tradition in which he had been raised.’35 Although the precise 
definition(s) of fideism will be discussed extensively in Chapter Two, this comment 
highlights that the purpose of the previous four paragraphs has not been to engage in 
speculative amateur psychology on the mental and religious history of Professor Basil 
Mitchell, but rather to draw out and identify a number of issues implicit in his 
statement from ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ issues that will 
occupy subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  These include: the shifting contexts 
and criteria of philosophical and theological reason in 20th century Britain and 
America; the philosophical justification of religious belief; the nature of fideism; the 
relation between ‘religious contemplation’ and ‘philosophical substance’; and the 
extent to which religious belief might be grounded in a ‘mystical vision’—or, less 
dramatically and more mundanely, what today is often called ‘spirituality’. 
C. Neutrality and Commitment 
Mitchell read the manuscript of Faith and Speculation before it was published 
in 1967, but returned it to Farrer without comment.  A case can be made, however, 
that Mitchell’s inaugural lecture as Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the 
                                                 
35 Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 177. 
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Christian Religion at Oxford—delivered on 13 May 1968 and titled ‘Neutrality and 
Commitment’—constitutes (among other things) Mitchell’s initial reply to Farrer’s 
first chapter, ‘The Believer’s Reasons.’  Mitchell may not have commented on 
Farrer’s text, but he was certainly troubled by it and was arguably moved to respond, 
if only implicitly or subliminally, in this lecture.  As stated above, the argument in 
Faith and Speculation is often structured in a dialogue form, and in the opening 
chapter the dialogue takes place between a ‘philosopher’ defending reason and a 
‘believer’ defending faith.  And, as already cited, when Mitchell first read this chapter 
he found himself siding with the ‘philosopher’ against the ‘believer.’  It is thus 
striking that, when formulating his own argument in ‘Neutrality and Commitment,’ 
Mitchell invokes the same two personae found in the same (compromising) position.   
Given that Farrer did not die until 29 December 1968, he almost certainly attended 
Mitchell’s lecture.36 
The issue Mitchell explores in this lecture is clearly expressed in the title: the 
(perceived) problem of reconciling the conflicting demands of neutrality and 
commitment in the attempt to philosophise or think reasonably about religious 
belief—the problem, that is, of being a professional philosopher of religion.  
‘Philosophers suspect that the philosopher of religion cannot achieve proper 
philosophical neutrality.  Theologians suspect that he cannot maintain necessary 
                                                 
36 In a personal letter to me, dated 16 June 2009, Professor Mitchell states that he ‘cannot remember if 
Austin came to my inaugural lecture, but he must have done.  We never discussed it and it was not 
intended as a comment on Faith and Speculation.’  However, as I argue below, the lecture does indeed 
address the precise issue Farrer deals with in ‘The Believer’s Reasons,’ and it expresses worries about a 
view at least approximate to Farrer’s, worries that are similar to the concerns that Mitchell later 
confessed in ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion’ about Farrer’s last book.  So, even if 
‘Neutrality and Commitment’ was not a specific, if indirect, response to the manuscript of Faith and 
Speculation, it at least provides a clear example of Mitchell’s own thinking about the relation between 
faith and reason in this period.  
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Christian commitment.’37  Mitchell continues—in terms reminiscent of Farrer’s ‘The 
Believer’s Reasons’—that this particular problem   
arises only when the philosopher of religion is himself a believer.  As such, it 
would seem, he is committed to certain beliefs which, in his religious life and 
thought, are not put in issue.  But, as a philosopher, he cannot be so 
committed, for a philosopher proceeds, as Plato puts it, ‘by destroying 
assumptions’.  It is hard, then, to see how a man can be genuinely a 
philosopher, if some questions are not open for him.38 
 
As will be seen in more detail in Chapter Four, this is precisely the dilemma 
Farrer considers in the first chapter of Faith and Speculation.  In Farrer’s own words: 
‘when philosophical criticism develops it will torture every assumption it has the 
ability to isolate or define.  Meanwhile, the believer, convinced of the reality of what 
he handles, is entitled to the confidence that his gold will never be proved dross by 
logical acid.’39  As stated above, the similarity of Mitchell’s and Farrer’s language is 
striking, as well as their identical formulation of the dilemma, if not their solution to 
it.  Thus, in ‘Neutrality and Commitment,’ Mitchell concedes: ‘There is, I think, a 
genuine problem here—and probably more than one.’40 
 However, before presenting his own solution to this dilemma (which may or 
may not differ from Farrer’s, depending on one’s interpretation), Mitchell considers 
an alternative position (which again may or may not differ from Farrer’s, depending 
on one’s interpretation).  Mitchell disarmingly admits that he may have ‘totally 
misconceived the character of both philosophy and theology, and that, given a proper 
understanding of the role of philosophy and religion, a conflict of the sort I have tried 
to analyse cannot conceivably occur.  Broadly speaking, the argument would be either 
                                                 
37 Mitchell, ‘Neutrality and Commitment,’ 119.  Originally published in pamphlet form as Neutrality 
and Commitment (Oxford University Press, 1968), reprinted in Basil Mitchell, How to Play 
Theological Ping-Pong, 113-131.  I will cite from this version. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 12-13. 
40 Mitchell, ‘Neutrality and Commitment,’ 119. 
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(or both) that philosophy is innocuous or that religion is invulnerable.’41  From both 
philosophical and theological directions, this position is equivalent to fideism.  But 
Mitchell accepts neither this view of philosophy, nor this view of religion, which he 
associates with certain followers of Wittgenstein.42   
Although he specifically refers here to what has widely come be to known as 
‘Wittgensteinian fideism,’ Mitchell could just as well have Farrer’s ‘The Believer’s 
Reasons’ in mind when he maintains that ‘it will not do to maintain either that the 
religious believer’s account of his faith is sacrosanct and that no philosophical critique 
can touch it by way of analysing its concepts or assessing its arguments, or that it is 
open to philosophers to go through religious claims and check their adequacy without 
making a serious and sympathetic attempt to consider the arguments by which they 
are supported.’43  Whether or not this is an accurate reading of Farrer remains to be 
seen, but based on his comments in ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 
this does indeed seem to be what Mitchell took him to be saying at the time.  But, 
explicitly rejecting such Wittgensteinian (or Farrerian?) fideism, Mitchell insists that 
religious belief ‘is not inherently invulnerable to philosophical criticism, and therefore 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 126.   
42 See page 127 for the reference to ‘thinkers under the influence of Wittgenstein, reinforcing a fideist 
strand in theology itself’ who urge that ‘faith can only be judged by criteria intrinsic to religion,’ which 
forms its own ‘language game’ and ‘form of life.’  Mitchell does not name any specific figures, but as 
Kai Nielson’s (in)famous essay on ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ was published the previous year, in 
Philosophy 42 (1967), and since D. Z. Phillips had already published The Concept of Prayer (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) and Religion and Understanding (New York: Macmillan, 1967), it is 
not difficult to guess whom Mitchell has in mind.  The question of whether this is an acceptable 
interpretation of either Wittgenstein or his followers is extensively debated in Kai Nielson and D. Z. 
Phillips, Wittgensteinian Fideism? (SCM Press, 2005), which also includes Nielson’s original article.  
The locus classicus remains Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 
Psychology, and Religious Belief, edited by Cyril Barrett (Basil Blackwell, 1966). 
43 Mitchell, ‘Neutrality and Commitment,’ 130 (emphasis in the original). 
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the individual who is committed to a religious faith incurs a risk of possible 
refutation’.44  The lecture concludes as follows: 
To avoid discussion with intellectual rigor of controversial issues about 
morality, politics, and religion, about which individuals are or ought to be 
committed, is likely to lead to one or the other of two undesirable 
consequences: a reluctance to commit oneself at all; or a refusal to think about 
or allow others critically to discuss the causes to which one is enthusiastically 
committed.  Rather than aim at a neutrality which is, perhaps in theory, and 
certainly in practice, unattainable, we should register our commitment to 
conventions of free, fair, and disciplined debate.45 
 
Not the fideism of either ‘innocuous’ philosophy or ‘invulnerable’ religion but 
‘commitment to free, fair, and disciplined debate’ is what Mitchell insists upon in 
religion no less than in other contested fields such as ethics and politics.  He is keenly 
aware that strict neutrality may well be impossible—and indeed even undesirable—
but this does not eliminate the requirement to abide by the ‘conventions’ of 
rationality.46 
D. The Justification of Religious Belief 
 Mitchell’s most developed defence of his own approach to the justification of 
religious belief may be found in a book of that very title.47  Denying that God’s 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 131. 
46 Mitchell spends more time than I have thus far indicated in sympathetically exploring what Burke 
calls ‘prejudice with the reason involved,’ citing Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (1790): see page 121.  In this lecture and subsequent writings, particularly Faith and Criticism 
(1994), Mitchell emphatically, extensively, and persuasively insists that strict neutrality is impossible 
and that firm commitment to our beliefs, as well as to the tradition and community in which they are 
embedded, is in fact a necessary intellectual virtue, even when the evidence may seem to run against 
such beliefs.   Indeed, in many ways Mitchell comes close to the hermeneutical position associated 
with Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002).  But he still rejects the overtures of fideism: such non-neutral 
commitment must still be held rationally and can never be invulnerable to critique.   
47 Cited in note 20 above.  For another articulation of Mitchell’s approach to religious epistemology, 
written a few years before ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ see his ‘Faith and Reason: 
A False Antithesis?’, in Religious Studies 16 (1980), 131-144; reprinted in How to Play Theological 
Ping-Pong, 132-150. 
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existence can be either conclusively proved or disproved, Mitchell suggests that 
religious epistemologists should move away from both isolated formal deductive 
arguments and attempts at strict probability and instead embrace a cumulative case 
approach.  ‘On this view,’ he says, ‘the theist is urging that traditional Christian 
theism makes better sense of all the evidence available than does any alternative on 
offer, and the atheist is contesting the claim.’48  This less formal approach, Mitchell 
states, is closer to the standard methodology used in the critical exegesis of literary 
texts and historical interpretation.  However, he argues that this approach is in fact 
also the best way to adjudicate competing claims for the rationality of rival 
metaphysical systems and world-views, including specific religions.49 
And here, perhaps surprisingly, Mitchell draws on the well-known work of 
Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to argue  that, at least when it 
comes to evaluating major theoretical frameworks such as classic Newtonian physics 
versus Einsteinian relativity theory (Kuhn’s ‘paradigms’), this is the standard pattern 
of actual scientific reasoning as well.50  Mitchell contends that the most fruitful way 
forward for literary, historical, scientific, metaphysical, and religious thinking is 
basically the same: the careful consideration of cumulative evidence and argument.  
                                                 
48 Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief, 40.  For a discussion of the significance of Mitchell’s 
work in reviving such arguments in contemporary religious epistemology, see William J. Abraham, 
‘Cumulative Case Arguments for Christian Theism,’ in Abraham and Holtzer (eds.), The Rationality of 
Religious Belief, 17-37. 
49 For an interesting historical study arguing that the sort of probabilistic, cumulative case reasoning 
defended by Mitchell and Abraham in philosophy of religion is distinctive to the English intellectual 
tradition more broadly, see Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century 
England: A Study of the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature 
(Princeton University Press, 1983). 
50 See T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962).  Kuhn published a second enlarged edition in 1970.  David Brown also notes Mitchell’s appeal 
to Kuhn in Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford University Press, 1999), 37. 
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Although he acknowledges that there are ‘peculiarities of the religious case which 
prevent us from assimilating it to the others,’ the analogies are still sufficiently strong 
to save religion from the charge of irrationality.  Thus, ‘the same sort of disagreement 
as occurs between theists and atheists is also found between proponents of rival 
scientific paradigms and rival philosophical theories.’51 
However, considering the critiques of Kuhn made by Imre Lakatos and others, 
Mitchell denies that choosing between such rival paradigms and theories is itself an 
irrational or—perhaps better—non-rational, ‘sociological’ act.  In short, Mitchell 
rejects any form of conceptual relativism or intellectual imprisonment within certain 
frameworks or systems of thought.52  Although such frameworks and systems are real, 
their boundaries are permeable and thinking agents can, albeit with difficulty, decide 
between them, even if this means leaving one firmly held paradigm for another.  
Mitchell tentatively concludes that, in religious disagreements no less than in science 
and philosophy, ‘although the disputes which arise cannot be settled by appeal to 
strict proof or inductive probabilities, nevertheless it is in principle possible for one 
side or the other to be rationally preferred because it makes better sense of all the 
available evidence.’53  The interim conclusion of his overall argument is thus that 
in its intellectual aspect, traditional Christian theism may be regarded as a 
world-view or metaphysical system which is in competition with other such 
systems and may be judged by its capacity to make sense of all the available 
evidence.  It has been argued that it is an error to hold that such expressions as 
‘make sense of’ can only be understood in terms of particular systems, for this 
is to presuppose what I have been contesting, that reasoning is always to be 
construed as following rules, whose character may to some extent vary from 
one system to another.54 
 
                                                 
51 Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief, 75. 
52 See especially Chapter 5, ‘Rational Choice between Scientific Paradigms,’ 75-95. 
53 Ibid., 75.  In this precise quotation Mitchell is actually raising the possibility rather than drawing the 
conclusion, but this is the position he finally reaches at the end of the book. 
54 Ibid., 99. 
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Having reached this point, however, Mitchell then turns to consider the 
previously admitted ‘peculiar’ character of religious belief that strains the analogies 
with literature, history, science, and philosophy.  And this returns him to the subject-
matter of ‘Neutrality and Commitment,’ for it is precisely the distinctive character of 
religious commitment that sets it apart from these other forms of belief.  Unlike beliefs 
in literature, history, science, philosophy, or even politics (the closest analogy yet), 
religious faith is often thought to be completely unconditional, held without (or even 
in spite of) any reference to reason or evidence.  One does not commit oneself to God 
by degree: it’s all or nothing.55  To this, Mitchell replies in classic philosophical 
fashion by making a distinction.  He writes: ‘these claims cannot be gainsaid.  There 
is a sense in which Christian faith is unconditional.  The only way out of this impasse 
is to conclude that the sense in which faith is unconditional is a different one, which is 
indeed peculiar to a theistic religion.’56  This unconditional sense of ‘faith’, which he 
defines as ‘trusting reliance upon God’ (fiducia) is ‘analogous to faith in a person, 
which is a necessary condition of any stable and profound personal relationship, and 
must go beyond the evidence that is ordinarily available to justify it.’57 
However, Mitchell then makes the crucial comment that such unconditional 
faith nevertheless presupposes that God does, in fact, exist.  ‘Thus,’ Mitchell argues,  
                                                 
55 For an extended popular expression of such a view, one which seems completely untouched by 
current discussions in either philosophy of religion or philosophy of science, see Richard Dawkins, The 
God Delusion, revised and updated paperback edition (Transworld Publishers / Black Swan, 2007).  
According to Dawkins, faith is ‘belief without evidence’ (232) and, as such, evil.  Faith ‘is an evil 
precisely because it requires no justification and brooks no argument.’ (347)  While such a view of 
faith is certainly fideistic, it is likewise certainly not what Mitchell and most other philosophers of 
religion and / or theologians mean by faith.  See my review of The God Delusion, along with 
contributions from Graham Kemp, Sarah Nohavicka, and Nicolas Helm-Grovas, in Foundation: The 
Journal of the St Chad’s College Foundation V (2008), 64-75. 
56 Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief, 139. 
57 Ibid. 
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although there is a Christian duty to trust in God, this does not imply a duty, 
let alone an unconditional duty, to go on believing that there is a God.  Indeed, 
once it is admitted to be a genuine possibility that there is no God and that the 
case against his existence might become cumulatively overwhelming, it is 
pointless to maintain that that one ought to go on believing nevertheless that 
there is a God, even when the belief could be seen to be false.58 
 
In other words, ‘the requirement of unconditional faith is one which has its place 
within the system of theistic belief and cannot be properly interpreted as an obligation 
to continue to embrace the system itself.’59  Just like any other metaphysical 
paradigm, the system of theistic belief must be rationally accepted or rejected on the 
basis of its ‘capacity to make sense of all the available evidence.’  Only once the 
system has been adopted, on rational grounds, does the duty of unconditional trust in 
God come into play. 
In his later book Faith and Criticism, Mitchell reiterates this precise argument, 
but then explicitly attributes it to Farrer as well: ‘As Austin Farrer once put it, “God 
cannot be trusted to exist”.’60  Although he does not provide a citation, Mitchell is 
perhaps referring to the first chapter of Farrer’s 1964 book Saving Belief, titled ‘Faith 
and Evidence.’  And here, although Farrer does not write those precise words as given 
above, he does indeed express a similar position to Mitchell’s.  Farrer writes: ‘The 
difficulty of religious faith may be put in a nutshell.  How can an attitude of 
trustfulness, evidently appropriate to God if he exists, be appropriate to a decision 
whether he exists or not?  I can trust him if he exists, how can I trust him to exist?’61  
                                                 
58 Ibid., 139-140.   
59 Ibid., 140.  According to Dawkins, this is precisely what religious people fail to recognise. 
60 Mitchell, Faith and Criticism (cited in note 20 above), 65. 
61 Austin Farrer, Saving Belief: A Discussion of Essentials (Hodder and Stoughton, 1964), 15.  ‘Faith 
and Evidence’ was reprinted in Ann Loades and Robert MacSwain (eds.), The Truth-Seeking Heart: 
Austin Farrer and His Writings (Canterbury Press, 2006), 168-184, and this passage may be found on 
page 171.  Farrer makes an almost identical claim in his later book, A Science of God? (Geoffrey Bles, 
1966), 9-10. 
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However, two important questions emerge at this point: (1) is the epistemological 
perspective Farrer articulates in 1964’s ‘Faith and Evidence’ indeed identical to 
Mitchell’s; and (2) does it differ from the position Farrer takes three years later in 
1967’s ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ (the text Mitchell found so unsatisfactory)?  I will 
argue in Chapter Four that even ‘Faith and Evidence’ is more fideistic than Mitchell 
would like, and that Farrer’s putative shift from 1964 to 1967 is subtle but genuine.62 
Returning to Mitchell’s ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 
which begins by admitting his initial unhappiness with Farrer’s Faith and 
Speculation, and then compares and contrasts Swinburne’s ‘rationalist’ approach with 
Wolterstorff’s ‘fideist’ one, it is vital to note that Mitchell’s aim in that essay is not 
purely exegetical, but an attempt to ‘reconcile’ both rationalistic and fideistic 
approaches—both Swinburne and Wolterstorff—into a single via media.63  And his 
investigation finds that, in fact, ‘under examination, both positions needed to be 
modified, in each case in a direction that brings it closer to the other.’64  It is this 
intermediate position that Mitchell identifies and claims as his own.  He also hopes it 
was Farrer’s.  Thus, Mitchell concludes that he personally ‘should want to remain a 
theoretical rationalist but a practicing fideist,’ and ‘should like to think that this was 
Farrer’s viewpoint too’.65       
                                                 
62 Douglas Hedley discusses Mitchell’s Faith and Criticism and its relation to Farrer’s own religious 
epistemology at some length in ‘Austin Farrer’s Shaping Spirit of Imagination’ in Hebblethwaite and 
Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in God’s World, 106-134, especially 106-113.  While I agree that 
Farrer was a great influence on Mitchell (see Section I.A above), for reasons that will become clear as 
we go along I am less confident than Hedley that we can describe Faith and Criticism as ‘in part, a 
creative instance of Farrer’s rich legacy in philosophical theology’ (106) without also acknowledging 
the ebb and flow of Farrer’s own thought.  Mitchell’s work in general and Faith and Criticism in 
particular is perhaps a more legacy of the ‘early’ Farrer than of the ‘late’ Farrer.    
63 Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 178. 
64 Ibid., 186. 
65 Ibid., 190 (emphasis added). 
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II. The Case Against (All) Fideism 
After Basil Mitchell, the British figure most associated with Farrer’s 
philosophical legacy is Brian Hebblethwaite (b. 1939).  A Life Fellow of Queens’ 
College, Cambridge, Hebblethwaite was Dean of Chapel at Queens’ from 1969 to 
1994, University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion in the Faculty of Divinity at 
Cambridge from 1973 to 2000, and Canon Theologian of Leicester Cathedral from 
1983 to 2001.  Although perhaps more accurately described as a ‘philosophical 
theologian’ than a ‘philosopher of religion,’ Hebblethwaite is a widely respected and 
influential scholar working at the intersection of philosophy and theology.66  Through 
a combination of exegetical and constructive publications, and also by co-editing two 
of the most important essay-collections on Farrer, Hebblethwaite has—even more 
explicitly than Mitchell—taken on the specific task of interpreting and defending 
Farrer’s work on a range of issues and incorporating his voice into contemporary 
discussions in systematic theology and philosophy of religion.  And, even more than 
Mitchell, Hebblethwaite has been concerned to rebut any charge of fideism from 
Farrer’s religious epistemology.67 
 
                                                 
66 See Hebblethwaite’s basic biography at http://www.giffordlectures.org/Author.asp?AuthorID=245 
(the Gifford Lectures website, accessed on 18 April 2008).  See also the recent Festschrift, Julius J. 
Lipner (ed.), Truth, Religious Dialogue, and Dynamic Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Brian 
Hebblethwaite (SCM Press, 2005). 
67 Hebblethwaite’s work on Farrer has covered a thirty-year span: see the recent collection of most of 
these essays in his The Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer (Peeters, 2007), and my review in 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 11 (2009), 365-367.  The two essay collections, both of 
which are essential volumes for Farrer studies, are Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson (eds.), 
Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer (T & T Clark, 1990) 
and Brian Hebblethwaite and Douglas Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in God’s World: Studies to 
Commemorate the Austin Farrer Centenary (SCM Press, 2006).  See Charles Taliaferro’s review of the 
earlier volume in Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993), 119-123, and my review of the later volume in 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 9 (2007), 471-473. 
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A. The Grounds of Theistic Belief and the Rationality of Revelation 
This exegetical and constructive concern on Farrer’s behalf is part of 
Hebblethwaites’s broader apologetic project to present the rational basis of theism in 
general and Christianity in particular.  In the face of what he sees as a strong (and 
disturbing) tide of fideism in contemporary Christian theology, over the course of his 
career Hebblethwaite has held out for a firmly rationalist ‘natural theology’ position 
on the essential compatibility between faith and reason.  He regards his defence of 
natural theology and the role of reason in religious belief as characteristically 
Anglican.  Given that Farrer ‘has been the predominant influence on [his] own work 
in philosophy of religion and philosophical theology,’ it is obviously important to 
Hebblethwaite that Farrer’s religious epistemology not be stained with any taint of 
fideism.68 
Hebblethwaite sets out his own position most fully in The Ocean of Truth: A 
Defence of Objective Theism.69  Here he argues that ‘belief in an objective God…is 
possible, despite the impact of modern science and historical criticism—and indeed 
not only possible but highly plausible, given all the data of science, history and 
experience.’70  The central chapter of this work—‘The Grounds of Theistic Belief’— 
deploys the traditional cosmological, teleological, anthropological, and axiological 
arguments for the existence of God and contends that, despite centuries of powerful 
                                                 
68 Hebblethwaite, The Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer, vii.  For his view of Anglicanism’s 
alleged ‘penchant for unashamed natural theology,’ see ‘The Anglican Tradition’ in A Companion to 
Philosophy of Religion, edited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (Blackwell, 1997), 178.  But 
also see Chapter Two, Section I.B. of this dissertation for doubts about Anglicanism’s enthusiastic 
commitment to natural theology, at least as Hebblethwaite seems to construe it. 
69 (Cambridge University Press, 1988).  Hebblethwaite has provided a more recent and up-to-date 
articulation of his apologetic project in In Defence of Christianity (Oxford University Press, 2005), 
which I will consider further below.  I begin, however, with The Ocean of Truth as I think it the more 
substantial work, at least in regard to Hebblethwaite’s version of natural theology. 
70 Ibid., x. 
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criticism, these arguments still provide a better rational explanation for the world’s 
existence, order, and nature (particularly including human nature) than the primary 
intellectual alternative on offer, namely naturalism.  Note, however, that even 
Hebblethwaite does not here mean by ‘argument’ a strictly deductive logical proof, or 
even a formalised inductive argument with a specific probability attached; he instead 
intends something more modest such as a plausible line of reasoning leading towards 
a particular conclusion.  Hebblethwaite is thus not presenting or analysing theistic 
arguments at the formal, technical level of Alvin Plantinga or Richard Swinburne but 
rather setting forth what might be called a more intuitive or ‘common sense’ approach 
to natural theology. 
According to Hebblethwaite, the difficulty for any ‘purely naturalistic view’ is 
that it ‘leaves the very existence of the world quite unexplained.’71  Hebblethwaite 
grants that ‘an absolutely necessary being is self-explanatory in a way no other being 
is, even if we cannot see the inner logic, so to speak, of its self-explanatoriness.’72  
Hence, the naturalist claim that the universe itself is such a necessary being—or, less 
strongly, just an arbitrary brute fact—is at least logically possible.  However, the 
evident complexity and contingency of the universe undermine the rationality of this 
view, rendering it extremely implausible.  For this reason, a ‘back up’ naturalist 
theory is the ‘multiverse’ postulate, which suggests that there are in fact an infinite 
number of universes, of which ours is just one.  In that case, its particular nature—
while perhaps unique within this range of infinite possibilities—is not so anomalous 
as if it were the only universe there was.  Hebblethwaite responds: ‘Perhaps the 
infinite totality of universes is the absolutely necessary being which our quest for 
explanation seeks.  But it is far from clear that the postulation of an infinite number of 
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existing universes is a more plausible or more simple explanation than attributing this 
universe to the deliberate creation of an absolutely necessary God.’73  Thus, the 
cosmological argument provides a better explanation of the world’s existence than 
any naturalistic theory.   
 However, although Hebblethwaite accepts the cosmological argument (thus 
construed), he also holds that the design argument is actually more persuasive.  He 
does not have in mind Paley-style arguments from a specific instance of alleged 
design such as the human eye.  Hebblethwaite accepts that such complexly ‘curious 
adapting of means to ends’ (Hume) can, at least for the most part, be explained by 
neo-Darwinian theories of biological evolution through natural selection.  But such 
isolated examples only allow for ‘scientific explanation within a given system.  What 
is not explained is the system itself and its power to produce such things as life and 
mind.’74  The evident ‘fine-tuning’ of the universe, no less than its very existence, 
provides evidence of intention and design.  ‘For even if the stuff of the world goes 
through an endless series of permutations, it still possesses the capacity, sooner or 
later, to combine in such a way as to produce life and mind.  It is this capacity which 
remains entirely unexplained’ by naturalism.75  So, again, the teleological argument is 
upheld against naturalism as a superior explanation of the world’s order. 
 In conventional natural theological fashion, Hebblethwaite freely grants that, 
‘by this route alone we can hardly claim to discern the God of religion, still less the 
God of Christian faith.’76  Even as arguments for generic theism, the cosmological 
and teleological arguments are individually insufficient, and so must be held and 
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presented together.  And both arguments are open to critique from the problem of evil, 
which must therefore meet with an adequate response before religious belief can be 
held rationally.  While such a response may involve the ‘free-will defence,’ which 
seeks to explain at least human moral evil due to ‘the possibility of wrong choice’ 
which tragically lies in ‘the essence of finite personhood,’ it must also go beyond such 
a defence to account for the very ‘building up of finite life and personhood from 
below, in and through a regularly structured physical universe, which explains the 
susceptibility of finite persons both to accident (including disaster) and to 
temptation.’77 
 But the rational case for theism goes far beyond such cosmological and 
teleological arguments for God’s existence and refutations of the problem of evil.  As 
Hebblethwaite puts it, ‘It is very difficult to account, on purely naturalistic terms, for 
man’s freedom, his openness to the future, his self-transcendence and creativity, and 
his perception and espousal of aesthetic, moral, and religious values.’78  Not only that, 
but the very properties of value, goodness, beauty, and even truth itself seem to have 
no place in a naturalistic world.  And yet through the centuries humans in every 
culture have believed themselves to be not just percipients of but also participants in 
such transcendent properties.  Just as the world’s existence and order need to be 
rooted more deeply than in the world itself, so likewise these transcendent properties 
and our human interaction with them cry out for a transcendent explanation—and that 
explanation is God. 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 93.  Hebblethwaite is here alluding to Farrer’s work of theodicy, Love Almighty and Ills 
Unlimited (Doubleday, 1961 / Collins, 1962).  Hebblethwaite explores these themes further in 
‘Freedom, Evil and Farrer’, New Blackfriars 66 (1985), 178-187, and ‘God and the World as Known to 
Science’, in Hebblethwaite and Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in God’s World, 65-84, both of 
which are reprinted in The Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer. 
78 Ibid. 
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And God, moreover, makes Godself known, in at least two ways: (1) religious 
experience (which still remains within the sphere of natural theology) and (2) 
revelation (which, naturally, takes us into the realm of revealed theology).  
Hebblethwaite writes: 
To anyone persuaded of even some probabilistic force in the accumulation of 
these rational arguments, the fact of religious experience, interpreted as 
experience of God, will hardly come as a surprise.  Indeed it stands to reason 
that if there is, as these arguments suggest, a transcendent source of the 
world’s being and nature and of the values that have emerged in the course of 
the long cosmic process, then we should expect that transcendent reality to be 
encounterable experientially by human subjects who are the products of the 
world process.  Indeed it is only reasonable further to expect some revelation 
from the mind and will behind the process.79 
 
Thus, while religious experience itself may be considered a proper subject of natural 
theology, it also forms the bridge to revelation and revealed theology as expressed in 
a particular religious tradition such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, or Hinduism.  And 
it is these particular traditions that ‘give some specificity and knowability to the God 
of religion.  Revealed theology fills out natural theology’s concept of necessary 
ground, designer, and source of value, with, for example, the concept of the trinitarian 
God of love, allegedly revealed through Jesus Christ and the gift of the Spirit.’80   
 Even revealed theology, however, still displays an ‘inner rationality’ subject to 
normal human cognitive processes and criteria.  As Hebblethwaite puts it elsewhere, 
‘it is surely a mistake to regard the logic of theological rationality as something 
wholly internal to the perspective of faith.’81  Revelation and faith cannot simply 
introduce warranted irrational beliefs into the rational system sketched out by natural 
theology; revealed truths must be at least vaguely comprehensible to us and 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 96-97. 
80 Ibid., 97. 
81 Hebblethwaite, In Defence of Christianity (cited in note 69), 59.  Here he sides with Wolfhart 
Pannenberg against the views of Bernard Lonergan and Thomas Torrance, at least as Hebblethwaite 
construes them. 
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compatible with what we know on the basis of reason.  Thus, as Hebblethwaite sees it, 
from a properly Christian perspective on faith and reason,  
there is no clash between the God of philosophy and the God of religion.  It is 
the very same God, dimly apprehended through the philosophical arguments 
of natural theology as the source and goal of all there is, who is also self-
disclosed in Christ as the God of love evoking the religious response of 
gratitude and dedication.  Alternatively, it might be better to say that there is 
no such thing as the God of philosophy.  There is only the God of religion.82 
 
In his later book In Defence of Christianity, Hebblethwaite lays great stress on 
the basic rationality of revelation and of faith.  After an opening chapter that covers 
much the same ground as ‘The Grounds of Theistic Belief,’ but taking account of 
developments in the intervening two decades, Hebblethwaite then devotes an entire 
chapter—‘The Rationality of Revelation’—to the ‘inner rationality’ mentioned above 
that he finds even within theological discourse committed to revealed truths and the 
religious life itself.  As he puts it here, there ‘really is no sharp distinction to be drawn 
between natural and revealed theology.’83  But whereas in The Ocean of Truth he 
wished to assimilate natural theology to revealed theology, as seen above, now 
Hebblethwaite seems rather more inclined to assimilate revealed theology to natural 
theology: both are equally dependent on reason.84 
Likewise, Hebblethwaite explicitly states that philosophical theology is not 
limited to ‘faith seeking understanding’ (fides quaerens intellectum).  Even the 
apologist, says Hebblethwaite, ‘in defending and commending Christianity, does not 
necessarily presuppose faith.  As in all serious dialogue, the apologist endeavours to 
put himself or herself in the unbeliever’s shoes and, using the shared techniques of 
critical rationality (of which much more will have to be said), to build up a cumulative 
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case for Christianity.’85  Hebblethwaite is of course well aware that, in the 
contemporary postmodern, post-foundationalist, self-consciously hermeneutical 
philosophical climate, to assume any such ‘shared techniques of critical rationality’ or 
a ‘common rationality’ is an extremely doubtful undertaking.86  And he does indeed 
duly acknowledge those such as Alasdair MacIntyre who consider ‘the question of 
incommensurability between different tradition-constituted modes of enquiry, and 
[who challenge] the Enlightenment paradigm of a single universal critical and 
practical rationality, shared by all educated people, whatever their background.’87  We 
will return to this question in Chapter Two.  Meanwhile, however, it is sufficient to 
note that, according to Hebblethwaite, even MacIntyre acknowledges ‘that some 
traditions succeed better than others in coping with failures and offering more 
constructive solutions to the problems of moral and political life.  These criteria of 
relative success and failure are suggestive of a more universal rationality after all.’88 
Indeed, Hebblethwaite explicitly pledges his allegiance to the conventional rational 
standards of analytic philosophy, which he regards as ‘by far and away the most 
important strand in contemporary philosophy of religion.  I admire it for its clarity and 
logical acumen and for the help it gives to anyone interested in pursuing, in depth but 
without obfuscation, the search for meaning and truth in the world of religion.’89 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 36. 
86 Ibid., 38. 
87 Ibid., 57.  Hebblethwaite is referring in particular to MacInytre’s Whose Justice?  Which Rationality? 
(London: Duckworth, 1988).  See also David Brown’s somewhat similar discussion of MacIntyre’s 
shift from After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981) to Whose Justice? Which Rationality? in Tradition 
and Imagination, 35-37 (cited in note 50 above). 
88 Ibid. 
89 Brian Hebblethwaite, Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine (Blackwell, 2005), 9.  See 
Section 1.5, ‘The Analytic Tradition,’ 9-12.  For a gentle critique of Hebblethwaite’s commitment to 
such a view of reason, see David F. Ford, ‘Incarnation, Rationality, and Transformative Practices’, in 
Lipner (ed.), Truth, Religious Dialogue, and Dynamic Orthodoxy (cited in note 66), 187-202.  The 
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B. The Believer’s Reasons: Hebblethwaite’s Version 
Given these epistemological convictions and concerns, and his deep, long-
standing interest in Austin Farrer, Hebblethwaite was moved to write an essay on the 
correct interpretation of Farrer’s religious epistemology.  Titled ‘The Believer’s 
Reasons’ (no doubt intentionally and provocatively after the first chapter of Farrer’s 
Faith and Speculation), this essay is a friendly but firm critique of an alternative 
reading of Farrer provided by Diogenes Allen, which will be considered in the 
subsequent section of this chapter.90  Hebblethwaite says that while he personally 
tends ‘to read Farrer in a more Catholic spirit, discerning elements of both natural 
theology and belief in the general intelligibility and intellectual power of Christian 
doctrine,’ Allen, by contrast, ‘gives a more fideistic interpretation of Farrer’s 
philosophical theology.’  Perhaps bearing in mind Mitchell’s concern that Farrer had 
moved towards fideism in the first chapter of Faith and Speculation, Hebblethwaite 
generously concedes that part of ‘the interest of Farrer’s work is that it can be read 
either way in the dispute over the accessibility of the believer’s reasons,’ but he 
naturally still maintains that his own interpretation is ‘best’.  In other words, although 
Hebblethwaite is well aware that the evidence in this case is somewhat ambiguous, 
and proper exegesis consequently rather doubtful, his goal is to clear Farrer’s name 
from the stain of fideism raised by Mitchell.  He thus comes to Farrer’s defence 
                                                                                                                                            
merits and demerits of analytic philosophy of religion are debated extensively in William J. 
Wainwright (ed.), God, Philosophy, and Academic Culture: A Discussion between Scholars in the AAR 
and the APA (Scholars Press, 1996) and Harris and Insole (eds.), Faith and Philosophical Analysis 
(cited in note 2). 
90 See Section III.B below.  Originally published in a Festschrift for Allen—Eric O. Springsted (ed.), 
Spirituality and Theology: Essays in Honor of Diogenes Allen (Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 
37-48—Hebblethwaite’s ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ has now been slightly revised and reprinted in his 
The Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer, 27-40.  I will cite from this more recent version; all 
citations in this paragraph are from page 28. 
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against Mitchell’s concern by specifically arguing against Allen’s interpretation.  This 
debate illuminates not only the specific question of whether Farrer might have been  
‘a sort of fideist,’ but also the broader question about the nature of fideism itself. 
To begin with, as indicated in Section II.A above, Hebblethwaite notes a 
widespread disagreement in contemporary religious epistemology regarding what he 
here calls ‘the general accessibility of the believer’s reasons.’  As he sees it, 
contemporary thinkers in both theology and philosophy of religion ‘differ over how 
far faith is a necessary condition for the appreciation of the rationality of Christian 
belief.’91  This epistemological divide, he stresses, is not simply over the admittedly 
controversial project of natural theology, but over any use at all of reason within 
religion, even within the study of allegedly revealed theology.  Both the justification 
and the intelligibility of religious beliefs are at stake.  He thus asks, ‘Might the 
sympathetic or even the curious unbeliever be able to entertain the content of alleged 
revelation hypothetically and assess the rationality of a theistic or Christian 
worldview based on it?  Or is the rationality of Christian theology peculiar and 
internal to the circle of faith and thus inaccessible to outsiders?’92  In other words, is 
Christianity inherently fideistic?   
Hebblethwaite continues that, traditionally, ‘Roman Catholics and Anglicans 
have tended to favour the theoretical accessibility of the believer’s reasons, both in the 
external (natural theology) sense, and in the internal (general intelligibility) sense, 
while Protestants, both Lutheran and Calvinist, have tended to favour the fideist’s 
view of faith as the precondition of Christianity’s intelligibility.’93  Placing Anglicans 
on the Roman Catholic side of this division—at least without qualification—is a 
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controversial claim, both epistemologically and historically, and perhaps difficult to 
sustain.94  It is also striking that here Hebblethwaite sees such Protestant fideism as 
undermining Christianity’s very intelligibility rather than merely its justification.  But 
clearly Hebblethwaite aligns himself with what he sees as the traditional Catholic / 
Anglican side of this confessional / epistemological division, wanting to affirm what 
the Protestants apparently deny: namely, that the reasoning involved in both natural 
theology and revealed theology is not specifically ‘Christian reason’ or dependent 
upon some prior faith commitment.  Reading between the lines, Hebblethwaite is also 
rejecting some currently powerful philosophical perspectives, such as that reason is 
enclosed within a ‘form of life,’ or bound to a particular tradition, or relative to a 
given culture, or is gender-specific, or merely masks the will to power, or is radically 
incompetent, and so forth and so on.  Rather, he insists that the reason or rationality 
employed in Christian theology is open and accessible to all, believers and un-
believers alike—to anyone with a ‘genuinely open mind.’95 
Acknowledging that the traditional epistemic divide between Christian 
confessions is not as neat as it used to be, Hebblethwaite still maintains that a good 
example ‘of the mainstream Protestant tradition, that of affirming the priority of faith 
where the believer’s reasons are concerned, may be found in the work of Diogenes 
Allen.’96  Thus, in a recent survey of contemporary analytic philosophical theology, 
Hebblethwaite conveniently pauses to contrast Basil Mitchell’s Faith and Criticism 
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with Allen’s Philosophy for Understanding Theology.97  Mitchell’s book, according to 
Hebblethwaite, ‘contains an excellent defence of the interdependence of faith and 
criticism,’ and in particular how reason can cross boundaries between specific 
religious traditions, such as Hinduism and Christianity.  Faith and Criticism appeals 
to ‘standards of critical rationality intelligible to any careful inquirer,’ and precisely in 
this respect it is to be preferred to Allen’s text.  Hebblethwaite writes: 
In many ways, [Allen’s Philosophy for Understanding Theology] is an 
extremely useful book.  Allen shows how elements in all the schools of 
philosophy, from Plato to the present day, can be, and have been, used in order 
to appreciate more deeply the meaning of virtually every major Christian 
doctrine.  But, for Allen, this is entirely a matter of faith seeking 
understanding.  This is not just a question of the theological agenda 
controlling the selection and use of philosophical concepts.  Faith is the 
precondition of the whole enterprise.  One learns from philosophy, but only 
from a standpoint already adopted within the Christian religion and its 
theology….Allen, apparently, does not agree with Mitchell’s conviction that 
such insights can be shared across the borders of the different religions and 
across the borders of belief and unbelief.98 
 
And according to Hebblethwaite this is not only true in regard to Allen’s own work: 
Allen also offers an equally Protestant and fideistic interpretation of Farrer.   
 Although Hebblethwaite never specifically defines what he means by 
‘fideism,’ by drawing these various statements together we can fairly say that 
Hebblethwaite understands fideism as follows: the affirmation that faith is a 
necessary precondition for appreciating the rationality and/or intelligibility of 
religious belief.  This understanding of fideism shares features with both ‘extreme’ 
and ‘moderate’ fideism, as will be discussed further in Chapter Two.  For now, note 
that extreme fideism ‘holds that religion requires the acceptance of doctrines actually 
absurd or contrary to reason,’ whereas in moderate fideism ‘reason is not 
                                                 
97 Mitchell’s Faith and Criticism was first cited in note 20 above and discussed in Section I.D.  Allen’s 
Philosophy for Understanding Theology will be discussed further below, in Section III.A. 
98 Hebblethwaite, Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine, all quotations from page 13 
(emphasis in the original). 
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antithetically opposed to faith, but plays an auxiliary role in formulating or 
elucidating what must first be accepted by faith.’99  In extreme fideism, faith is 
contrary to reason; in moderate fideism, faith precedes reason. 
Hebblethwaite initially classes Allen as a moderate Protestant-style fideist in 
his statement above: Allen affirms ‘the priority of faith where the believer’s reasons 
are concerned’.100  But it seems that Hebblethwaite’s real worry is not that, in fideism, 
faith precedes reason in terms of justifying religious beliefs, but rather that fideism 
calls in question those ‘standards of critical rationality intelligible to any careful 
inquirer,’ to any ‘genuinely open mind.’101  It either doubts that there are such 
standards, or that there are such individuals.  In other words, for Hebblethwaite, the 
deeper problem is that, in addition to denying reason’s role in establishing the external 
justification of religious beliefs, fideism also undermines their internal intelligibility.  
It seems then that Hebblethwaite’s understanding of fideism would also charge 
Allen—and Allen’s reading of Farrer—with something close to extreme fideism. 
Thus, while Allen—and Allen’s Farrer—may not actually commit themselves to 
believing something positively absurd, they would not know it if they did, because for 
them the criteria of rationality (and hence absurdity) are only determined within the 
circle of faith.102 
But, of course, Hebblethwaite rejects both Allen’s alleged fideism and any 
such fideism as an authentic interpretation of Farrer’s religious epistemology.  As 
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101 Hebblethwaite, Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine, 13; ‘The Believer’s Reasons,’ 27. 
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Hebblethwaite says, he reads ‘Farrer in a more Catholic spirit, discerning elements of 
both natural theology and belief in the general intelligibility and intellectual power of 
Christian doctrine.’103  Hebblethwaite lays out his positive interpretation of Farrer’s 
religious epistemology in two essays: the one I have been citing so far, ‘The 
Believer’s Reasons,’ and an earlier essay titled, ‘The Experiential Verification of 
Religious Belief in the Theology of Austin Farrer.’104 
In both essays, Hebblethwaite’s basic claim is that Farrer ‘holds together the 
rational arguments for theism, the public appeal to the figures of Christ and the saints, 
and what [Hebblethwaite calls] the private appeal to one’s own experience, namely 
the way in which, for the believer, the reality of God’s will is found, experientially, by 
one who lets that will take effect in his or her life.’105  Throughout his career, Farrer 
actively engaged in both ‘negative apologetics’ in seeking to refute criticisms of 
Christian belief based on, say, the problem of evil, and ‘positive apologetics’ through 
his reformulation of the cosmological argument and defence of crucial concepts such 
as human free will and divine agency.  In no case does Farrer avoid ‘the criteria of 
general logic or intelligibility,’ or appeal to ‘a purely internal logic that presupposes 
the horizon of faith.’106 
In the earlier essay, Hebblethwaite maintains that 
Farrer’s reliance on genuine spirituality is very great in his overall apologetic, 
but it is not detached from the rational considerations and indeed is itself to be 
subjected to rational scrutiny.  Moreover at the point where our own 
experience seems implausibly to have to carry too much weight, attention is 
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shifted to the public evidence of the saints and of Christ himself.  Thus, the 
rational arguments, the appeal to Christ and the saints and the appeal to our 
own experience are held in creative tension. 
 
He concludes, ‘The great merit of Farrer’s apologetic lies in the way in which 
experiential verification and rational theology are held together.’107  And his 
conclusion to the later essay is much the same:  for Farrer, ‘while it is indeed the 
assumptions of the believing mind that provide the data for our scrutiny, that scrutiny 
proceeds by arguments whose rational force is, in principle, accessible to all.’108   
 In other words, despite some admitted evidence to the contrary, Farrer ‘never 
in fact moved over into the fideist camp.  For him the believer’s self-understanding 
finds rational support in the cosmological argument, which carries some weight as an 
argument independently.’109  Thus, according to Hebblethwaite, Farrer is not a fideist.  
For Farrer, faith is not a necessary condition for appreciating the rationality or 
intelligibility of religious belief.  Mitchell’s concern is thus without warrant, and 
Allen’s interpretation is tendentious.    
 
III. The Case For (Moderate) Fideism 
John Hick’s successor as the Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton 
Theological Seminary, Diogenes Allen (b. 1932) began his academic career at York 
University in Toronto in 1964, taught at Princeton Seminary from 1967, became 
Stuart Professor in 1976, and retired as Emeritus Professor in 2002.  Initially ordained 
as a Presbyterian minister, he was recently also ordained as a priest in the Episcopal 
Church of the United States.  An expert on Leibniz and Simone Weil, Allen has been 
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one of the leading figures in the attempt to bring theology and spirituality back into 
conversation with one another.110  As will be discussed further in Chapter Four, 
although Allen received his doctorate in philosophy from Yale University, where he  
previously studied with several of the originators of ‘Yale School’ theology, he also 
spent a year in Oxford being supervised by Farrer himself (1963-64).  Through the 
incorporation of Farrer’s arguments in his own constructive work, essays specifically 
focused on Farrer, and perhaps most of all through teaching a regular seminar on 
Farrer at Princeton Seminary over many years, Allen joins Mitchell and 
Hebblethwaite as constituting perhaps the three most prominent figures associated 
with Farrer’s name in contemporary philosophical theology, as well as being the one 
North American in the trio.111   
A. Faith Seeking Understanding 
As we have seen above, however, Hebblethwaite registers strong disagreement 
with Allen’s interpretation of Farrer’s religious epistemology.  Hebblethwaite’s 
critique focuses on one essay, published in 1990 and titled ‘Faith and the Recognition 
of God’s Activity.’112  However, before turning to Allen’s interpretation of Farrer, it is 
important to consider Hebblethwaite’s characterisation of Allen himself as a 
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Protestant fideist, particularly in relation to Allen’s Philosophy for Understanding 
Theology.113  It is both striking and revealing that Hebblethwaite uses the motto 
famously associated with Saints Augustine and Anselm (fides quaerens intellectum), 
and hence with moderate fideism, both to describe Allen’s position on faith and 
reason and to distinguish it clearly from his own: ‘for Allen, [the relation between 
philosophy and theology] is entirely a matter of faith seeking understanding…. Faith 
is the precondition of the whole enterprise.’114  And therefore, according to 
Hebblethwaite, Allen would not agree with Mitchell that reason can cross boundaries 
between specific religious and non-religious traditions.  But is this true? 
 Obviously, the very title of Allen’s book calls to mind both fides quaerens 
intellectum and credo ut intelligam, and this is certainly intentional.  In the first 
chapter of this book—‘The Foundation of Christian Theology: The World Was 
Created’—Allen articulates his basic understanding of where and how philosophy fits 
within the theological enterprise.  According to Allen, the two primary sources of 
Christian theology are ‘the Bible and hellenic culture, especially Greek 
philosophy.’115  However, despite their fundamental differences on ontological and 
epistemological matters, Christian theology does not simply hold these two sources in 
                                                 
113 (John Knox Press and SCM Press, 1985).  I will cite from the original version, but note that the 
book has recently been published in a revised Second Edition, co-authored by Eric O. Springsted 
(Westminster John Knox Press, 2007).  For a condensed version of Allen’s perspective, see his entry on 
‘philosophy’ in Adrian Hastings, et. al. (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought (Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 535-539.  
114 Hebblethwaite, Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine, 13 (emphasis in the original).  See 
Chapter Two of this dissertation for the association of Augustine and Anselm with ‘moderate fideism’. 
115 Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 1.  This text is primarily aimed at theological 
students without a background in philosophy.  See also the companion volume, Diogenes Allen and 
Eric O. Springsted (eds.), Primary Readings in Philosophy for Understanding Theology (Gracewing 
and Westminster / John Knox, 1992), which contains relevant extracts of major philosophers from 
Plato to Wittgenstein. 
 52 
tension or as entirely separate, non-integrated spheres.  Rather, Christian theology is a 
fusion of these two distinct traditions.  Indeed, Allen goes further and says that 
Christian theology is ‘inherently hellenic.’  It is inherently hellenic because ‘it could 
not exist as a discipline without the kind of intellectual curiosity which was unique to 
ancient Greece.’116  Thus, the discipline of Christian theology first emerged not in the 
pages of Scripture itself, but only later in the work of the early Church Fathers.  And 
Allen insists that more than the use of particular philosophical concepts is at play in 
Christian theology: it also depends upon a certain mental attitude.  He writes: 
An essential part [of this hellenic influence] is a mental make-up, an attitude 
of mind, an outlook that prizes coherence, that presses as a matter of principle 
the question, ‘Why and how is that so?’—one that searches for principles to 
organize diverse things, and that seeks to discover the basis or ground for 
every claim that is made.  There would have been no such discipline as 
Christian theology without the Bible and without a believing community.  But 
likewise we would not have the discipline of theology without the hellenic 
attitude in Christians that leads them to press questions about the Bible and the 
relations of the Bible to other knowledge.  Thus when people call for purging 
Greek philosophy from Christian theology, unless they are referring to specific 
ideas or concepts, they are really calling for the end of the discipline of 
theology itself, though they may not realize it.117 
 
Although Christian theology is thus inherently hellenic, its biblical inheritance 
nonetheless sets certain limits on the discipline.  This is because, as Allen puts it 
elsewhere, according to biblical teaching ‘God is above the power of the mind to 
comprehend’.118  We can reason about God, but when we do so ‘we are reasoning 
about a reality who is in a different category from the gods of ancient Greek and 
Roman religion, the various conceptions of ultimate reality in ancient philosophy, and 
the universe itself because God, as the self-sufficient source of all, is not a member of 
                                                 
116 Ibid., 4 (emphasis in the original). 
117 Ibid., 5 
118 Diogenes Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern World: The Full Wealth of Conviction 
(Westminster / John Knox Press, 1992), 148. 
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our universe.’119  Thus, theology ‘must recognize that however much it may want 
complete comprehension, the ontological status of deity is such that God exceeds our 
comprehension.’120  Or, put differently, ‘we do not know what God is in essence.  
That essence, God’s very being, is unknowable.’121  Again: ‘The essential 
unknowability of God…springs from God’s inherent nature—its inexhaustible 
fullness—and not simply from the specific limitations of our faculties.’122  And again: 
‘mystery penetrates and is part of every doctrine about God.’123 
So Allen, more than either Mitchell or Hebblethwaite, insists on the inherent 
limits of human cognition in regard to the irreducible mystery of the divine nature.  
Despite our best efforts—indeed, due to the finite contours of humanity—God 
ultimately remains outside our epistemic grasp.  And, as shall be seen in a moment, 
this apophatic tendency does indeed cause Allen to place more emphasis on faith than 
either Mitchell or Hebblethwaite.  Precisely because God is above our 
comprehension, ‘we recognise the appropriateness of faith.’124 
These ontological and epistemological claims lead Allen to consider the 
project of natural theology, and like Hebblethwaite he also notes the traditionally 
different attitudes of Protestants and Roman Catholics to this enterprise.  Allen’s two 
primary comments on natural theology are: (A) one can deny that the traditional 
arguments of natural theology work as strict philosophical demonstrations or ‘proofs 
in the technical sense’ and yet still maintain that ‘the created world bears marks of its 
dependence on God’; and (B) such natural theology, ‘either in the sense of rigorous 
                                                 
119 Ibid., 153. 
120 Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 6. 
121 Ibid., 9. 
122 Ibid., 12 (emphasis in the original). 
123 Ibid., 12-13 (emphasis in the original).  
124 Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, 148. 
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proofs or in the sense of traces of God in the universe, is not to be identified with all 
of philosophy.’125  (A) leads to questions about the clarity and persuasiveness of these 
alleged marks: ‘Are they so strong that it would be irrational not to believe in God?  
Are they merely such that they give a person who already believes in God because of 
special revelation, additional grounds?’126  In Philosophy for Understanding 
Theology, Allen leaves these questions unanswered.  But (B) opens the intriguing 
possibility that philosophy may have another role in theology besides simply 
supplying it with such justifying grounds.  Allen’s focus in the rest of Philosophy for 
Understanding Theology is thus a development of (B), namely a historically-
structured survey of the philosophical concepts necessary to understand Christian 
doctrines such as Creation, Providence, Trinity, Incarnation, and so on.  It is, as the 
title indicates, precisely an exercise in philosophy for understanding—rather than 
justifying—theology. 
But several years later Allen took up the questions surrounding (A) in his 
Christian Belief in a Postmodern World: The Full Wealth of Conviction.127  In this 
book, Allen develops a positive case for Christian belief based on precisely such 
questions raised by the apparently non-demonstrative character of natural theology 
noted above.  From a strictly philosophical perspective, Allen does not regard the 
traditional arguments of natural theology as necessarily compelling assent from all 
reasonable people.  As demonstrations or proofs they are unsuccessful, partly because 
they rely on the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  And this principle, while possibly 
true, is one of philosophy’s great contested questions: ‘No one has yet been able to 
show that everything must have a reason for its existence in a way that has won the 
                                                 
125 Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 7 and 8. 
126 Ibid., 7.   
127 Cited in note 118. 
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approval of the philosophical community at large.’128  However, in Allen’s view the 
postmodern collapse of the Enlightenment consensus on ‘reason’—which I will 
discuss more fully in Chapter Two—has re-opened the discussion of the rationality of 
religious and specifically Christian belief.  The foundational convictions of the 
Enlightenment that (i) God is entirely superfluous to explanations of the universe, (ii) 
that morality and society can be securely built on secular foundations, (iii) that 
progress is inevitable, and (iv) that knowledge is inherently good, have all been 
seriously undermined in our contemporary postmodern context.  The essentially non-
demonstrative character of natural theology is thus no longer an insuperable obstacle 
to rational belief and faith in God.  Although we cannot prove the existence of God, 
or even establish the obvious rational superiority of theism over naturalism, it remains 
the case that the order and existence of the universe point to the possibility of God, 
our religious needs motivate our search for God, and the experience of divine grace 
can convince us of the reality of God.129 
Thus, for example, in regard to the cosmological argument, even without the 
benefit of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, we still ‘do not know either scientifically 
or philosophically that the world “just is.”  There might be a reason for its existence, 
and God might be the reason.  God is a possible answer to the question posed by 
nature’s existence.’130  But God being just a ‘possible answer’ to this question is not 
somehow epistemically second-class, since one ‘of the achievements of philosophy in 
                                                 
128 Ibid., 77.  Allen appeals at this point to William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975). 
129 See the introduction, ‘The End of the Modern World: A New Openness for Faith’ (1-19), and the 
summary of the book’s argument on 19.  These various points are explored in more detail in the five 
chapters that constitute Part I: ‘The Book of Nature’.  Note that Allen, like Mitchell, accepts a modified 
version of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
130 Ibid., 77. 
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[the 20th] century has been to show that there are no claims which are true by 
necessity in any area of inquiry, including science.’131  Allen thus joins his voice to 
the chorus of cumulative case arguments for the rationality of religious belief. 
As noted above, however, Allen places far more emphasis than either Mitchell 
or Hebblethwaite on the essential epistemic role of faith in Christian belief.  
Following Pascal, Allen holds that the paradoxes of even our human nature—let alone 
God’s—baffle and finally defeat our reason.  It is precisely by entering deeply into the 
travails of reason that ‘we are pressured by our reason to become open to what is 
above reason’s ability to discover or demonstrate as true.’132  Faith, while not 
contrary to reason, is still above it.  So, distinctive Christian doctrines such as our 
creation in God’s image, our fundamentally fallen state, and our redemption by Christ  
are not demonstrable by reason….The proper response to Christian claims is 
indeed faith but only after we have recognized with our minds the 
incomprehensibility of our nature and our own wretchedness.  Then we can 
see by reason the coherent picture of ourselves which Christian truth gives us 
as it enables us to understand those paradoxes which perplexed us and left us 
in our wretchedness without hope of remedy.  Even though faith is not 
produced by reason, our faith is reasonable because Christian claims illumine 
the mind on matters that otherwise baffle us.133 
 
When it comes to the well-known phrase ‘the leap of faith,’ Allen notes that 
this is ‘usually taken to mean that since all the available evidence falls short of 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 134.  Allen adds in a footnote that propositions ‘in formal logic and pure mathematics do not 
constitute counter examples because they are not propositions about the world’ (note 6 on page 227).  
Thus, the question of God’s possibly necessary existence can be and still is pursued by certain 
philosophers (such as Alvin Plantinga and Robert Merrihew Adams), but from a modally logical 
approach to metaphysics which is very different than the rigorous but still less formal philosophical 
method practised by Allen.  However, in a review of Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, James E. 
Taylor contests Allen’s claim above, stating that he ‘has overlooked scientific essentialism, the view 
that propositions such as “water is H2O” are necessarily true and about an essence of the world.’  This 
view, defended by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke, ‘remains the subject of lively debate.’  See James 
E. Taylor’s review in Zygon 30 (1995), 643-646 (citations from 646).   
132 Ibid., 142. 
133 Ibid., 143. 
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establishing the truth of Christianity, we must leap the gap between evidence and 
truth.’  This, however, is a serious misunderstanding, as it treats both faith and reason 
‘as belonging to the same order.’  On the contrary, Allen insists that ‘Christian faith is 
not a leap within the order of the intellect, a leap which violates the very essence of 
that order.  The leap of faith is a leap from the order of the intellect to the order of the 
heart.’134  Again, however, following Pascal, Allen argues that the ‘order of the 
heart’—that is, the domain of value—is not subordinate but superior to the intellect.  
While this claim cannot but be heard as a form of fideism to many, that is not Allen’s 
intent.  We are, as he puts it, ‘to reason with the heart.’135 
Although Allen rejects Enlightenment views of reason, and places a high value 
on faith, he also rejects what he understands as fideism.  Allen understands fideism as 
the attempt ‘to retain the language of traditional Christianity but at the price of 
repudiating in various degrees the need to take into account knowledge from any 
other domain.’  Such fideism 
neglects the long historical development of the Bible and of Christian 
doctrines.  Their development has always involved human reasoning.  
Fideism, often without realizing it, treats some specific interpretation of 
Scripture or a particular doctrinal formulation as though it sprang directly 
from the mind of God into human minds, rather than also requiring the use of 
the best estimates of knowledge that existed in various historical eras.136 
 
Although Christian faith is a matter of the heart it is not only a matter of the heart for 
(take note) ‘a commitment should be given up should the mind not be convinced of 
the truth of Christianity from an examination of nature, history, human nature, and the 
gospel.’137  Thus, faith is ‘an essential but not the only ingredient in making Christian 
                                                 
134 Ibid., this and previous quotations in this paragraph from 145 (emphasis in the original). 
135 Ibid, 154.  For a more developed treatment of Pascal, see Diogenes Allen, Three Outsiders: Blaise 
Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard, Simone Weil (Cowley Publications, 1983), 15-51. 
136 Both quotations from Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, 7. 
137 Ibid., 15. 
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claims.  Reason is used, not only to examine the grounds for Christian claims [i.e., 
justification] but also to understand them better [i.e., intelligibility].  Those with faith 
seek understanding.’138  Fideism, by contrast, is ‘blind faith.’139 
 The crucial point here is that Allen clearly accepts that Christian theology 
must admit the deliverances of reason and knowledge from domains outside the circle 
of faith.  If his view is faith seeking understanding, the understanding faith seeks must 
both recognise and incorporate knowledge discovered outside of faith.   In light of 
Hebblethwaite’s claims above it is also important to mention that, ironically, Allen’s 
Christian Belief in a Postmodern World explicitly incorporates insights drawn from 
Mitchell’s Faith and Criticism, and that Part III of this book takes up the question of 
engaging with other religious traditions—particularly Hinduism!140  In short, although 
Allen’s configuration of the relation between faith and reason is rather different from 
Hebblethwaite’s in placing greater emphasis on the positive epistemic role of faith in 
Christian belief, and although Allen is more sympathetic to the postmodern critique of 
‘reason’ than Hebblethwaite and consequently more cautious in his endorsement of 
any kind of natural theology, I nevertheless conclude that, especially if one takes 
account of Christian Belief in a Postmodern World in addition to Philosophy for 
                                                 
138 Ibid., 16.   
139 Ibid., 128. 
140 Ibid., 7, 19, 128, 136, 217, 221, 227, and Part III: Chapter Ten, ‘A Christian Theology of Other 
Faiths’ (185-196) and Chapter Eleven, ‘Incarnation in the Gospels and in the Bhagavad-Gita’ (197-
211).  To be precise, Allen’s dependence on Mitchell’s Faith and Criticism—which was published five 
years later—is not on the book itself but on the text of some of the lectures that then went into it, 
namely the Nathaniel Taylor Lectures at Yale University in 1985 (see Mitchell’s preface in Faith and 
Criticism).  In particular, Allen uses Mitchell’s analogy of Christian doctrine in the contemporary 
intellectual climate as a barge with cargo trying to navigate a difficult river, seeking to avoid various 
dangers such as Hume, Kant—and fideism.  For Mitchell’s own articulation of this analogy, see Faith 
and Criticism, Chapter 4: ‘Faith and Reason: A Problem in Navigation,’ 67-87, particularly 72-74; for 
Allen’s appropriation of it, see 6-9 and 128 of Christian Belief in a Postmodern World.  
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Understanding Theology, Hebblethwaite has exaggerated the fideistic element in 
Allen’s own thought.  If Allen is a fideist, he is at most a moderate fideist, not an 
extreme one. 
B. The Believer’s Reasons: Allen’s Version  
I turn now to Allen’s interpretation of Farrer.  Allen begins his essay on 
Farrer’s religious epistemology by saying that  
[p]hilosophers of religion are prone to ignore or to dismiss faith in their 
assessment of the truth of falsity of Christian theism.  They usually consider 
the existence of the universe, the operations of nature, religious experience, 
and perhaps the events of history to see what support these provide for theism 
in general and for Christian theism in particular.  The typical philosopher of 
religion does not find much support for either.141 
 
But, Allen claims, Austin Farrer was not a typical philosopher of religion.  According 
to Allen, from the time of Farrer’s 1964 book Saving Belief, ‘Farrer takes the 
believer’s faith to be essential for a proper assessment of the grounds of Christian 
theism.’142  Thus, in Farrer’s case, 
the usual relation between faith and evidence is reversed.  Rather than 
examining nature, history and religious experience first to see whether they 
support theism, as is usually the case in the philosophy of religion, one is first 
to have faith in order to be in a position to recognise the manifestation of 
divine activity in nature, history, and individual lives.  If faith is indeed a 
necessary condition for the proper assessment of the grounds of Christian 
theism, then philosophers of religion will have to take far more seriously the 
familiar theological procedure employed by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas 
who examine Christian theism with faith as they seek to understand it and 
display its grounds.143 
                                                 
141 Allen, ‘Faith and the Recognition of God’s Activity,’ 197.  Allen also discusses Farrer’s religious 
epistemology in some detail in the introduction to Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, 11-16, 
covering much of the same material as the essay being considered.  I will thus cite from this 
introduction as well as from the essay in Divine Action to present Allen’s interpretation of Farrer. 
142 Ibid., 198.  Allen is referring to ‘Faith and Evidence,’ the first chapter of Farrer’s Saving Belief, 
cited in note 61. 
143 Ibid. (emphasis in the original).  Again, see Chapter Two of this dissertation for another expression 
of the view that Augustine, Anselm, and even Aquinas might exemplify ‘moderate fideism’. 
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But if one is first to have faith in order to recognise the existence of God or the 
truth of Christianity, then how does one come to have faith?  Although Allen 
discusses at length how reason must exercise its proper function to see its own 
limitations, the simple answer is that one must open one’s heart to God.144  Allen thus 
states that in Farrer’s last book, Faith and Speculation, when Farrer ‘describes “the 
believer’s reasons”…all that he mentions is that the believer embraces the gospel, and 
in embracing it finds himself or herself blessed.  The blessings the believer 
experiences are the reasons the believer continues to embrace the gospel.’145  These 
blessings are not unusual religious experiences or mystical ecstasies, but rather more 
‘prosaic’ events such as ‘finding oneself judged and accepted, nourished and 
strengthened.  Having a broken and ensnarled life healed is more dramatic but still 
rather common.’146 
Allen then makes an important distinction.  He claims that, for Farrer, these 
blessings ‘are said to give sufficient reason to be a believer, even though they are not 
evidence for the truth of the gospel.’147  For such evidence, we must look away from 
the felt blessings of the believer to the more objective criteria preferred by typical 
philosophers of religion: for example, the existence and order of the natural universe.  
This is where the intellect has its rightful place.  But even here faith is necessary to 
properly perceive and interpret this evidence.  Without faith it cannot be rightly 
understood.  As Allen puts it in Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, ‘Nature 
cannot be a witness to God’s existence and goodness to a person with a closed 
                                                 
144 Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, 13. 
145 Allen, ‘Faith and the Recognition of God’s Activity,’ 202 (emphasis added). 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid., 203. 
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heart.’148  The evidence is there, but it cannot be seen.  In his essay on Farrer, Allen 
says: 
The problem with the experience of divine blessings as part of the basis of 
belief is not that individual experiences are private nor that the blessings are 
too paltry to be evidence for Christian theism, but that the blessings are the 
result of opening one’s heart.  If one’s heart were open, one might be able to 
experience the blessings of the gospel.  Then one might be able to recognise 
and respond to the evidence provided by the natural world’s existence and 
evolving order[.]149 
 
In other words, both (i) the blessings of the gospel which provide one’s reason 
to be a believer, as well as (ii) the faith which allows one to perceive evidence for the 
truth of the gospel, are themselves the result of a prior condition, namely (iii) a 
Pascalian ‘open heart’ (note: an open heart, not Hebblethwaite’s ‘open mind’).  Allen 
acknowledges that to ‘speak of the heart may seem remote to a philosophical defence 
of theism and Christian theism,’ but he argues that such considerations are required by 
any attempt to properly interpret Farrer’s own thought as well as by the actual realities 
under discussion.150  Allen cites with approval Farrer’s claim that the very idea of 
God unsettles us, throws us off balance, and draws us either for or against it: in 
Farrer’s words, the concept of God contains ‘built-in attitudes.’  Thus, Allen states, 
‘neutrality is a fiction.’151   
But because neutrality is a fiction, does that mean there is no room for reason 
at all?  As seen above in Section III.A, Allen resists this conclusion: the intellect has 
                                                 
148 Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, 14. 
149 Allen, ‘Faith and the Recognition of God’s Activity,’ 203. 
150 Ibid.  For examples of two other philosophers of religion taking account of ‘the heart,’ see William 
J. Wainwright, Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason (Cornell 
University Press, 1995), and James R. Peters, The Logic of the Heart: Augustine, Pascal, and the 
Rationality of Faith (Baker Academic, 2009).   
151 Ibid., 209.  The discussion of ‘built-in attitudes’ is in ‘Faith and Evidence,’ cited in note 61 above.  
As was made clear in the discussion of Mitchell, although he does not place the same emphasis on faith 
as Allen does, Mitchell would also firmly agree that ‘neutrality is a fiction’ and insist on the rightful 
place of commitment even in fully rational belief. 
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its proper role to play as well.  Citing an early essay of Farrer’s, Allen insists that our 
mental activity in fact runs in two streams: both credulous and critical.  Faith and 
reason are not mutually exclusive opposites, but co-exist in the same cognitive agent, 
often unhappily and incompatibly.  Thus, Allen says, it is precisely because ‘our 
minds function in two ways that a believer investigates philosophical questions that 
are relevant to Christian claims, and also considers historical questions, since [quoting 
Farrer] “we must have no bogus history”.’152  In principle, it is entirely possible that 
such investigations will erode and even destroy faith.  Thus, Allen says that full ‘faith 
or commitment does not imply that there is no intellectual work to be done.  Quite the 
contrary.’153  Moreover, such intellectual work must produce results supportive of 
faith if faith is to endure.  So, although Allen admits that it is ‘not at all clear how 
much divine agency must be manifest in nature and history for us to continue to have 
faith,’ and grants that ‘Farrer does not tell us how much of the divine agency we must 
be able to detect for Christian theism to be true or plausible,’ the very fact that these 
considerations are raised indicates that, on Allen’s reading of Farrer, the twin issues 
of (1) continuing to have faith and (2) the truth and plausibility of Christian theism 
remain open questions.154 
So, does Allen present a fideistic interpretation of Farrer’s religious 
epistemology, as Hebblethwaite charges?  Recall that Hebblethwaite describes 
fideism as the affirmation that faith is a necessary precondition for appreciating the 
                                                 
152 Ibid., 208 (emphasis in the original).  This essay, ‘On Credulity,’ was originally published in 
Illuminatio 1 (1947), 3-9; reprinted in Austin Farrer, Interpretation and Belief, edited by Charles Conti 
(SPCK, 1976), 1-6; and is now also available in Loades and MacSwain (eds.), The Truth-Seeking 
Heart, 190-195.  Farrer’s rejection of ‘bogus history’ is found on page 6 of Interpretation and Belief 
and page 195 of The Truth-Seeking Heart. 
153 Ibid., 209. 
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rationality and/or intelligibility of religious belief.  As thus stated, on first glance there 
is indeed good reason to classify Allen’s interpretation as fideistic, although he never 
applies that term to himself or Farrer.  According to Allen, ‘Farrer takes the believer’s 
faith to be essential for a proper assessment of the grounds of Christian theism.’155  
What could be more explicitly fideistic than that?  However, things are somewhat 
more complicated than they first appear.   
To begin with, it seems that Hebblethwaite and Allen mean different things by 
‘faith.’156  For Hebblethwaite, ‘faith’ seems to mean ‘uncritical commitment’ or the 
opposite of ‘rationality.’  He seems to view faith negatively as the absence of reason, 
rather than something positive which may in its own right provide some justification 
for belief.  Hence his strong claim that even Christian philosophical theology is not 
simply faith seeking understanding.157  So when Allen says that ‘Farrer takes the 
believer’s faith to be essential for a proper assessment of the grounds of Christian 
theism’ (emphasis added), it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Allen means 
something very different by ‘faith.’  Faith, for Allen, carries positive epistemic 
weight.  Thus he says (with those such as Hebblethwaite in mind) that in ‘the typical 
examination by philosophers of religion of the grounds for religious belief, faith is a 
pale substitute for evidence’, but that on the contrary for Farrer ‘faith is a response to 
the good promised to us by God, preeminently in Christ.’158 
                                                 
155 Ibid., 198. 
156 ‘Faith’ is, of course, itself an enormously complex and contested concept that will not receive the 
attention it deserves in this dissertation, although it is implicitly discussed throughout in contrast to 
‘reason’ and in relation to ‘fideism’.   
157 Ironically, here Hebblethwaite seems to agree with Richard Dawkins’s understanding of faith (see 
note 55 above). 
158 Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, 15-16.  Conversation and correspondence with 
Professor Allen about the difference between his and Hebblethwaite’s view of faith has helped me to 
make these distinctions, for which I am grateful. 
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Second, as stated above, Hebblethwaite’s criticism of Allen strongly implies 
that Allen’s reading of Farrer is actually guilty of the extreme fideistic position that 
denies reason any place at all within the life of faith—for either justification or 
clarification.  Faith, on this view, is immune from any criticism, and so faith may lead 
one to believe the actually absurd or irrational.   But this is clearly false, as Allen 
explicitly states that questions raised by philosophy and history must be addressed if 
faith is to be maintained.  To use a term in contemporary epistemology, reason can 
and must deal with ‘defeaters’ if faith is to be maintained with integrity.  It is not 
invulnerable.  Faith may provide the initial grounds for believing in Christian theism, 
and may also enable one to read the both the universe and human nature rightly, but 
faith is not hermetically sealed from rational inquiry.  Allen does not use the term 
‘fideism’ for either himself or for Farrer, and indeed clearly rejects it as an apt 
description of acceptable Christian practice.  But, as noted above, will be discussed in 
Chapter Two, and defended further in Chapters Four and Five, Allen’s (and Farrer’s) 
position may well be considered under the rubric of ‘moderate fideism’. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter began with Basil Mitchell’s concern that in his final book, Faith 
and Speculation, Austin Farrer—‘the reasonable man’—had abandoned rational 
theology and had become ‘a sort of fideist’.  It continued with Mitchell’s critique of 
something like Farrer’s alleged fideism in ‘Neutrality and Commitment,’ and 
considered Mitchell’s own religious epistemology in The Justification of Religious 
Belief and Faith and Criticism.  It then surveyed Brian Hebblethwaite’s endorsement 
of natural theology in The Ocean of Truth and In Defence of Christianity, followed by 
his firmly non-fideistic reading of Farrer in his own ‘The Believer’s Reasons.’  And 
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finally it looked at the rather different formulation of the Christian philosophical 
enterprise in Diogenes Allen’s Philosophy for Understanding Theology and Christian 
Belief in a Postmodern World, followed by Allen’s ‘moderate fideist’ interpretation of 
Farrer in ‘Faith and the Recognition of God’s Activity.’    
Within the broad range of extant positions in contemporary philosophy of 
religion and religious epistemology, Mitchell, Hebblethwaite, and Allen are not 
themselves that far apart.  They all accept the cumulative case approach, and they are 
all concerned to defend the rationality of religious belief.  However, subtle but 
significant differences are certainly still manifest among these three prominent 
followers of Austin Farrer.  Hebblethwaite is the most rationalistic of the three, 
holding that the traditional arguments of natural theology provide theism a clear 
rational advantage over naturalism, and denying that reason is compromised by 
various postmodern critiques.  Allen’s position—protests to the contrary 
notwithstanding—does verge on the fideistic, as that term is commonly understood, 
although Allen rejects extreme fideism and insists on the capacity of reason to both 
support and undermine religious belief.  Unlike Hebblethwaite, however, Allen’s non-
demonstrative understanding of the character of natural theology commits him only to 
the view that theism is permitted by the available evidence, and hence rational, rather 
than being obviously more plausible than naturalism.  And Mitchell seems somewhere 
between the two, closer to Hebblethwaite on the rational justification of religious 
belief, but likewise closer to Allen in insisting on the essential role of commitment, 
tradition, and community in formulating all beliefs whatsoever, religious and 
otherwise. 
These personal differences are reflected in their interpretations of Farrer: 
Hebblethwaite denies that Farrer ever ‘in fact moved over into the fideist camp,’ 
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Mitchell hopes that Farrer remained ‘a theoretical rationalist but a practicing fideist,’ 
and Allen holds that—at least from Saving Belief (1964) onwards—‘Farrer takes the 
believer’s faith to be essential for a proper assessment of the grounds of Christian 
theism.’  Although he denies the term, this view is equivalent to moderate fideism.  In 
Chapters Three and Four I will trace the development of Farrer’s religious 
epistemology and, in so doing, defend Allen’s interpretation of Farrer against 
Hebblethwaite’s.  However, in Chapter Two, we must first consider the complex 
history and multiple definitions of fideism itself.   
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CHAPTER TWO: ‘A SORT OF FIDEIST’ 
 
The contested question of whether Austin Farrer may or may not have become 
‘a sort of fideist’ is further complicated by the diverse definitions of fideism found in 
contemporary theology, philosophy, and religious studies.  Thomas D. Carroll has 
recently argued that attributions of fideism are almost always inaccurate, ahistoric, 
and pejorative, and thus urges that we greatly restrict use of the term.  The denotation 
and connotation of ‘fideism’ vary considerably between Roman Catholic and 
Protestant usage, and ‘Anglican epistemology’ is arguably identical with so-called 
‘semi-fideism’ (or ‘soft rationalism’).  Postmodern questionings of reason’s 
competence have recently undermined the traditional ‘faith / reason’ dichotomy that 
gave fideism its particular significance as a controversial option in religious 
epistemology.  Academic discussions of fideism itself are largely confined to 
reference works: it is a neglected topic, and yet still a widely used and apparently 
essential term when discussing the rationality of religious belief.  This chapter thus 
sorts through these various issues so that when ‘fideism’ appears in subsequent 
chapters a precise range of meanings can be given to it, and so the ‘sort of fideist’ 
Farrer may or may not have become can be determined more accurately.  (Sections I 
and II are mostly concerned with citation and exposition; Sections III and IV are more 
analytic and critical.)    
 
I. The History and Definitions of Fideism  
Basil Mitchell is not the only scholar to wonder whether Farrer, for all of his 
undoubted philosophical brilliance and early focus on rational theology, might have 
ended up as ‘a sort of fideist’.  For example, in an essay on Farrer’s theodicy, Simon 
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Oliver states that, although in dealing with the problem of evil Farrer ‘appears to 
reject the rationalism of philosophical theodicy in favour of a dogmatic theology, the 
present article will argue that this does not, as has sometimes been supposed, render 
him a type of fideist.’1  Oliver then cites two essays by J. N. (Jeremy) Morris and 
Edward Henderson which defend a more fideistic reading of Farrer, and which will be 
considered in more detail in Chapters Four and Five. 
However, recent scholarship has made it increasingly difficult to use the term 
‘fideism’ with the insouciance with which philosophers and theologians have long 
been accustomed, and so it is important to pause in this second chapter to consider 
what this term might actually mean.  As stated twice in Chapter One, in 1983 Mitchell 
wrote: ‘Farrer, it seemed, had become a sort of fideist, content to rest the truth of 
Christianity upon the believer’s sense of being nourished by the tradition in which he 
had been raised.’2  But using ‘fideist’ in this context may beg the question—and, 
indeed, more than one.  Is such a cognitive state properly identified with fideism?  
Are ‘tradition’ and ‘nourishment’ so closely associated with faith and so sharply 
contrasted with reason?  If so, is such ‘fideism’ good, bad, or indifferent?  Is it 
rational or irrational?  A term of praise or blame?  Where does this term come from, 
and what does it mean?  And—perhaps most important of all—does ‘fideism’ mean 
different things to different communities and individuals, and in different cultures, 
periods, and languages?3 
 
                                                 
1 Simon Oliver, ‘The Theodicy of Austin Farrer,’ The Heythrop Journal XXXIX (1998), 282. 
2 Basil Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ in Jeffrey C. Eaton and Ann Loades 
(eds.), For God and Clarity:  New Essays in Honor of Austin Farrer (Pickwick Publications, 1983), 
177. 
3 I am grateful to Ann Loades for helping me articulate some of these questions, especially the first 
two. 
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A. The Religious History of ‘Fideism’ 
In asking these questions, we are stepping from the rather austere and insular 
world of Oxford philosophy and Anglican theology into a complex and 
interconnected set of historical and ecclesial considerations.  In an article aptly titled, 
‘The Traditions of Fideism,’ Thomas D. Carroll observes that despite the widespread 
use of the term ‘comparatively little has been written on fideism itself’—that is, on its 
specific history and definition(s).4  He further observes that the term is often used 
pejoratively and ahistorically, without any regard for its actual origins in 19th century 
French theology, both Protestant and Roman Catholic.  He thus says, ‘The diverse and 
sometimes conflicting individual definitions of fideism call out for some 
philosophical housekeeping if the term is to be useful academically.  This preliminary 
investigation into the genealogy of fideism shows that the meaning of the term is not 
at all clear in either philosophical or theological discourse.’5  My own initial research 
into fideism’s ‘genealogy,’ although not as detailed and deeply historical as Carroll’s, 
had independently drawn similar conclusions to his: specifically, that the term 
originated in a religious rather than a philosophical context; that it is often used 
pejoratively; that it can mean different things to philosophers and theologians; that it 
certainly means different things to Protestants and Roman Catholics; and that fixing 
on one specific contemporary definition is thus difficult if not impossible.  Fideism is 
a highly context-dependent concept.    
                                                 
4 Thomas D. Carroll, ‘The Traditions of Fideism’, Religious Studies 4 (2008), 2.  More poignantly, 
Craig B. Brush wrote back in 1966, ‘Most religious encyclopedias or dictionaries of philosophy…are 
conspicuously silent or distressingly vague on fideism.’  The situation has changed very little since 
then.  See Craig B. Brush, Montaigne and Bayle: Variations on the Theme of Skepticism (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1966), 19 footnote 1.  Brush’s work will be discussed further below.  Due to the lack of 
extensive scholarly attention to fideism, many of the citations in Section I of this chapter will be drawn 
precisely from such ‘religious encyclopedias or dictionaries of philosophy’. 
5 Ibid. 
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As Carroll and others have noted, the word fidéisme emerged in France in the 
middle of the 19th century, and first appeared in English in 1885.  Although the term’s 
invention is normally attributed to Protestants, in fact it seems to have been coined 
entirely independently by the Roman Catholic Abbé Robitaille in 1854 and then later 
by the Parisian Lutheran theologian Eugène Ménégoz in 1879: by Robitaille to refer 
to the thought of Lamennais and by Ménégoz to refer to his own system.  It was also 
used by the Roman Catholic philosopher Léon Ollé-Laprune in 1880.  Carroll writes: 
Neither Ménégoz nor Ollé-Laprune gives any indication of awareness of the 
term’s having already been in use.  Both authors appear to take themselves to 
be coining or otherwise appropriating the term (in both cases, placing it in 
italics).  It is a testament to how cut off from one another Protestant and 
Catholic theologians in France were that Ménégoz did not discover the 
Catholic use of the word until three decades later when the 1907 encyclical 
Pascendi Dominici Gregis was written.6 
 
He later adds, ‘Within a few decades after its appearance in French, the term 
“fideism” appears in English and other European languages, and enters more fully 
into Catholic and Protestant theological conversation.  Eventually, it would find a 
place in philosophical discourse.’7 
Ménégoz (1838-1921) and his colleague Auguste Sabatier (1839-1901) 
developed their view—sometimes called ‘symbolo-fideism’—as a positive 
programme of post-Enlightenment Protestant theology, seeking to take account of 
modern science and historical-critical interpretations of Scripture.8  Seeing themselves 
as the heirs of Luther, Calvin, Kant, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl, they were also 
                                                 
6 Carroll, ‘The Traditions of Fideism,’ 10-11.  Pascendi Dominici Gregis was published by Pope Pius 
X on 8 September 1907 ‘on the doctrines of the Modernists’.  An on-line English translation may be 
found on the Vatican website: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_x/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
x_enc_19070908_pascendi-dominici-gregis_en.html (accessed on 13 April 2008).  For the original 
Latin text, see Henrici Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus 
fidei et morum, edited by Peter Hünermann (Herder, 1991), §§3475-3500. 
7 Ibid., 11. 
8 Ibid.   
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keenly aware of the new challenges to faith and theology raised by both Darwin and 
historicism.  Summarising their work, Carroll writes: 
In depicting the faith alone that is to be the essence of religion (and 
Christianity supremely)—fideism—Ménégoz first circumscribes the region in 
which it lies by delimiting the regions in which the essence of faith does not 
lie: ancient metaphysics, ancient sacred texts, science, and philosophy.  
Christian faith also does not lie in any particular historical expression of itself: 
it lies in the experience of transcendence that the believer has through 
contemporary religious symbols.9 
     
Thus, ‘fideism’ in this context means the very specific school of thought developed by 
Ménégoz and Sabatier and their followers in the Protestant theology faculty in Paris—
it was a positive self-designation. 
Like ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star,’ however, within Roman 
Catholicism ‘fideism’ differs in sense, if not in reference, to its use in Protestantism.  
As Carroll notes, ‘Protestants occasionally use the term to describe their own views, 
whereas Catholics treat fideism as a charge to be avoided.’10  More significantly, 
however, the term also seems to have a rather different meaning in Catholic discourse, 
so both sense and reference may be different.11  In what Nicholas Wolterstorff 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 15.  See pages 11-15 of Carroll’s article for more detail.  Very little has been written on either 
Ménégoz or Sabatier: Carroll’s article seems to be the first piece of scholarship on them, at least in 
English, for several decades.  Sabatier is the more well-known figure of the two and shows up in 
various reference works and discussions of symbolism, whereas Ménégoz seems largely forgotten, 
despite being senior to Sabatier in Carroll’s presentation.  See, for example, the entry on ‘Fideism’ in F. 
L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Third Edition 
(Oxford University Press, 1997), 609, and Alistair Mason, ‘Fideism,’ in Adrian Hastings, et. al. (eds.), 
The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought (Oxford University Press, 2000), 240-241. 
10 Carroll, 10.  And not only Catholics.  Most Protestants would rather not be explicitly associated with 
fideism, either.  See Steven G. Smith, ‘Karl Barth and Fideism: A Reconsideration’, in Anglican 
Theological Review (Volume LXVI, Number 1, January 1984), 64-78.  
11 See G. M. Sauvage, ‘Fideism,’ in The Catholic Encyclopedia: An International Work of Reference 
on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline, and History of the Catholic Church, Volume VI (Caxton 
Publishing Company, 1909), 68-69; Paul Poupard, ‘Fideism,’ in Sacramentum Mundi: An 
Encyclopedia of Theology, Volume Two (Burns and Oates, 1968), 335-337; and most especially S. A. 
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describes as an ‘authoritative Catholic treatment of fideism,’ the Roman Catholic 
philosopher and theologian S. A. Matczak says, ‘By fideism Ménégoz meant sola 
fides that consists of the movement of oneself to God, independently of the adherence 
to certain beliefs or to revealed truth; such faith is justifying faith.’12  Thus, as 
Matczak understands him, Ménégoz’s primary concern was soteriological rather than 
epistemological.  However, Matczak says, ‘Catholic usage of the term fideism, 
particularly in the teaching of the traditionalists, gives the opposite meaning to this 
term; fideism means the acceptance of the fundamental truth on the authority of God; 
hence faith becomes a criterion of truth.’13  Whether or not Matczak understands 
Ménégoz correctly, or whether or not ‘Catholic usage’ is ‘opposed’ to Ménégoz’s, 
with Matczak’s discussion of fideism we now shift from Protestant soteriology to the 
far more epistemologically-oriented realm of Roman Catholicism.  And perhaps even 
more significant than epistemology is the great interest and direct involvement of the 
Magisterium, papal encyclicals, and Vatican Council decrees on this matter. 
While Ménégoz and Sabatier may have eventually influenced some Modernist 
currents of late 19th and early 20th century Roman Catholic thought, ‘fideism’ in 
Roman Catholic use is primarily associated with ‘traditionalism’ and Abbé Louis 
Eugène Marie Bautain (1796-1867).14  As Matczak explains it, traditionalism held 
                                                                                                                                            
Matczak, ‘Fideism,’ in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, Second Edition, Volume 5 (Thomson Gale in 
association with the Catholic University of America, 2003), 711-713.    
12 S. A. Matczak, ‘Fideism,’ 711.  Poupard, another Roman Catholic, also notes that ‘the word has a 
special meaning when used in French Protestant theology’ (‘Fideism,’ 336).  For Wolterstorff’s 
comment, see his article ‘Faith’ in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 3 (Routledge, 
1998), 544.  Wolterstorff is referring to Matczak’s entry in the first, 1967 edition of the New Catholic 
Encyclopedia, but it appears unchanged in the second edition of 2003. 
13 Ibid. 
14 For traditionalism, see S. A. Matczak (again), ‘Traditionalism,’ The New Catholic Encyclopedia, 
Second Edition, Volume 14, 138-140, and the entry on ‘Traditionalism’ in The Oxford Dictionary of the 
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that ‘the principal truths of a metaphysical and moral nature can be attained by man 
through God’s revelation alone.  According to traditionalism, human reason by itself 
is not capable of coming to these truths; it needs external instruction—in the last 
resort, divine revelation.’15  Traditionalism is thus a species of fideism.  Matczak then 
technically defines fideism, from a Roman Catholic perspective, as 
a philosophical and theological doctrine or attitude that minimizes the capacity 
of the human intellect to attain certitude and assigns faith as a criterion of the 
fundamental truths.  Thus, God’s existence, the immortality of the soul, the 
principles of morality, the fact of divine revelation, and the credibility of 
Christianity cannot be proved by reason alone, but must be accepted on 
authority.16 
 
Traditionalism may differ from fideism simpliciter in that it specifies tradition as the 
authority on which such beliefs must be accepted. 
Although several other figures were involved with the traditionalist 
movement—L. G. A. de Bonald (1754-1840), the famous F. R. de Lamennais (1782-
1854), A. Bonnetty (1789-1879), G. C. Ubaghs (1800-1875), and the so-called 
‘Louvain school of traditionalism’—as far as fideism is concerned, Bautain is 
regarded as the classic exemplar and cause célèbre.17  Ordained in 1828, Dean of the 
Faculty of Letters at the University of Strasbourg from 1838, Vicar-General for the 
Archbishop of Paris from 1849, and Professor of Moral Theology at the Sorbonne 
from 1853 to 1863, Bautain enjoyed a brilliant academic and ecclesial career.  
                                                                                                                                            
Christian Church, Third Edition, 1635-1636.  For Bautain, see Paul Poupard (again), ‘Bautain, Louis 
Eugène Marie,’ The New Catholic Encyclopedia, Second Edition, Volume 2, 161.   
15 Matczak, ‘Traditionalism,’ 138. 
16 Matczak, ‘Fideism,’ 711.  
17 Poupard, ‘Fideism,’ 336; see Matczak, ‘Traditionalism,’ 138, for the reference to the ‘Louvain 
school.’  ‘Traditionalism’ and ‘fideism’ are used almost although not quite interchangeably in these 
various reference articles, with Poupard associating Bonald and Lamennais primarily with 
traditionalism and Bautain and Bonnetty primarily with fideism, but with the latter two ‘in close 
liaison’ with the former two (336).  Matczak acknowledges that accurately distinguishing and 
classifying the various figures is difficult (‘Traditionalism,’ 138). 
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However, both traditionalism and fideism were eventually condemned by the Church 
as incompatible with Catholic dogma, and between 1834 and 1840 Bautain was twice 
forced by his authorities to assent to six statements that explicitly repudiated his 
teaching and published work.18  In particular, Bautain was required to affirm the 
following two theses, contrary to fideism:  
• ‘Human reason is able to prove with certitude the existence of God; faith, a 
heavenly gift, is posterior to revelation, and therefore cannot be properly used 
against the atheist to prove the existence of God.’ 
 
• ‘The use of reason precedes faith and, with the help of revelation and grace, 
leads to it.’19 
 
Moving to the present day, Carroll notes that ‘probably the most widely read 
text to mention fideism explicitly’—whether Catholic or Protestant—is Pope John 
Paul II’s 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio.20  For example, in Paragraph 52 of Chapter 
                                                 
18 Sauvage, ‘Fideism,’ 69; Poupard, ‘Fideism,’ 336, and ‘Bautain, Louis Eugène Marie,’ 161; Matczak, 
‘Fideism,’ 711.  Carroll covers this period in 15-17 of ‘The Traditions of Fideism.’  
19 Cited from Denzinger in Sauvage, ‘Fideism,’ 69: Theses a Ludovico Eugenio Bautain iusse sui 
Episcopi subscriptae (8 September 1840).  The original text (in French rather than Latin) may be found 
in Denzinger §§2751-56.  The first thesis cited above (number 1 from, in fact, the 1835 theses rather 
than the 1840 version) reads, ‘Le raisonnement peut prouver avec certitude l’existence de Dieu. – La 
foi, don du ciel, est postérieure à la révélation; elle ne peut donc pas convenablement être alléguée vis-
à-vis d’un athée en preuve de l’existence de Dieu.’ (§2751)  And the second thesis cited above (number 
5 of the six 1835 theses) reads, ‘L’usage de la raison precede la foi, et y conduit l’homme par la 
révélation et la grace.’ (§2755)  As we will see further in Chapters Three and Four, Austin Farrer 
denied the substance of both theses. 
20 Carroll, 5.  Fides et Ratio was published on 14 September 1998.  I will cite from Laurence Paul 
Hemming and Susan Frank Parsons (eds.), Restoring Faith in Reason: A New Translation of the 
Encyclical Letter Faith and Reason of Pope John Paul II together with a commentary and discussion 
(SCM Press, 2002).  This edition contains a valuable commentary on the encyclical by James McEvoy, 
as well as responses by various scholars such as Nicholas Lash and Robert Sokolowski.  Janet Martin 
Soskice’s ‘Fides et Ratio: The Postmodern Pope’ (292-296) considers the document’s treatment of 
fideism on page 295, stating that John Paul II sees fideism as ‘a form of nihilism.’  The official English 
translation as well as the original Latin text may also be found on the Vatican website at: 
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/_INDEX.HTM (accessed on 12 April 2008) and 
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/LAT0381/_INDEX.HTM (accessed on 13 April 2008). 
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V, ‘The Judgements of the Magisterium Upon Philosophy’ (‘De Re Philosophica 
Magisterii Iudicia’), the Pope surveys precisely the period and figures just mentioned.  
Acknowledging that ‘the voice of the Magisterium was heard more frequently in the 
nineteenth century’ than in some previous periods, he explains that these interventions 
were due to the philosophical ferment and confusion caused not only by the welter of 
non-Christian thought, but also by well-meaning but misguided Catholic philosophers 
seeking to respond to these challenges on behalf of the Church.  He thus writes:     
In those days the Church’s Magisterium was compelled to make sure that 
these [Catholic] philosophical views did not in their turn assume false or 
negative forms.  Consequently censure was imposed equally on fideism and 
radical traditionalism because of their distrust of the natural faculties of 
reason; on the other hand rationalism and ontologism were also censured 
because they assigned to natural reason what could only be known by the light 
of faith.  Whatever was validly contained in these discussions was included in 
the decree Dei Filius, in which the First Vatican Council gave solemn 
expression to the relationship between revelation and faith.  The teaching 
which is contained in that document had a profound and healthy effect upon 
the philosophical investigations of many of the faithful, and even today stands 
out as a point of reference for which we should aim if we wish to arrive at a 
fair and appropriate Christian exploration of these issues.21 
 
                                                 
21 Hemming and Parsons (eds.), Restoring Faith in Reason, 87 (italics in the original).  The official 
Latin text (on page 84 and 86) reads: ‘Tunc autem Ecclesiae Magisterium omnino coactum est ad 
vigilandum ne hae philosophicae doctrinae vicissim in formas falsas et negatorias transgrederentur.  
Sunt idcirco censura aequabiliter affecti hinc fideismus et traditionalismus radicalis, propter eorum 
diffidentiam naturalium rationis facultatum, illinc rationalismus, et ontologismus, quandoquidem 
rationi naturali id tribuebant, quod solummodo fidei lumine cognosci potest.  Quae valida in his 
disceptationibus continebantur Constitutione dogmantica Dei filius recepta sunt, qua primum Concilum 
Oecumenicum quoddam, Vaticanum scilicet I, sollemniter inter Revelationem ac fidem necessitudinem 
pertractavit.  Doctrina quae in documento illo continetur penitus et salubriter philosophicam 
complurium fidelium inquisitionem affecit atque hodiernis quoque temporibus quiddam perstat 
praeceptivum ad quod tendere debemus ad iustam congruentemque christianam hac de re inquisitionem 
consequendam.’  Interestingly, the translation of the Hemming / Parsons edition omits the specific 
claim in the Latin above that, as the official English translation puts it, ‘for the first time an Ecumenical 
Council—in this case, the First Vatican Council—pronounced solemnly on the relationship between 
reason and faith.’  The official translation continues: ‘The teaching contained in this document strongly 
and positively marked the philosophical research of many believers and remains today a standard 
reference-point for correct and coherent Christian thinking in this regard.’ 
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After mentioning fideism (fideismus) the text cites in a footnote the 
condemnation of Bautain discussed above:  Theses a Ludovico Eugenio Bautain iusse 
sui Episcopi subscriptae (8 September 1840) and Theses a Ludovico Eugenio Bautain 
ex mandato S. Cong. Episcoporum et Religiosorum subscriptae (26 April 1844).22  
Whatever was ‘validly contained in these discussions,’ the Pope says, ‘was included 
in the decree Dei Filius’ from the First Vatican Council, which ‘even today stands out 
as a point of reference for which we should aim if we wish to arrive at a fair and 
appropriate Christian exploration of these issues.’  In other words, according to Pope 
John Paul II’s 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio, the contemporary mind of the Roman 
Catholic Church on what it understands as ‘fideism’ is apparently still to be found in 
the decrees of the First Vatican Council of 1869-1870.23 
And in those decrees, from Chapter 2, ‘On revelation’ (‘De revelatione’) in 
Session III, ‘Dogmatic constitution on the catholic faith’ (‘Constitutio dogmatica de 
fide catholica’), we read that the Church ‘holds and teaches that God, the source and 
end of all things, can be known with certainty from the consideration of created 
things, by the natural power of human reason’ (citing Romans 1.20).24  And Chapter 
4, ‘On faith and reason’ (‘De fide et ratione’) states: ‘Even though faith is above 
reason, there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason, since it is 
the same God who reveals the mysteries and infuses faith, and who has endowed the 
                                                 
22 Denzinger, §§2751-56 and §§2765-69.  Fides et Ratio also discusses ‘the seductive attractions of 
fideism’ (‘proclivita ad fidem blandimenta’) in Chapter V, Paragraphs 53 and 55.  
23 Although the exact title does not appear as such in Tanner (see below), Session III, promulgated on 
24 April 1870, is known as Dei Filius.  Although I will cite these documents from Tanner, Dei Filius 
may also be found in Denzinger §§3000-45. 
24 Norman P. Tanner SJ (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Volume Two (Trent to Vatican II) 
(Sheed & Ward and Georgetown University Press, 1990), 806: ‘Eadem sancta mater ecclesia tenet et 
docet, Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali humanae rationis lumine e rebus creatis 
certo cognosci posse’. 
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human mind with the light of reason.  God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever be 
in opposition to truth.’25  Thus, the famous canon: ‘If anyone says that the one, true 
God, our creator and lord, cannot be known with certainty from the things that have 
been made, by the natural light of reason: let him be anathema.’26 
 Now, much can be and has been said on the epistemological implications of 
Dei Filius that cannot detain us here, and I will return to this question in Chapter 
Five.27  However, it is important to briefly comment on three matters.  First, Carroll 
points out that although John Paul II clearly takes Dei Filius to be condemning 
fideism, the word itself does not appear in the documents of Vatican I.  According to 
Carroll, the word ‘fideism’ does not appear in a papal encyclical until Pascendi 
Dominici Gregis of 1907.28  That may be less significant than Carroll thinks, in that 
Dei Filius ends with a general warning to avoid all ‘such wrong opinions, though not 
expressly mentioned in this document, [that] have been banned and forbidden by this 
                                                 
25 Tanner, Decrees, 808-809: ‘Verum etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen unquam inter fidem et 
rationem vera dissensio esse potest: cum idem Deus, qui mysteria revelat et fidem infundit, animo 
humano rationis lumen indiderit; Deus autem negare seipsum non possit, nec verum vero unquam 
contradicere.’ 
26 Tanner, Decrees, 810.  This is the first canon from the second set of canons, ‘On revelation’ (‘De 
revelatione’): ‘Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, creatorem et dominum nostrum, per ea, quae facta 
sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse: a. s.’  
27 Regarding the epistemological commitments of Vatican I, Denys Turner explores this issue at length 
in Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God (Cambridge University Press, 2004), seriously considering 
‘the possibility that the Bishops of the First Vatican Council were right—and, after all, they might be.’ 
(xi)  See also the general discussion of natural theology in Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of 
Thomism (Blackwell, 2002), 35-51, and especially 37-38 where he considers Vatican I.  On 60-63 he 
discusses the alleged ‘scriptural authority’ for natural theology provided by the common citation of 
Romans 1.20, as seen above.  As Kerr puts it, for Thomas Aquinas, at any rate (and so, perhaps, for 
Vatican I as well), Romans 1.20 means that ‘it has been divinely revealed that the existence of God can 
be demonstrated from reasoning from the existence and nature of the world.  It is a matter of faith that 
God’s existence can be discovered from reason.’ (60) 
28 See Carroll, 6 and 16-17.  Pascendi Dominici Gregis is cited in note 6 above. 
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holy see.’29  Carroll’s main point, however, is that in contexts such as Pascendi 
Dominici Gregis and Fides et Ratio ‘the meaning of “fideism” is presumed to be 
understood—and to be understood as a term of reproach.’30 
 Second, Dei Filius (24 April 1870)—as well as, more immediately, Pascendi 
Dominici Gregis (8 September 1907)—set the stage for the Anti-Modernist Oath, or 
Oath Against Modernism, which was issued by Pope Pius X on 1 September 1910 and 
officially remained in effect until 1967.31  To be sworn by all clergy, pastors, 
confessors, preachers, religious superiors, and professors in theological seminaries, 
the oath begins as follows: 
I, _______, firmly embrace and accept all and each of the things defined, 
affirmed and declared by the inerrant Magisterium of the Church, mainly those 
points of doctrine directly opposed to the errors of our time.  And in the first 
place I profess that God, beginning and end of all things, can be certainly 
known, and therefore also proved, as the cause through the effects, by the 
natural light of reason through the things that have been made, that is, through 
the visible works of creation.32 
 
Obviously, the second sentence is a direct reference to the passages from Dei Filius 
cited above.  Hence the very first profession of the oath entails the rejection of 
fideism, as understood by the Roman Catholic Church.  Epistemological concerns are 
‘front and centre.’ 
                                                 
29 Tanner, Decrees, 811. 
30 Carroll, 6. 
31 Denzinger §§3537-3550.  It is also reproduced in English as the Appendix of Fergus Kerr’s 
Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism (Blackwell, 
2007), 223-225.  See Kerr’s discussion in a section of his first chapter (‘Before Vatican II’), aptly titled 
‘Reason under Oath,’ 1-3.  For an on-line version of the Oath, in both Latin and English, see 
http://www.traditionalcatholic.net/Tradition/Prayer/Modernism_Oath.html (accessed on 14 April 
2008).   
32 In Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians, 223.  As cited in Denzinger §3538, the Latin of 
the second sentence reads: ‘Ac primum quidem: Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali 
rationis lumine “per ea quae facta sunt” [Rm 1,20], hoc est, per visibilia creationis opera, tamquam 
causam per effectus, certo cognosci, adeoque demonstrari etiam posse, profiteor.’ 
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 Third and finally, it is important to note that both Dei Filius and the Oath 
insist that belief in God’s existence is not simply rational, or supported by arguments 
and evidence, but that God’s existence can be ‘certainly known, and therefore also 
proved’ (‘certo cognosci, adeoque demonstrari etiam posse’).  God ‘can be known 
with certainty from the consideration of created things, by the natural power of human 
reason’ (‘naturali humanae rationis lumine e rebus creatis certo cognosci posse’).  
Thus, at least according to the standard reading of these two documents, certain proof 
and hence knowledge of God through human reason is the traditional epistemological 
standard to which the Church summons the faithful.33 
 B. ‘Semi-fideism’: An Essential Excursus 
And not just the existence of God, but the immortality of the soul, the 
principles of morality, the fact of divine revelation, and the credibility of 
Christianity—all of this can and must be, not just supported, but proved by reason 
alone.  Matczak helpfully clarifies this traditional Roman Catholic epistemological 
standard by introducing the sub-category of semi-fideism.  Semi-fideism ‘holds that 
man reaches truth by reason, but with probability only and not with certitude.’34  
Although semi-fideism is less irrational and thus less objectionable than fideism 
                                                 
33 Kerr questions this conventionally rationalistic reading of Vatican I in his After Aquinas, seeing it as 
overly indebted to the Leonine Thomism instigated by Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris (see note 35 below).  
Stating that the Council ‘sought to steer a way between the twin errors of fideism and rationalism,’ 
when read rightly in this context ‘the claim for the possibility of knowing God with certainty from the 
world, by the natural light of reason, is not as ambitious as Roman Catholic apologists have often 
hoped and Barthian theologians always feared….The emphasis is entirely on the claim that reasoning 
of some kind from the existence of the world to the existence of God is possible, without appealing to 
faith’ (38).  I am sympathetic to this interpretative strategy, if not necessarily persuaded.  Denys 
Turner, at least, takes the more ambitious reading for granted.  In comments on an earlier version of 
this chapter, David Brown pointed out that Kerr’s rather more modest interpretation is at least 
allowable in the ambiguous Latin of Vatican I, if not supported by the conventional reading of it.      
34 Matczak, ‘Fideism,’ 711.  Matczak uses the term without a hyphen, but I follow Brush in adding it, 
and adapt quotations from Matczak accordingly. 
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simpliciter, it too is an unacceptable position in the eyes of the Church.  Matczak 
writes: ‘The Church’s rejection of semi-fideism can be deduced from its insistence, in 
the above cited decrees [e.g., the theses against Bautain, various papal encyclicals 
including Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris, and Vatican I], on the proofs with certitude of 
God’s existence, of the spirituality of the soul, and of the credibility of divine 
revelation.  The particularly important decree for this certitude is that of Vatican 
Council I’.35 
The term ‘semi-fideism’ in Catholic theological discourse—at least in 
English—seems both to originate with and be limited to Matczak’s article in The New 
Catholic Encyclopedia.  So far, I have found no other use of the term in Roman 
Catholic reference works or theology texts, although with the second (2003) edition of 
The New Catholic Encyclopedia, Matczak’s original (1967) article is still current, 
widely read, and—as Wolterstorff says—‘authoritative’ (in the scholarly sense that it 
accurately summarises traditional Catholic teaching on this issue).  Carroll does not 
discuss semi-fideism as such or by name.  On-line searches in English, Latin, and 
French reveal very little use of the term at all: contemporary academic discussion 
seems to associate it not with Roman Catholicism per se but with the thought of the 
French Protestant Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), and this association seems to have 
originated in Bayle studies with Craig B. Brush, Montaigne and Bayle: Variations on 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 712.  Pope Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris, ‘On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy’ (Denzinger 
§§3135-40), published on 4 August 1879, was an immensely influential text, instigating the renewal of 
the study of St Thomas Aquinas throughout the Church, and thus the development of so-called neo-
Thomism and neo-scholasticism in pre-Vatican II Roman Catholicism.  While it is thus also highly 
relevant for the Roman Catholic understanding of fideism, it cannot be considered further here.  For an 
on-line English translation see the official Vatican website: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/ 
encyclicals /documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris_en.html (accessed on 14 April 2008).   
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the Theme of Skepticism.36  But, as this text appeared the year before Matczak’s article 
was first published, it is very unlikely to have influenced his terminology.  Brush 
himself seems to be relying on what he calls a ‘conservative Catholic’ text by Herman 
Janssen, published in 1930, and has apparently appropriated an apt Catholic term to 
describe Bayle’s religious epistemology.  Thus, according to Brush, ‘To hold that [the 
existence of God, the fact of divine revelation, and God’s trustworthiness] are 
demonstrated only probably, and not conclusively, is semi-fideism.’37 
But the specific category (of error) that Matczak, Brush, and perhaps Janssen 
call semi-fideism was certainly recognised by the Church beforehand, with or without 
a particular term to describe it, as the decrees and encyclicals and council documents 
cited above indicate.  G. M. Sauvage, writing over half a century earlier than Matczak 
in The Catholic Encyclopedia of 1909, does not use the term ‘semi-fideism’.  
However, he still writes: 
As to the opinion of those who maintain that our supernatural assent is 
prepared for by motives of credibility merely probable, it is evident that it 
                                                 
36 (cited in note 4).  See, for example, Karl C. Sandberg’s review of Brush’s book in Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 8 (1970), 103-104; and Sean O’Cathasaigh, ‘Skepticism and Belief in Pierre 
Bayle’s Nouvelle Letteres Critiques,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984), 421-433.  A text that 
uses the term without reference to Brush is D. E. Curtis, ‘Pierre Bayle and the Range of Cartesian 
Reason,’ Yale French Studies 49 (1973), 71-81. 
37 Brush, 19.  In footnote 1 on page 19, Brush says, ‘The definition of fideism adopted here is the 
conservative Catholic one used by Herman Janssen in his Montaigne fidéist (Nijmegen and Utrecht: 
Dekker and van de Vegt and van Leeuwen, 1930),’ although he also depends on Sauvage’s article on 
‘fideism’ in the 1909 Catholic Encyclopedia, which he cites at length (as do I, on the following page).  
So Janssen may well be Brush’s source for the term ‘semi-fideism,’ particularly as he describes it as a 
‘technical term’ when applying it to Bayle’s position on the rationality of religious belief (300).  Brush 
correctly realises, however, that he is using both ‘fideism’ and ‘semi-fideism’ anachronistically in 
applying either one or the other to Bayle or anyone in his era: fideism is ‘a nineteenth century name’ 
(18); ‘the word, originally coined by French Protestant theologians, varies in its usage’ (19 footnote 1); 
‘One must remember that that concept of fideism is a modern one, and that many precise philosophical 
distinctions familiar to the modern world were unknown in the greater part of the sixteenth century’ (19 
footnote 1).  Carroll would approve of his historical sensitivity. 
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logically destroys the certitude of such an assent.  This opinion was 
condemned by Innocent XI in the decree of 2 March, 1679 [Denzinger §2121], 
and by Pius X in the decree ‘Lamentabili sane’ [§3425]: ‘Assensus fidei 
ultimo innititut in congerie probabilitatum’ (The assent of faith is ultimately 
based on a sum of probabilities).  Revelation, indeed, is the supreme motive 
for faith in supernatural truths, yet the existence of this motive and its validity 
has to be established by reason.38 
 
Matczak says rather dismissively that semi-fideism ‘is accepted mainly by 
some scientists.’39  However, for those attuned to certain currents in recent Anglo-
American philosophy of religion, semi-fideism sounds rather familiar: it is, in fact, 
identical to the cumulative case, or probabilistic, approach to religious epistemology 
discussed in Chapter One, which is precisely concerned with a congerie 
probabilitatum.40  And this probabilistic strategy has, moreover, been identified as 
particularly characteristic of Anglicanism.  Without using the term ‘semi-fideism,’ 
William J. Abraham states that the cumulative case approach ‘constitutes a fascinating 
alternative to the prevailing options in philosophy on the rationality of religious 
belief.  Thus, in a characteristically Anglican fashion it seems to chart a via media 
between the classical proofs of the natural theologians and the voluntarism of the 
fideists.’41  Here, in distinguishing the cumulative case approach from both natural 
                                                 
38 Sauvage, ‘Fideism,’ 69.  I have updated Sauvage’s older Denzinger references with the current 
numbering system.  Lamentabili sane, Pope Pius X’s ‘Syllabus Lamenting the Errors of the 
Modernists’ (Denzinger §§3401-66) was published on 3 July 1907 and so several months before his 
similarly-themed encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis (cited in note 6).  Lamentabili sane seems not to 
be on the Vatican website, but an English translation may be found on-line at 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius10/p10lamen.htm (accessed 14 April 2008).  The proposition cited 
by Sauvage to be ‘condemned and proscribed’ is Number 25 (Denzinger §3425), given in both Latin 
and English above, and translated slightly differently on this website as: ‘The assent of faith ultimately 
rests on a mass of probabilities.’ 
39 Matczak, ‘Fideism,’ 711. 
40 See William J. Abraham, ‘Cumulative Case Arguments for Christian Theism,’ in William J. 
Abraham and Steven W. Holtzer (eds.), The Rationality of Religious Belief: Essays in Honour of Basil 
Mitchell (Clarendon Press, 1987), 17-37.   
41 Ibid., 18-19. 
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theology and fideism, Abraham argues that these are not the mutually exclusive 
options they are often advertised to be, but that between them one may find a via 
media, a tertium quid.  Elsewhere, Abraham is more specific about why he sees this 
approach to religious epistemology as rooted in or associated with Anglicanism: 
It is surely no accident that cumulative case arguments become the hallmark of 
religious epistemology in the Anglican tradition.  One thinks immediately of a 
line of great figures: Richard Hooker, William Chillingworth, John Locke, 
Bishop Butler, John Henry Newman, [F. R.] Tennant, J. R. Lucas, Basil 
Mitchell, and Richard Swinburne.  Just as there is a distinctive Reformed 
epistemology and a distinctive Roman Catholic epistemology, there is also a 
distinctive Anglican epistemology.  The full sweep of this tradition awaits 
careful historical exposition which would attend to its continuities and 
diversity.42 
 
The fact that that Basil Mitchell (though not Austin Farrer) is included in that 
list may be taken as a hint to the reader that this chapter’s journey through the history 
of fideism does have a purpose and will eventually join up with the main argument of 
the dissertation.43  For now, let me simply note that, to the extent that it demurs from 
                                                 
42 William J. Abraham, Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology: From the Fathers to Feminism 
(Oxford University Press, 1998), 212 footnote 50.  This note occurs in a chapter titled ‘Canonical 
Synthesis: The Anglican Via Media’ (188-214).  Abraham, a Northern Irish Methodist, is not entirely 
sanguine about this allegedly Anglican epistemology and goes on to raise a number of critical 
concerns.  It should be noted that, in his list of great Anglican epistemologists, Newman of course 
became a Roman Catholic and Swinburne is now Orthodox—and yet each continued to hold his 
previously constructed ‘Anglican’ epistemology.  It should also be noted that instead of the obviously 
intended F. R. Tennant (1866-1957), the English philosophical theologian, Abraham accidentally 
included William Tennant (1784-1848), a native of Anstruther, Fife, sometime Professor of Oriental 
Languages at St Mary’s College, University of St Andrews, and author of a Scots poem, Papistry 
Storm’d (1827).   
43 Actually, Abraham does include Farrer in an earlier list from 1987, along with some non-Anglican 
figures.  He writes, ‘Any through historical survey [of cumulative case arguments] would have to 
include figures as diverse as Charles Hartshorne, Richard Swinburne, Elton Trueblood, Basil Mitchell, 
J. R. Lucas, Austin Farrer, and Gary Gutting.  All of these have in one way or another deployed 
cumulative case arguments to support the rationality of religious belief.  In doing so they have 
highlighted and retrieved an approach to natural theology that can be traced right back to F. R. Tennant 
and John Henry Newman to Joseph Butler.’ (17)  Two additional contemporary Anglican defenders of 
the cumulative case approach that could be added are the late William P. Alston and David Brown.    
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attributing proof and certainty (‘certo cognosci’) to our knowledge of God, traditional 
Anglican religious epistemology seems identical to an error condemned by the Roman 
Catholic Church in Vatican I, an error explicitly proscribed by Pius X in Lamentabili 
sane (‘The assent of faith ultimately rests on a mass of probabilities’), an error 
understood by the Church to be a species of fideism, an error to which S. A. Matczak 
and others assign the term ‘semi-fideism’.  I therefore suggest that Anglican 
epistemology is equivalent to semi-fideism—or, perhaps better, what Abraham calls 
‘soft rationalism’.44  I will return to this thought in Section IV below. 
 C. Philosophical Definitions of ‘Fideism’ 
 Given the origins of the term in 19th century French theology, both Protestant 
and Catholic, Thomas D. Carroll worries that when fideism is (properly) defined ‘in a 
historically sensitive way, it may not be robust enough to survive being detached from 
its context.’45  Non-historically sensitive usage tends to oscillate between vagueness 
of content and inaccuracy of application.  But ‘fideism’ is now employed most often 
in precisely such detached contexts, being considered as a ‘general category in 
religious and philosophical thought.’46  As Carroll explains in a valuable summary, 
over the course of the 20th century,   
use of the term ‘fideism’ drifts from these nineteenth-century contexts and is 
projected back through the history of ideas to refer to philosophers and 
theologians such as Kierkegaard, Montaigne, Pascal, Erasmus, and Tertullian.  
In each of these thinkers, embrace of Christian faith was coupled with a 
relative lack of trust in philosophy for discovering religious truth.  The term 
                                                 
44 See William J. Abraham, ‘Soft Rationalism’ in Michael Peterson, et. al. (eds.), Philosophy of 
Religion: Selected Readings, Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2000), 98-108.  As Abraham 
presents it, soft rationalism has three main tenets: (i) religious belief should be assessed as a ‘global 
theory’ or worldview; (ii) assessment of such global theories is never a matter of ‘simple demonstration 
or strict probabilistic reasoning’; and yet (iii) such cumulative-case assessment is still genuinely 
rational.  Soft rationalism is thus a rational alternative to either ‘hard rationalism’ or fideism.   
45 Carroll, 7-8.  
46 Ibid., 6. 
 85
was taken to be helpful for understanding the occasional opposition, for 
religious reasons, between philosophy and theology.47 
 
In making this observation, Carroll now moves us from the concerns of the 
historian of dogma or ideas back to our primary interest in theology and philosophy of 
religion.  For when one encounters references to fideism in such contemporary 
contexts, it is almost always described ahistorically as a philosophical position that 
has existed from the dawn of time—or, at least, Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-275 BCE).  As 
Carroll puts it, ‘philosophers, on the whole, have been drawn to seek after the 
essential doctrine underlying various instances of fideism through intellectual 
history’.48  For a widely read and very useful example of this tendency, consider the 
anonymously-written definition of fideism offered in A Dictionary of Philosophy 
(edited by Antony Flew) which was already cited in Chapter One: 
The view, recurrent throughout religious history, that essential religious 
doctrines cannot be established by rational means, but only accepted, if at all, 
by acts of faith.  Its extreme form (for example, in Kierkegaard) holds that 
religion requires the acceptance of doctrines actually absurd or contrary to 
reason (compare credo quia impossibile).   In its more moderate forms (for 
example, in St Augustine or Pascal), reason is not antithetically opposed to 
faith, but plays an auxiliary role in formulating or elucidating what must first 
be accepted by faith.49 
 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 17. 
48 Ibid., 5.  Thus, even Matczak, despite his expert awareness of the specific historical derivation of 
‘fideism’ with Ménégoz and Sabatier, its association with Bautain and subsequent treatment by the 
Magisterium, nevertheless includes the following figures and movements as somehow representative of 
or touched by fideism: Tertullian (c.160-c.225), al-Ghazzālī (1058-1111), William of Ockham (c.1285-
c.1347), Martin Luther (1483-1546) and Protestantism generally, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), 
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Thomas Reid (1710-1796), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Friedrich Jacobi 
(1743-1819), Johann Herder (1744-1803), Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Charles S. Peirce 
(1839-1914), Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and existentialism generally, William James (1842-
1910), Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976), Martin Buber (1878-1965), Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), Karl 
Barth (1886-1968), and Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973).  Other figures commonly associated with fideism 
are Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Lev (Leo) Shestov (1866-1938), and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951).  
49 A Dictionary of Philosophy, editorial consultant, Anthony Flew (Pan Books, Second Revised 
Edition, 1983), 120. 
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And the very distinguished, late, Roman Catholic, analytic philosopher of religion 
Philip Quinn, in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, offers an almost identical 
entry, although with a stronger interpretive sting in the tail: 
Fideists hold that religious belief is based on faith rather than reason.  Extreme 
fideists maintain that it is contrary to reason; moderate fideists argue that what 
must first be accepted on faith may subsequently find rational support.  The 
maxim credo quia absurdum est encapsulates the former view; the slogan 
credo ut intelligam epitomizes the latter.  There being no reason to prefer one 
absurdity to another, the commitments of extreme fideists are bound to seem 
arbitrary.50 
 
It would, of course, be possible to question these entries’ interpretations of 
Tertullian (by allusion—note the two different versions of his famous, controversial, 
oft-misunderstood, and even mis-rendered tag), Augustine (by name and allusion), 
Anselm (by allusion), Pascal, and Kierkegaard—and that is partly Carroll’s concern.51  
But the broader question he raises about such standard philosophical definitions of 
fideism is their ahistorical and/or pejorative character.  That is, given the word’s 
actual origins, to what extent may we rightly describe fideism as the view, ‘recurrent 
throughout religious history, that essential religious doctrines cannot be established 
by rational means, but only accepted, if at all, by acts of faith’ (Flew, emphasis 
added)?  Carroll questions whether there is, indeed, any such recurrent animal (or 
                                                 
50 Philip Quinn, ‘fideism,’ in Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Second 
Edition (Oxford University Press, 2005), 301. 
51 For example, he points out that, according to Geoffrey D. Dunn’s Tertullian (New York: Routledge, 
2004), Tertullian did not, in fact, say either credo quia impossibile or credo quia absurdum est, but 
credible est, quia ineptum est (Carroll, page 7 and note 24).  And others have argued that precisely 
what Tertullian meant by this phrase should be construed against the background of legal rhetoric 
rather than sceptical philosophy: he was trying to win a case, not solve an epistemological dilemma.  
See Diogenes Allen and Eric O. Springsted, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, Second Edition 
(Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 253 note 1, referring to Robert H. Ayers, ‘“Tertullian’s 
Paradox” and “Contempt for Reason” Reconsidered,’ The Expository Times (July 1976), 308-311.  
However, in comments on an earlier version of this chapter, David Brown also noted that the very 
category ‘rhetoric’ carried more epistemic weight in the classical context than in the contemporary 
one—it was not simply contrasted with reason or logic, but was itself a form of truth-seeking discourse. 
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perennial plant).  And, with those such as Quinn in mind, he avers that ‘fideism, when 
used pejoratively, is not very useful in academic discourse.’52 
 I will return to Carroll’s concerns and conclusions in Section III of this 
chapter, but we must first consider two widely-used methods of classifying fideism in 
contemporary philosophical—rather than theological—discussion.  We have already 
encountered the first method in the citations from Flew and Quinn above, namely the 
division of fideism into extreme (or radical) and moderate (or responsible) varieties.  
Rightly or wrongly, in this method Tertullian and Kierkegaard are associated with 
extreme fideism, and Augustine, Anselm, and sometimes even Aquinas are associated 
with moderate fideism.53  Extreme fideism, it is said, sees religious belief as absurd or 
irrational—but still to be believed—whereas moderate fideism sees religious belief as 
starting with faith which may then find rational support.  In extreme fideism, faith is 
contrary to reason; in moderate fideism, faith precedes reason. 
The second method of classification is associated with the work of Terence 
Penelhum, whose God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism remains 
the standard historical study of fideism from the perspective of the philosophy of 
                                                 
52 Carroll, 4.  For a good, clear, careful, historically-sensitive and very helpful survey of fideism that 
avoids some of the mistakes Carroll finds in most philosophical discussion on this topic, see Richard 
Amesbury’s entry on fideism in the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/ (accessed on 28 October 2009) 
53 For other examples of this classification beside Flew and Quinn, see Richard H. Popkin, ‘Fideism’, 
in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume Three (Macmillan / Collier Macmillan 
Publishers, 1967), 201-202; ibid., The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (University of 
California Press, 1979), xix-xxi; and Terence Penelhum, ‘Fideism’, in Philip L. Quinn and Charles 
Taliaferro (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 376-382.  
C. Stephen Evans considers the extent to which Thomas Aquinas might be considered a moderate or 
responsible fideist in a chapter titled ‘Faith Above Reason: Aquinas’ in Faith Beyond Reason 
(Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 55-64.  Recall that Diogenes Allen associated his arguably 
‘moderate fideist’ interpretation of Farrer with Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas as well. 
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religion, despite its publication twenty-six years ago.54  Penelhum defines fideism as 
‘a recurrent theme in religious thought’ which holds that ‘that faith and reason are so 
disparate that faith is not undermined, but strengthened, if we judge that reason can 
give it no support.’55  Following the historical work of Richard Popkin, Penelhum 
accepts the thesis that at least some forms of fideism were directly influenced by the 
16th century renewal of the study of the classical sceptical tradition: that is, the 
tradition of Greek philosophers such as Pyrrho of Elis (c.360-c.275 BCE), Arcesilas 
(c.315-241), Carneades (c.213-129) and their Roman disciples such as Sextus 
Empiricus (c.160-c.210 CE), who denied that we have any real knowledge of 
anything at all, religious or otherwise.56  Such fideists, Penelhum says, ‘consider the 
case for Fideism to be made even stronger if one judges that reason cannot give us 
truth or assurance outside the sphere of faith any more than within it.  In other words, 
they sustain their Fideism by an appeal to Skepticism.  I will call them, therefore, 
Skeptical Fideists.’57 
                                                 
54 (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983).  Primarily historical in nature, Penelhum still sees this book 
as ‘an exercise in philosophical criticism’ (ix), as his task is to evaluate as well as explicate, and he 
does take a fairly critical line against both scepticism and fideism.  Two more recent, though less 
historically-oriented, philosophical defences of fideism are C. Stephen Evans, Faith Beyond Reason 
(cited above) and John Bishop, Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of 
Religious Belief (Oxford University Press, 2007).  A forthcoming study of fideism in theology is Olli-
Pekka Vainio, Beyond Fideism: Negotiable Religious Identities (Ashgate, 2010).  
55 Penelhum, God and Skepticism, ix.  In directly referring to Penelhum’s work I will follow his 
conventions of spelling and capitalisation, but will then revert to standard British use. 
56 See ibid., Chapter 1, which surveys both classical scepticism and its relation to Descartes in some 
detail.  Penelhum pays great tribute to Popkin’s groundbreaking work on the 16th century rediscovery 
of classical scepticism, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, cited in note 53 above.  
While certainly relevant to religious fideism, after the first chapter on ‘The Intellectual Crisis of the 
Reformation’ (1-17), Popkin’s monograph is more purely philosophical in nature, and so a detailed 
engagement is reserved for Penelhum instead. 
57 Ibid., ix. 
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Crucially, however, Penelhum goes on to make a two-fold distinction within 
Skeptical Fideism: Conformist and Evangelical.  He writes, ‘The attempt to present 
Christian faith as analogous to the Pyrrhonian conformity to appearances I shall call 
Conformist Skeptical Fideism.’58 And here he places Erasmus (c.1466-1536), 
Montaigne (1533-1592), and Bayle (1647-1706).  Conformist Skeptical Fideists are 
true sceptics in regard to all human knowledge, but focus on the specific 
consequences of such global scepticism for religious belief, seeing it as a positive way 
of protecting religion from the depredations of reason.  Denying reason’s competency 
in religious as well as all other matters, they thus counsel passive conformity to 
dominant doctrinal contexts and communities.  By contrast, those whom Penelhum 
calls Evangelical Skeptical Fideists recognize that 
Skeptic belieflessness and Christian faith are indeed the polar opposites they 
seem.  But they have nevertheless seen Skepticism as a tradition which has, 
unintentionally, served the cause of faith by exposing the inability of human 
reason to provide grounds for the commitment faith embodies.  In doing this, 
Skepticism has, in their view, prepared the way for divine grace to generate 
faith without philosophical obstacles.  For on this view, the attempts of natural 
theology to ground faith in reason are, as it has been put in our own day ‘a 
sustained attempt to replace conversion by argument’.59 
 
And in this category Penelhum places Pascal (1623-1662) and Kierkegaard (1813-
1855).  Unlike the conformists, Evangelical Skeptical Fideists typically have religious 
as well as philosophical objections to natural theology. 
Three themes characteristic of the Evangelical Skeptical Fideists that 
Penelhum explores at length are the rejection of proof, the hiddenness of God, and the 
reasons of the heart.60  Evangelical Skeptical Fideists are also inclined toward what 
Penelhum calls ‘the Parity Argument’: ‘the popular argument which says, roughly, 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 15.  See Chapters 2 and 3. 
59 Ibid., 15-16.  The quotation at the end is from Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘The Logical Status of Religious 
Belief,’ in Metaphysical Beliefs (London: SCM Press, 1957), 210. 
60 See ibid., Chapters 4 and 5. 
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that the Skeptic shows us that our common-sense beliefs lack intellectual foundations, 
and in showing us this makes it clear that the assent that faith requires is analogous to 
the assent we give, without resistance, to the tenets of common-sense.’61  In addition 
to Pascal and Kierkegaard, Penelhum reckons that both Alvin Plantinga and Norman 
Malcolm employ versions of the Parity Argument.62 
Finally, in a later essay that presents the basic argument of the book in 
summarised form, Penelhum asks: 
But what has this to do with us today?  My answer is that both Conformist 
Fideism and Evangelical Fideism have close contemporary counterparts, and 
that our response to those counterpart forms of apologetic can benefit from the 
recognition that they are counterparts to these earlier positions.  The 
contemporary counterpart of Conformist Fideism, is the position which Kai 
Nielson has called Wittgensteinian Fideism, and is most commonly associated 
with D. Z. Phillips….The contemporary counterpart of Evangelical Fideism is 
the position of those, particularly Malcolm and Plantinga, who insist that the 
rationality of religious belief is independent of the existence of grounds for 
it.63 
 
In short, in addition to the two classifications of fideism considered above—
extreme and moderate—Penelhum offers us a second method, applicable to those 
fideists who ‘sustain their Fideism by an appeal to Skepticism,’ namely to divide such 
                                                 
61 Ibid., x.  Penelhum considers the Parity Argument at length in Chapter 7: ‘Fideism and Some Recent 
Arguments.’ 
62 Ibid., 147-158.  Plantinga, in an essay that was later incorporated into his classic statement of 
Reformed epistemology, ‘Reason and Belief in God,’ in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(eds.), Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 16-
93.  Malcolm, in ‘The Groundlessness of Belief,’ reprinted several times, including in his Thought and 
Knowledge (Cornell University Press, 1977), 199-216.  Norman Malcolm (1911-1990), was an 
American philosopher who studied with Wittgenstein in Cambridge in the late 1930s, taught at Cornell 
University for many years, and who was a major interpreter and defender of Wittgenstein’s thought.   
63 Terence Penelhum, ‘Sceptics, Believers, and Historical Mistakes’, Synthese 67 (1986), 138.  In a 
robust response to this article, Eleonore Stump questions even the fairly limited value Penelhum places 
on the sceptical tradition in philosophy, and strongly dissents from his reading of Plantinga as ‘any sort 
of skeptic, fideistic or otherwise’.  See Eleonore Stump, ‘Penelhum on Skeptics and Fideists’, Synthese 
67 (1986), 147-154.  Nielson, Phillips, and Plantinga will be considered at more length in Chapter Five 
of this dissertation, so I will not comment further on their position in Penelhum’s schema at this time. 
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Skeptical Fideists into Conformists and Evangelicals.  We thus now have five 
possible categories of fideism at our disposal—extreme, moderate, semi-, conformist, 
and evangelical—which may or may not overlap amongst themselves. 
 
II. Reason Itself on Trial: Another Essential (But Brief) Excursus 
All of these definitions of fideism, whether religious or philosophical, derive 
their energy from a contrast between faith and reason, with fideism giving the former 
priority over the latter.  But a pervasive feature of our contemporary Western 
intellectual situation, even (perhaps especially) in philosophy, is a crisis of confidence 
in the power of reason to do what reason was once thought competent to do—namely, 
to give us accurate and independent access to knowledge of reality (‘truth’).  In some 
influential quarters, such confidence is now held to be naïve at best and dangerous at 
worst, contributing to a host of ills both individual and social.  We must thus at least 
acknowledge a development that challenges the very distinction between ‘faith’ and 
‘reason’ on which the term fideism is based: the postmodern questioning of reason 
itself.  For postmodernism, it is reason, not faith, that is on trial. 
Often said to have (re)originated with Hume and Kant in the 18th century and 
been exacerbated by Marx and Freud in the 19th century, more or less radical critiques 
of reason are now frequently associated with a variety of movements sharing the 
common rubric ‘postmodern’.  To the extent that it questions reason’s competence, 
postmodernism is similar to both the classical and 16th century scepticism discussed 
earlier, but remains an independent philosophical movement with its own distinctive 
concerns and emphases.  In a remarkably clear and hence extremely valuable survey 
of contemporary French postmodernism, Merold Westphal associates such views with 
both Nietzschean perspectivism (‘there are no facts, only interpretations’) and the 
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claim that Descartes’s ‘clear and distinct ideas’ are purely chimerical.64  He then 
enunciates the following three theses:  
• As the denial of unmediated presence to either meanings or facts, 
postmodernism is a critique of the metaphysics of presence. 
 
• As the denial of Hegelian totality, postmodernism is a critique of onto-theo-
logy. 
 
• As the denial of the identity of (human) thought and being, postmodernism is a 
critique of logocentrism.65 
 
Although such jargon can be forbidding to the non-cognoscenti, Westphal continues: 
These three terms, the metaphysics of presence, onto-theo-logy, and 
logocentrism are bandied about rather loosely in postmodern contexts [but] 
they can be given reasonably precise meanings, and when they are they turn 
out to be more or less interchangeable because, while the sense is different in 
each case, the reference is pretty much the same.  They point, in different 
ways, to the perennial tendency of western philosophy to overvalue its 
conceptual currency.66 
 
Westphal also provides a helpfully succinct discussion of two other frequently 
encountered-and-employed terms in such postmodern contexts: namely, the 
‘hermeneutics of finitude’ and the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’.  He says that the 
former 
emphasizes the embeddedness of our concepts and our judgments in the 
sensible, temporal, linguistic, historico-cultural milieux from which we can 
never fully extract ourselves by reflection; the latter emphasizes the role of 
interests and desires, often disreputable enough to require repression and 
denial, in the work of the mind that would like to call itself ‘Reason’.67  
                                                 
64 Merold Westphal, ‘Postmodernism and Religious Reflection,’ in International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 38 (1995), 128.  This issue also published as Eugene T. Long (ed.), God, 
Reason, and Religions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1995). 
65 Ibid., 128-129, 131 (emphasis added). 
66 Ibid., 131. 
67 Ibid., 131-132.  For a book-length study of the hermeneutics of suspicion in relation to religious 
belief, looking specifically at Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche, see Westphal’s Suspicion and Faith: The 
Religious Uses of Modern Atheism (Fordham University Press, 1998), originally published by 
Eerdmans in 1993. 
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In other words, according to such postmodern views, reason itself is limited, 
situated bodily, and contextualised in history, culture, gender, and language.  It is 
never objective, never neutral, never free from bias, and those biases may range from 
the moderately distracting to the deeply corrupt.  As Mary McClintock Fulkerson puts 
it, ‘Knowledge is not tainted by interest; it is interest.’68  What is thus presented as the 
ineluctable deliverances of a pure, disembodied, impartial rationality may in fact be 
the irrational and destructive outworking of obsession, neurosis, self-deception, class 
or gender or race prejudice—and so on.69  Such a postmodern critique or unmasking 
of reason’s finitude and false consciousness is often said to signal the end of the 
Enlightenment hope (or ‘project’) of replacing religion, or tradition, or authority, or 
ethnicity, or nationality with a supposedly universal and secular norm—reason—that 
transcends all human diversities and so provides an effective cohesion to our 
inevitability pluralistic society.  But reason, it turns out, on this story, is no more 
secure a foundation on which to build than any of these other options.  This is cause 
for either lament or celebration, depending on your view of the Enlightenent.70  
In a somewhat similar fashion to Westphal, Paul Murray identifies what he 
calls two recurrent themes in the postmodern questioning of reason: ‘the first of these 
                                                 
68 Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Changing the Subject: Women’s Discourses and Feminist Theologies 
(Minneapolis: Fortress University Press, 1994), 25 (emphasis in the original).  I indebted to William 
Abraham’s discussion of Fulkerson for this quotation, in his Canon and Criterion, 450-460 (453). 
69 In addition to the theological / epistemological work of Fulkerson, for another feminist view on the 
implications of this reconfiguration of reason for the philosophy of religion, see Sarah Coakley, 
‘Analytic Philosophy of Religion in Feminist Perspective: Some Questions,’ in her Powers and 
Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender (Blackwell, 2002), 98-105. 
70 In addition to the Reformed epistemologists Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff referenced in 
Chapter One, four major contemporary Anglophone figures in theology and philosophy associated with 
this broader postmodern—or at the very least post-foundationalist—critique of the ambitions of 
‘Enlightenment reason’ are Alasdair MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, Jeffrey Stout, and John Milbank.  I 
will briefly consider some of these figures in Chapter Five. 
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themes presses the claim that there are no neutral perspectives on reality, [while] the 
second further shifts attention away from the human person as knower by 
emphasizing the “open texture” of reality and the constructive role that humans play 
in its shaping.’71  If the first of these two themes is epistemological and conflates the 
hermeneutics of finitude and suspicion, the second is more metaphysical and moves 
toward radical anti-(or non-)realism and constructivism.  It thus ‘compounds the 
relativising of human reason occasioned by the first by maintaining that human 
engagement with reality consists primarily in the shaping, unfolding and living of 
ever new realities rather than being limited to the attempt to understand reality as 
given.’72  Reality, on this view, is not something fixed and external to which we must 
conform our beliefs and behaviour or else face the consequences, but rather 
something we apparently make up as we go along.  Reality itself, not simply our 
knowledge of it, is fluid and relative.  Epistemology thus dissolves metaphysics, and 
hermeneutical analysis of texts gives way to ontological anti-realism. 
 Contemporary philosophers of religion—particularly in the analytic 
tradition—are often accused of ignoring postmodern concerns.  But as we have seen 
in Chapter One, to varying degrees Basil Mitchell, Brian Hebblethwaite, and 
Diogenes Allen all deal either explicitly or implicitly with the metaphysical and 
epistemological issues raised by postmodernism’s radical critique of reason.  For 
example, Mitchell’s partial endorsement of Kuhn and firm rejection of 
                                                 
71 Paul Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatist Perspective (Peeters, 2004), 4.  The first 
chapter of Murray’s book, ‘Establishing the Agenda: Christian Theology and the Postmodern 
Questioning of Reason’ (3-22) provides an overview of these contemporary discussions, which 
subsequent chapters then explore in more detail. 
72 Ibid., 7.  Murray associates the theological expression of this anti-(or non-)realistic theme with Mark 
C. Taylor and Don Cupitt.  His critical philosophical attention is focused on the neo-pragmatism of 
Richard Rorty, with Nicholas Rescher’s pragmatic-idealist position being viewed more favourably. 
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‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ and cultural-conceptual relativism, Hebblethwaite’s clear 
defence of the canons of analytic philosophy against MacIntyre’s tradition-constituted 
reason, and Allen’s careful exploration of what natural theology might look like on 
the far side of the Enlightenment.  All three are at least aware of postmodernism, and 
take account of it in their own justifications of religious belief, even if their 
assessments of the extent and value of the challenge differ.73 
It remains to be seen whether Farrer’s own work—which basically spanned 
the period 1940-1970—meets or even takes account of these issues.  Mitchell claims 
that although Farrer ‘was not confronted by the kind of sophisticated postmodernism 
which is now prevalent,’ he nevertheless anticipated and rejected ‘the typically 
postmodernist claim that philosophical viewpoints are culture-bound in the sense that 
they would only have developed within a given culture and that their meaning and 
truth-claims are bound up with the basic presuppositions of that culture.’74  We will 
consider these matters further in subsequent chapters.  But although of course the 
multiple metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical challenges of postmodernism are 
not going to be resolved in this dissertation, it is necessary to at least acknowledge the 
shadow they cast over all contemporary discussions of the rationality of religious 
belief—and indeed over the continuing validity of the very term ‘fideism.’  For if 
‘reason’ is an illusion and the traditional contrast between faith and reason thus fails 
                                                 
73 For more on postmodernism, see David Brown, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change  
(Oxford University Press, 1999), 9-59; John D. Caputo, ‘Messianic Postmodernism’ (153-166), and 
Anselm Kyongsuk Min, ‘The Other without History and Society—a Dialogue with Derrida’ (167-185), 
in D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin (eds.), Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century (Palgrave, 
2001); and Graham Ward, ‘Postmodern Theology’, in David F. Ford with Rachel Muers (eds.), The 
Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918, Third Edition (Blackwell, 
2005), 322-338. 
74 Basil Mitchell, ‘Introduction’ to Brian Hebblethwaite and Douglas Hedley (eds.), The Human Person 
in God’s World: Studies to Commemorate the Austin Farrer Centenary (SCM Press, 2006), 5. 
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to obtain, then what does it mean to prefer ‘faith’ over ‘reason’?  If postmodernism is 
right, we are all fideists, religious or otherwise.  
 
III.  Interim Conclusions on ‘Fideism’ 
I now return to Carroll’s concerns and conclusions about the use of ‘fideism’ 
in contemporary philosophical and theological discourse, as canvassed in Section I.  
Due to the pervasively ahistorical and pejorative character of most discussions of 
fideism, Carroll wonders ‘whether the term can be excerpted from its original context 
of use and applied to this novel setting’.75  He is most concerned about the term 
‘Wittgensteinian fideism’—and rightly so.76  Apparently still maintaining the 
traditional faith / reason dichotomy questioned in Section II, Carroll rather 
provocatively claims that if fideism was ‘defined loosely as the idea that the truth 
about religious matters cannot be established by natural reason alone, then the vast 
majority of religious thought—among the many religions of the world—would be 
fideistic.  “Fideism” would lose its usefulness as a term of appraisal, being in 
extension little different than “religious thought”.’77  This worry is thus just the 
opposite of the postmodern one that closed Section II: not that we are all in fact 
fideists, whether religious or otherwise, but rather that all religion is in fact fideistic, 
because irrational—or at least not sufficiently rational.  Strongly rationalistic critics of 
religion, such as Richard Dawkins, would take this view: ‘religion’ just equals 
‘fideism,’ and so there is no non-fideistic religion.       
                                                 
75 Carroll, 10. 
76 See Kai Nielson and D. Z. Phillips, Wittgensteinian Fideism? (SCM Press, 2005), which will be 
briefly discussed in Chapter Five. 
77 Carroll, 17-18.       
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Inspired, however, by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, rather than seeking a 
single definition, Carroll suggests that we look ‘to the variety of ways the word is 
used—that is, to the traditions in which the term has been used.’78  He thus hopes that 
‘study of particular traditions of use may contribute to the resolution of philosophical 
problems concerned with the alleged fideism of a philosopher or theologian.’79  
Suggesting that all pejorative uses of the term be abandoned in academic discourse, 
Carroll argues that the only valid uses of the term are the original ‘symbolo-fideism’ 
of Ménégoz and Sabatier and the two varieties of sceptical fideism identified by 
Penelhum, namely conformist and evangelical.  The term should not be used, he 
thinks, in reference to the ‘traditionalism’ and ‘fideism’ of Magisterial 
pronouncements and papal encyclicals, or to the criticism of ‘anti-metaphysical 
philosophy and theology.’80  He is unhappy with the extreme / moderate distinction, 
as he believes it has ‘not caught on widely in the literature and [relies] in some 
unspecified sense on one or more’ of the senses he thinks should be either accepted or 
rejected.81  Carroll concludes, ‘Scrupulously identifying the tradition of fideism that 
informs one’s scholarly use of the term is one way to avoid introducing further 
confusion into one’s analysis of a problem.’82  
 As stated at the beginning of this chapter, my own research into fideism, 
although not as detailed and deeply historical as Carroll’s, had independently drawn 
similar conclusions to his: specifically, that the term originated in a religious rather 
than a philosophical context; that it is often used pejoratively; that it can mean 
                                                 
78 Carroll, 18 (emphasis added). 
79 Ibid.  Of course, this is precisely what I am trying to accomplish in this dissertation in regard to the 
‘alleged fideism’ of Austin Farrer. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 21 footnote 59. 
82 Ibid., 19. 
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different things to philosophers and theologians; that it certainly means different 
things to Protestants and Roman Catholics; and that fixing on one specific 
contemporary definition is thus difficult if not impossible.  Fideism, I claimed, is a 
highly context-dependent concept.  I am thus very sympathetic with many of the 
conclusions that Carroll draws here.  I agree that pejorative uses of ‘fideism’ should 
normally be avoided, that its actual historical context ought to be known and  
acknowledged, that the way to avoid confusion is to be attentive to particular 
traditions of use, and—thus—to offer or even attempt one conclusive definition is a 
mistake.  We must speak of fideisms, rather than fideism simpliciter.  However, I must 
demur from some of his other specific recommendations.  Despite linking his own 
approach with the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, I think Carroll’s lexicographical 
scrupulosity in fact betrays an insufficiently Wittgensteinian perspective. 
 Although he never cites it directly, at both the beginning and the end of his 
article, Carroll invokes Wittgenstein’s well-known maxim that ‘meaning is use’.  He 
thus explicitly associates his entire project with Wittgenstein, stating that ‘it is best to 
see how [‘fideism’] was actually used in its original context and to construct 
extensions of the term carefully from this original use.’83  And then, having limited 
himself (and us) to the original use, he argues that certain common uses are 
unacceptable—particularly ahistorical uses that ignore the word’s originating context.  
I will come back to that in a moment.  But, as Fergus Kerr has recently reminded us, 
Wittgenstein does not in fact offer the maxim ‘meaning is use’ without qualification.84  
                                                 
83 Ibid., 2 (emphasis added). What Carroll does cite as the opening epigraph of his article is 
Philosophical Investigations, Part I, §38. 
84 See Kerr’s review of Terrance W. Klein, Wittgenstein and the Metaphysics of Grace, in New 
Blackfriars 89 (2008), 126-127.  Kerr criticises Klein for making ‘meaning as use’ into an absolute, 
unqualified rule, but it is not the case, says Kerr, citing Klein, that ‘the meaning of any word is its 
usage’ (page 126 of Kerr’s review, citing page xii of Klein). 
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What Wittgenstein actually wrote was: ‘For a large class of cases—though not for 
all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language.’85 
 Recognising that these are deep and dangerous waters, and without going into 
technicalities in either hermeneutics or philosophy of language, I wish to propose that 
even from a broadly Wittgensteinian perspective we may consider at least three 
criteria for a term’s meaning: etymology, origin, and use.  Thus, in general, I would 
say that even ahistoric, essentialistic, philosophical definitions of ‘fideism’ are not 
necessarily unacceptable, but rather opportunistic.  They take advantage of a 
convenient word whose etymology (Latin fides ‘faith’ + -ISM) is perfectly suited to a 
wide range of definitions involving an emphasis on faith.  ‘Fideism’ can mean 
anything that ‘faith-ism’ can mean.  Only definitions to the effect that fideism 
disparages or denigrates faith would be etymologically unacceptable. 
As for origin, I agree that informed use of the term should be aware of its 
historical context, and that this context is particularly illuminating when considering 
the different meanings of ‘fideism’ within specifically Roman Catholic discourse and 
other, more Protestant or generically philosophical discourse.  That is, it is important 
to know which meaning a specific author has in mind.  But, as Carroll himself admits, 
fidéisme may well have been coined by 19th century French Roman Catholic writers 
entirely independently of Ménégoz and Sabatier, for their own purposes, and probably 
                                                 
85 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Basil 
Blackwell, 1953), Part I, §43, 20e with German on facing text: ‘Man kann für eine große Klasse von 
Fällen der Benützung des Wortes “Bedeutung”—wenn auch nicht für alle Fälle seiner Benützung—
dieses Wort so erklären: Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.’  As Kerr 
points out in his critique of Klein, unlike the English translation, the original German italicises alle as 
well as große. 
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even beforehand.86  So then why assign the originating context to Ménégoz and 
Sabatier alone and forbid it to Roman Catholics? 
And as for use, I think that here Wittgenstein’s qualified maxim actually 
counts against some of Carroll’s conclusions rather than supports them.  First, it is 
rather odd to invoke ‘meaning is use’ and then limit such usage to original and not 
subsequent activity.  Second, ‘fideism’ is not an ordinary word in everyday 
language—no matter what the language.  The ‘language’ in which it occurs is not 
primarily English, French, or Latin, but scholarship and official documents.  
‘Fideism’ is a term of art, a word employed in professional academic discussions in 
philosophy, theology, and intellectual history.  And, as both Carroll and Brush have 
noted, even in those contexts it has not been studied in great depth.  So when 
considering how it is used, we have a very limited range of examples.  Contrary to 
‘meaning is use,’ Carroll wants to eliminate what he admits are the two most common 
uses of the term—namely, within Roman Catholicism and contemporary philosophy 
of religion—because he reckons they deviate to greater or lesser extents from the 
term’s originating context.  But these are precisely the ‘particular traditions of use’ we 
have to hand.  As long as we recognise them as traditions—or, as different ‘language 
games’ with certain ‘family resemblances’—then they are both free to employ 
‘fideism’ as they like, within the range of its etymology, with rather different 
connotations or denotations, precisely because there is no one exact meaning of the 
term.  The problem is not so much with their stipulated definitions, as with their 
application to particular individuals.87 
                                                 
86 Carroll, 8: ‘Perhaps the most surprising feature of the history of the term “fideism” is that there seem 
to be two discrete points of origin for the term.’ 
87 Philosophy and theology are of course replete with technical terms that are still defined and deployed 
very differently even within the same broad discipline. ‘Rationalism’, ‘naturalism’, ‘humanism’, and 
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So I wish to permit Roman Catholics and analytic philosophers of religion to 
continue to use ‘fideism’ as they have been accustomed, and as we have seen the term 
variously defined above.  I would argue, however, that both of these traditions need a 
greater degree of self-awareness and self-critique about who may or may not belong 
in the category (or categories), and a greater awareness that fideism is a fluid 
phenomenon with different traditions of use.  Some commonly classified figures (such 
as Tertullian) may be misplaced, some particular sets (such as ‘extreme fideism’) may 
be empty, other particular sets (such as ‘semi-fideism’) may have unexpected 
occupants, and what one tradition means by ‘fideism’ may not align exactly with 
another. 
I also thus disagree with Carroll’s claim that the distinction between extreme 
and moderate fideism has ‘not caught on widely in the literature’—a rather odd claim 
given that he himself mentions the tendency to make this distinction on page 3 of his 
article.  But, more to the point, given the paucity of discussions of fideism, those few 
books, dictionaries, and encyclopedia entries cited in Section I basically are ‘the 
literature’: they suffice to constitute a tradition.  So, unlike Carroll, I wish to retain 
this method of classification.  As we have already seen in the debate between 
Hebblethwaite and Allen, as was noted in the theses against Bautain, and as we shall 
see further in our consideration of Farrer, the distinction between an extreme fideism 
that sees faith as contrary to reason and a moderate fideism that sees faith as 
preceding reason is clear and useful, particularly in contrasting Roman Catholic and 
Protestant views.  
                                                                                                                                            
‘libertarian’ are among the most obvious and prominent examples, but even ‘existentialism’ means 
something quite different in contemporary analytic metaphysics than it did in mid-20th century Parisian 
cafés. 
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    Finally, I agree that carelessly or wantonly pejorative definitions of fideism 
are overly opportunistic, and should be chastised.  So, for example, The Oxford 
Dictionary of the Christian Church defines fideism as: ‘A term applied to a variety of 
doctrines which hold in common belief in the incapacity of the intellect to attain to 
knowledge of divine matters and correspondingly put an excessive emphasis on 
faith.’88  The ‘excessive’ is objectionable—it begs the question on precisely the issue 
at hand, namely whether or not the human intellect is capable of attaining such 
knowledge.  This is a serious question that goes to the heart of both philosophy and 
theology, that divides various communions of Christendom, and whose answer is far 
from obvious.  But, this being the case, individual philosophers or theologians, or 
specific traditions of philosophy and theology, may well have very carefully thought-
out positions on this matter, and if they have concluded that what they understand 
fideism to entail is intolerably irrational, immoral, or heretical, then they certainly 
have the right to think ill of it.  So, a deliberately pejorative definition may be put 
forward as the conclusion of an investigation, rather than assumed at the beginning.  
For Carroll to rule out all pejorative definitions is overly scrupulous.89 
As stated above, I recognise that these are deep and dangerous waters.  Carroll 
raises serious philosophical questions about the nature of linguistic meaning and 
difficult historical questions about classifying an allegedly perennial category of 
                                                 
88 ‘Fideism’ in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Third Edition, 609. 
89 For example, in ‘Does contemporary theology require a postfoundationalist way of knowing?’, 
Scottish Journal of Theology 60 (2007), 271-293, Kevin Diller considers various stipulated definitions 
of fideism, including (F3): ‘A position is fideistic whenever an unsupported assumption becomes the 
unassailable ground of knowledge, or there are good reasons to think it is not true.’  In light of those 
definitions, particularly (F3), he concludes, ‘The real sting of fideism is its lack of humility which 
stifles dialogue and prevents the growth that can come from being challenged by other views.’ (288)  
This seems to be a perfectly acceptable negative judgement on fideism as Diller defines it, and, in so 
defining it, has contributed to the tradition of its use. 
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human thought that is supposed to span enormously diverse centuries, cultures, 
religions, and languages.  There is no doubt that a word coined in 19th century France 
has been, as he puts it, ‘projected back through the history of ideas’ to encompass 
those who certainly would not have known the term and perhaps not accepted it for 
themselves if they did.  And this is certainly a questionable practice. 
However, I am inclined to think that one can hold or reject a formulated 
intellectual position without knowing that it goes by a particular name or has a 
particular history.  Alvin Plantinga, for example, reports that he did not know he was 
a Molinist until Anthony Kenny told him he was, since he had never heard of Luis de 
Molina (1535-1600), the Spanish Jesuit who apparently first developed the idea that 
God has ‘middle knowledge’ (scientia media) of counterfactual future contingents.  
Plantinga arrived at a similar position independently, but by the rather different route 
of contemporary modal logic and possible-world semantics.90  Thus, like the title 
character of Molière’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (1670), who spoke prose for more 
than forty years without knowing it (until a philosopher enlightened him), Plantinga 
might well have been a Molinist for more than forty years without knowing it (had not 
Kenny enlightened him).  Elizabeth Anscombe, on the other hand, rejected middle 
knowledge on purely conceptual grounds when she first encountered the idea (as an 
adolescent!), without knowing of the long—and highly acrimonious—history of 
debate between Jesuits and Dominicans on this topic, and so without any historical 
context.  She just ‘couldn’t see how that stuff could be true’ and thus took the 
Dominican side without realising it.91  If philosophers such as Plantinga and 
                                                 
90 See Alvin Plantinga’s ‘Self Profile’ in James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin 
Plantinga (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 50.   
91 See the introduction to her Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical 
Papers, Volume II (Basil Blackwell, 1981), vii.  For a classic contemporary discussion of Molinism 
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Anscombe can relate to ‘Molinism’ shorn of its name and historical context, then why 
not ‘fideism’ as well?  Surely fideism can exist without ‘fideism’. 
But I also accept that thoughts are dependent on language, and that without a 
specific name and history to hand it is very unlikely that they would ‘hang together’ 
in quite the same way across so many divides.  It is also extremely doubtful that a 
single definition of ‘fideism’ could possibly encompass all of those individuals and 
movements that are now associated with the term.  So I fully agree that we must speak 
with Carroll of the traditions of fideism.  I simply wish to keep more of those 
traditions in play than he seems to want to do—as well as to explicitly hold out the 
possibility of the criticism and even rejection of whatever a given tradition of fideism 
might turn out to be.92 
In conclusion, ‘fideism’ can mean anything that ‘faith-ism’ can mean.  Thus, 
we cannot determine in advance and in the abstract whether ‘fideism’ is good or bad; 
rational or irrational; what its precise parameters are; or whether a given figure is 
‘fideist’ (and, if so, of what variety).  Instead, we can only examine a number of 
possible traditions of definition and classification, look carefully at a specific example 
of alleged fideism, and then—in light of the various traditions of definition and 
classification—allow the particular features of the example before us to manifest 
themselves under questioning.  The result will be known in the investigation, not 
before it. 
                                                                                                                                            
that both relates it to Plantinga’s work and considers the Jesuit / Dominican conflict, see Robert 
Merrihew Adams, ‘Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,’ originally published in American 
Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), now reprinted in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in 
Philosophical Theology (Oxford University Press, 1987), 77-93. 
92 For more on this, see Hugo Strandberg, The Possibility of Discussion: Relativism, Truth and 
Criticism of Religious Beliefs (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), and my review in New Blackfriars 
89 (2008), 129-131. 
 105
IV. Conclusion: What ‘Sort of’ Fideist? 
The conclusion of the first chapter suggests the analogy of a legal trial.  Austin 
Farrer has been, as it were, accused of fideism by a key witness, Basil Mitchell.  The 
two questions before the court are: ‘Is he guilty as charged?’ and ‘Is it even a crime?’  
I am the judge presiding over the case.  My readers are the jury.  For the defence we 
have Brian Hebblethwaite, and for the prosecution Diogenes Allen.  While this 
analogy is somewhat fanciful, it clearly identifies the issues at hand and the primary 
dramatis personae according to their roles in the investigation. 
This present chapter was thus a necessary background exploration of what the 
charge of fideism might actually entail, given the multiple definitions and uses of the 
term.  For the fourth (and penultimate) time, Basil Mitchell wrote in 1983 that his 
impression upon reading the manuscript of Faith and Speculation was that Farrer had 
apparently ‘become a sort of fideist, content to rest the truth of Christianity upon the 
believer’s sense of being nourished by the tradition in which he had been raised.’93  
While we are not yet in a position to comment about the justice of this remark vis-à-
vis Farrer himself, having just surveyed in some detail various traditions of defining 
and classifying fideism, what can we now say about Mitchell’s understanding and use 
of the term? 
First, Mitchell describes Farrer as ‘a sort of fideist,’ thus leaving open the 
possibility that there may be more than one variety.  He does not, therefore, make the 
common mistake of only holding to one specific definition.  Second, he defines the 
sort of fideism Farrer seemed to exemplify in an interesting way, stating that Farrer 
seemed ‘content to rest the truth of Christianity upon the believer’s sense of being 
nourished by the tradition in which he had been raised.’  This ‘spiritual’ 
                                                 
93 Basil Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 177. 
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understanding of fideism did not emerge so clearly in the material canvassed in this 
chapter, and the themes of spiritual ‘nourishment’ as well as the possible rationality of 
‘tradition’ will be considered further in due course. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, implicit in Mitchell’s description of 
Farrer’s alleged fideism is Mitchell’s own location in contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy of religion and Anglican theology.  Or, put differently, Mitchell is not 
wondering whether Farrer might have been a fideist in the Roman Catholic sense of 
the term.  Here, at long last, we can see the need for this chapter, as now the 
confessional / epistemological differences in defining ‘fideism’ finally come into 
play.  As the survey in Sections I.A and I.B above made abundantly clear, the past 
(and present?) official epistemological standard of Roman Catholicism would render 
both Farrer and Mitchell as fideists or semi-fideists.94  It should go without saying 
that neither Farrer nor Mitchell, as good Anglicans, could have sworn the Anti-
Modernist Oath and declared that they ‘profess that God, beginning and end of all 
things, can be certainly known, and therefore also proved, as the cause through the 
effects, by the natural light of reason through the things that have been made, that is, 
through the visible works of creation.’95  Note that the Anti-Modernist Oath was only 
issued on 1 September 1910, one month to the day before Farrer’s sixth birthday, and 
not withdrawn until 1967, the year before he died.  The epistemological and 
theological views articulated by the Oath were thus not ancient—or even 19th 
century—history, but the public stance of the Roman Catholic Church throughout 
almost the entire extent of Farrer’s life.  Farrer lived to see the Second Vatican 
Council, and the eventual repeal of the Oath, but only just.  
                                                 
94 And of course Hebblethwaite as well, to his chagrin, not to mention Allen. 
95 Cited in Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians, 223 (emphasis added).  
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And not just confessional reasons would keep Farrer and Mitchell from taking 
this oath.  Farrer’s philosophical views have yet to be fully discussed, but it has 
already been noted that Mitchell is a proponent of the cumulative case approach to 
religious epistemology, which seeks to rationally justify—but not certainly prove or 
demonstrate—religious belief through considering a congerie probabilitatum.96  Even 
Richard Swinburne, Mitchell’s immediate successor in the Nolloth chair at Oxford 
and widely regarded (and often deplored) as among the most rigorous examples of 
this approach, accepts (1) that metaphysical naturalism (and hence atheism) is a 
rational system, (2) that deductive arguments for God’s existence are not widely 
convincing, and so (3) the way forward is to reformulate the classical arguments of 
natural theology on probabilistic grounds.  Although he holds that God’s existence 
can be defended as ‘a fairly well-justified conclusion by rational argument,’ it cannot 
be proved in any strict sense.97  Indeed, Swinburne explicitly rejected the 
epistemology of Vatican I in the first edition of his book Faith and Reason: 
the First Vatican Council was wrong to hold that the existence of God can 
‘certainly [certo] be known by the natural light of human reason from the 
things which are created’…if by ‘certainly’ is meant ‘without there being the 
slightest ground for suspecting error’.  I do not think that the arguments for the 
existence of God, although they make their conclusions probable, give it that 
degree of certainty.98 
 
Far from being a ‘rationalist,’ even Swinburne would thus still be classified as a semi-
fideist by the traditional Roman Catholic standard.   
                                                 
96 For more details, see Chapter One, Section I, and in particular the discussion of Mitchell’s The 
Justification of Religious Belief (Macmillan, 1973) in Section I.D.  See also the historical study cited in 
that chapter as well, Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A 
Study of the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature (Princeton 
University Press, 1983). 
97 See Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2004), 
particularly 1, 12-13 and 136-137. 
98 Ibid., Faith and Reason (Clarendon Press, 1981), 179 note 2 (Swinburne’s emphasis).  Interestingly, 
this note is omitted from the thoroughly rewritten Second Edition (2005). 
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So no matter how strongly the Anglican philosophers Farrer and Mitchell may 
be committed to some sort of ‘rational theology’ or ‘justification of religious belief,’ 
in demurring from demonstration they will still fall under the category of semi-
fideism.  Or, perhaps better, as noted in Section I.B above, the position William J. 
Abraham calls ‘soft rationalism’—although he admits that such a position, in trying to 
mediate between the ‘hard rationalism’ of evidentialist natural theology and fideism 
simpliciter, might just as accurately be called ‘soft fideism.’  It is a matter of where 
one places the emphasis.99  Mitchell, at any rate, writing from within his own Anglo-
American tradition of philosophy and his own Anglican tradition of theology (which 
two traditions, according to Abraham, might well be conflated into the single tradition 
of Anglican epistemology) and thus not seeing himself as fideistic in any way, is 
asking to what extent Farrer’s later thought might have deviated from the recognised 
canons of these traditions (or, from the tradition of Anglican epistemology). 
Fourth and finally, where might Mitchell place Farrer’s ‘sort of fideism’ 
among the five categories defined above in Section I.C—extreme, moderate, semi-, 
conformist, and evangelical?  It is difficult to say, and so here I speculate, but from 
the description given, it sounds as though Mitchell was interpreting Farrer’s position 
in 1967 as a form of moderate fideism (faith is not contrary to reason but precedes it) 
with both conformist (‘tradition’) and evangelical (‘nourishment’) aspects.  
                                                 
99 Abraham, ‘Soft Rationalism,’ 108.  Abraham takes Mitchell as his exemplar of the soft rationalist 
approach to religious epistemology.  The term itself originated with an article by Rod Sykes, ‘Soft 
Rationalism,’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion VIII (1977), 51-66.  In footnote 8 on 
page 56, Sykes says: ‘My label is not intended to impute woolly-mindedness.  “Soft” means here what 
it does in “Soft Determinism”: a middle option that carries across one extreme but softens its impact by 
modification to accord with people’s intuitions.’  The epistemic parallel with the controversy over 
Anglicanism’s (alleged) ecclesial via media status is obvious.  Unfortunately, Abraham’s citation of 
Sykes’s article in both his essay on cumulative case arguments and in the essay cited above provides 
the wrong volume number and year of publication. 
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Remember, however, that Penelhum intends those two latter categories to be 
understood as varieties of sceptical fideism—that is, fideism that draws its inspiration 
from a pervasive pessimism about the capacities of human reason to achieve any 
knowledge of anything whatsoever, religious or otherwise.  As I shall argue further 
below, whether or not he was open to religious fideism toward the end of his life, the 
mature Farrer was not at all inclined toward philosophical scepticism or relativism. 
So, in conclusion, it seems that Mitchell would describe the Farrer of Faith 
and Speculation as exemplifying a (‘sort of’) moderate fideism with both conformist 
and evangelical tendencies.  Hebblethwaite explicitly rejects that description.  Allen 
implicitly accepts it, or something close to it.  And so we now finally turn to Austin 
Farrer himself to consider the primary evidence in this case concerning his alleged 
turn to fideism.  Ressourcement!  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
‘A VIABLE AND SOPHISTICATED NATURAL THEOLOGY’ (1904-1948) 
 
 From the time of his undergraduate studies at Oxford, Austin Farrer’s avowed 
aim was to ‘have a connected and rational theology, or perish in the attempt.’  And 
yet, an early moment of philosophical illumination involved recognising the limits of 
reason, and specifically that ‘it does not touch religion.’  This tension between 
accepting the legitimate claim of ‘reason’ while simultaneously defending the 
transcendent truth of ‘religion’ runs throughout Farrer’s subsequent career: for him, to 
be ‘rational’ meant, at least in part, appreciating reason’s limited function and powers.  
This chapter begins with a brief sketch of Farrer’s life and influences, looks at his 
undergraduate correspondence where some of these ‘fideistic’ themes are first 
articulated, and then focuses on Farrer’s classic text of ‘rational theology,’ Finite and 
Infinite (1943).  After noting some of Farrer’s other work from this period, the chapter 
concludes with a brief summary of Eric Mascall’s He Who Is (1943) as a counterpoint 
to Farrer’s more individual and creative appropriation of ‘the Thomist vision.’  The 
interest throughout is on the epistemological rather than metaphysical implications of 
Farrer’s attempt to defend what Rowan Williams calls ‘a viable and sophisticated 
natural theology.’    
 
I. A Swift Among Swallows 
 Austin Marsden Farrer was born in Hampstead, London, on 1 October 1904 to 
Augustine and Evangeline Farrer.  His father (1872-1954) was a Baptist minister and 
lecturer who variously taught church history, the history of religion, Hebrew, and 
New Testament at Regent’s Park College, first in its original location in London and 
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then later when it moved to Oxford.  Augustine and Evangeline had three children, 
including the two girls Joyce (1903) and Eleanor (1907).1  The Farrers were a serious 
and devout Nonconformist family, and yet Augustine was ‘neither an emotional 
evangelical nor a biblical fundamentalist.  He moved in circles which had early come 
to terms with biblical criticism.’2  Consequently, it was difficult for the Farrers to find 
a home in the rather more conservative Baptist community of London, and young 
Austin’s experience of several congregational schisms and his awareness of his 
father’s intellectual isolation from his co-religionists contributed to his own eventual 
decision to be baptised in the Church of England instead. 
 From 1917 to 1923 Farrer was a day boy at St Paul’s School in London, and in 
1923 he went up to Balliol College, Oxford, as a classical scholar.  He received Firsts 
in Classical Moderations (1925) and Literae Humaniores (1927), along with the 
Craven Scholarship (1925), Liddon Studentship (1927), and the Jenkins Exhibition 
(1927).3  In his first year at Oxford he found the pull of Anglicanism inexorable and 
was baptised and confirmed in May 1924.  This shift in religious allegiance gradually 
led to a sense of call to ordained ministry in the Church of England, and after a further 
year of theological study at Balliol—for which he was awarded his third First 
                                                 
1 For these details, see Philip Curtis, A Hawk Among Sparrows: A Biography of Austin Farrer (SPCK, 
1985), 1-4.  Curtis says that Farrer was born on 11 October, and that his father’s name was ‘Augustus,’ 
but these seem to be errors.  Farrer’s birth certificate, a copy of which may be found in Box 10 of the 
Farrer papers in the Bodleian, gives the date and name as provided above.  See also I. M. Crombie, 
‘Farrer, Austin Marsden (1904-1968),’ in The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography:  Volume 19 
(Oxford University Press, 2004), 121-123, which agrees with the birth certificate rather than Curtis on 
both counts.  (Subsequent references to this multi-volume work will be abbreviated ODNB). 
2 Curtis, 3. 
3 See Curtis, 16; Crombie, 121; and Farrer’s final entry in Crockford’s Clerical Directory, 1967-68 
(Oxford University Press, 1968), 399.  Competition for the Craven (classics) and Liddon (theology) 
prizes are open to all Oxford students, whereas the Jenkins (classics) is limited to Balliol. 
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(1928)—and formation at Cuddesdon Theological College (just outside Oxford), he 
was ordained deacon in 1928 and priest in 1929.4 
After serving his curacy in Dewsbury, Yorkshire (in the Diocese of 
Wakefield) from 1928 to 1931, Farrer returned to Oxford where he spent the rest of 
his life in teaching, pastoral ministry, and administration at three different colleges.  
He was Chaplain and Tutor at St Edmund Hall (1931-1935), Fellow and Chaplain of 
Trinity College (1935-1960), and the seventh Warden of Keble College (1960-1968).  
While at Trinity he married Katharine Newton, a fellow Oxford graduate and the 
daughter of an Anglican clergyman.  They had one child, a daughter named Caroline.   
Over the course of his career, Farrer was elected to deliver the Bampton 
Lectures (Oxford) in 1948, the Edward Cadbury Lectures (Birmingham) in 1953-
1954, the Giffords (Edinburgh) in 1957, the Nathaniel Taylor Lectures (Yale) in 1961, 
and the Deems Lectures (New York University) in 1964.  Some of his most well-
known books emerged from these various lecture series.  A good friend of C. S. 
Lewis, he was also a leading—if relatively moderate—figure in the Anglo-Catholic 
wing of the Church of England in the mid-20th century, closely associated with such 
luminaries as K. E. Kirk (1886-1954), Gregory Dix (1901-1952), Michael Ramsey 
(1904-1988), and Eric Mascall (1905-1993).  His association with the Metaphysicals 
was discussed in Chapter One.  Farrer died unexpectedly at the age of sixty-four on 29 
December 1968 (twenty days after Karl Barth).  Earlier that year he had been elected 
as a Fellow of the British Academy.5 
                                                 
4 For this period see Curtis, 16-57. 
5 See Curtis, 58-264, for Farrer’s life from his curacy to his death, along with chapters dealing with his 
philosophical, biblical, and theological thought.  For his obituary notice for the British Academy, 
written by Eric Mascall, see Proceedings of the British Academy LIV (1968—Oxford University Press, 
1970), 435-442.  For a discussion of Farrer’s Anglo-Catholicism, see J. N. Morris, ‘“An Infallible Fact-
Factory Going Full Blast”: Austin Farrer, Marian Doctrine, and the Travails of Anglo-Catholicism’, in 
  
114
Farrer’s entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography identifies him 
as a ‘philosopher, theologian, and biblical scholar’.  Perhaps ironically, given his 
Anglo-Catholic credentials, the best one-sentence summary of his intellectual 
achievement was written by the evangelical Anglican theologian J. I. Packer.  Naming 
each of the three academic fields in which Farrer worked, Packer says that his 
writings on philosophy, theology, and New Testament exegesis show ‘an 
independent, lucid, agile, argumentative and articulate mind, fastidiously whimsical, 
witty in the manner of a metaphysical poet, Newmanesque in sensitivity, incantatory 
in expression, and committed to a rational credal orthodoxy.’6  However, as the 
introduction and previous chapters of this dissertation make clear, our focus is on 
philosophical theology, with a particular interest in the epistemological implications 
of Farrer’s thought, and whether or not he might be described as a fideist.  His 
doctrinal work will thus be touched on only tangentially, and his fascinating and 
controversial contribution to biblical studies will be completely set aside.7 
                                                                                                                                            
R. N. Swanson (ed.), The Church and Mary, Studies in Church History 39 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The 
Boydell Press, 2004), 358-367.  See also Robert MacSwain, ‘Above, Beside, Within: The Anglican 
Theology of Austin Farrer’, in Journal of Anglican Studies 4 (2006), 33-57. 
6 J. I. Packer, ‘Farrer, Austin Marsden’ in Sinclair B. Ferguson and David F. Wright (eds.), New 
Dictionary of Theology (Inter-Varsity Press, 1988), 253.  In his biography of Packer, Alister McGrath 
writes that Packer recalls attending Farrer’s lectures and being ‘stimulated by the ideas of this 
remarkable Oxford philosopher’ (To Know and Serve God: A Biography of J. I. Packer [Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1997], 44).     
7 Farrer published four monographs of New Testament scholarship—A Rebirth of Images: The Making 
of St John’s Apocalypse (Dacre Press, 1949), A Study in St Mark (Dacre Press, 1951), St Matthew and 
St Mark (Dacre Press, 1954; Second Edition, 1966), and The Revelation of St John the Divine: A 
Commentary on the English Text (Oxford University Press, 1964)—and a number of important articles, 
most notably ‘On Dispensing With Q’, in D. E. Nineham (ed.), Studies in the Gospels: Essays in 
Memory of R. H. Lightfoot (Blackwell, 1955), 55-88.  Most professional New Testament scholars have 
been dismissive of Farrer’s literary / narrative / typological approach, but for some more sympathetic 
considerations of Farrer’s work in this area, see Michael Goulder’s chapter ‘Farrer the Biblical Scholar’ 
in Curtis’s A Hawk Among Sparrows (1985), 192-212; Charles C. Hefling Jr, ‘Origen Redivivus: 
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According to I. M. Crombie, ‘Farrer had as penetrating a philosophical mind 
as anyone of his generation, though the truth of this—which puts him on a par with 
such practitioners as J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle—was not apparent outside the 
relatively small circle of those who engaged in philosophical discussion with him.  
His especial genius lay in his ability to penetrate through the cloud of detail to the 
essential structure of a problem or the essential features of some doctrine.’8  In light of 
this claim, Basil Mitchell somewhat surprisingly states that Farrer ‘did not regard 
himself as a professional philosopher, and would courteously defer to those who 
were.’9  But Mitchell further explains that Farrer’s philosophical formation was in the 
Oxford ‘Greats’ school, before what would later be known as analytic philosophy 
revolutionised the discipline.  Farrer was educated before the B.Phil. was introduced 
                                                                                                                                            
Farrer’s Scriptural Divinity’, in Jeffrey C. Eaton and Ann Loades (eds.), For God and Clarity:  New 
Essays in Honor of Austin Farrer (Pickwick Publications, 1983), 35-50; and ibid., ‘Farrer’s Scriptural 
Divinity’, in David Hein and Edward Hugh Henderson (eds.), Captured by the Crucified: The Practical 
Theology of Austin Farrer (T & & Clark International, 2004), 149-172.  See also William Horbury’s 
discussion of Farrer in ‘The New Testament’, in Ernest Nicholson (ed.), A Century of Theological and 
Religious Studies in Britain (Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2003), 51-
137, on pages 97-98, 129 and 136.  Farrer’s perhaps best-known and most influential contribution to 
New Testament scholarship is his rejection of Q, and the so-called ‘Farrer Theory’ still has its 
defenders: see, for example, Jeffrey Peterson, ‘A Pioneer Narrative Critic and His Synoptic 
Hypothesis: Austin Farrer and Gospel Interpretation’, Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers 
2000 (Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 651-672; Mark Goodacre, The Synoptic Problem: A Way 
Through the Maze (T & T Clark, 2001); and Ken Olsen, ‘Unpicking on the Farrer Theory’ in Mark 
Goodacre and Nicholas Perrin (eds.), Questioning Q (SPCK, 2004), 127-150.  There is also an 
interesting debate on Farrer’s biblical work that has been carried forward by literary scholars such as 
Frank Kermode and Helen Gardner, and theologians such David Jasper and David Brown, but this too 
cannot detain us further.   
8 Crombie, 121. 
9 Basil Mitchell, ‘Austin Farrer: The Philosopher’, in New Fire 7 (1983), 452.  Contrast this with 
Rowan Williams’s claim that ‘Farrer was professionally a philosopher,’ in Anglican Identities (Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 2003), 110.  Crombie, however, sides with Mitchell against Williams: ‘Though 
[Farrer] assisted in the teaching of philosophy while at Trinity, he did not think of himself as a 
professional philosopher by vocation.’ (121) 
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as a ‘professional’ degree in philosophy, focused primarily on philosophical 
‘problems.’10  By contrast, ‘Greats’ involved ‘the study of Greek and Latin language 
and literature, philosophy and ancient history, and thus provided a threefold mental 
training: in precision of language, clarification of concepts and the weighing of 
historical evidence.’11  Consesquently, rather than a narrow ‘obsessional’ concern 
with logic and contemporary figures and debates, due to his broad intellectual, 
linguistic, literary, and historical training Farrer ‘was at home in the entire Western 
philosophical tradition, not excluding Augustine and Aquinas or Leibniz and Kant 
[not to mention Aristotle, Descartes and Berkeley] and it formed the permanent 
background to his thinking.’12  He was also receptive to 19th and 20th century French 
and German philosophers such as Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Henri Bergson 
(1859-1941), Maurice Blondel (1861-1949), and Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), as well 
as important ‘non-analytic’ English philosophers such as A. N. Whitehead (1861-
1947) and R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943). 
However, Farrer was neither ignorant of nor untouched by the revolutionary 
ferment in philosophy all around him, particularly in Oxford, and thus, although his 
work was ‘never influential with the professionals, [it] was treated by them with 
respect.’13  Or, as Mitchell put it elsewhere, ‘Although he rejected their limitations, he 
                                                 
10 Farrer completed his formal philosophical training in 1927.  It was not until two decades later that, 
under the influence of Gilbert Ryle, Oxford established the B.Phil.  According to Peter Strawson, Ryle 
‘was primarily responsible for the introduction, by a statute of 1946, of the new postgraduate degree of 
bachelor of philosophy, which was first examined in 1948.’  See Peter Strawson, ‘Ryle, Gilbert (1900-
1976)’, in ODNB: Volume 48, 483. 
11 Mitchell, ‘Introduction’ in Brian Hebblethwaite and Douglas Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in 
God’s World: Studies to Commemorate the Austin Farrer Centenary (SCM Press, 2006), 2. 
12 Mitchell, ‘Austin Farrer: The Philosopher,’ 452   
13 Ibid.  For a striking example of this respect, see Strawson’s review of Farrer’s The Freedom of the 
Will (1958) in Mind LXIX (1960), 416-418.  
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respected their standards.  So when he entered into dialogue with a [contemporary 
professional] philosopher, he knew what he was talking about.’14 
According to Mitchell, Farrer shared with the early analytic philosophy ‘its 
suspicion of obscurity and pretentiousness and its concern for clarity and precision of 
statement.’15  Indeed, in a later survey of Farrer’s philosophical significance, Mitchell 
went so far as to claim that 
in an important respect Farrer was an ‘analytical philosopher’.  He did not 
approach philosophical problems with a pre-existing metaphysical theory 
which he sought to vindicate against rival theories.  In a sense he was also an 
ordinary language philosopher who simply felt entitled to take as his subject 
matter ordinary Christian language in its doctrinal and devotional use.  This 
Christian language had for him been largely formed by Aquinas, but Farrer 
was never formally a Thomist, as his friend and colleague, Eric Mascall, was.  
His project was to take Christian belief as he found it and seek to render it as 
clear and coherent as he could make it, and relate it intelligibly to whatever 
else we could claim to know.16    
 
Farrer’s relation and indebtedness to both Thomism and analytic philosophy 
are complex questions that will be explored throughout this chapter and beyond.  
However, in an important description of Farrer’s philosophical approach that raises 
doubts about his final commitment to formal analytic methods, Crombie writes: 
‘Though no Platonist, he perhaps had a somewhat Platonic conception of 
                                                 
14 Mitchell, ‘Introduction’, The Human Person in God’s World, 7. 
15 Mitchell, ‘Austin Farrer: The Philosopher,’ 452.  For a survey of the development of analytic 
philosophy and an exploration of its relation to Christian theology, see Elizabeth Burns, ‘Transforming 
Metaphysics? Revisioning Christianity in the Light of Analytic Philosophy’, in Harriet A. Harris and 
Christopher J. Insole (eds.), Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on 
the Philosophy of Religion (Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 46-60.  The chapters by Basil Mitchell, Richard 
Swinburne, and Ann Loades are also highly relevant to this period. 
16 Mitchell, ‘Introduction’, The Human Person in God’s World, 7-8.  Philip Curtis’s chapter on ‘Farrer 
the Philosopher’ (170-191) is a valuable source of insight, not only into Farrer’s philosophical 
influences and interests, but also his opinion of then-contemporary analytic philosophy.   See in 
particular the excerpt of a letter from C. G. Stead to Curtis on 188-189.  Farrer’s interest in the 
philosophers mentioned above—classical, medieval, modern and contemporary—is documented in 
various primary and secondary sources. 
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philosophy—that it is essentially dialogue, that there can be no formulation of the 
truth so lapidary that it cannot be misunderstood, and that what needs to be said in 
some context depends on what is being misunderstood in that context.’17  This 
statement is significant for two reasons: (1) it intimates a gradual shift within Farrer’s 
own philosophical development that bears some resemblance—one might say a 
family resemblance—to the development of the early Wittgenstein into the later; and 
(2) it also situates Farrer within the ongoing contemporary debate about the very 
nature of reason and philosophy that was noted in Chapter Two, Section II, on 
postmodernism—namely, regarding their inescapably contextual, ‘conversational’ 
status. 
Thus, describing Farrer’s transition from his first book Finite and Infinite: A 
Philosophical Essay (1943) to his last book Faith and Speculation: An Essay in 
Philosophical Theology (1967), Charles Conti says: ‘In many respects, the evolution 
of Farrer’s thought to natural forms of belief paralleled Wittgenstein’s movement 
from the Tractatus to the Investigations, allowing for the living functions of religious 
language in the later work.’18  While I will develop this comparison with Wittgenstein 
                                                 
17 Crombie, 121-122.  Likewise, Mitchell wrote that Farrer’s philosophical style was ‘dialectical, 
almost conversational.  Objections are incorporated in the discussion as it proceeds—often in the form 
of actual passages of dialogue—and the reader is encouraged rather than constrained to view the matter 
in a certain way’ (‘Austin Farrer: The Philosopher,’ 456).  
18 Charles Conti, Metaphysical Personalism: An Analysis of Austin Farrer’s Theistic Metaphysics 
(Clarendon Press, 1995), xviii.  Wayne Proudfoot makes an almost identical claim, although he only 
goes from Finite and Infinite to The Glass of Vision (published five years later): see page 108 and note 
27 on pages 147-148 of God and the Self: Three Types of Philosophy of Religion (Bucknell University 
Press / Associated University Presses, 1976).  Despite their similar comments about Farrer and 
Wittgenstein, Conti strongly dissents from Proudfoot’s ‘individualistic’ reading of Farrer in this book, 
stating that Proudfoot’s ‘misrepresentation of the evolution of Farrer’s thought, in God and [the] Self, 
provided me with the stimulus of a rebuttal.’  See Charles Conti, ‘Austin Farrer and the Analogy of 
other Minds’, in Eaton and Loades (eds.), For God and Clarity, 51-91 (quotation from title note on 51).  
Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism continues his rebuttal of Proudfoot.     
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rather differently from Conti, taking it in an epistemological rather than a 
metaphysical direction, I will nevertheless argue in due course that this comparison 
combined with Crombie’s description points towards perhaps the most fruitful 
appropriation of Farrer’s philosophical legacy.19 
Although our focus here is primarily philosophical, it is important not to forget 
the broader theological context, and not just in England.  For while Farrer indeed 
studied and taught at Anglican and analytic Oxford, he was also intensely interested in 
contemporary Christian theology in Continental Europe, both Protestant and Roman 
Catholic.  Thus, in a recent survey of 20th century British theology, Rowan Williams 
introduces Farrer by stating that ‘one of those who initially found [Emil] Brunner 
attractive was a young Anglican…who was to make a very distinctive mark indeed in 
the period following the Second World War.’20  Developing the Brunner connection, 
Williams says that Farrer ‘spent some months studying in Germany in 1931 and 1932, 
and his correspondence shows how positive an impact Brunner made—and how little 
he was at that time impressed by Barth.’21  In fact, Farrer spent this time in both 
                                                 
19 My forthcoming article on Farrer in the on-line journal Philosophy Compass contains some of this 
material.  For further discussions of Farrer as philosopher, see Brian Hebblethwaite, ‘The Anglican 
tradition’, in Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro, A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion 
(Blackwell, 1997), 175; Daniel W. Hardy, ‘Theology Through Philosophy’, in David Ford (ed.), The 
Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, Second Edition 
(Blackwell, 1997), 256; Thomas Williams, ‘Farrer, Austin Marsden (1904-68)’, in Edward Craig (ed.), 
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:  Volume 3 (Routledge, 1998), 560-561.  
20 Rowan Williams, ‘Theology in the Twentieth Century,’ in Nicholson (ed.), A Century of Theological 
and Religious Studies in Britain, 242.  This essay is also useful as general background for Farrer’s 
context in British theology of this era. 
21 Ibid.  For a brief introduction to Brunner (1889-1966), see I. John Hesselink, ‘Emil Brunner: A 
Centennial Perspective,’ The Christian Century 106 (1989), 1171-1174.  Likewise for Barth (1886-
1968), see—among many possible texts—Daniel W. Hardy, ‘Karl Barth’, in David F. Ford with Rachel 
Muers (eds.), The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918, Third 
Edition (Blackwell, 2005), 21-42. 
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Germany and Switzerland.  According to Philip Curtis, Farrer was awarded the Senior 
Denyer and Johnson Scholarship for Oxford graduates, which he used after his 
appointment as Chaplain of St Edmund Hall to visit Bonn in December 1931 (to study 
with Barth) and Zürich in the summer of 1932 (to study with Brunner).22 
In the Winter Semester of 1931/32, Barth lectured on ‘Prolegomena to 
Dogmatics’ (i.e., his Church Dogmatics, I/1) and ran a seminar on ‘The Problem of 
Natural Theology’.  He had also just published his book on Anselm’s ontological 
argument, having worked on it from the summer of 1930 to the summer of 1931.23  
And Brunner at this point had published at least two major books that Farrer had 
already read in German: Religionsphilosophie evangelischer Theologie (1926) and 
Der Mittler (1927).24  The famous Barth / Brunner debate on natural theology was 
                                                 
22 Curtis, 96.  Curtis discusses these visits and cites the correspondence Williams mentions on pages 
79-80 and 96-103.  The letters may be read in the Bodleian in MS Eng. Lett. C. 272, folios 75, 76, 78, 
79, 103-110, and 118.  Curtis’s reproduction of the correspondence is not entirely reliable, but he still 
accurately conveys their basic content.  Farrer was indeed more impressed with Brunner than with 
Barth, both in terms of published work and personal presence.  Apparently somewhat embarrassed by 
this, Curtis says, ‘It must be remembered that Farrer had not yet read the Church Dogmatics and that in 
1931 the struggle of the German Church against Hitler was still in the future.’ (96)  When Farrer later 
reviewed Barth’s The Doctrine of the Word of God (Church Dogmatics I/1)—some of which he may 
have heard in lectures (see next paragraph of main text)—he was indeed more respectful, if not yet 
persuaded (see Theology XXXIII [1936], 370-372).   
23 For this phase of Barth’s life, see Chapter 10, ‘Fides quaerens intellectum (Bonn, March 1930 – June 
1935)’ in Bruce McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936 (Clarendon Press, 1995), 412-449.  The information cited above comes from 
pages 415-416 and 420.  For an English translation of the Anselm book, see Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides 
quaerens intellectum: Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of His Theological 
Scheme, translated by Ian W. Robertson (SCM Press, 1960). 
24 Fascinatingly, the first was later co-translated into English by none other than Farrer’s father, A. J. D. 
Farrer, and Bertram Lee Woolf, as The Philosophy of Religion from the Standpoint of Protestant 
Theology (Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1937).  In their foreword they thank Brunner himself for 
commenting on the translation, and also ‘the Rev. Austin M. Farrer, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, 
Oxford, who has had the advantage of sitting at Dr. Brunner’s feet’ (vii). 
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still three years ahead, and so the relationship between these two giants of Swiss 
Reformed theology, while already strained, had not yet broken down.25 
But, in strong contrast to the Reformed heritage of Barth and Brunner, 
Williams says that the Anglican Farrer was ‘already much influenced by the 
Aristotelian-Thomist tradition,’ although adding that ‘there is surprisingly little 
evidence that he had studied the French Thomists of the twenties and thirties in any 
depth.’26  Curtis corroborates this, stating that when Farrer received the scholarship 
for study abroad, his mentor K. E. Kirk—still at this point Farrer’s immediate 
predecessor as Chaplain of Trinity, but soon to be Regius Professor of Moral and 
Pastoral Theology, and eventually Bishop of Oxford—had ‘advised him first to visit 
France to study the developments among the French Catholic scholars, but Farrer 
preferred Germany and Switzerland.’27  Curtis does not mention any specific figures 
here, but in an unpublished letter to his father dated 4 May (1931), Farrer says that 
Kirk suggested he go to Paris to work with Étienne Gilson (then at the Sorbonne) and 
Jacques Maritain (then at the Institut Catholique), on the topic of ‘The limitations of 
natural theology in the Scholastic systems’.28  That Farrer chose to study with the 
                                                 
25 Originally published in separate, individual pamphlets in 1934 and 1935, later collected and 
translated into English in Natural Theology: Comprising ‘Nature and Grace’ by Professor Dr Emil 
Brunner and the reply ‘No!’ by Dr Karl Barth, with an Introduction by John Baille (Geoffrey Bles, 
1946).  Although he never mentions them directly, Farrer undoubtedly read these essays, probably 
before they were translated into English.  The debate is mentioned in the report Catholicity, to which 
Farrer contributed: see Catholicity: A Study of Conflict of Christian Traditions in the West (Dacre 
Press, 1947), 23.  For the growing tension between Barth and the other ‘dialectical theologians,’ 
including Brunner, see Part III of McCormack, covering 1924-1936. 
26 Williams, ‘Theology in the Twentieth Century,’ 242.   
27 Curtis, 96. 
28 Bodleian, MS Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 79.  For basic information about the careers of Gilson (1884-
1978) and Maritain (1882-1973), see their respective entries in F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingston (eds.), 
The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Third Edition (Oxford University Press, 1997), 677-
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Protestant Barth and Brunner instead—against not only his mentor’s advice but also 
contrary to his own likely preference in terms of actual intellectual agreement—shows 
both his independent character and a willingness to expose himself to perspectives 
decidedly different from his own.  Either that, or a desire to beard the Reformed lions 
in their own dens—and possibly a mixture of all three.  It also helps to verify that 
Farrer’s appropriation of what he later called ‘the Thomist vision’ was very much his 
own, and was not mediated by other major interpreters.  By contrast, as will be seen at 
the end of this chapter, the Thomism of Farrer’s friend Eric Mascall was deeply 
indebted to Gilson, Maritain, Garrigou-Lagrange, and other 20th century Thomists. 
At any rate, according to Williams, Farrer’s theological agenda  
was initially to [develop] a viable and sophisticated natural theology, and he 
never found any variety of dialectical or existentialist theology at all 
sympathetic.  The final point of this natural theology was a robust doctrine of 
divine freedom, with will and agency seen as the essentials of any analogy 
between the created and the uncreated subject.  There are both parallels and 
immense gaps between this and Barth’s thought: Farrer concludes his 
monumental essay of 1943, Finite and Infinite, by emphasising that natural 
theology can do no more than clarify the ‘grammar’ of divine action; only 
historical contingency can prompt the conviction that such action has 
occurred.  This is not Barth; but neither is it the anthropocentrism that Barth 
repudiated.29 
 
Whether Barth would agree with Williams’s claim here, is of course, a completely 
different question.30 
                                                                                                                                            
678 and 1038.  For Kirk, see E. W. Kemp, ‘Kirk, Kenneth Escott (1886-1954)’, in ODNB: Volume 31, 
772-774. 
29 Williams, ‘Theology in the Twentieth Century,’ 242.  Like ‘fideism’, the term ‘natural theology’ is 
of course open to several definitions—some of which are highly polemical—which could use at least a 
chapter of their own to sort out, but which will not receive that treatment in this dissertation. 
30 For a more detailed comparison of Barth and Farrer, see James J. Buckley and William McF. Wilson, 
‘A Dialogue with Barth and Farrer on Theological Method’, The Heythrop Journal XXVI (1985), 274-
293.  For further considerations of Farrer’s general theological significance—not for specific doctrines 
such as revelation or Christology—in addition to my article ‘Above, Beside, Within’ (cited in note 5 
above), see Ann Loades, ‘Farrer, Austin Marsden,’ in Alister E. McGrath (ed.), The SPCK Handbook 
of Anglican Theologians (SPCK, 1998), 120-123; Peter Sedgwick, ‘Anglican Theology’ in Ford with 
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To conclude this introductory section on Farrer’s life and influences, it is 
remarkable how many superlatives he has received and yet how little he has been 
studied.  Rowan Williams suggests that he was ‘possibly the greatest Anglican mind 
of the twentieth century’.31  In 1987 Richard Harries published a set of readings from 
Farrer titled The One Genius, for ‘it has been said of him that he is the one genius that 
the Church of England has produced during this century.’32  Brian Hebblethwaite 
argues that he provides the best 20th century example of ‘the Anglican tradition’s 
ability to marry natural theology, rational theology, and the theology of revelation,’33 
and—along with Douglas Hedley—claims that he ‘exemplified an unparalleled 
combination of spiritual sensitivity, theological perspicacity and philosophical 
acuity.’34  In a survey of religion in Oxford from 1914 to 1970, F. M. Turner says, 
‘More than any figure of his generation in the University, Farrer embodied the highest 
ideal of the college chaplain-theologian.’35  Leslie Houlden says he was ‘a giant of a 
preacher.’36  I. M. Crombie reports that ‘in the judgement of many there was no abler 
                                                                                                                                            
Muers (eds.), The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918, 178-181, 
183-184; and Robert Boak Slocum, Light in a Burning Glass: A Systematic Presentation of Austin 
Farrer’s Theology (University of South Carolina Press, 2007)—along with my review in Anglican 
Theological Review 89 (2007), 682-683. 
31 Rowan Williams, ‘Debate on The Gift of Authority—Archbishop of Canterbury’s Remarks’, 
delivered at the Church of England’s General Synod in London on Friday, 13 February 2004, 
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1194 (accessed on 27 March 2009). 
32 Richard Harries, introduction to The One Genius: Readings Through the Year with Austin Farrer 
(SPCK, 1987), ix. 
33 Brian Hebblethwaite, ‘The Anglican Tradition’, in Quinn and Taliaferro (eds.), A Companion to the 
Philosophy of Religion, 175. 
34 ‘Preface and Acknowledgements’ in Hebblethwaite and Hedley (eds), The Human Person in God’s 
World, vii. 
35 F. M. Turner, ‘Religion’, in Brian Harrison (ed.), The History of the University of Oxford.  Volume 
VIII: The Twentieth Century (Clarendon Press, 1994), 309. 
36 ‘Introduction’ to Leslie Houlden (ed.), Austin Farrer: The Essential Sermons (SPCK, 1991), ix. 
  
124
Christian thinker among his contemporaries.’37  The novelist Susan Howatch says that 
he ‘deserves to be read today by all those interested in truth, tradition, and twentieth-
century spirituality.’38  And so on: this is just a small sample of the litany of praise.  
And yet he remains almost completely unknown and without influence outside the 
small circle of his admirers and enthusiasts. 
 As noted in Chapter One, Basil Mitchell has been instrumental in championing 
Farrer’s legacy, and has written some of the most significant tributes in his honour.  
Nevertheless, he demurs from the title of Philip Curtis’s biography, A Hawk Among 
Sparrows (taken from a description of Farrer by his student Gordon Phillips: see 
pages 230-231).  Writing somewhat facetiously, Mitchell said that this title ‘has 
always worried me—Austin was not in the least predatory and the rest of us were not 
so inconsiderable: A Swift Among Swallows might have been better.’39  Whether 
Farrer was a hawk among sparrows, or a swift among swallows, he remains less well 
known than he should be, even among Anglicans.  The goal of this dissertation, 
however, is not to rehabilitate Farrer’s general reputation, but rather to clarify the 
development of this thinking on faith and reason, to which we now turn. 
 
II. An Undergraduate Writes Home      
 Most studies of Farrer begin with his published material and thus with the 
formal start of his scholarly career.  Farrer’s first publication appeared in June 1933 
(when he was 28), and his first book ten years later.40  But as Curtis’s biography 
                                                 
37 Crombie, 123. 
38 Susan Howatch, ‘Introduction’ to Austin Farrer, Saving Belief: A Discussion of Essentials 
(Mowbray, 1994), xi.  This book was originally published in 1964 by Hodder and Stoughton.   
39 Mitchell, ‘Introduction,’ The Human Person in God’s World, 6. 
40 ‘A Return to New Testament Christological Categories’, in Theology XXVI (1933), 304-318.  The 
book, of course, was Finite and Infinite.   
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makes clear, the undergraduate Farrer engaged in a long and fascinating 
correspondence with his highly-educated, widely-read, moderately-liberal but still 
deeply-Baptist father.  The topics they discussed included Austin’s decision to join 
the Church of England, his ‘Greats’ education, his philosophical and theological 
thinking, and his initial forays into biblical scholarship.  With rare exceptions, only 
Austin’s side of the correspondence survives, but it still provides essential material for 
anyone seeking to chart the development of his thought.  In particular, it greatly 
complicates Basil Mitchell’s concern that, with Faith and Speculation in 1967, Farrer 
had ‘become a sort of fideist’.  On the evidence of the correspondence, Farrer became 
‘a sort of fideist’ forty years earlier, around 1927—at least for a while.41 
 One of the very few cases where both sides of an exchange survive is in regard 
to Austin’s difficult and painful decision to be baptised (and confirmed) in the Church 
of England rather than remain a Baptist.42  These events occurred in May 1924, 
toward the end of his first year at Balliol, when Austin was nineteen.  But the 
correspondence about it began with him writing to his father on 15 January of that 
year.  Austin’s side of this correspondence remains unpublished, and it is indeed a 
deeply moving and interesting exchange—but I must resist the temptation to discuss it 
here in detail, as it properly belongs to Anglican and Baptist studies rather than 
religious epistemology.  However, in responding to Augustine’s subsequent plea 
(dated 26 January 1924) that he not make a decision too quickly, Austin replied: 
                                                 
41 As stated in Chapter One, Curtis’s transcriptions are sometimes unreliable, and so I provide my own 
transcriptions from the originals, held in Bodleian MS Eng. Lett. c. 270, c. 272, or according to box 
number in the Farrer papers.  In most cases, the cited correspondence is provided by Curtis, if not as 
accurately, and so I provide page numbers to his biography when available.  Farrer did not always 
provide full dates, and when they cannot be determined by context I follow Curtis’s best guess.  
42 For this episode see Curtis, 20-24.  Curtis provides excerpts from his parents’ letters to Austin at this 
time, but not Austin’s own.  None of these letters, on either side, were foliated in Eng. Lett. c. 270 with 
the other correspondence from this period, but were (and are) kept in the un-catalogued boxes.  
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The matter seems at present left to reason.  I never yet have decided anything 
by reason and probably never shall; I see both sides and can convince myself 
of either at will.  I suppose I must just study the subject as much as I can, and 
wait for the voice of conscience, which will sometime speak, I trust.43 
 
Augustine replied to this letter on 3 February and said: 
I quite agree with the view you take of the way in which your deliverance will 
arise: the question will be settled by conscience rather than reason, and in due 
time your conscience will become clear as to the line of your duty.  (Of 
course, indirectly reason will have played its part in determining conscience.)  
And when conscience declares itself, on whichever side, to that side you will 
go, and with your mother’s and father’s blessing and prayers to second you.44 
 
It is, of course, important not to make too much out of the claim of a nineteen 
year-old undergraduate that he has not yet ‘decided anything by reason and probably 
never shall’ for he can ‘see both sides and can convince [himself] of either at will.’  It 
would be a mistake to declare Austin an out-and-out fideist at this point.  On the other 
hand, this is a theme that recurs more than once in this phase of his life, particularly in 
regard to vocational questions (he was then contemplating a career in law).  He finds 
himself paralysed by his ability to intellectually consider all the different aspects of a 
question and to see the various reasons for and against it.  He thus cannot engage his 
will to act on the direction of reason, for reason is not giving him any clear direction.  
And this, of course, is the dilemma of classical scepticism and one of the primary 
causes of fideism (see Chapter Two, Section I.C). 
It is unclear in Austin’s comment above whether he is making a sharp contrast 
here between ‘reason’ and ‘conscience,’ and thus wondering if conscience will 
provide what reason lacks, or whether he is saying that, if reason finally makes a 
decision, conscience will naturally follow.  His father’s response picks up on this 
                                                 
43 Letter from Austin Farrer to his father, Farrer Papers, Box 10.  This letter is only dated ‘Thursday’ 
but it comes between his father’s two letters of 26 January and 3 February 1924. 
44 Letter from Augustine Farrer to his son, Farrer Papers, Box 1.  The penultimate word is unclear, and 
may be ‘send.’  Both make sense, however. 
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ambiguity, and brings ‘conscience’ and ‘reason’ into more explicit relation: ‘the 
question will be settled by conscience rather than reason,’ he says, but ‘indirectly 
reason will have played its part in determining conscience.’  And that tells us not only 
what he thought about the solution to Austin’s dilemma, but also the elder Farrer’s 
view of the relationship between, and relative value of, reason and conscience.  
But Austin’s fear throughout this exchange is that, now that he has finally 
admitted both to himself and to his parents that he feels drawn to the Church of 
England, if he does not go ahead and act on the vivifying impulse, however uncertain 
it is, he will ‘sink back into apathy’45—that is, his state of paralysis mentioned above.  
And so, in an undated letter that follows at some unspecified time his father’s letter of 
3 February, Austin writes: 
As for your desire to be assured that I am at least clear in my own mind on the 
issue—I am about as clear as I am ever likely to become from looking at 
things from outside, which, you may say, is not saying much.  Perhaps not: but 
hesitancy is rather my vice than precipitancy, and at the present stage of things 
I feel that to put it off now would be nothing but weakness.46   
 
And this, too, is a theme that will emerge again when Austin is considering 
ordination: the need to act without complete certainty, combined with a sense that 
some knowledge can only be gained from within a certain perspective or tradition, 
rather than ‘looking at things from outside.’  
The correspondence that followed was less personal and more concerned with 
Austin’s on-going education, initially in ‘Greats’ and then in theology.  In a letter 
from 14 May, probably in 1926, he tells his father that he is studying Plato’s Republic 
with John Macmurray (‘He is amazingly good.  He opens up a new world of thought 
to me.  The profundity of Plato is far greater than I ever imagined.  I am fairly lost in 
                                                 
45 Austin’s letter cited in note 43. 
46 Letter from Austin Farrer to his father, Farrer Papers, Box 10.  This letter is only dated ‘Monday’ but 
was written in early 1924, perhaps February or March. 
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it.’).47 And in a letter from 20 November, also probably in 1926, he says that he is 
studying metaphysics and reading Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity (‘It is 
the worst written volume I ever attacked’).48  After mentioning Alexander, he writes:  
The philosophical atmosphere has odd effects on people’s personal religion: 
and while I can’t profess to perform the startling feat of John Findlay, who has 
a practising religion without a personal God, still I find that the form of 
religious thinking is to a certain extent modified: particularly it is real hard 
work to keep Christ Himself in view; the Communion is the only sure and 
unfailing hold.49 
 
He goes on to say that under philosophical scrutiny the concept of God seems to move 
inexorably away from conventional religion in an impersonal direction.  Thus, how to 
connect the personal God of Christian tradition—not to mention Jesus Christ—with 
this remote and abstract philosophical deity is difficult.  Here is a familiar practical 
example of the conflict between faith and reason—i.e., Pascal’s famous contrast 
between the ‘God of philosophers and scholars’ and the ‘God of Abraham, Isaac, and 
                                                 
47 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 20.  John Macmurray taught at philosophy at Balliol from 1923 to 1928, and 
ended his career as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh (1944-1958).  His Gifford Lectures—
delivered in Glasgow in 1953-1954 and published as The Self as Agent (1957) and Persons in Relation 
(1961)—are sometimes compared to Farrer’s own metaphysics of action and personhood.  For basic 
information on his life and thought, see David Fergusson, ‘Macmurray, John (1891-1976)’, in ODNB: 
Volume 35, 919-920.  For his teaching at Balliol and comments on Farrer as an undergraduate, see 
Curtis, 26-27. 
48 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 22 (Curtis, 28).  Samuel Alexander was Professor of Philosophy at 
Manchester (1893-1924).  His Gifford Lectures, delivered in Glasgow in 1916-1918, were published in 
1920 in two volumes as Space, Time, and Deity.  See John Laird, revised by Michael A. Weinstein, 
‘Alexander, Samuel (1859-1938)’, in ODNB: Volume 1, 684-686. 
49 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 22 (Curtis, 28).  This fascinating reference to ‘John Findlay’ reveals that the 
South African philosopher J. N. Findlay, who was a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol during 1924-1926 and 
thus a fellow student there with Farrer, even then held the perspective he famously defended over 
twenty years later in his essay ‘Can God’s Existence be Disproved?’, originally published in Mind in 
1948 and reprinted in Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical 
Theology (SCM Press, 1955), 47-56.  His Gifford Lectures, delivered in St Andrews in 1964-1966, 
were published as The Discipline of the Cave (1966) and The Transcendence of the Cave (1967).  See 
Mark J. Schofield, ‘Findlay, John Niemeyer (1903-1987), in ODNB: Volume 19, 589-590.  By 
coincidence, Alexander, Macmurray, Findlay, and Farrer all studied at Balliol.     
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Jacob.’  In response to this dilemma, Farrer is driven to conclude that while God may 
indeed have a personal character in some sense, God is not as a person just like us, but 
‘a person by analogy.’50  Curtis comments that this letter marks the first mention of 
the concept of analogy that he found in Farrer’s writings.  If so, then Farrer’s interest 
in—or at least openness to—Thomism may have begun as early as 1926.51 
 But undoubtedly the early letter most relevant to the theme of this dissertation 
was written on 14 March and convincingly placed by Curtis in 1927.  That is, in 
Farrer’s fourth year at Balliol (when he was twenty-two) before eventually proceeding 
to study theology later that year and train for ordination at Cuddesdon.  This letter 
thus culminates Farrer’s more purely secular philosophical formation and marks the 
moment when he was finally able to move forward into accepting his call to ordained 
ministry and thus to grapple with the complexities of the Christian intellectual 
tradition.  For Farrer, these two elements (ordination and theology) came together—
he could not consider one apart from the other.  And he could not seriously consider 
either prior to the breakthrough described to his father in this letter.  This 
breakthrough involved nothing less than determining the proper relationship between 
‘faith’ and ‘reason’, or—as he also puts it here—‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’.52 
 Farrer begins by telling his father about ‘an enormous bout of philosophising,’ 
which has led him to the following conclusion: faith should be established ‘on its own 
                                                 
50 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 23 (Curtis, 29).  Farrer actually wrote this phrase in Greek, but Curtis 
translates it directly in the text of his transcription.  I am grateful to David Brown for help in 
determining the accuracy of Curtis’s translation. 
51 See Curtis, chapter 3, note 9, on page 245.  Although on page 46 he says that Farrer began to read 
Aquinas in September 1928—i.e., when he was at Cuddesdon. 
52 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folios 29-30 (Curtis, 30-32).  Because of the significance of this letter to the 
argument of this dissertation, and because Curtis’s transcription contains omissions and a major error 
(writing ‘belief’ for ‘disbelief’), I have included most of the letter in Appendix A, to which readers are 
now referred.  Subsequent quotations will simply be provided in the text to draw out the main points. 
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foundations, where the ebb and flow of metaphysical speculations ought not to be able 
to touch it any more.’  This, he says, is ‘a great gain,’ since it delivers the person of 
faith from constantly worrying whether or not their beliefs stand rationally 
‘condemned,’ or are at least ‘dependent upon any turn your theories may take in the 
future’.  This constant worry about the rational credentials of faith, Farrer says, ‘is just 
as disastrous as disbelief and less progressive.  So now I am going about saying to 
myself, that if only people would think their philosophy out they would discover the 
scope of its view, and realise that it does not touch religion.’  And he continues by 
adding, ‘This little victory pleases me a great deal, because the curse of this 
intellectualism is, that it destroys desire by challenging the grounds of it before it has 
time to act; and then leaving it hanging on an infinite regress of problems to be 
considered.’  Further on, Farrer writes: ‘You don’t know how happy I am: I feel less 
the slave of Reason than I have done any time these four years I should think.’  
However, and crucially, he then says: ‘But don’t suspect me of plunging into 
irrationalism: philosophy is the deliverer and not the chain, and I more and more want 
to go through with it.’  And thus the letter’s final conclusion: ‘We must (I am a 
prophet already!) go through with reason and see what it does, and then just say of 
faith, that it too does and says these other (not contradictory but supplementary) 
things.’53 
                                                 
53 In the letter Farrer mentions H. A Hodges (1905-1976), one of Farrer’s closest friends at Balliol, 
eventually a distinguished Dilthey scholar and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading, as 
someone who had recently gone through a similar experience and foresworn ‘rationalism’.  Curtis 
omits this particular sentence from Farrer’s letter, but in a letter sent to Curtis for the biography, 
Hodges says that as a result of Farrer’s breakthrough he ‘was now ready to join me in acknowledging 
the insufficiency of human reason and accepting the light of faith’ (see Curtis, 33).  For Hodges’s life 
and work, see the biographical sketch in H. A. Hodges, God Beyond Knowledge, edited by W. D. 
Hudson (Macmillan Press, 1979), vii-x.  This book contains Hodges’s Gifford Lectures, delivered at 
Aberdeen in 1956-1957, under the title The Logic of Religious Thinking (xi).  
  
131
 It is unnecessary to comment at length on the fideistic nature of these 
statements—however one defines fideism (see Chapter Two).  This letter takes a 
position somewhere between extreme and moderate fideism: it is not clear if reason 
plays any positive role here at all.  Although Farrer emphasises that he does not see 
himself as embracing ‘irrationalism,’ he certainly seems to have made philosophy 
‘innocuous’ and religion ‘invulnerable’—to use the terms employed by Basil Mitchell 
in Neutrality and Commitment in his rejection of ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ (see 
Chapter One, Section I.C).  Philosophy ‘is the deliverer and not the chain’ precisely 
because its powers are so limited, and only the study of philosophy confirms its 
weakness.  Faith stands established on its own foundations, above the surging tides of 
metaphysical speculation.  The scope of philosophy does not touch religion.  Faith 
‘does its thing’ and reason ‘does its thing,’ and these two ‘things’ are ‘not 
contradictory but supplementary’.  Again, as stated above in regard to Farrer’s 1924 
claim that he has ‘never yet…decided anything by reason and probably never shall,’ 
the point is not to saddle the mature Farrer with such a position—although it remains 
to be seen how close Farrer’s chapter ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ in Faith and 
Speculation is to this letter written forty years earlier.  The point is that any attempt to 
determine whether or not Farrer ‘became’ a fideist in 1967 must take account of what 
he wrote to his father in 1927.  And, at least prima facie, it bears a striking 
resemblance to what Mitchell was afraid he was saying in Faith and Speculation. 
 After this comes two remarkable letters on the relationship between 
Gnosticism, philosophy, myth, and early Christianity, written in February 1928 after 
Farrer had begun to study theology.  Farrer takes his newfound appreciation for the 
decidedly ‘odd’ intellectual milieu in which orthodox Christian doctrine arose and 
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puts it to good practical use, arguing against the ‘rationalism’ of liberal Protestantism.  
Thus, he provocatively writes to his father: 
Gnosticism has a logic in which A can be B and not-B at the same time, and 
this should be considered by those who are treating the original meaning of the 
sacraments, or the Incarnation.  One must go further, and see how infinitely 
more plausible are the Catholic than Protestant theses….And what’s more, it 
looks to me as though the Christian Religion lifted out of this mental 
atmosphere becomes a fish out of water, and rationalistic arguments used 
against the sacraments and ministry, just as destructive of the Incarnation, in 
the hands, that is, of a man who would consent to be consistent.  And is not 
this what is happening to ‘enlightened’ Protestantism?54 
 
The distinctively Christian idea of God ‘is simply not philosophy, and cannot be: it is 
not exact information, or even vague information, but just “the best myth”, a poem 
which vanishes into nothing if we try to interpret it, a symbolism to which there is no 
key.  Christ is the poem that was history, his Eucharist the myth become bread.’55  
While acknowledging that the secular discipline of academic history does indeed have 
definite criteria which can rule out certain positions as untenable, Farrer nevertheless 
inveighs against the ‘Protestant’ preoccupation with getting behind tradition to the 
supposed factual truth.  Rejecting such Protestant rationalism, however, is not an 
evasion of intellectual responsibility—or, if so, it is a necessary one:    
don’t you see that this anti-Protestant line of approach is our only salvation?  
Protestantism has still something to stand on while there is any one single 
rational element in the Faith from which it can start: but Philosophy will no 
longer support so much as the existence of our God, nor science the 
continuance of our consciousness.  No logic can forbid us to establish the 
antithesis ‘God—creatures’, because ‘God’ is so far perfectly empty of 
content[:] but when you go on to say that God ‘is’, you must realise that this is 
poetry, that considering the other attributes you are bound to give Him, His 
‘being’ cannot be predicated in any category known to us, nor have we any 
means of determining it: so that it is as true to deny that He is (in any sense of 
the word we possess) as to assert that he is in He only knows what sense; and 
the path of wisdom is to do neither, but to accept this as an element in the 
revealed poem of divine truth.56 
                                                 
54 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folios 36-37 (Curtis, 45).   
55 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 37 (Curtis, 45). 
56 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 37-36 again—reverse side of paper (Curtis, 45-46). 
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Here Farrer boldly mixes contemporary secular scepticism about the existence 
of God and the immortality of the soul (definitely not adhering to the admonitions of 
Vatican I and the Anti-Modernist Oath!) with standard apophatic and mystical claims 
about God’s transcendent ineffability, and throws in conformist Catholicism for good 
measure.  That is to say, we don’t know anything about God, from either nature or 
revelation, but that’s all right because it’s all poetry anyway—so just go to Mass.  
Thus rejecting any project of evidentialist apologetics, such as put forward by B. H. 
Streeter (‘poor devil!’), the young Farrer concludes, rather grandly:  
Above all, let us not tire ourselves in vain by beating in the void the wings of 
the mind, but turn back into the circle of the myth, and there let our spirits 
dwell: being assured that this is something which Reason can never take from 
us, because she gave it us not, and that it carries its own truth immanently 
within itself.57 
 
This letter seems to mark the most extreme fideistic statement of Farrer’s 
precocious student phase, and certainly goes far beyond anything he would later say 
in print.  It also seems to have provoked a strong reply from his father, expressing 
complete consternation, for Austin’s next letter, dated 26 February (1928) begins, ‘It 
cannot be necessary for you to go mad, in order to find yourself happy in an 
atmosphere where I feel myself most sane, and therefore I conclude that I failed to say 
what I intended to say.’58  He then both qualified and defended his previous letter: 
‘Perhaps when I protest against the “rationalism” of all the Protestantism I can 
understand, I mean that it applies an arbitrary rule or standard to dogma and practice, 
it judges by an external standard’ (i.e., apparently, unexamined canons of secular 
                                                 
57 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 36 (Curtis, 46).  Streeter (1874-1937) was a distinguished theologian and 
New Testament scholar who taught at Queen’s College, Oxford from 1905 until his death: see his entry 
in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Third Edition, 1547-1548.  Farrer would later argue 
against his solution to the Synoptic Problem in ‘On Dispensing With Q’. 
58 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 38. 
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rationality).59  However, Farrer stands firm in his conviction that what his Baptist 
father would no doubt consider ‘bad philosophy’ (i.e., the Neoplatonism of the early 
Church) is essential to understanding not just Christianity’s historical development 
but its continued intelligibility (such as it is): 
Did not degenerate Platonism in ceasing to be philosophy become the true 
‘logic’ of religion, and are we not right in viewing our faith through the eyes 
of the early gentile Church?….I really didn’t mean to tie revelation down to 
discreditable religious developments, but only to suggest that the same 
religious logic was to be found in the degenerate Platonism and in 
Christianity.60 
 
What next follows in the foliated correspondence is an undated fragment, 
apparently to Farrer’s mother, which says: 
I hope Father is not annoyed with my controversiality.  I am only disputing 
with everybody possible in the hope of making up my own mind.  He need not 
be afraid that I shall say any of the things I now say in a year’s time.  But I 
will have a connected and rational theology, or perish in the attempt.61 
 
This last sentence is revealing, for it indicates not only that Farrer still wished to have 
a ‘rational theology’—and thus to be rational himself—but also his opinion that the 
positions explored in the previous letters still might count as such, even if only under 
some description of ‘rational’ that Farrer could accept but his father could not.  That 
is, even if they entailed commitment to a ‘religious logic’ that was not obtainable by 
currently respectable philosophical standards.  If adherence to orthodox Christian 
doctrine (‘Catholicism’) required moves allowed by Neo-(‘degenerate’)-platonism but 
disqualified by more sober metaphysical schemes (‘Protestantism’), Farrer was 
willing to at least entertain degenerate Platonism.  That is, in classical moderate 
fideist fashion, Farrer was philosophically investigating the limits of reason and was 
inclined, once those limits were determined, to take up a position outside the city 
                                                 
59 Ibid. (Curtis, 47). 
60 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folios 39-40 (Curtis, 48-49). 
61 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 41 (Curtis, 49). 
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walls.  If, that is, the limits of reason could be safely circumscribed.  But what if they 
could not?  What if contemporary philosophy could decisively pass judgement on ‘the 
logic of religion’ and annexe its territory under philosophical jurisdiction?  What if 
the powers of reason were greater than Farrer thought?  What would that imply for the 
future of ‘Catholicism’?  And thus for Farrer’s own religious beliefs? 
 For, despite the philosophical / fideistic ‘breakthrough’ of March 1927, 
subsequent letters reveal that Farrer continued to struggle with the conventional faith / 
reason dilemma.  That is, he continued to feel the pressing requirements of reason, 
demanding an answer for the hope that was in him.  So, for example, on 23 August 
1927, in his first summer at Cuddesdon, Farrer says of his fellow ordinands that they 
are 
interesting and intelligent, like the rest of mankind.  But they tend to be 
interested in the wrong things, for instance points of ritual, whether we ought 
to believe in the Immaculate Conception, and the Scout Movement.  I don’t 
see how anyone is ever going to have a properly balanced view of things who 
has never felt the pains of real scepticism.  What is the reason for not worrying 
about the papacy and the use of incense, except the necessity of holding on to 
the existence and character of God?62 
 
Here Farrer soberly speaks of the ‘existence’ and ‘character’ of God, as if these were 
topics one could actually discuss and argue about in shared rational, prosaic terms, not 
merely as ineffable poetry, apophatic mysticism, or Neoplatonic mystery.  And while 
his reference to ‘the pains of real scepticism’ may be alluding to his recent struggles, 
now safely behind him after the fideistic breakthrough five months earlier, this is 
certainly not the case in a letter written at least a year afterwards, dated by Curtis in 
March or April 1928.  Halfway through his year at Cuddesdon and preparing for his 
forthcoming ordination, Farrer tells his father that he has turned down the position of 
chaplain at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, partly because it is too small for the 
                                                 
62 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 33 (Curtis, 42). 
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chaplain to have much to do, and so Farrer would have to start teaching immediately.  
But he has not yet been ordained or spent time in a parish.  Thus, he says: 
If I took it, I could only do so with the intention of doing theological research 
and so becoming a theology tutor at last: and I don’t think this is right or 
decent to start with.  You cannot research profitably into the philosophy of 
religion—the only conceivable branch of study for me—until you know what 
you are talking about, and the sphere to reveal that to you is the practical life.  
Or at least it is so to me: I have no doubt [that] other people can be mystics 
quietly by themselves in corners, but I’m not endowed that way: at least I feel 
so, and can’t give reasons.  And besides this, I don’t know whether you have 
seen, but I suppose you have, the profundity of my scepticism.  My faith is a 
very small and tender plant in a very vast expanse of unsheltered desert: 
religion is a wild and almost preposterous experiment to me, which I must try 
out on the most stringent testing ground I can find before I shall have any 
peace.  A bad reason, you may think, for taking Holy Orders: I don’t know: 
but I am convinced that in any other line of life my faith would never assert 
itself against sceptical indifference.  I must give it the most bracing air or it 
won’t grow at all.  If I don’t live for religion, I shan’t live by religion.  If you 
ask me whether I’m such an utter empiricist as this: whether I am prepared to 
say ‘experience will decide’ perhaps I shall say no: the test is not pragmatical, 
only it is by experience alone that the ‘innate ideas’ imprinted in the soul can 
be drawn out into the light of day and recognised for the eternal truths that 
they are.  Of course I know that one can live ‘for religion’ without becoming a 
priest: but I haven’t written this as an abstract doctrine, but as what I feel for 
myself, which the immediate point. 
 
And he concludes, ‘I think I am a Proteus, and give an entirely different set of 
reasons, whenever questioned, which must be a little confusing for my friends.  But 
while I write I imagine each time that I am saying exactly what I feel and have felt for 
years.  So I must leave you to fit the jig-saw together as best you can.’63 
Here we see that the concerns expressed in his 1924 letters about whether or 
not he should join the Church of England continue to trouble him.  Despite four years 
of further study and Anglican practice, and indeed on the cusp of ordination, his 
actual beliefs are still uncertain.  He still finds himself able to give ‘an entirely 
different set of reasons’ to justify his desired conclusions.  And despite his vaunted 
‘breakthrough’ in 1927, where he allegedly discovered that philosophy properly 
                                                 
63 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 43 (Curtis, 54-55). 
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understood did not touch religion, he here admits a profound scepticism under which 
his ‘small and tender’ plant of faith wilts in the ‘very vast expanse of unsheltered 
desert’—‘unsheltered,’ that is, from the harsh light of reason.  So whatever degree of 
fideism Farrer may have embraced in 1927 seems somewhat moderated by 1928. 
Again, however, as with his eventual decision to seek baptism because only in 
so doing could he stop inconclusively ‘looking at things from outside,’ so here Farrer 
asserts that the only way he can move forward in dealing with his doubt is to ‘live for 
religion’—otherwise, he says, ‘I shan’t live by religion’ but will succumb to ‘sceptical 
indifference.’  And this ‘pragmatic’ ‘empirical’ approach with its emphasis on 
‘practical life’ over ‘innate ideas’ will indeed return to the fore in Faith and 
Speculation.  For now, it is sufficient to note that Farrer was ordained deacon on 23 
December 1928 to serve his curacy in the Parish of All Saints, Dewsbury.  Curtis 
writes: ‘It lies in the south of the West Riding of Yorkshire, a region as rugged as its 
inhabitants, where anything worth building must be founded on the rock, and at this 
moment in its history it was a region of great poverty and distress.  Here indeed he 
could try the experiment of religion on what he had explicitly desired, a stringent 
testing ground.’64 
 
III. ‘Possessed by the Thomist Vision’ 
 During the fifteen years between his ordination and the publication of Finite 
and Infinite, Farrer matured greatly as a philosopher, theologian, and biblical scholar, 
and in particular became fascinated with the increasingly controversial project of 
‘rational theology’.  But in making this sudden leap of a decade-and-a-half, I am not 
simply following the specific concerns of this dissertation with the development of 
                                                 
64 Curtis, 57. 
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Farrer’s religious epistemology.  For while he published some interesting articles and 
book reviews between 1933 and 1943 concerned with various philosophical, 
theological, and biblical topics, Finite and Infinite was the first clear indication of 
Farrer’s undoubted genius, announcing that a major figure had arrived.  Even so, the 
years leading up to this book cannot be passed over without comment—especially 
since they usually are. 
 A. Preparation 
For these were the years when he engaged seriously with Emil Brunner and 
Karl Barth, not only reading their work in German but also travelling to study with 
them directly.  Brunner’s Der Mittler of 1927 (ET 1934)—which Farrer apparently 
read in March 1931 while still a curate, in the Spring before his return to Oxford later 
that year—made an enormous impact.65  And while, as noted above, Farrer’s initial 
impression of Barth was less favourable, this was of course primarily the ‘early’ Barth 
of the first-and-second-editions of the Romans commentary.  Farrer went to Bonn in 
1931, the year the Anselm book appeared, and in 1936 he gave The Doctrine of the 
Word of God (Church Dogmatics I/1) a critical but positive review.  Somewhat 
puckishly, Farrer says that this book ‘deals with the nature of dogmatics, a science in 
which Barth believes, and we—according to his view—probably do not.’66  But the 
Anglo-Catholic chaplain-don’s encounter with the best of contemporary Continental 
                                                 
65 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 75 (Curtis, 79). 
66 Austin Farrer, Review of Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God and God in Action, in 
Theology XXXIII (1936), 370.  The conventional understanding of Barth’s theological development as 
a shift from ‘dialectic to analogy,’ associated with Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988), has been 
seriously challenged by Bruce McCormack (see note 23 above).  Even McCormack, however, accepts 
and indeed argues for considerable development in Barth from Der Römerbrief (1919) to Die 
kirchliche Dogmatik (1932-1965).  So far as I am aware, there is no evidence that Farrer read the book 
on Anselm, but—as with the Barth / Brunner debate—it is very difficult to believe that he did not, 
particularly since he went to Bonn the year it was published.  
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Reformed theology undoubtedly challenged and stimulated his thinking on a number 
of topics, not least being his eventual defence of what Rowan Williams described 
above as ‘a viable and sophisticated natural theology’ in Finite and Infinite.  It is vital 
to remember that this book was written by someone with personal knowledge and 
experience of both Barth and Brunner and their work.67 
 But these were also years when Logical Positivism swept through British 
philosophy, mostly due to the publication in 1936 of the first edition of A. J. Ayer’s 
Language, Truth and Logic.68  Although this slender book was hardly original, it 
forcefully and accessibly presented the ideas of the Vienna Circle, Bertrand Russell, 
and the early Wittgenstein (at least, as understood by Ayer) to a much broader 
audience than a small group of professional philosophers.  Famously, Ayer argued 
that metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and religion were all, strictly speaking, 
meaningless, as their ‘assertions’ could not be verified by positivistic criteria.69  In 
particular, his critique was strongly felt in philosophy of religion and, eventually, 
theology.  Thus, Donald MacKinnon writes that when 
Ayer’s book appeared, the world of philosophical theology was dominated in 
Great Britain by the works of three men: A. E. Taylor’s The Faith of a 
Moralist [1930]; F. R. Tennant’s Philosophical Theology [Volume 1, 1928; 
Volume 2, 1930]; and John Oman’s The Natural and the Supernatural [1931].  
The impact of logical positivism led to a sharp depreciation of their 
                                                 
67 For Williams, see note 29 above.  Farrer also reviewed God Transcendent by the German Lutheran 
theologian Paul Heim (1874-1958), in The Church Quarterly Review CXXII (1936), 334-337.  Farrer’s 
engagement with Continental Reformed and Lutheran theologians during this period deserves more 
attention than it can receive here.   
68 (Victor Gollancz, 1936; second edition, 1946).  For Ayer’s life and career, see Richard Wollheim, 
‘Ayer, Sir Alfred Jules [Freddie] (1910-1989)’, in ODNB: Volume 3, 8-10; and Ian Morton, ‘A. J. Ayer 
(1910-1989)’ in Philip B. Dematteis, et. al. (eds.), British Philosophers 1800-2000 (Thompson Gale, 
2002), 26-35. 
69 See, in particular, Chapter VI, ‘Critique of Ethics and Theology.’  Flew and MacIntyre’s 1955 
collection of New Essays in Philosophical Theology (cited in note 49 above) is a classic document of 
the encounter between logical positivism and Christian theology. 
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achievement, and to a heightened self-consciousness concerning the logical 
precariousness of any significant statement concerning a transcendent 
absolute.  It is to this period that there belongs the preparation of Dr Austin 
Farrer’s major work—Finite and Infinite [1943].  In it he presented to the 
world the fruits of his prolonged attempt to find, in a refashioning of the 
Thomistic way of analogy, the means whereby a rational theology might be 
constructed and rendered immune from the positivist critique.70 
 
So, in addition to grappling with Barth and Brunner on one side, and Logical 
Positivism on the other, these were also the years in which Farrer seriously engaged 
with the thought of St Thomas Aquinas and with contemporary Roman Catholic 
theologians and philosophers.  Indeed, Farrer said in 1959 that during the period when 
he wrote Finite and Infinite he ‘was possessed by the Thomist vision, and could not 
think it false.’  In this book, he ambitiously and ecumenically attempts to answer both 
Barth and Ayer while simultaneously repairing Thomistic metaphysics from within, 
by rescuing it from ‘the breath-taking naivety of old linguistic realism.’71 
As noted above, Rowan Williams comments that although Farrer was clearly 
‘influenced by the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition,’ there is yet ‘surprisingly little 
evidence that he had studied the French Thomists of the twenties and thirties in any 
depth’, and in support of this claim I provided original unpublished evidence that he 
had declined Kirk’s suggestion to study with Gilson and Maritain in Paris.72  And I 
                                                 
70 D. M. MacKinnon, ‘Philosophy of Religion in Great Britain: A Personal Impression’, in Raymond 
Klibansky (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy: A Survey.  Volume IV (La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971), 
214.   According to Conti, Farrer wrote to John Glasse at Vassar in 1965, saying that in Finite and 
Infinite he was ‘reacting to Ayer’s first edition, and to the current discussion of it.’  See Appendix 2 to 
Conti’s Metaphysical Personalism, 265-269.  For a general survey of this period that discusses Ayer, 
Tennant, Oman, Farrer, Mackinnon, and many others, see Stewart Sutherland, ‘Philosophy of religion 
in the twentieth century’, in Nicholson (ed.), A Century of Theological and Religious Studies in Britain, 
253-269.  Taylor will be discussed further below. 
71 Both citations from Austin Farrer, Revised Preface for the Second Edition, Finite and Infinite: A 
Philosophical Essay (Dacre Press, 1959), ix. 
72 See notes 26 and 28 above.  For illuminating discussions of some of the other great ‘French 
Thomists’ of that period—Marie-Dominique Chenu (1895-1990), Yves Congar (1904-1995), and Henri 
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also already mentioned, in the Introduction, that—frustratingly—Farrer tends not to 
indicate his sources.  As Mitchell puts it, ‘The materials of his thought are so 
thoroughly fermented in his imagination that no sediment remains (footnotes are 
notoriously absent)’.73  This leads to a genuine uncertainty, even among experts, as to 
what precisely Farrer had read and whom exactly he was either drawing upon or 
criticising.74 
However, Farrer’s book reviews from this period provide some evidence of his 
reading, both directly and indirectly.  In 1935 he reviewed P. Erich Przywara’s 
Polarity (a major text in its own right), in which he speaks with at least apparent 
authority about the ‘revived study of Thomism’ and the opinions of ‘Modern 
Thomists’.  And in 1939 he reviewed Walter Farrell, OP, A Companion to the 
Summa: Volume II: The Pursuit of Happiness and M. C. D’Arcy, SJ, Thomas 
Aquinas: Selected Writings.  These latter two are obviously not significant works of 
Thomist scholarship, but Farrer’s comments on them reveal a direct knowledge of 
Aquinas himself.  Thus, Farrer was not impressed with Farrell (‘St Thomas was 
careful to understand his opponents: his expositor prefers a bewildered derision’); but 
of D’Arcy’s volume he says, ‘As an anthology to delight the reader who already 
knows the obvious things, nothing could be better’, and that throughout D’Arcy’s 
diverse selection of Aquinas’s texts the ‘beautiful clarity, the serene and devout 
reasonableness, the direct vision of realities could not be more happily illustrated.’75   
                                                                                                                                            
de Lubac (1896-1991)—see the relevant chapters of Fergus Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic 
Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism (Blackwell, 2007).   
73 Mitchell, ‘Austin Farrer: The Philosopher’, 456. 
74 See, for example, Farrer’s letters to Edward Henderson, in Conti, Metaphysical Personalism, 
Appendix 4, 272-275, in response to Henderson’s inquiry regarding Farrer’s sources and opponents. 
75  See Austin Farrer, Review of P. Erich Przywara, Polarity, in Theology XXXI (1935), 361-363; 
Review of Walter Farrell, OP, A Companion to the Summa: Volume II: The Pursuit of Happiness, in 
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Curtis claims, without citation, that Farrer began reading Aquinas in 
September 1928, when he was still at Cuddesdon, about three months before his 
ordination.  In an undated fragment of a letter to his father that Curtis places as 
possibly at Cuddesdon in December 1928, Farrer says, ‘I am in the middle of a 
section of Thomas Aquinas, and have a treatise of my own on his theory of 
knowledge broken off in the middle.’76  So he was certainly studying Aquinas by at 
least December 1928.  However, as I pointed out earlier in regard to Farrer’s use of 
‘analogy’ in his letter of 20 November (1926), his interest in or openness to Aquinas 
or Thomistic thought may have started then. 
Even so, this is still very far from the profile of a standard Thomist.  Farrer the 
Oxford-educated classicist and Anglican priest went through nothing like the 
conventional early 20th century Roman Catholic training in neoscholastic philosophy 
and theology, ad mentem Sancti Thomæ.  Nor was Farrer bound by the epistemic 
strictures of Vatican I and the Anti-Modernist Oath, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
Ironically, Farrer may have thus actually read more of Aquinas himself than did the 
average Roman Catholic student.77  On the other hand, serious interest in Aquinas and 
                                                                                                                                            
Theology XXXVIII (1939), 153-154; and Review of M. C. D’Arcy, SJ, Thomas Aquinas: Selected 
Writings, in Theology XXXIX (1939), 319-320.  Another book of Roman Catholic philosophy that 
Farrer reviewed in this period was Paul Ortegat, Philosophie de la Religion, in Journal of Theological 
Studies Old Series XL (1939), 100-101.  The review of the Przywara volume, translated by A. C. 
Bouquet, was preceded by Bouquet’s own essay a year earlier seeking to introduce Przywara’s thought 
to British theology: see his ‘A German Catholic Philosophy of Religion’, in Theology XXIX (1934), 
327-348.  Erich Przywara SJ (1889-1972) of course played a major role in Barth’s development and in 
shaping his (mis)understanding of Roman Catholicism: see McCormack, 319-322, 383-391, 407, 416. 
76 Eng. Lett. c. 270, folio 52 (Curtis, 44).  For the reference to September 1928, see note 51 above.   
77 For a discussion of such neoscholastic training, see the first chapter of Kerr’s book, cited in note 72 
above: ‘Before Vatican II’ (1-16).  Kerr directs readers to Anthony Kenny’s A Path From Rome 
(Oxford University Press, 1986)—which I discussed in note 14 of Chapter One—as containing the 
‘best account’ of what it was like go through the course at the Gregorian (Kerr, 9).  Recall that Kenny 
reports Farrer’s quip that the Pope should issue an encyclical titled Deus Artium Magister (Kenny, 50):  
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Thomism was also atypical of Oxford-educated Anglicans during this period.78  
Rightly or wrongly, Anglicans still saw themselves as primarily heirs of the patristic 
‘undivided Church,’ rather than deeply indebted to either Western Scholastic or 
Reformation thought; and with a stronger emphasis on the Greek Fathers than the 
Augustinian focus of their Continental cousins, whether Protestant or Roman 
Catholic.79  So Bruce Marshall’s description of the late Victor Preller could just as 
easily be applied to Farrer: he was ‘a kind of Melchizedek among Thomists, without 
father or mother or genealogy—at least any genealogy that most other readers of 
Aquinas could understand.’80  Or, as Douglas Hedley rightly puts it, Farrer’s ‘debt to 
Aquinas is huge, his affinity to the textbook neo-Thomism of his contemporaries 
slender.’81   
The singular and somewhat ambiguous nature of what we might call Farrer’s 
‘proto-analytic Thomism’ was noted by four reviewers of Finite and Infinite, two 
                                                                                                                                            
this witticism actually gives a very good sense of how Farrer himself approached Aquinas—that is, as 
someone holding an Oxford MA rather than a Roman licentiate.    
78 Or even now.  As a complement to his discussion of early 20th century Roman Catholic Thomism, 
see Kerr’s comments on the study of Aquinas in late 20th century—and thus still predominantly 
Anglican—Oxford, where he says that one can today receive a degree in theology ‘without knowing 
anything of Aquinas’ (‘The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,’ in Fergus Kerr [ed.], Contemplating 
Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation [SCM Press, 2003], 27-28).   
79 The classic statement of Anglican doctrine in the mid-20th century, which Farrer would certainly 
have read carefully, is the 1938 report Doctrine in the Church of England (reprinted by SPCK in 1982).  
See William Temple’s comments on the Anglican preference for the Greek fathers on 5-6.  And for a 
useful survey of Anglican theology after the War and after the increased influence of Barth, which also 
mentions both Farrer and his colleague Eric Mascall, see R. Cant, ‘Recent Tendencies in Theological 
Writing’, in The Church Quarterly Review 142 (1946), 149-175. 
80 Bruce Marshall, ‘In Search of An Analytic Aquinas: Grammar and the Trinity’, in Jeffrey Stout and 
Robert MacSwain (eds.), Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein (SCM 
Press, 2004), 56. 
81 Douglas Hedley, ‘Austin Farrer’s Shaping Spirit of Imagination’, in Hebblethwaite and Hedley, The 
Human Person in God’s World, 132 note 19. 
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Roman Catholic and two Anglican.82  Gervase Mathew OP of Blackfriars, Oxford, 
begins his brief review by stating that 
Mr Farrer’s study on the nature of Being has an especial significance for the 
future of Thomism in England.  It would be quite misleading to describe the 
author as Thomist.  The structure of his concise and compressed thinking is 
very characteristically his own.  Both directly and by reaction he owes much 
to the Logical Positivists.  But the debt to the De Ente et Essentia is patent 
enough and even possibly a debt to Père Penido, and it is perhaps the first time 
that a modern English philosopher, teaching in one of the greater universities, 
has discussed and utilized Thomism as a living system of metaphysics.83 
 
And in a longer review essay, Vincent Turner SJ of Campion Hall, Oxford, says: 
 
The author is as empirical in temper as anyone could wish and is well 
acquainted with philosophy, Kantian and modern, Cartesian and Berkeleian; 
and while the argument is radically thomistic, it is not exegetical or a serving 
of a twice-cooked dish.  It is philosophical to a degree—yet nothing could be 
less ‘neo-scholastic.’84   
 
W. G. de Burgh, an Anglican layman and Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Reading from 1907 to 1934, says that while Aquinas ‘alike in 
metaphysics and theology furnishes the groundwork for Mr Farrer’s construction,’ he 
nevertheless detects more of a direct influence from contemporary positivism.  He 
also notes that Farrer’s ‘repudiation of the claim of rational theology to be 
demonstrative’ sets his project apart from a purely, or at least conventionally, 
                                                 
82 The term ‘analytic Thomism’ was coined by John Haldane, currently Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of St Andrews.  It is mostly associated with the ‘Cornell School’ associated with the late 
Norman Kretzmann and his students such as Eleonore Stump and Scott MacDonald.  See Bruce 
Marshall’s essay cited above, page 70, note 4 for a brief discussion and bibliography.  According to 
Eric Mascall’s British Academy obituary of Farrer (cited in note 5 above), Dom Gregory Dix referred 
to Farrer as a ‘para-Thomist’ (436)! 
83 Gervase Mathew OP, Review of Finite and Infinite, in Blackfriars XXV (1944), 33.  Mathew is 
probably referring to M. T-L. Penido’s text Le Rôle de l’Analogie dens la Theologie dogmatique (Paris: 
Vrin, 1931), which is discussed by Mascall in He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism, Second 
Edition (Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966—first edition published in 1943) and Existence and 
Analogy: A Sequel to “He Who Is” (Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966—first published in 1949).   
84 Vincent Turner SJ, ‘Mr Austin Farrer’s Metaphysics of Theism’, in Theology XLVII (1944), 99. 
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Thomistic one.85  He thus comments (approvingly) that ‘by allowing no demonstrative 
argument anywhere in theology,’ Farrer has—perhaps inadvertently—eliminated the 
traditional Thomistic distinction between natural and revealed theology: ‘In the one, 
Aquinas held, reason could demonstrate; in the other, it could only offer probable 
reasons in support of truths accepted by faith and in refutation of objections raised 
against them.’  Therefore, since Farrer ‘offers probable arguments in Natural 
Theology; why should he not go on to argue on similar lines to the truth of 
Revelation?’86  Here in both Farrer and de Burge we see the Anglican ‘semi-fideism’ 
discussed in Chapter Two, Section I.B and Section IV: properly construed, reason can 
only offer probable arguments, not demonstrative ones, and so therefore Thomism 
needs to be updated accordingly.  We will return to this theme in a moment.87   
 But perhaps the most substantial review of Finite and Infinite was written by 
A. E. Taylor, another Anglican layman, successively Professor of Moral Philosophy 
at St Andrews (1908 to 1924) and Edinburgh (1924 until 1941).  His Gifford Lectures, 
delivered in St Andrews in 1926-1928 and published in 1930 as The Faith of a 
Moralist, were mentioned above by MacKinnon as one of the great works of early 
20th century British philosophical theology.  Describing him elsewhere as ‘a man of 
very remarkable learning,’ and on Plato ‘an authority of international repute,’ 
MacKinnon singles out his substantial article on ‘Theism’ as ‘one of the most 
                                                 
85 W. G. de Burgh, Review of Finite and Infinite, in Mind LII (1943), 345. 
86 Both citations from ibid., 351. For de Burgh’s life and career, see Alan P. F. Sell, ‘De Burgh, 
William George (1866-1943)’ in Stuart Brown (General Editor), The Dictionary of Twentieth-Century 
British Philosophers: Volume 1 (Thoemmes Continuum, 2005), 223-224.  Sell says that de Burgh died 
on 27 August 1943, and indeed this volume of Mind contains his death notice.  This review may well 
have been his final publication.  He is one of the very few contemporary philosophers mentioned by 
name in Finite and Infinite (on 153), and positively, at that. 
87 Note, however, that in his review Mathew denies that a Thomist is committed to such demonstrative 
argument, stating that such an epistemic standard is actually the Anselmian one that Aquinas rejected 
(34). 
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valuable introductions to theistic metaphysics in the English language’.88  Taylor’s 
nine-page review, written after his retirement from Edinburgh and so at the end of his 
long and brilliant scholarly career, begins: ‘Rarely has any book come into my hands 
which argues a greater metaphysical theme for three hundred pages with the 
closeness, penetration, and subtlety shown by Mr Farrer.’89  Stating that Farrer ‘really 
knows what Metaphysics, as conceived alike by Aristotle and St Thomas and by 
Descartes or Spinoza, is all about,’ he goes on to say that Farrer ‘shows himself to be 
thoroughly steeped in Thomism; indeed, his argument is couched all through in 
Thomist technical language…but he is no blind devotee of Thomist formulae.’90  
Taylor also discerns engagements both positive and critical, explicit and implicit, with 
Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Bergson, Whitehead, and positivism.  And, among 
many other points, Taylor also draws attention to Farrer’s denial of demonstrative 
arguments in rational theology (or indeed anywhere in contemporary philosophy).91 
 But Taylor also frankly addresses what all commentators on this text have 
found to their chagrin, namely that ‘Mr Farrer’s essay is hard reading, very hard 
reading….[T]he argument calls for an exceptionally arduous effort to maintain one’s 
thinking continuously at the highest level of philosophical abstraction, and permits of 
no digressions of the kind by which Plato likes to relax the strained attention of his 
                                                 
88 See Donald M. MacKinnon, revised by Mark J. Schofield, ‘Taylor, Alfred Edward (1869-1945)’, in 
ODNB: Volume 53, 860-862.  For the weighty article, which is indeed highly illuminating and 
informative, even for the contemporary scholar, see A. E. Taylor, ‘Theism’ in James Hastings (ed.), 
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Volume XII (T&T Clark, 1921), 261-287.  Farrer refers to The 
Faith of a Moralist on 298 of Finite and Infinite as a good example of theistic argument from morality 
or duty. 
89 A. E. Taylor, Review of Finite and Infinite, in Journal of Theological Studies Old Series XLV 
(1944), 237-238. 
90 Ibid., 238 and 239. 
91 Ibid., 242-243. 
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readers.’92  He even adds, modestly, that ‘there are turnings in the argumentation 
which are still dark to me—very likely from my own native dullness—after more than 
one careful reading.’93  Mathew, Turner, and de Burgh all heave similar sighs, 
although Turner and de Burgh are more inclined to blame Farrer for serious ‘faults of 
construction and presentation’.94  I. M. Crombie, Anthony Kenny, and Charles 
Helfling have all described Finite and Infinite as ‘difficult’, and Philip Curtis reports, 
‘I once tried to summarize the 300 pages of Finite and Infinite and found I had 120 
pages of notes.’95 
 All eight of these authors—and many more—also remark on the primarily 
metaphysical focus of Farrer’s first book, although it ranges through epistemology 
and ethics as well.  As stated in the Introduction to this dissertation, Farrer was indeed 
a great metaphysician, and most scholarly attention to his philosophical work has 
rightly been devoted to this aspect of his thought.  This is work that has already been 
done, thoroughly, and often very well—but one also notes a tendency for such 
commentators to get entangled in a metaphysical briar-patch from which they only 
emerge, if at all, with difficulty.  My own concern here, however, is in tracing the 
development of Farrer’s religious epistemology in relation to the subsequent charge of 
fideism.  Therefore, the following far-too-brief treatment of Finite and Infinite will 
also be comparatively oblique, as I am interested not so much in Farrer’s direct 
arguments for, e.g., substance and free human agency, but in the epistemological 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 240. 
93 Ibid., 241. 
94 So Turner on 101.  For the difficulty of the book, see Mathew, 34; Turner, 100; and de Burgh, 344; 
and on how Farrer could have mitigated this, see Turner, 101; de Burgh, 350-351; and Taylor, 240. 
95 Crombie, 122; Kenny, ‘The Problem of Evil and the Argument from Design’ (1988), reprinted in his 
The Unknown God: Agnostic Essays (Continuum, 2004), 81; Helfling, Jacob’s Ladder: Theology and 
Spirituality in the Thought of Austin Farrer (Cowley Publications, 1979), 127; and Curtis, ‘The 
Rational Theology of Doctor Farrer’, Theology LXXIII (1970), 249.   
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‘payoff’.  For my purposes, it will suffice to determine the epistemological 
implications of Finite and Infinite for the rationality of religious belief.96 
B. A Philosophical Essay 
 Let me begin by reminding readers of what I said in Chapter One, Section I.A: 
namely, that in this text Farrer set out to deal with four interrelated tasks essential to 
the successful practice of what he called, not ‘natural theology’ or ‘philosophy of 
religion,’ but ‘rational theology’—which he defined as the study of God through 
‘philosophical enquiry and not something else’.97  Or, spelled out more explicitly, ‘a 
reflective cognitive activity appropriated to the knowledge of God from universal 
grounds.’98  And yet remember also what was determined at the end of Chapter Two: 
namely that—despite the Thomist influence discussed above—Farrer is still basically 
working within the ‘semi-fideistic’ context of British philosophy and Anglican 
theology, rather than within the arguably more rationalistic epistemic framework of 
the (then contemporary) Roman Catholic Church.  According to Farrer, the four tasks 
of rational theology are: 
(1) ‘To state the whole mechanism of the mind in working with the scheme of 
the Analogy of Being or, as I have called it, the Cosmological Idea.’ 
                                                 
96 For valuable studies that focus much attention on the metaphysics of Finite and Infinite, see John 
Glasse, ‘Doing Theology Metaphysically: Austin Farrer’, in Harvard Theological Review 39 (1966), 
319-350; Jeffrey C. Eaton, The Logic of Theism: An Analysis of the Thought of Austin Farrer 
(University Press of America, 1980); Julian Hartt, ‘Austin Farrer as Philosophical Theologian: A 
Retrospective and Appreciation’, in Jeffrey C. Eaton and Ann Loades (eds.), For God and Clarity: New 
Essays in Honor of Austin Farrer (Pickwick Publications, 1983), 1-22; and Wayne Proudfoot, God and 
the Self (cited in note 18 above).  The most recent major study remains Charles Conti, Metaphysical 
Personalism (also cited in note 18), but for my reservations about that text, see the Introduction, which 
also references reviews of Metaphysical Personalism by Jeremy Morris and Charles Taliaferro.  For 
Julian Hartt’s fairly critical review of Conti’s book, see Religious Studies 32 (1996), 525-528.  For a 
more sympathetic review by a fellow traveller, see Frederick Ferré’s in Process Studies 28 (1999), 141-
143. 
97 Farrer, Finite and Infinite: A Philosophical Essay (Dacre Press, 1943), v. 
98 Ibid., vii. 
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(2) ‘To show the involvement of theology with an at least implicit doctrine of 
finite substance, and to re-state the doctrine explicitly.’ 
 
(3) ‘To show how far down in our common thinking the question of faith 
enters.’ 
 
(4) ‘To show what the traditional arguments for God’s existence are, and are 
not; to classify them in an intelligible manner and to find a principle for 
distinguishing between valuable and absurd types.’99 
 
Of these four tasks, (2) takes up far and away the most space of Finite and Infinite—
all of Part II: ‘Examination of Finite Substance’ (63-261)—but I shall by-pass it 
almost entirely.  Or rather, I shall merely note the role it plays in Farrer’s overall 
argument.  My primary interest is in the first task, which sets out Farrer’s 
epistemological perspective in the context of his overall metaphysical scheme. 
 (1) The Whole Mechanism of the Mind 
 To begin with task (1), both the subtitle and the first sentence of Finite and 
Infinite announce that the work is a philosophical essay or treatise, not a theological 
one.  It is, however, a philosophical essay or treatise about God, and such an 
enterprise was—and is—widely regarded as both philosophically and theologically 
problematic, leading inevitably to either mere ‘speculation’ or sheer ‘ecclesiasticism’.  
Farrer rejects both, and says that ‘we may hope to avoid the worst faults on either side 
if we take up the traditional theology without having decided either what area of its 
extent is capable of direct philosophical support, or what degree of strength and 
demonstration that support can attain.’100  In other words, as Farrer makes more clear 
elsewhere, his first interest is in the analysis of theistic belief, and only secondarily in 
dialectic (that is, in this context, actually arguing for the truth of this position).101  
This also seems to be part of his distinction between ‘rational’ and ‘natural’ theology, 
                                                 
99 Ibid., vi-vii. 
100 Ibid., v. 
101 See ibid, 5-6. 
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with rational theology being more concerned with analysis and natural theology being 
more concerned with demonstration.  Farrer says that to analyse is to treat ‘the system 
with respect, but without favour,’ in order ‘to discover on what assumptions the 
system would become credible’.102  While this approach is now normative in 
contemporary analytic philosophical theology, which feels free to take up questions of 
the coherence of doctrines such as the Incarnation or the Trinity independently of 
questions of their truth or the grounds of belief in them, this was not the case when 
Farrer wrote Finite and Infinite.  But he is interested in dialectic as well, and this 
means arguing not only for belief in God but also in defence of a particular 
metaphysical commitment, namely the controverted doctrine of substance.103   
Farrer writes, ‘It is generally recognised that there are some metaphysical 
questions which must be settled if we are to vindicate the significance of any 
theological statements whatever of the traditional type.’104  And, as Farrer sees it, the 
concept of substance is chief among them, and not just the one infinite substance that 
we may call ‘God’, but also the many finite substances that make up everything else, 
including human beings.  Indeed, Farrer explicitly claims that ‘finite substance has to 
be vindicated if theism is to be upheld’—for, presumably, if finite substance is 
vindicated then infinite substance may be entertained as well—and devotes most of 
Finite and Infinite to that goal, thus fulfilling task (2) above.105 
                                                 
102 Ibid., 5 (emphasis in the original).   
103 Explicitly rejected by Ayer: ‘The metaphysical question concerning “substance” is ruled out by our 
criterion as spurious.’  See Language, Truth and Logic (Second Edition, cited in note 68 above), 40, 
and the further discussion on 42-45.  As noted above, Finite and Infinite is partly a response to Ayer’s 
radical positivism and phenomenalism.  These positions must be ruled out for theism to be affirmed. 
104 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, v. 
105 Ibid., 21.  Farrer’s actual understanding of substance is not our concern, but for a very brief 
discussion see note 132 below.   
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 However, as our four reviewers have already alerted us and as I just reminded 
us again, Farrer undertakes this metaphysical task with the conviction that, while 
philosophy does indeed admit of reasoned argument (i.e., the appeal to ‘universal 
grounds’ mentioned above), it does not allow for strict demonstration (i.e., a 
deductive syllogism whose conclusion cannot be denied).  In a significant paragraph 
he thus writes: 
In taking this attitude towards philosophy, we are intervening whether we wish 
or no in the unhappy debate between the Thomists and the Modern 
Theologians.  The Thomists possess the true principles for the solution of the 
problems of rational theology and above all the problem of analogical 
argument and analogical predication.  But by their rigid Aristotelianism and 
their insistence on the possibility of inescapable demonstration they make 
themselves vile in modern eyes.  The Moderns by reaction deny that the 
problems exist, and either philosophise about the Infinite Being with 
surprising naivety or refuse to philosophise at all and content themselves with 
introducing a certain degree of order into the deliverances of diffused or 
particular inspiration.  There is nothing for it but to re-state the doctrine of 
Analogy of Being in a credible form, and this is our endeavour here.106 
 
Although he does not mention any specific Thomists by name, it is clear 
enough in general whom Farrer intends, whether or not his accusation is just (see note 
87 above).  But the referents of ‘the Modern Theologians’ are considerably more 
ambiguous, and here we see Farrer’s penchant for avoiding footnotes or even specific 
names at work.  A clue is provided in his claim that some such modern theologians 
content themselves with ordering ‘the deliverances of diffused or particular 
inspiration,’ for later on he playfully writes that ‘Liberals believe in a diffused, and 
Calvinists in a particular, spiritual revelation, and some of us are hardy enough to 
believe in both.’107  Here the above ‘Moderns’ are now divided into ‘Liberals’ and 
‘Calvinists,’ and yet even those terms are somewhat arch, for while by ‘Liberals’ 
Farrer could mean several different Protestant groups (all more or less following in 
                                                 
106 Ibid., vi.   
107 Ibid., 1. 
  
152
the wake of Schleiermacher), by ‘Calvinists’ he almost certainly means Barthians.108  
And by ‘some of us’ he probably intends to refer not just to himself and his close 
associates but to those Anglicans who walk in the correct via media between natural 
and revealed theology.  For, contrary to de Burgh’s suggestion that he has (perhaps 
inadvertently) abolished that distinction, Farrer still wants to maintain it, at least at 
this point.  Thus, ignoring for now any distinction he may intend between his term 
‘rational theology’ and the more conventional designation ‘natural theology’, he still 
writes: ‘We have, then, to be ready to draw the ancient line between rational and 
revealed theology, though not necessarily in the ancient place, nor with the ancient 
optimism about the strength of demonstration in the rational branch.’109      
At any rate, Farrer’s intention to re-state Thomism in a way that the Moderns 
will find ‘credible’ is clear enough.  But, whether or not the Thomists insist on it, why 
cannot God’s existence—or anything else—be conclusively demonstrated?  Farrer 
apparently just accepts this as a commonplace of contemporary (British, analytic) 
philosophy—and it also fits in with the probabilistic, cumulative-case, ‘semi-fideistic’ 
quality of the English intellectual tradition discussed in Chapter Two, Section I.B.  So 
Farrer asserts that Finite and Infinite is presented as an exercise in ‘rational theology’ 
even though he is not committed to ‘the perfect demonstration of even one basic 
theological proposition.  We may find that we can only show its possibility or 
probability.’110  Over a decade later, in 1957, Farrer observed that the attempt to prove 
                                                 
108 This is also the group to whom Farrer probably intends to refer under the term ‘revelationists’.  See 
the brief but trenchant critique of such on ibid., 2-3.  Having reviewed Church Dogmatics I/1, Farrer 
was of course very well aware that Barth described the Analogy of Being that Farrer here sets out to 
rehabilitate as ‘the invention of the antichrist’.   
109 Ibid., v.  See also the discussion on 58—‘The condescension of God does not belong to rational 
theology.  Revealed theology is about little else.’—and the famous conclusion on 299-300.   
110 Ibid. 
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‘is now out of fashion, not so much because theology cannot be philosophically 
demonstrated as because nothing can’.111  And back in Finite and Infinite, in regard to 
the existence of God, Farrer says: 
An ‘inescapable demonstration’ must be a fallacy.  For if a proof of this kind 
could be produced it would have been produced.  Anselm thought he had 
produced it, so perhaps did St Thomas; but Gaunilo and Kant and Russell are 
not convinced, and they are as good men to follow an argument as any 
others.112  
 
This appeal to authority—and to such authorities (Russell in particular)—may 
seem dubious to Thomists, but it conveys Farrer’s life-long conviction that it is absurd 
to assume that ‘the difference between the believing and the unbelieving philosopher 
[lies] in the greater logical competence of the former, or in his superior judgment of 
empirical evidence (in any ordinary sense).’113  This claim—which finds some 
parallel in the so-called ‘Parity Argument’ that Terence Penelhum associates with 
fideism (see Chapter Two, Section I.C)—recurs several times in Farrer’s work over 
the years: atheists are smart people whose intellectual integrity he is at pains to 
defend.  While theism may indeed be both true and rational, its truth and rationality 
are not so obvious that atheists are ipso facto irrational in rejecting them.  If the 
existence of God could be logically demonstrated in some straight-forward manner, 
A. J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell would be convinced.  Farrer takes their lack of 
conviction seriously, and formulates his own case in response to it.  If there is a 
philosophical argument that leads to God, it must have a different character, and 
                                                 
111 Austin Farrer, ‘A Starting Point for the Philosophical Examination of Theological Belief’, in Basil 
Mitchell (ed.), Faith and Logic: Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology (George Allen and Unwin, 
1957), 9.  And to this extent Farrer agrees with Ayer, who likewise denies the capability of philosophy 
to provide demonstrations outside of formal logic and tautological statements.   
112 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 4.  Note that here Farrer acknowledges that Aquinas himself may not 
insist on the ‘inescapable demonstration’ that Farrer finds orthodox among Thomists (again see note 
87). 
113 Ibid., 5.   
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cannot be a ‘proof’.  And yet, of course, from the then-official Roman Catholic 
perspective, this statement is anathema, the (Anglican) heresy of semi-fideism.     
Further on, Farrer justifies his denial of theistic demonstration by stating that it 
is precisely the uniqueness of God that renders God’s existence un-demonstrable.  
God—if God exists—is not purely unique in the sense that no analogy between finite 
and infinite can be found, for about ‘that which is simply unique there can be no 
discourse; we can only repeat its name, and say that it is itself and not any of the 
others.’114  Rather, God—if God exists—is unique in the slightly weaker sense that 
God ‘shares no identical characteristics with anything else, and so cannot be placed in 
a proper class with the others [and so analogy is both possible and necessary].  Now, 
if this is so, by what sort of reasoning could the existence of God possibly be 
proved?’115  For in falling outside all classes, God also seems to fall outside all normal 
rules of our understanding.  Thus, Farrer argues: 
neither under the head of causality nor under any other head can God or His 
activity be made the case of a rule, or the instance of a class, and therefore He 
cannot be demonstrated in the ordinary sense; for no principle can be found 
for a proof.  It is not merely that (as St Thomas says) He cannot be 
demonstrated a priori….He cannot be demonstrated a posteriori either, i.e., 
from His effects, because we must first know that they are effects, and effects 
of a perfectly unique activity….So then, to argue from effects is to begin by 
positing the divine activity and the divine Agent, and begs the question.116   
                                                 
114 Ibid., 23. 
115 Ibid., 7 (emphasis added).  Farrer first mentions God’s uniqueness in the Preface, on page vii.  
Jeffrey Eaton’s The Logic of Theism makes Farrer’s emphasis on divine uniqueness one of the key 
points of his interpretation. 
116 Ibid.  Farrer’s summary—and indeed rather compressed—rejection of a posteriori theistic 
arguments requires more attention than I will give it here, for my primary concern at this point is to 
exposit Farrer’s position.  Even the evaluative comments that will follow in due course will be general 
rather than detailed in nature, but clearly many of these claims could be debated at considerable length.  
Note, however, that Fergus Kerr makes a similar observation about Aquinas’s mode of argumentation 
‘from effects’ in After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Blackwell, 2002), 58-59.  Kerr does not reject 
such arguments as briskly as Farrer, but concedes that they are ‘pervaded by theological assumptions’ 
(58). 
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But if not by demonstration, then can God be known by the intellect, apart 
from special revelation?  Only, according to Farrer, through apprehension.  And here 
he appeals to an insight drawn from Descartes, which provides a somewhat different 
role for ‘effects’ than the conventional Thomistic one rejected above, where they 
provide material for the premises of a syllogism.  Instead, ‘Descartes is on the right 
line when he suggests that what we have to do is to show that in and through and with 
His effects our minds grasp God—since we have seen that God cannot be inferred, 
and it remains that He should be apprehended.’117  Now, precisely what Farrer means 
by ‘apprehension’ is not easy to determine, and would require a whole chapter—or 
dissertation—in itself.118  He clearly distinguishes it from inference (deductive or 
inductive); he seems to think of it an intuitive cognitive power; and his most concise 
definition of it is ‘objective grasp of realities’.119  But, at least in part, ‘apprehension’ 
conveys Farrer’s insistence that belief in God’s existence is less the conclusion of a 
formal argument as it is the recognition of a unique relation.120   
                                                 
117 Ibid., 8.  Farrer explicitly cites and interacts with Descartes, Meditations, Chapter III on 14-16. 
118 See Rodger Forsman, ‘“Apprehension” in Finite and Infinite’, in Eaton and Loades, For God and 
Clarity, 111-130.  This is one of the few treatments of this text from an epistemological angle.  
Forsman indeed wrote a doctoral dissertation on this theme: Austin Farrer’s Notion of Apprehension: 
An Analysis and Appraisal of His Claim to Knowledge of Substance (University of Toronto, 1974).  
See the list of ‘Theses and Dissertations’ on Farrer on 207-208 of Hein and Henderson, Captured by 
the Crucified.  Proudfoot also has a helpful section on apprehension in God and the Self, 106-122.     
119 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 45. 
120 Forsman argues that ‘apprehension’ in Finite and Infinite should not be understood in intuitive 
terms, and proposes what he calls a ‘criteriological’ interpretation instead: see 113, 122-129.   I am not 
convinced on either conceptual or textual grounds that this is a necessary distinction.  By ‘intuition’ 
Forsman seems to mean something like a power of (actual) perception or a ‘sixth sense’ (122), whereas 
by ‘criterion’ he intends ‘a condition which if satisfied confers rational acceptability upon a 
proposition’, and ‘apprehension’ thus ‘signifies satisfaction of such a criterion.’ (123)  More formally, 
Forsman says, ‘If S takes it for granted that p (under relevant standard conditions) then S is warranted 
in believing that p.’ (123)  According to Forsman, Farrer holds that ‘what justifies us in accepting the 
claim that we are substances is that we take it for granted—find it unavoidable, natural, inevitable to 
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Those who believe in God, Farrer says, ‘have believed in Him as bearing to all 
finite things a single necessary relation—necessary to the finites, that is, and to all in 
the same way; as performing for all of them a single function which they could not do 
without.’121  And this ‘function,’ of course, is the continuous act of their creation and 
preservation.  This act is unique, as is the Agent who performs it.  Therefore, ‘the 
description we give ourselves of Him cannot (with any justification) be independent 
of the ground on which we propose to believe in Him, viz., the function He performs 
for all the finites.  He must be understood as the Agent of this very effect.’122  And 
understanding God in this very specific particular way—as the Agent of the function 
of our creation—seems to be what Farrer means by apprehending the existence of 
God.  Thus, further on he writes: ‘God, the absolute form of existence, is apprehended 
in the instance “my existence”.’123  Farrer then adds to this claim in a footnote: 
‘Where the existence of something impresses us, we apprehend God, for we interpret 
that existence by the clue of our own.’  This, in short, is what Farrer calls ‘the 
                                                                                                                                            
believe that—we are substances in the determinate conditions to which Farrer calls our attention, that 
is, in the situations of deliberation, decision, and carrying out of an intended course of action, and so 
on.’ (124)  But, if so, Forsman’s distinction between ‘intuition’ and ‘criteria’ becomes much less clear: 
for even in the criteriological version we just ‘see’ it to be the case.  At least, that’s how I would 
metaphorically explain what I meant if I said that I took a belief for granted, found it unavoidable, 
natural, inevitable to believe, etc.—‘I just see it.’  So, while it may be important to take account of 
Forsman’s distinction in regard to the nuances of what Farrer means by ‘apprehension’, it still does not 
seem inaccurate to describe it, if only loosely, as an ‘intuitive cognitive power’.  And, contra Forsman, 
Farrer does explicitly associate apprehension with intuition, as when he glosses ‘the cosmological 
intuition’ as ‘the apprehension of God’ (Finite and Infinite, 262).  What Forsman wants us to accept, 
perhaps, is that apprehension is an intuitive cognitive power that only obtains under certain conditions, 
namely deliberation, decision, etc.  If so, fine. 
121 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 3. 
122 Ibid., 4.  See also page 22, where Farrer says that it is ‘impossible to over-stress the importance of 
realising that creation is an unique relation.  No theology can survive the assumption that it is reducible 
to some other, for manifest absurdities result.’ 
123 Ibid, 47. 
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cosmological idea’: that is, ‘the scheme of God and the creature in relation.’124  And, 
as task (1) of rational theology indicates, the ‘cosmological idea’ is simply Farrer’s 
term for the more traditional phrase ‘analogy of being’.   
In his focus on God as the unique Agent of a unique act, and on apprehension 
as the recognition of God’s existence vis-à-vis the function of our own creation, and 
on the cosmological idea as the scheme of God and the creature in relation, Farrer is 
keen to emphasise that all of these terms and definitions are just a formal way of 
expressing actual, simple, unreflective, religious belief—what he calls the ‘Jacob’s-
ladder of living religion.’125  All this, he says, is just what religious people have 
always believed and taught—one doesn’t need a metaphysician to know that God is 
the Creator.  Thus, ‘Those who accept a revealed theology place among its articles the 
Creator of heaven and earth; this is the foundation upon which the rest is built.’126  
But, Farrer says, even revelation must be intelligible to the human mind before it can 
be accepted, and so we must be properly designed to receive it.  Otherwise, it is futile: 
unless I had some mental machinery for thinking the bare notion of God, could 
I recognise His revelatory action as that of God?….As we shall learn, to study 
this notion of God, of a supreme and original being, is to study what the mind 
can only see in and through the general nature of finite and dependent being.  
And this is to study rational theology.127  
 
Although, as usual, Farrer doesn’t name any names, it seems probable that here he is 
(among other things) taking up Brunner’s side in the debate with Barth over natural 
theology, for this human capacity for revelation is nothing other than the disputed 
‘point of contact’ which makes theologia naturalis possible.128 
                                                 
124 Ibid., 16.     
125 Ibid., 4.  Hence the title of Hefling’s book, cited in note 95. 
126 Ibid., 2. 
127 Ibid.  
128 See note 25 above 
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But here we also see Farrer walking the tightrope between fideism and 
rationalism.  On one hand, he eschews the demonstration of God’s existence, defends 
the rationality of atheists, and says that he does not ‘expect to convince the sceptical 
philosopher’.129  The difference between belief and unbelief is not a matter of logical 
competence or the weighing of empirical evidence.  Is it then purely arbitrary and / or 
irrational?  No, for, on the other hand, as a theist Farrer assumes that ‘God’s activity 
is there for the mind, and there is hope of bringing it into view.’  Indeed, if this is in 
fact the case, ‘it is unlikely that it has remained wholly latent hitherto; if the world is 
in God, it is likely that those who habitually look at it have some crypto-theism in 
some parts of their interpretation of it, some sub-awareness of certain aspects of the 
divine activity.’130  What this means is that ‘the theist’s first argument is a statement; 
he exhibits his account of God active in the world and the world existing in God, that 
others may recognise it to be the account of what they themselves apprehend—or, if 
you like, that others may find it to be an instrument through which they apprehend, 
for perhaps apprehension is here not separable from interpretation.’131  So, while those 
such as A. J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell may be excused from condemnation for 
refusing to accept traditional demonstrative arguments for the existence of God, it 
remains possible to engage with them on a more subtle level.  Even they are—or 
ought to be—subliminally aware of their dependence on God, as finite substances / 
agents in relation to the infinite Substance / Agent.  For while God’s existence may 
                                                 
129 Ibid., 5. 
130 Both citations from ibid., 10.   
131 Ibid., 9-10.  This linkage—or even identification—of ‘apprehension’ with ‘interpretation’ raises all 
sorts of interesting epistemological and hermeneutical questions that cannot detain us here, but which 
will re-emerge later in Chapters Four and Five, if only implictly.  Farrer discusses this again briefly in a 
section titled ‘Apprehension and Interpretation’ (102-104). 
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not be demonstrated, it might still be discerned—apprehended—through reason.  It all 
depends on what one means by ‘reason’.132 
If Farrer concisely defines ‘apprehension’ as ‘objective grasp of realties’, his 
concise definition of ‘rationality’ in the same context is ‘appropriate response to 
them’.133  This links up with an important discussion in which Farrer astutely notes 
that the meaning of terms such as ‘coherence’ and ‘rationality’ are not self-evident, 
and thus not defined without controversy, and that their meanings shift according to 
context and between different philosophical systems.  In particular, the meaning of 
these terms differs between the logically-oriented positivist on one side and the 
metaphysically-oriented Thomist or Idealist on the other.  Farrer sees this as a basic 
epistemic divide not easily crossed.  For these are two (or three) different perspectives 
that ‘start with completely different views of what constitutes “coherence” and 
“rationality”, of what “satisfies the mind”.’134  And where they start largely 
determines where they finish.  So, he says: 
The question, then, must not be ‘What view is more rational, more coherent?’ 
but ‘What sort of coherence or order is in the things, and what sort of things 
are there?’  If we must use the word ‘rational’, i.e., ‘worthy of a reasonable 
mind’, let us recall the Aristotelian doctrine that mind is in a manner all 
things; the nature of mind is simply to be the characters of its objects in the 
state of understood-ness.  What is ‘rational’, what is felt to ‘satisfy the mind’ 
must, in the long run, be a correct account of what there is for the mind.  
Unless ‘rational’ means this, it must mean simply ‘that which is in accordance 
with the formal procedure of the discursive reason’.  But this in turn either 
reduces to the absolute formality of pure logic—the principles must be 
exemplified in every system of terms with which we are able to think at all—
                                                 
132 In here conflating ‘substance’ with ‘agent’ and ‘agency’, I am introducing a major piece of Farrer’s 
metaphysical scheme that other scholars have commented on at length, namely his insistence that 
(contra Berkeley) Esse est operari, and thus that ‘the substance is a unit of activity, and we think of 
God also as a unit of activity, when we think of Him as the perfection of which we are the limitation’ 
(see pages 21 and 28).  This is Farrer’s way of restating the Thomistic doctrine that God is Pure Act: 
God as ‘absolute existent’ is also ‘absolute activity’. 
133 Ibid., Finite and Infinite, 45. 
134 Ibid., 9. 
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or else means ‘that which is consistent with the principles of one assumed 
system’.  But what system should we assume?  That is the question.135 
 
Here Farrer is undoubtedly taking aim at Ayer’s reduction of philosophical reason to 
logic, and thus at his explicitly contrary statement that ‘to be rational is simply to 
employ a self-consistent accredited procedure in the formation of all one’s beliefs,’ 
for ‘we define a rational belief as one which is arrived at by the methods which we 
now consider reliable.’136 
Against this positivistic reduction of reason to logic alone, Farrer insists that it 
has to do with an appropriate response to objective realities.137  In a posthumously-
published essay on ‘Poetic Truth,’ which Charles Conti dates as contemporaneous 
with Finite and Infinite, Farrer leaves the lectern and ascends the pulpit to express his 
more ‘metaphysical’ view of reason in a moving passage that incorporates both the 
concept of ‘apprehension’ discussed earlier and the above comment that those who 
                                                 
135 Ibid.  Farrer’s reference to the ‘the Aristotelian doctrine that mind is in a manner all things’ connects 
to the current renewal of interest in ‘mind/world identity,’ associated with ‘analytic Thomism’: see 
Kerr, After Aquinas, 28-30, 32-33, 78-79.   
136 Ayer, 100. 
137 See, further, Finite and Infinite, 18-19.  While respecting logic within its proper limits, Farrer 
apparently maintained this ‘metaphysical’ view of reason throughout his life.  See his interesting and 
amusing letter to his father, written on 1 February (1953), which Curtis says is ‘a comment on a certain 
type of logical philosopher in the ascendant in Oxford in the 1950s,’ but which inspection of the 
original reveals is actually is about Lewis Carroll!  However, the comparative evaluation remains 
apropos.  Observing that Carroll’s ‘intellect resides in a world of arid logical puzzles while his 
sentiments and human interests are childlike and naïve to the last degree’, Farrer goes on to say that he 
‘is an instance of a sort of eccentricity pretty common among academic philosophers whose philosophy 
is chiefly logical, rather than being an attempt to gain insight into the essence of things.  Their intellect 
becomes absorbed in puzzles about the relation between dream and real experience, about logical 
identity and inferential validity, about sense and nonsense.  The mind having gone a wool-gathering, 
the rest of their life has to take care of itself: and as it is not a very complicated or painful one (for the 
most part), and as the possession of an absorbing intellectual hobby makes for contentment, such men 
are likely to drop into an amiable and virtuous puerility: especially if they be not married.’  See Curtis, 
142, and Bodleian Eng. Lett. c. 272, folios 140-141. 
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carefully and habitually ‘look’ at the world should discern at least some awareness of 
divine activity.  Again undoubtedly with those such as Ayer in mind, Farrer laments: 
The chief impediment to religion in this age, I often think, is that no one ever 
looks at anything at all: not so as to contemplate it, to apprehend what it is to 
be that thing, and plumb, if he can, the deep fact of its individual existence.  
The mind rises from the knowledge of creatures to the knowledge of their 
creator, but this does not happen through the sort of knowledge which can 
analyse things into factors or manipulate them with technical skill or classify 
them into groups.  It comes from the appreciation of things which we have 
when we love them and fill our minds and senses with them, and feel 
something of the silent force and great mystery of their existence.  For it is in 
this that the creative power is displayed of an existence higher and richer and 
more intense than all.138   
 
Similarly, but in a different context, he pronounces: ‘We are not suffering from too 
much logic, but from too little contemplation.’139 
 As we have heard earlier, according to Farrer the first task of rational theology 
is to state ‘the whole mechanism of the mind in working with the scheme of the 
Analogy of Being or, as [he has] called it, the Cosmological Idea.’  To complete this 
brief sketch of the first task, three more elements need to be mentioned.  First, Farrer 
does indeed enter into a discussion of the nature of analogy itself and its necessary 
role in our understanding the divine nature.140  Second, in seeking to ascend the scale 
                                                 
138 ‘Poetic Truth’, in Austin Farrer, Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by 
Charles C. Conti (SPCK, 1972), 37-38.  Hedley discusses this passage in ‘Austin Farrer’s Shaping 
Spirit of Imagination,’ 122.   
139 ‘The Nature of God as Personal Act’, in Reflective Faith, 139.  Conti says that this previously 
unpublished essay was written ‘for a philosophical conference at Windsor, 1951, in the form of a letter 
to its convener, Miss Dorothy Emmet’ (137). 
140 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 52-55.  For further contributions from Farrer on the essential and highly 
contested topic of analogy, see his 1947 article in The Downside Review, ‘The Extension of St 
Thomas’s Doctrine of Knowledge by Analogy to Modern Philosophical Problems’, reprinted in 
Reflective Faith as ‘Knowledge by Analogy’ (69-81); his 1955 article on ‘analogy’ from The Twentieth 
Century Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, reprinted as ‘The Concept of Analogy’ in Reflective 
Faith (64-68); the posthumously-published ‘Metaphysics and Analogy’ which Conti dates circa 1951, 
in Reflective Faith (82-90); and the posthumously-published ‘Analogy and Common Talk’ which Conti 
says was delivered to a postgraduate class on analogy in Michaelmas 1968, and so just a month or so 
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of being from finite to infinite, Farrer distinctively insists on the advantage of what he 
calls ‘the interior scale’ as opposed to ‘the scale of nature’.141  This is because Farrer 
is convinced that our knowledge of ourselves, and in particular of our willing and 
thinking, is more ‘reliable’ than our knowledge of external realities: we know human 
nature from the inside, as it were, whereas we do not know what it is like to be an 
electron or an amoeba.142  As he says further on, ‘we have no direct knowledge of any 
particular mode of existence except our own.’143  These two aspects of Farrer’s 
argument are extremely important and obviously controversial, and should be treated 
much more fully than the mere mention they will receive here.144 
Third, despite Farrer’s insistence that we do have ‘some mental machinery for 
thinking the bare notion of God,’ that ‘God’s activity is there for the mind,’ and that 
therefore we can to some extent apprehend God’s existence—and even, by analogy, 
God’s infinite nature—Farrer nevertheless insists that, finally, God is 
incomprehensible.  Deity exceeds the power of our intellect to grasp, but 
                                                                                                                                            
before his death, in Austin Farrer, Interpretation and Belief, edited by Charles C. Conti (SPCK, 1976), 
202-210.  See also Ian Davie, ‘Inverse Analogy’, in The Downside Review 113 (1985), 196-202; and 
Kevin Tortorelli, ‘Some Contributions of Balthasar and Farrer on the Subject of the Analogy of Being’, 
in The Downside Review 107 (1989), 183-190. Simon Oliver claims that Farrer’s interpretation of 
Aquinas’s theory of analogy ‘as one of proportionality’ (specifically in the 1955 article) is ‘a common 
misreading’, but I cannot pursue this matter further in this dissertation, either in regard to Farrer or 
Aquinas.  See Simon Oliver, ‘The Theodicy of Austin Farrer’, in The Heythrop Journal XXXIX 
(1998), note 34 on 296-297. 
141 See Chapter IV, ‘The Ladder of Ascent,’ 37-48.     
142 Ibid., 45.   
143 Ibid., 264.  Of course this largely depends on what Farrer means by ‘direct knowledge’.  If I had 
time to comment on this claim, I would argue that here Farrer is still captive to Cartesian scepticism.  
144 They are thoroughly discussed in the works of Conti, Curtis, Eaton, Glasse, Hartt, Hefling, and 
Proudfoot cited in notes 18, 95, and 96 above.  See also Eric Mascall’s Existence and Analogy (cited in 
note 83), which refers to Finite and Infinite at several points and engages exclusively with it on pages 
158-175.    
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whoever said that Deity was conceivable?....God is (in the sense implied) 
inconceivable, and it is necessary to face this fact; any doctrine that says 
otherwise must fall into limitless absurdities….It remains that the act of 
thinking the divine perfection strains to the uttermost the powers of the human 
mind.  How could it be otherwise, if God is God?145    
 
So by 1943 Farrer, ‘possessed by Thomist vision’, has clearly moved some distance 
from the extreme apophaticism and ineffability in regard to the divine nature 
expressed in his undergraduate letter in February 1928.  However, he still insists that 
God is ultimately a mystery that we cannot fully comprehend.  This does not excuse 
us from the strenuous attempt to do so, nor does it mean that rational theology is 
entirely impossible.  It just means that its results are very meagre indeed. 
 (2) Knowledge of Substance 
The second task of rational theology is to ‘show the involvement of theology 
with an at least implicit doctrine of finite substance, and to re-state the doctrine 
explicitly’—and, as stated above, this endeavour takes up a full two-thirds of Finite 
and Infinite (Part II, pages 63-261).  This part of the book is a metaphysical tour de 
force (for the most part concerned with what in contemporary terms would be called 
philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology) that deals successively with the 
logical prolegomena of the examination of finite substance, including the problems of 
speech about and apprehension of substance (63-105); the definition, scope, and 
freedom of the will (106-170); the nature and unity of the self (171-229); the 
knowledge of things (230-246); and the metaphysical analysis of finite substance in 
terms of form and essence (247-261).146 
For my purposes, however, all that needs to be said about this extremely 
dense, difficult, and doubtful exercise are twelve words cited earlier, namely Farrer’s 
                                                 
145 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 56 and 60. 
146 For in-depth discussions of this material, see Glasse, 325-335; Proudfoot, 88-148; Eaton, 73-115; 
and Conti, passim.  See also de Burgh, 349-350; Turner, 101-103; and Taylor, 245-246.  
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claim that ‘finite substance has to be vindicated if theism is to be upheld’.147  For here, 
despite all the qualifications and subtleties and nuances discussed above, despite the 
rejection of inference and the emphasis on apprehension, despite the denial of 
demonstrative arguments and the insistence on divine incomprehensibility, one can 
yet see the residual rationalism lurking at the core of Finite and Infinite.  For theism 
to be upheld, Farrer says, finite substance—a controverted metaphysical doctrine—
must be vindicated.  That is, not just believed in as an article of faith (à la 
revelationism or fideism), and not—per impossible—proved (à la conventional 
natural theology or rationalism), but yet still convincingly established by 
philosophical argument as a perfectly respectable rational belief (à la the moderate 
‘rational theology’ described above).  This part of the book is thus necessary for 
Farrer’s defence of theism; or, more broadly, metaphysics is thus necessary for 
Farrer’s defence of theism.  Why?  Because, as Farrer approvingly said earlier, ‘there 
are some metaphysical questions which must be settled if we are to vindicate the 
significance of any theological statements whatever of the traditional type.’148 
In short, the rationality of religious belief rides on Farrer’s success (or failure) 
in these 200 pages.  In terms of grasping the epistemic character of Farrer’s thought at 
this stage in his development vis-à-vis rationalism and fideism, it is sufficient to note 
the avowed strategy of Finite and Infinite.  The question of whether or not Farrer 
actually succeeds on his own terms here is of course of great philosophical interest, 
and has been much written about, but is not my primary concern.149  As stated several 
times previously, this is where the epistemic emphasis of my project differs from the 
                                                 
147 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 21. 
148 Ibid., v. 
149 Farrer himself came to think his argument in Finite and Infinite was problematic, as we will see in 
Chapter Four. 
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metaphysical focus of those such as Glasse, Eaton, and Conti who are more concerned 
with following through on the details of Farrer’s argument in his first major work.  
However, it is important to discuss briefly what Farrer says about ‘knowledge 
of things’, as this has significant implications for his religious epistemology as well, 
particularly in his later work.  In Chapter VII of Finite and Infinite, ‘Substance-
Propositions and the Function of Language’, Farrer says that is ‘not plausible that we 
should be able to talk about types of things, about which we can do nothing but 
talk.’150  This claim receives a more well-known alternative formulation on page 294, 
in which talking (language) is replaced by thinking (thought): ‘we cannot think about 
anything about which we can do nothing but think.’151  In these two variations of the 
same idea, Farrer expresses a central aspect of both his general and religious 
epistemology, namely that human knowledge is not purely intellective but primarily 
interactive. 
Immediately after stating the dictum cited above, Farrer writes: 
‘Understanding, to be real and a part of me, must be an act, for I am activity.  An 
                                                 
150 Ibid., 74. 
151 In a manner reminiscent of the later Wittgenstein, Farrer sometimes identifies thought with 
language.  It would thus be interesting to pursue to what extent the argument of Finite and Infinite 
depends on ‘apprehension’ being a non-linguistic form of knowledge.  Thus, on 249 Farrer says, ‘we 
have seen in what sense and why both activity as such and the substantial whole or unit of activity are 
indescribable, through not inapprehensible’ (emphasis added).  But if thought and language are linked 
as intimately as Farrer himself indicates, then what does it mean to apprehend something we cannot 
describe?  Is that even possible?  Those sympathetic to a Wittgensteinian or ‘cultural-linguistic’ 
approach to theology would think not: see Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, Second Edition 
(SPCK, 1997) and George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
Postliberal Age (Westminster Press, 1984).  But both Kerr and Lindbeck would probably agree with 
Farrer’s formulation that we cannot talk (and think) about that which we can do nothing but talk (and 
think).  Proudfoot criticises the non-linguistic character of Farrer’s ‘apprehension’ in Finite and 
Infinite, and notes that by The Glass of Vision, Farrer admits that ‘without discourse there is no 
intellectual apprehension’ (cited on Proudfoot, 141).   I discuss The Glass of Vision briefly below.  
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understanding which was thought of as a passive mirroring of that which is, could 
form no part of any real being; it would be itself a phenomenon requiring an active 
subject to contemplate it.’  He develops this interactionist epistemology in more detail 
in Chapter XX, ‘Knowledge of Things.’  Here Farrer says that his theory of 
knowledge is ‘causal’: that is, ‘we know things as they condition or effect our vital 
operation.’152  Our knowledge arises from ‘an interaction of beings, and the form of 
that [other being] as an ingredient in the interaction’153  Commenting on this passage, 
Edward Henderson says, ‘Our experience of the world, then, is not primarily a result 
of synthesizing passively received data; it is operation in which the world is 
apprehended as a diversified field of supports and limits to action.’154  This 
interactionist perspective is not just the familiar Kantian view that our mind actively 
organises—and thus interprets—the raw data of experience within certain specific and 
determined categories, but the more holistic claim that our acquisition of knowledge 
is not so much mental as corporal, involving every aspect of our being.  I would argue 
that Farrer’s brief sketch of an interactionist epistemology is actually far more 
important than the interior scale of Part I or the long and detailed defence of substance 
in Part II, and not just in terms of the epistemological focus on this dissertation, but in 
terms of Farrer’s contribution to contemporary philosophical theology.155 
                                                 
152 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 231.  Farrer adds that he means ‘causal’ more in Spinoza’s sense than in 
Locke’s. 
153 Ibid.   
154 Edward Henderson, ‘Knowing the World: The Process View of Austin Farrer’, in Philosophy Today 
12 (1968), 207. 
155 As will become more apparent in Chapters Four and Five, I am largely indebted to Henderson for 
my appreciation and understanding of the interactionist—or, as he sometimes prefers to call it, 
‘volitionist’—character of Farrer’s epistemology.  In addition to his essay cited above, see ‘Knowing 
Persons and Knowing God’, The Thomist 46 (1982), 394-422; and (most especially) ‘Valuing in 
Knowing God: An Interpretation of Austin Farrer’s Religious Epistemology’, Modern Theology 1 
(1985), 165-182.  As I will discuss further in the next chapter, Henderson thinks that Chapter XX of 
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Interestingly, Farrer tells us that in order to understand his view it is necessary, 
if only temporarily, to ‘abandon the path of logical rectitude, and to consider 
evolutionary theory and biological probability.’156  This is because Farrer takes 
seriously our nature as embodied and indeed animal intellects: we are neither brains in 
vats nor (the currently more popular alternative) computer programmes, but evolved 
organic material beings.  Following the Thomistic insight that the scope of our 
knowledge is determined by our specific (human) nature—i.e., that we know 
according to our order of being—Farrer says that what we know is a matter of ‘being 
up against that which we interact with in some manner on a level and which must thus 
be known as to some degree in pari material [‘of like kind’] with our own activity and 
being.’  We thus do not see things as ‘the holy angels’ or even as the physicists do—
or, if so, it is only ‘at the price of diagrammatic and analogical abstraction.’157  But 
such ‘angelism’ is not the normal human way of knowing.  And so, ‘to apprehend 
things we must conventionalise them under the form of static conditions for our own 
active existence.  The things themselves can be no more static than this existence of 
ours which they are seen as conditioning.’158    
                                                                                                                                            
Finite and Infinite is key to this book’s general importance and continuity with Farrer’s later thought, 
particularly with Faith and Speculation.  Of all Farrer’s interpreters, Henderson’s work brings out 
perhaps most clearly and helpfully the distinctive character of Farrer’s thought in this area.  Many 
readers just miss it entirely and interpret his epistemology in more conventional ‘Cartesian’ terms.  
156 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 232. 
157 Both citations from ibid., 235. 
158 Ibid., 237.  ‘Angelism’ is the ‘sin’ (or heresy) of Descartes, according to Jacques Maritain in his 
Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, and Rousseau (London: Sheed and Ward, 1941).  As noted 
earlier, Farrer declined Kirk’s suggestion to study with Maritain at the Institut Catholique, but Farrer 
still probably read at least some of his books, and possibly this one, published two years before Finite 
and Infinite.  Farrer contrasts human and angelic cognition several times in his book, and while he may 
have inadvertently slipped into angelism at some points (see note 151) that was not his general 
intention.  I am indebted to Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, 208 for the reference to angelism. 
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Henderson notes the parallels between Farrer’s activist metaphysics and 
interactionist epistemology in Finite and Infinite with the ‘process view’ of 
Whitehead and Bergson.  As we will see further in Chapter Four, there is indeed a 
strong resemblance between Farrer’s dictum that ‘we cannot think about anything 
about which we can do nothing but think’ (and similar comments from Faith and 
Speculation) and Whitehead’s ‘reformed subjectivist principle’ which denies ‘any 
meaning not abstracted from the experiential meaning’.  As David Brown explains it, 
Whitehead is claiming that ‘no sense can be attached to an account of God [or indeed 
anything] that is not based on that alone of which we have knowledge, namely our 
own experience’—which seems to be an excellent gloss on Farrer’s statement as 
well.159  However, Henderson differs from Charles Conti in that while he (correctly) 
attributes a process influence on Farrer’s philosophy—that is, on his cosmology and 
epistemology—Henderson does not carry that influence (more doubtfully) into 
Farrer’s theology—that is, into his doctrine of God.  It is probably much safer to call 
Farrer a process philosopher than a process theologian.160    
 
 
                                                 
159 Whitehead’s ‘reformed subjectivist principle’ from Process and Reality (1929) and the quotation 
from David Brown are both cited from Brown’s Continental Philosophy and Modern Theology: An 
Engagement (Basil Blackwell, 1987), 50.   
160 Rather damagingly for Conti’s thesis, Farrer explicitly distanced himself from process theology in 
‘The Prior Actuality of God’ (a paper delivered in the United States in 1966 and published in Reflective 
Faith, 178-191), to which Schubert Ogden later replied: ‘Must God Be Really Related to Creatures?’, 
in Process Studies 20 (1991), 54-56.  For a useful selection of readings that survey the major themes of 
process theology and some criticisms that have been raised about them, see Chapter 2, ‘Process 
Theology: A more engaging God?’ in Jeff Astley, David Brown, and Ann Loades (eds.), Problems in 
Theology 1: Creation (T & T Clark, 2003), 38-63.  For recent statements from the two leading process 
theologians, see Cobb’s ‘Process Thought’ (251-265) and Ogden’s ‘Process Thought—a Response to 
John B. Cobb, Jr’ (266-280), both in D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin (eds.), Philosophy of Religion 
in the 21st Century (Palgrave, 2001). 
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(3) Faith and Argument 
As we saw above, Farrer claims that the third task of rational theology is to 
‘show how far down in our common thinking the question of faith enters.’  He adds 
that he means this not in the specifically religious or theological sense of faith, but in 
the general sense in which ‘intuitions…mould our practical thought.’161  He seems to 
be referring to the now familiar anti-sceptical epistemological point associated with 
Newman, James, Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Gadamer and many others that most of our 
beliefs are in fact taken on trust rather than painstakingly established by reason.  The 
fact that we cannot prove each and every belief (for either pragmatic or epistemic 
limitations) is not a philosophical scandal, but constitutive of the human condition.  
He adds that this theme ‘runs throughout the book and has no special place.’162  It is 
partly expressed in his conviction about the non-demonstrative character of 
philosophy discussed earlier: a belief may be rational, even if it cannot be proven.  
And it will emerge with greater prominence in Chapter Four, particularly in 
connection with the discussion of ‘initial faith’ in Saving Belief (1964). 
Part III of Finite and Infinite—‘Dialectic of Rational Theology’ (262-300)— 
is concerned with the fourth and final task of rational theology, to ‘show what the 
traditional arguments for God’s existence are, and are not; to classify them in an 
intelligible manner and to find a principle for distinguishing between valuable and 
absurd types.’  However, I will not directly discuss the details of this section since, 
like Part II, its specific content and success or failure (even on Farrer’s own terms) is 
largely irrelevant to the epistemic strategy of Finite and Infinite as presented in Part I.  
We already know that, at this point in his career, Farrer believes that ‘finite substance 
has to be vindicated if theism is to be upheld’.  Part III, where he applies the results of 
                                                 
161 Farrer, Finite and Infinite, vi. 
162 Ibid. 
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Part II specifically to theistic arguments, is thus important to the details of Farrer’s 
case but less significant for the bigger epistemic picture.  The point is, he apparently 
thinks that something along the lines of an argument is necessary, if only in principle.  
But Julian Hartt rightly notes that, even so, Farrer’s treatment of the theistic 
arguments is curiously insouciant: while apparently still necessary for the successful 
execution of his project, they are ‘tucked…into the last few pages of his 
performance…almost as though [they] were a concession to the unfortunate 
expectations of the audience.’163  In Finite and Infinite, protests to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the actual purpose of Part III seems rather ambiguous, with only 38 
out of 300 pages devoted to the arguments themselves.  In fact, given what Farrer says 
in Part I about apprehension rather than inference being the path to God, it remains 
unclear how any sort of argument functions in aiding the task of apprehending either 
God or finite substance—but that is a point of interpretation that I will here leave 
unresolved.164   
C. Knowledge by Analogy 
Finite and Infinite is far and away Farrer’s most important and extensive 
statement of his thinking about the rationality of religious belief while ‘possessed by 
the Thomist vision’.  Discounting those pieces focused on biblical or more theological 
issues, most of the relevant articles, book reviews, and posthumously published 
papers from this period (roughly from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s) are interesting 
for the points of detail and nuance they provide, but are not essential for establishing 
                                                 
163 Hartt, ‘Austin Farrer as Philosophical Theologian,’ 10 
164 See Hartt’s essay, 10-11, for a discussion of the ‘Proofs’ and their place in Finite and Infinite.  
Jeffrey Eaton provides a summary and analysis of each of the thirteen arguments considered by Farrer 
in Part III and interested readers looking for a commentary are referred to his text (20-33). Proudfoot 
also discusses Farrer’s theistic arguments in God and the Self, 132-137. 
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the content of his epistemological position.165  Likewise for his other major book of 
this period, The Glass of Vision.166 
As Basil Mitchell’s eloquent testimony from Chapter One bears witness, this 
is one of Farrer’s most profound, fertile, and suggestive books.  Charles Helfling says 
that it is ‘undoubtedly the most important source for understanding the breadth of 
Farrer’s genius’.167  And it does indeed have a strong epistemological character: both 
Eric Mascall and Rowan Williams speak of Farrer’s ‘epistemology of images’.168  In 
The Glass of Vision, Farrer continues his polemic against Barth and Ayer by 
defending a ‘natural knowledge of God’ (such as he argued for at greater length in 
Finite and Infinite), the reality of revealed truth that is above unaided human reason to 
reach on its own (a theme almost entirely absent from the previous book), and the 
indispensable role of creative imagination or ‘wit’ in human intellectual activity 
(likewise).  However, the primary concern of this book as a whole is with how 
inspiration, revelation, and imagery combine with the literary character of the 
                                                 
165 For relevant articles and papers, see ‘The Rational Grounds for Belief in God’ (approximately 
contemporaneous with Finite and Infinite and posthumously published in Reflective Faith, 7-23); ‘Can 
We Know That God Exists?’ (editor’s summary of a debate between the Rev. A. M. Farrer and Mr 
MacNabb), in Socratic Digest 2 (1944), 12-13; ‘Does God Exist?’, in Socratic Digest 4 (1947), 27-34, 
reprinted in Reflective Faith, 39-47, and in Ann Loades and Robert MacSwain (eds.), The Truth-
Seeking Heart: Austin Farrer and His Writings (Canterbury Press, 2006), 207-215; ‘On Credulity’ in 
Illuminatio 1 (1947), 3-9, reprinted in Interpretation and Belief, 1-6, and The Truth-Seeking Heart, 
190-195; ‘Faith and Reason’ (of unknown early date, posthumously published in Reflective Faith, 48-
63); ‘The Nature of God as Personal Act’ (cited in note 139 above); and ‘On Verifying the Divine 
Providence’ (according to Conti, written sometime between 1951 and 1954, posthumously published in 
Reflective Faith, 140-148).  See also the book reviews in the Bibliography, I.1.4., published between 
1935 and 1946. 
166 The Glass of Vision: The Bampton Lectures of 1948 (Dacre Press, 1948).   
167 Helfling, Jacob’s Ladder, 130. 
168 Mascall, in his British Academy obituary notice of Farrer, 438; Williams, in his Christology and the 
Nature of the Church: The Fourth Mascall Memorial Lecture, given in St Mary’s Bourne Street, 6 
November 1999 (St Mary’s Bourne Street London), 4.   
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Scriptural text to convey what Farrer calls ‘the form of divine truth in the human 
mind’.169  Revelation itself is at least in part an epistemological concept, as William 
Abraham has recently reminded us, but in The Glass of Vision revelation does not 
connect directly with the rationality of religious belief or the question of fideism.170  
Farrer does indeed explicitly consider the implications of supernatural revelation for 
these topics, but not until 1957, as I will discuss further in Chapter Four.  So, while I 
agree with Helfling that The Glass of Vision is perhaps Farrer’s most significant 
single book, and also acknowledge David Brown’s suggestion that its emphasis on 
images and imagination perhaps represents Farrer’s most fruitful line of thought for 
contemporary Christian theology, I will not discuss it further in this dissertation.171 
                                                 
169 Farrer, The Glass of Vision, 1.  Thus, Henderson does not deal with The Glass of Vision in ‘Valuing 
in Knowing God: An Interpretation of Austin Farrer’s Religious Epistemology’ (cited in note 155), but 
skips straight from Finite and Infinite to The Freedom of the Will. 
170 For Abraham, see his Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Eerdmans, 2006), and my 
review in International Journal of Systematic Theology 10 (2008), 219-222. 
171 As cited below, Brown has written two essays on Farrer’s work.  In ‘The Role of Images in 
Theological Reflection’ (92) he says that ‘although Farrer is not mentioned, I have taken seriously his 
stress on the power of images and their capacity to generate new meanings’ in two major volumes, 
Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford University Press, 1999) and Discipleship 
and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth (Oxford University Press, 2000).  For studies that 
engage directly with The Glass of Vision, see David Brown, ‘God and Symbolic Action’, in Brian 
Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson (eds.), Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical 
Theology of Austin Farrer (T & T Clark, 1990), 103-122; ibid., ‘The Role of Images in Theological 
Reflection’, in Hebblethwaite and Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in God’s World (SCM Press, 
2006), 85-105; Ingolf Dalferth, ‘The Stuff of Revelation: Austin Farrer’s Doctrine of Inspired Images’, 
in Ann Loades and Michael McLain (eds.), Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism (St Martin’s 
Press, 1992), 71-95; Jerry H. Gill, ‘Divine Action as Mediated’, Harvard Theological Review 80 
(1987), 269-378; Douglas Hedley, ‘Austin Farrer’s Shaping Spirit of Imagination’, in Hebblethwaite 
and Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in God’s World, 106-134; and Gerard Loughlin, ‘Making it 
Plain: Austin Farrer and the Inspiration of Scripture’, in Loades and McLain (eds.), Hermeneutics, the 
Bible and Literary Criticism, 96-112.  See also Proudfoot, 137-146; Eaton’s chapter ‘Diagrammatic 
Fictions and Inspired Images’ in The Logic of Theism, 131-200; and Robert Boak Slocum, Light in a 
Burning Glass: A Systematic Presentation of Austin Farrer’s Theology (University of South Carolina 
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However, to round out this discussion of Farrer’s unique brand of Thomism as 
it relates to his revision of rational theology and the development of his religious 
epistemology, it will be illuminating to look briefly at a largely neglected paper, ‘The 
Extension of St Thomas’s Doctrine of Knowledge by Analogy to Modern 
Philosophical Problems.’  Originally delivered to the Aquinas Society of London and 
published in The Downside Review in 1947, while it is indeed partly concerned with 
analogy, I am more interested in its implications for knowledge.172 
Farrer begins by saying that Aquinas introduces the concept of analogy 
specifically to deal with problems associated with our knowledge of God.  For 
Aquinas, we know the items of everyday life simply and without complication or 
confusion—and thus without analogy—whereas God transcends these normal 
categories and so can be grasped by us only by analogy with mundane objects.  But, 
according to Farrer, ‘for a modern the balance of this contrast has considerably 
altered, and…what we take to be our apprehension of finite substances approximates 
far more towards the traditional [Thomist] account of our apprehension of God than 
strict traditionalism would have said.’173  Our epistemic situation vis-à-vis the world 
is much more indirect than Aquinas assumed, and finite substances are far more 
mysterious.  Since Berkeley, Hume, Kant, quantum physics, etc., we now think of 
ourselves as almost as distant from the mundane ‘things in themselves’ as we are from 
God.  Thus: ‘We say of the physical, something far more like what the medieval 
would say of the divine being, that it is indirectly signified to us by the sensible signs, 
                                                                                                                                            
Press, 2007), 50-76.  Hedley has recently published a major study titled Living Forms of the 
Imagination (T. & T. Clark, 2008) which contains a chapter dealing with this aspect of Farrer’s 
thought: ‘Inspired Images, Angels and the Imaginal World’ (211-244).   
172 The Downside Review 65 (1947), 21-32; reprinted in Reflective Faith as ‘Knowledge by Analogy’, 
69-81: I will cite from the version in Reflective Faith. 
173 Farrer, ‘Knowledge by Analogy,’ 72. 
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that we cannot give ourselves a clear and proper account of it, but are reduced to 
using diagrams, in which certain elements selected from the sensible signs are 
combined to yield some sort of indirect representation—presumably an analogical 
representation.’174  Hence the characteristically modern emphasis on epistemology 
rather than the classical and medieval focus on metaphysics—that is, on being itself.  
Farrer then distinguishes between what he calls the supernatural object (God), 
the connatural object (finite physical being), and the perspicuous object (the sensible 
sign by which we perceive finite physical being).  Explaining the latter term, he says 
that a ‘sense-datum, a patch of colour qua seen, a tone of sound in so far as heard, and 
so forth, is perspicuous by definition: it is only when we raise the question what 
physical being it is the sign of that we arrive at the non-perspicuous.’175  And he 
admits that being as such, even the finite beings we interact with on a daily basis, is 
non-perspicuous.  He then asks when and why we are driven to thinking by analogy, 
and answers that it is only when we are faced with a reality that transcends our normal 
cognitive powers.  But this is now the case with all ‘reality’ whatsoever.  Analogy is 
no less necessary for our attempt to grasp a grain or a gnat as it is to grasp God.  Thus, 
Farrer concludes: 
analogical method will not simply assist the solution of this and that 
philosophical puzzle: it must save philosophy itself.  The modern philosophers 
[i.e., post-Descartes], having nailed the colours of clear-and-distinct thinking 
to the mast, have been obliged by their principle to throw more and more of 
the cargo out of the ship.  Now there is no going back upon the work of the 
critical philosophers [i.e., post-Kant], and if we are to re-apply philosophical 
method to the world of real being and recover the science of metaphysics, we 
have got to give a credible account of how the mind proceeds in approaching 
real being—the supernatural object ultimately, but primarily the connatural 
object.176 
 
                                                 
174 Ibid.  
175 Ibid., 77. 
176 Ibid., 80. 
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Ironically, therefore, the only way to save modern philosophy is to retrieve the 
Thomistic doctrine of analogy.  He then adds, ‘For though analogy may not give us 
clear-and-distinct knowledge of that about which we analogize, there is nothing to 
prevent our having a clear-and-distinct account of what analogizing itself is, and of its 
several varieties or modes.  And by such an enquiry we shall justify analogical 
thinking, including that metaphysical thinking which is analogical, and we shall gain a 
clearer understanding of the nature of our knowledge of the real.’177 
This latter passage is one of the very few places where Farrer seems to look 
favourably at more formal, analytic strategies, as he seems to claim that while the 
deliverances of both metaphysics and epistemology will always fail to be ‘clear-and-
distinct’—and will thus stubbornly remain problematic from a Cartesian 
perspective—we might yet have, or devise, a method of approaching them that is 
itself ‘clear-and-distinct,’ at least to us.  And this, of course, is the dream of the early 
analytic philosophers such as Moore, Russell, and (the early) Wittgenstein.  But this 
interest in formalising the methods of our thinking is decidedly at odds with the more 
organic or ‘human’ approach characteristic of Finite and Infinite and the other texts 
cited in this chapter. 
 In keeping with his general practice, Farrer does not name any specific 
Thomists in this essay.  It is, however, to some extent a courteous but critical response 
to Dorothy Emmet’s book The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, and he does discuss 
her by name, including (very briefly) her understanding of Aquinas.178  However, 
                                                 
177 Ibid., 80-81.  For more of Farrer’s view of analogy, and for commentary on his views, see note 140. 
178 See Dorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (London: Macmillan, 1945).  Emmet 
(1904-2000) was an exact contemporary of Farrer’s at Oxford during their undergraduate days, and 
although she was a student at Lady Margaret Hall she was tutored by A. D. Lindsay, the Master of 
Balliol, who also taught Farrer.  She ended her career as Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Manchester.  Farrer and she knew each other professionally and interacted on several occasions, as we 
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Farrer’s position here bears some resemblance to the post-Kantian school of 
‘Transcendental Thomism’ associated with Joseph Maréchal, which concluded that 
Cartesian / Kantian philosophy could not be outwitted by being regarded as a 
total mistake; rather, Thomas had to be reread in the light of modern 
philosophical considerations.  The ‘Copernican revolution’ inaugurated by 
Kant, in his focus on the active role of the knower and the autonomy of the 
moral agent, turned out, on this rereading, to be anticipated in Thomas’s 
conception of the natural drive of the mind towards truth and being.  Far from 
a supposedly empiricist epistemology, with the mind being conformed to 
things in the world, Thomas viewed every act of knowing and choosing as 
implicitly knowing and choosing the truth and goodness which is the mystery 
of the divine being.179 
 
Whether or not he had read any of the Transcendental Thomists, Farrer, at any rate, is 
here trying to do equal justice to both the undeniable conclusions of post-Kantian 
‘critical’ philosophy and the epistemic wisdom of medieval Thomism.  Although very 
well aware of the complicating character of the modern critique, he is still possessed 
by the Thomist vision. 
  
IV. Conclusion  
 This third chapter—the physical centre of the dissertation—has had three 
goals.  Section I introduced Farrer’s life and career, and provided a much more 
                                                                                                                                            
shall see again in Chapter Four (see also note 139 above).  Emmet belonged to a circle called the 
Epiphany Philosophers, which also included Richard Braithwaite and Margaret Masterman (husband 
and wife).  While in some very loose sense ‘Christian’, the Epiphany Philosophers were decidedly less 
orthodox—both philosophically and theologically—than the Metaphysicals.  For Emmet’s life and 
career, see Onora O’Neill, ‘Emmet, Dorothy Mary (1904-2000)’, in ODNB: Volume 18, 415-416.  See 
also Kwame Anthony Appiah, ‘The Epiphany Philosophers’, in The New York Times Magazine (21 
September 2008), available on-line at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/magazine/21jolley-
side.html?ref=magazine (accessed on 16 May 2009).    Eric Mascall’s Existence and Analogy deals 
with both Finite and Infinite and Emmet’s The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking in the final chapter, 
‘Two Recent Discussions of Theism’ (158-181). 
179 So Fergus Kerr’s summary of Transcendental Thomism on page 208 of his After Aquinas.  See also 
David Brown’s section titled ‘From Kant to Maréchal’ in his Continental Philosophy and Modern 
Theology, 7-10. 
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detailed biographical and intellectual context for his work than his commentators 
normally offer.  In particular, I looked at his philosophical and theological education 
in early 20th century Britain vis-à-vis analytic philosophy, the dialectical theology of 
Barth and Brunner, and the revival of Thomism.  Section II then continued in this 
biographical vein by going behind Farrer’s professional published work to consider 
his undergraduate correspondence with his father.  This material demonstrates that 
any concern about Farrer’s alleged fideistic turn in 1967 must take account of his 
1927 ‘breakthrough’ letter and his two letters in 1928 dealing with Gnosticism, myth, 
and Neoplatonism.  The young Farrer undoubtedly went through a fideistic phase in 
the late 1920s, and while one of the 1928 letters expresses an extreme fideism and 
apophaticism that never again surfaces in Farrer’s thought, I will argue in Chapter 
Four that the position taken in the 1927 letter is almost identical to 1967’s ‘The 
Believer’s Reasons’ in Faith and Speculation. 
Third and finally, Section III offers an epistemically-oriented reading of Finite 
and Infinite that—as with Farrer himself in Section I—contextualises this book more 
thoroughly within the then-contemporary debates than most previous studies.  
Specifically, I argued that Rowan Williams’s description of Finite and Infinite as ‘a 
viable and sophisticated natural theology’ meant reconstructing a basically Thomistic 
project while holding off Barth with one hand and Ayer with the other.  My reading of 
Finite and Infinite indicates that by 1943 Farrer had indeed moved a considerable 
distance from the strong fideism of 1928.  Both metaphysically and epistemologically, 
Farrer’s stance here is certainly more subtle and nuanced than conventional 
Neoscholastic Thomism.  However, by this point—perhaps in reaction to Barth and in 
response to Ayer—he has nevertheless acquired a distinctly rationalistic bent.  
Although—contra Vatican I and the 19th century condemnations of Abbé Bautain—
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he insists that rational theology cannot demonstrate the existence of God and only 
allows for non-inferential ‘apprehension’ or merely probabilistic arguments, Farrer 
nevertheless also states—contra Barth and Ayer—that ‘finite substance has to be 
vindicated if theism is to be upheld’.180  God cannot be ‘known with certainty from 
the consideration of created things, by the natural power of human reason’ (Dei 
Filius), but metaphysical justification is still necessary for the rationality of theistic 
belief.  In short, while Farrer would be regarded as a semi-fideist (at best) by the 
standards of Vatican I and the Anti-modernist Oath (still in full effect), within the 
context of British philosophy and Anglican theology he is still defiantly adhering to 
the canons of rational respectability, holding out against the twin onslaughts of 
Barthianism and positivism. 
This third chapter thus charts a more complicated portrait of Farrer’s 
epistemological development than was perhaps anticipated.  We have seen him move 
from a very early and immature general scepticism (‘I never yet have decided 
anything by reason and probably never shall’); to an oppressive rationalism brought 
on by his initial study of philosophy (under which he felt himself ‘the slave of 
Reason’); to the liberating fideistic ‘breakthrough’ of 1927 (faith ‘should be 
established on its own foundations’ and philosophy ‘does not touch religion’); to an 
extreme fideistic depreciation of reason (the Christian myth ‘carries its own truth 
immanently within itself’); and finally to the moderate (‘soft’) rationalism of Finite 
and Infinite (with its conviction that ‘some metaphysical questions…must be settled if 
we are to vindicate the significance of any theological statements whatsoever of the 
traditional type’).  Thus, now ‘possessed by the Thomist vision,’ but still as an 
                                                 
180 Barth would deny that such vindication is necessary; Ayer would deny that it is possible. 
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Anglican also in dialogue with Barth and Ayer, Farrer sets out his ‘viable and 
sophisticated natural theology’. 
In terms of the five categories of fideism discussed in Chapter Two—extreme, 
moderate, semi-, conformist, and evangelical—I would say that Farrer’s 1927 
‘breakthrough’ letter took a position somewhere between moderate and extreme 
fideism, with evangelical tendencies; the 1928 letter expressed an extreme fideism, of 
a more conformist (and specifically Catholic) stripe; and Finite and Infinite 
exemplified an unusually subtle Anglican semi-fideism (too rationalistic for Barth, 
not rational enough for Rome, and impossible for Ayer). 
To conclude, it is both interesting and illuminating to note that Farrer’s friend 
Eric Mascall (the founder of the Metaphysicals) published his own defence of 
Thomism—He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism—in 1943, the very same year 
as Finite and Infinite.181  Mascall and Farrer are often classed together as the two 
‘Anglican Thomists’ of the 20th century, but that is somewhat misleading.182  I have 
already noted at length the singular and ambiguous nature of Farrer’s so-called ‘para-
Thomism’.  It would be deeply unfair to Mascall, and indeed entirely inaccurate, to 
describe He Who Is as (in Vincent Turner’s terms above) a ‘twice-cooked dish,’ for it 
is a major work of synthesis and interpretation.  However, unlike Finite and Infinite, it 
is certainly ‘exegetical’.183  In marked contrast to Farrer, Mascall deals directly and at 
length with the actual text of Aquinas, and interacts extensively with leading (and 
mostly French) Roman Catholic Thomists such as D’Arcy, Garrigou-Lagrange, 
                                                 
181 Mascall’s text went through many editions, the last of which was a 1966 paperback with a 
substantial new introductory essay that surveyed developments in the intervening two decades (Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1966). 
182 For just two examples out of many, see Rowan Williams, Christology and the Nature of the Church, 
4; and John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought (London: SCM Press, 2001), 290. 
183 For the use of ‘twice-cooked’ and ‘exegetical,’ see Turner’s review of Finite and Infinite, 99. 
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Gilson, Maréchal, Maritain, Penido, Przywara, and Victor White.  He also considers 
classical commentators such as Cajetan and Suarez, and even takes account of R. P. 
Phillips’s widely used Neoscholastic textbook Modern Thomistic Philosophy.184  
Mascall is probably best classified as an exponent of the Existential Thomism of 
Gilson and Maritain, and not the Transcendental Thomism with which Farrer may 
have flirted in ‘Knowledge by Analogy’.185  But, while Mascall’s interpretation of 
Aquinas does indeed take account of modern and contemporary developments in 
philosophy, both British and Continental, we still find him asserting that ‘our 
conviction of God’s existence is not merely of a high degree of probability or even of 
purely moral certitude: it is objectively certain.’186  While some aspects of Mascall’s 
defence of natural theology are identical to Farrer’s—for example, they both insist on 
the necessity of a ‘contemplative’ attitude to finite realties in order for divine reality 
to be grasped as well, and both speak of ‘apprehending’ God—Mascall’s insistence 
on certain knowledge is a major difference between them.  Although like Farrer a 
priest in the Church of England, Mascall nevertheless stands on the ‘Catholic’ rather 
than the ‘Anglican’ side of the epistemic division discussed in Chapter Two.  Unlike 
Farrer, Mascall is not any kind of fideist, semi- or otherwise. 
                                                 
184 In two volumes, London: Burns and Oates, 1934, 1935. 
185 For more on this, and on Mascall’s Thomism generally, see Fergus Kerr, ‘“Real Knowledge” or 
“Enlightened Ignorance”: Eric Mascall on the Apophatic Thomisms of Victor Preller and Victor 
White’, in Stout and MacSwain (eds.), Grammar and Grace, 103-123.  According to Kerr, John 
Macquarrie (in the book cited in note 182; I owe the reference to Kerr) classifies Mascall as a 
Transcendental Thomist—‘but that cannot be right’ (110). 
186 Mascall, 76.  Mascall’s position is subtle and interesting, but cannot be discussed any further here.  
For more detail, see Chapters IV-VII of He Who Is (30-94). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
‘CAN REASONABLE MINDS STILL THINK THEOLOGICALLY?’ 
(1949-1968) 
 
 While never surrendering his commitment to some form of ‘rational theology,’ 
Farrer became increasingly open to placing a greater epistemic emphasis on faith and 
the supernatural character of Christian belief.  Metaphysics thus functioned as less of 
an essential foundation for theism.  And yet, Farrer continued to press the question: 
‘Can reasonable minds still think theologically?’  What we might call ‘the middle 
Farrer’ articulated a moderate fideist view of the relationship between faith and reason 
in the first chapter of Saving Belief (published in 1964).  In 1963, however, Farrer 
began reading the doctoral dissertation of an American postgraduate from Yale named 
Diogenes Allen.  Stimulated by Allen’s work and citing it explicitly, Farrer’s first 
chapter of Faith and Speculation (1967) attempts to blend Allen’s more ‘fideistic’ 
view with a continuing concern for legitimate philosophical critique.  Whether this 
rather syncretistic position is then fully integrated into the interactionist epistemology 
of the rest of the book remains to be seen.  The chapter concludes with a brief 
summary of Alvin Plantinga’s God and Other Minds (1967) as an example of a text 
which, rather than either Farrer’s or Allen’s, set the agenda for the subsequent history 
of religious epistemology in Anglo-American philosophy. 
 
I. The Freedom of the Will and the Mind of Christ 
Although it is difficult to identify a precise transition-point, there is arguably 
an increasingly ‘fideistic turn’—or ‘re-turn’—in the last two decades of Farrer’s life.  
Between The Glass of Vision in 1948 and The Freedom of the Will in 1958, Farrer’s 
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academic energies were mostly devoted to biblical scholarship, with only the 
occasional essay or book review dealing with a philosophical topic.  There is thus a 
considerable gap in the available published evidence for those seeking to determine 
exactly when and why his thinking shifted in this period.1  And when, after this long 
silence, Farrer publicly returned to philosophy with his Gifford Lectures (delivered in 
Edinburgh in 1957), rather than offering a direct defence—or even discussion—of 
natural theology, it is notable that the author of Finite and Infinite focused instead on 
an almost entirely ‘secular’ theme: the perennial debate between free will and 
determinism.  Perhaps aware of the incongruity of this situation, Farrer tells us, in the 
very first paragraph of Chapter I, that a  
Gifford Lecturer need not handle the substance of rational theology; he may 
discuss the preliminaries.  There are two branches of these, logical and 
material.  The logical branch examines the formal nature of theological 
statement, and the force of theological argument.  The material branch traces 
in the world of our common experience those characteristics which lend 
support to theistic belief.  We take the material branch.2 
 
                                                 
1 Farrer’s archived correspondence becomes more fragmentary at this point and so is not much help 
either.  Philosophical essays include ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ to G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the 
Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, edited by A. M. Farrer and translated by 
E. M. Huggard (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), 4-47; and ‘A Midwinter Daydream’, in University: A 
Journal of Inquiry 1 (1951), 86-90.  Both of these pieces were reprinted in slightly abridged form in 
Austin Farrer, Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by Charles C. Conti (SPCK, 
1972), as ‘The Physical Theology of Leibniz’ (91-113) and ‘Prologue: Theology and Philosophy’ (1-4).  
The latter appears in full under its original title in Ann Loades and Robert MacSwain (eds.), The Truth-
Seeking Heart: Austin Farrer and His Writings (Canterbury Press, 2006), 163-167.  The only 
philosophically-oriented book review of the decade between 1948 and 1958 is of John Hick, Faith and 
Knowledge: A Modern Introduction to the Problems of Religious Knowledge, in Journal of Theological 
Studies New Series IX (1958), 410.  Farrer’s assessment of the constructive aspects of Hick’s argument 
was rather negative, but as we shall see Farrer eventually moved somewhat closer to Hick’s position.    
2 Austin Farrer, The Freedom of the Will (A. & C. Black, 1958), 1.  (This book was published in a 
second edition in 1960 that included a ‘Summary of the Argument’ on 316-320, but the original 
pagination was unchanged.)  Farrer says that, as for the logical branch, he has nothing to add to what 
Ian Crombie wrote in ‘The Possibility of Theological Statements’, in Basil Mitchell (ed.), Faith and 
Logic: Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology (George Allen and Unwin, 1957), 31-83. 
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Libertarian human freedom thus assumes something like the doctrine of 
substance in Finite and Infinite, as a ‘preliminary’ metaphysical position that must be 
defended if theism is to be held rationally—although Farrer simply says that such 
freedom lends theism ‘support’ to the extent that it enables us to conceive of God as a 
freely willing agent as well.  Indeed, in the very last sentence of the main text of the 
book, on page 315, Farrer invokes the ‘human will, from which alone the divine can 
be conjectured.’  So if in Finite and Infinite Farrer’s basic argument was, ‘no finite 
substance, no infinite substance,’ here Farrer’s basic argument is, ‘no human free will, 
no divine free will.’  In the first fourteen chapters, Farrer speaks from a purely 
philosophical perspective, considering various aspects of the determinist / libertarian 
debate, and only turns to theological concerns in the fifteenth and final chapter.   
It is interesting to note that Farrer’s ‘voice’ or ‘persona’ in these lectures is far 
more conventional than in Finite and Infinite, at least in terms of the context of then-
contemporary British philosophy.3  Yes, the prose in which the arguments are 
expressed is unusually elegant and literary, the defence of metaphysics (in general) 
and libertarianism (in specific) is certainly atypical, and the arguments themselves—
both in terms of presentation and content—are distinctively ‘Farrerian’.  But the book 
is still unmistakably a piece of late 50s / early 60s ‘ordinary language’ or ‘linguistic’ 
philosophy rather than some unique form of ‘para-Thomism’.  Reviewers thus greeted 
                                                 
3 Several of the general surveys of the relationship between theology, philosophy, and philosophy of 
religion cited in the previous chapter are equally relevant for the second half of the 20th century as well.  
In particular, see Daniel W. Hardy, ‘Theology Through Philosophy’, in David F. Ford (ed.), The 
Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, Second Edition 
(Blackwell, 1997), 252-285; Ann Loades, ‘Philosophy of Religion: Its Relation to Theology’, in Harriet 
A. Harris and Christopher J. Insole (eds.), Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical 
Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion (Ashgate Publications, 2005), 136-147; and Stewart 
Sutherland, ‘Philosophy of religion in the twentieth century’, in Ernest Nicholson (ed.), A Century of 
Theological and Religious Studies in Britain (Oxford University Press, 2003), 253-269. 
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the text with less perplexity, while still retaining the usual reservations.  In short, 
while The Freedom of the Will may be a more successful ‘philosophical essay’ than 
Finite and Infinite, and while it is unquestionably one of Farrer’s major works, it is 
not directly concerned with the rationality of religious belief as such, and so—like 
The Glass of Vision—will largely be passed over in silence.4 
Nevertheless, it is still necessary to flag Edward Henderson’s claim that these 
Gifford Lectures marked a ‘crucial turning point’ for Farrer’s general epistemology 
that was later to have a significant impact on his religious epistemology as well.  
According to Henderson, in Finite and Infinite Farrer was running two entirely 
different and disconnected epistemologies: the ‘apprehensionist’ epistemology of 
Parts I and III, and the ‘interactionist’ or ‘volitionist’ epistemology of Part II, most 
clearly expressed in Chapter XX, ‘Knowledge of Things’ (see Chapter Three of this 
                                                 
4 For contemporary (and mostly positive) reviews of Farrer’s Gifford Lectures, see C. T. Chapman in 
Church Quarterly Review CLXI (1960), 107-108; John Hick in Theology Today 17 (1960), 268-270; 
Bernard Jones in The Expository Times 75 (1964), 170-171; I. T. Ramsey in Journal of Theological 
Studies, New Series X (1959), 456-459; and P. F. Strawson in Mind LXIX (1960).  For essays dealing 
with the substance of Farrer’s arguments in this text, see Steven M. Duncan, ‘Experience and Agency’, 
in F. Michael McLain and W. Mark Richardson (eds.), Human and Divine Agency: Anglican, Catholic, 
and Lutheran Perspectives (University Press of America, 1999), 149-161; Brian Hebblethwaite, ‘Finite 
and Infinite Freedom in Farrer and von Balthasar’, in Human and Divine Agency, 83-96; Edward 
Henderson, ‘The Supremely Free Agent’, in Human and Divine Agency, 97-119; Robert H. King, ‘The 
Agent’s World: Farrer’s Contribution to Cosmology’, in Jeffrey C. Eaton and Ann Loades (eds.), For 
God and Clarity: New Essays in Honor of Austin Farrer (Pickwick, 1983), 23-34; Nancey Murphy, 
‘Downward Causation and The Freedom of the Will’, in Brian Hebblethwaite and Douglas Hedley 
(eds.), The Human Person in God’s World: Studies to Commemorate the Austin Farrer Centenary 
(SCM Press, 2006), 14-37; and W. Mark Richardson, ‘A Look at Austin Farrer’s Theory of Agency’, in 
Human and Divine Agency, 121-148.  See also John Glasse, ‘Doing Theology Metaphysically: Austin 
Farrer’, in Harvard Theological Review 39 (1966), 323-324, and 326 note 17; and Jeffrey C. Eaton, 
The Logic of Theism: An Analysis of the Thought of Austin Farrer (University Press of America, 1980), 
90-98.  W. Mark Richardson’s essay is especially helpful in providing the 20th century British 
philosophical ‘background and historical context,’ particularly in philosophical psychology and 
philosophy of mind, for Farrer’s Giffords (122-131). 
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dissertation, Section III.B.(2) for more detail).  But Henderson argues that in The 
Freedom of the Will ‘the apprehension theory altogether disappeared.  Now Farrer 
saw that the paradigm for understanding all knowledge of real subjects, both human 
and divine, is not that of the spectator-observer who “sees,” but that of the agent 
whose knowing is a specialized form of practical action in the world.’5  Thus, 
Henderson points out that when Farrer finally does turn to theological matters in 
Chapter XV, ‘Liberty and Theology,’ his 
thought about both the nature of God and our knowledge of God had 
completed the volitionist turn.  Now he no longer saw the need to translate 
from the language of personal agency into the language of scholastic 
formalism.  Consequently, he conceived God not as the identity of essence and 
existence, but as a perfect creative will.6 
 
So, as Henderson observes, in one of the very few references in this volume to 
God, Farrer writes that ‘the physical is known to us by the way it conditions our 
physical motion; and the divine will, which is God himself, is known to us in limiting 
or evoking our dutiful action, through all the persons with whom we have to do.’7  
Henderson rightly comments that this claim links up with moral arguments for God’s 
existence, but he does not here mention another passage along these same lines which 
connects rather more with the theme of spirituality, which we will explore further in 
Chapter Five.  In this subsequent passage, Farrer addresses how we may, through 
actual relation, come to know the inconceivable deity.  On the final page of the book, 
in the penultimate paragraph, Farrer says: 
                                                 
5 Edward Hugh Henderson, ‘Valuing in Knowing God: An Interpretation of Austin Farrer’s Religious 
Epistemology’, in Modern Theology 1 (1985), 168. 
6 Ibid.  Farrer’s shift toward a voluntarist conception of God is a major topic in secondary literature on 
his philosophical theology that will attract our attention only tangentially—that is, as it relates to ‘our 
knowledge of God’ rather than ‘the nature of God’.  Obviously, these topics are intimately connected, 
as Henderson indicates above, but our primary concern is with the former rather than the latter. 
7 Farrer, The Freedom of the Will, 309 (also cited and discussed by Henderson on page 168 of his 
essay).  Eaton discusses this same passage on pages 97-98 of The Logic of Theism. 
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As God himself is unimaginable, so also must be the dependence of his 
creatures on his power.  And if the relation appears imaginable, we have 
reason to fear that we are viewing it unrealistically, and, as it were, from a 
great distance.  The nearer we come to it, and the more we are involved with 
it, the less imaginable, the more paradoxical we shall find it to be.  But what 
we lose in imaginative clarity is made up for us in actuality; just when we 
cease to conceive our dependence on God, we begin to live it.8 
 
Intriguingly, Farrer here claims that conceptual understanding (‘apprehension’) dims 
as we engage in relation (‘interaction’) with God, and yet that the very ‘living’ of this 
dependency somehow compensates for the loss in intellectual vision.  We will come 
back to these ideas when we reach Faith and Speculation, but for now it is sufficient 
to agree with Henderson that The Freedom of the Will indeed has considerable 
relevance for Farrer’s religious epistemology, but mostly in terms of its place as a 
‘bridge’ text within Farrer’s overall epistemological development from apprehension 
to interaction, and not in its primary argument for libertarian freedom.9 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 315.  The word ‘begin’ in the final sentence is actually printed as ‘being’ in the text, but this is 
an obvious typographical error. 
9 It seems obvious that Farrer’s work on the 1957 Gifford Lectures, as well as the various reactions to 
Finite and Infinite, not to mention important developments in British philosophy between 1943 and 
1959, all stand behind the Revised Preface to the Second Edition of Finite and Infinite (Dacre Press, 
1959).  Although—as with the second edition of The Freedom of the Will—the main text and 
pagination remained unchanged, Farrer’s revised preface indicates how his thinking had developed in 
the intervening years and to what extent he both agreed and disagreed with the original argument of the 
book.  It is in this revised preface that Farrer describes his previous self in 1943 as ‘possessed by the 
Thomist vision’ (ix).  He says, ‘My starting-point was correct, and my procedure materially sound; but 
my methodology was ill-considered.’  He admits that his talk of ‘apprehension’ of substance or self 
was chimerical: ‘What was I doing, in fact, but finding a certain abstract, artificial and diagrammatic 
account of my active being applicable or luminous?  What right had I to claim that any such account 
was the account?’ (ix)  Here, Farrer seems to concede that all of his detailed analysis of the willing self 
/ substance was perhaps nothing other than what we might call, somewhat oxymoronically, 
introspectionist projectionism.  However, he then makes the fascinating suggestion that perhaps the 
structure of the self can be found more externally and objectively in language: ‘A grammar of being is 
not a chimerical project, where the being in question is our own.  Every grammar is a grammar of 
speech, but speech is human being, and uniquely revelatory of the rest of it.  And as I trust I was able to 
show in this book, we both do and must think of the being of all things through an extension of our 
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 When Farrer does directly address the relationship between faith and reason in 
this period, a decisive shift is apparent from his work in the 1940s.  This may be seen 
in his contribution to Faith and Logic: Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology, a 
collection of essays by the Metaphysicals, edited by Basil Mitchell in 1957, the same 
year as Farrer delivered his Gifford Lectures.10  Farrer contributed two chapters to this 
volume, ‘A Starting-Point for the Philosophical Examination of Theological Belief’ 
(9-30) and ‘Revelation’ (84-107).  Although Henderson associates the first essay with 
the connection between morality and theistic belief mentioned above, I am more 
interested in the second one.  For in this piece, Farrer not only explicitly considers the 
epistemological implications of supernatural revelation, but also makes some overtly 
fideistic statements.  As with my treatment of Farrer’s metaphysics in Chapter Three, 
here I am less concerned with the specific doctrinal contours of his understanding of 
revelation as I am with its epistemic payoff.11 
                                                                                                                                            
self-understanding.’ (ix-x)  This connects directly with a number of statements in The Freedom of the 
Will which construe human nature in linguistic terms, and begs to be compared with Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations (published six years earlier in 1953) and other of his later texts—but 
further discussion would, alas, take us away from the focus of this dissertation.  
10 Cited, for Crombie’s chapter, in note 2 above.  For a fairly critical review of this collection, see H. D. 
Lewis, Review of Basil Mitchell (ed.), Faith and Logic, in Journal of Theological Studies, New Series 
X (1959), 202-205.  For a rather more positive one, see Howard Root’s joint review of Faith and Logic 
with C. A. Campbell’s On Selfhood and Godhood, in Theology LXII (1959), 36-38.  However, Root 
does comment that the ‘essays, eight in number, are of unequal length and importance, and one cannot 
but feel that the laymen involved do rather better than the clergy.’ (38) 
11 The first essay was reprinted by Charles Conti in Austin Farrer, Reflective Faith, under a new title: 
‘A Moral Argument for the Existence of God’ (114-133).  Several commentators have regretted this, as 
it both narrows the actual content of the article and rather misleadingly turns Farrer’s suggestive 
comments into a specific ‘argument’.  See, for example, Walter E. Creery, Review of Austin Farrer, 
Reflective Faith, in Theology Today 30 (1973), 298-301.  For Henderson’s linkage of this essay to The 
Freedom of the Will, see ‘Valuing in Knowing God’, 168.  And for Henderson’s own development of 
the link between recognising the reality of our neighbours and the existence of God, see his essay, 
‘Knowing Persons and Knowing God’, The Thomist 46 (1982), 394-422. 
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 Farrer begins by noting that there is ‘nothing superficially less attractive to a 
philosophical mind than the notion of revealed truth.  For philosophy is reasonable 
examination, and must resist the claim of any doctrine to exempt itself from 
criticism.’12  How, then, can divine revelation be incorporated into a philosophically-
acceptable—that is, reasonably critical—perspective?  The most common strategy, 
found even in the pages of the New Testament, is to offer an analogy of ‘human 
statements taken upon trust’—but is this sufficient?  St Paul perhaps complicates 
matters even further by making a sharp and basic distinction between the ‘natural’ and 
the ‘spiritual’ human person (or mind).  The things of God are ‘foolishness’ to the 
natural person—she ‘cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged’—but 
Christians ‘have the mind of Christ.’  All this seems ‘wildly irrational’ to the ‘natural’ 
person, so how can she possibly come to believe it?13 
 Farrer does indeed develop the analogy between accepting revealed truth with 
accepting the general authority of human culture (as children) and even the specific 
authority of established scientific beliefs (as adults).  In each case we initially accept 
something on authority, by faith or trust, and then go on to confirm its truth—or at 
least reliability—in our own lives.  But the analogy can only take us so far: 
The religion we derive from saints and prophets lays down precepts by which 
we are to live, and unless they can be lived by, they will cease to be accepted.  
For faith is not the blind belief that certain attitudes and policies, utterly 
undemonstrative in this world, will be inexplicably rewarded in another.  Faith 
assures us of everlasting salvation, but only because it is a way of life here and 
now; a way which must convince us, not indeed by easing life, but in some 
way by deepening it.  Yet the proving, in life, of those things delivered to us 
upon authority, is nothing like physical experiment, nor does it in like manner 
free us from dependence upon the authority accepted.14    
 
                                                 
12 Farrer, ‘Revelation’, in Basil Mitchell (ed.), Faith and Logic, 84.  Eaton discusses this essay on 
pages 146-147, and 159-163 of The Logic of Theism, but with a rather different focus from my own. 
13 Ibid., 84-85.  Farrer is of course quoting from 1 Corinthians 2.9-15, using the Authorised Version. 
14 Ibid., 89. 
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So while putative divine revelation may well induct us into a convincing ‘way of life’ 
that ‘deepens’ our perception and experience of mundane reality as well, and so must 
to that extent be continuous with ‘natural’ perceptions and experiences, such putative 
revelation still goes far beyond them, and perhaps illegitimately.  Even more, both the 
technique for testing the results and the certainty of the outcome are different: 
Nature is tested by masterful violence, but if God is to be known, it is by 
humble obedience, and by patient waiting for Him....No one has the 
spirituality to prove anything absolutely, and the spirituality of the ordinary 
believer is a negligible equipment compared with that of the saint.  What is 
received on authority must be proved in action, and yet it is never so proved, 
that it could not be proved more….The religious mind, incapable of proving 
faith in seventy years of imperfection, adds the years of others to its own and 
extends experiment by proxy.15 
 
It is important to stress that Farrer is making these claims, not in a sermon or 
even in a work of theology, but in a philosophical essay.  While they are of course 
homiletic and pastoral platitudes, their presence in a book published in 1957 with the 
avowed aim of developing a rapprochement with the dominant empiricism of British 
philosophy was bound to be seen as provocative at best and anti-intellectual at worst.  
Critical readers may well have thought that Farrer had traded his erstwhile Thomism 
for pietism, or had reverted to the prevailing stereotype of his ancestral religion.16 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 90. 
16 Thus, commenting on one of Farrer’s later—and even more explicitly theological—claims in this 
essay, H. D. Lewis says, ‘It is more irritating than helpful to be told, in this context: “For the 
recognition of revealing action begins with Christ.  He first, and in himself, acknowledges divine 
presence.  And if he was in truth the Divine Son it seems absurd to ask how he knew it; how could he 
have been ignorant of it?”   There are genuine and most reverent questions that this just sweeps aside.’ 
(From Lewis’s review of Faith and Logic, cited in note 9, page 203; emphasis in the original; Farrer’s 
quoted passage is from page 102 of ‘Revelation’.)  By italicising the phrase, ‘in this context,’ Lewis 
indicates his fear that Farrer is dangerously blurring the boundaries of philosophy and theology.  And 
Farrer indeed admits that this is precisely what has happened, and which must happen, when revelation 
is discussed at all, in any context: see page 99.  For further analysis this essay, see Ninian Smart, 
‘Revelation and Reasons’, in The Scottish Journal of Theology 11 (1958), 352-361.     
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But Farrer goes on to make even more eyebrow-raising claims on behalf of 
divine revelation—or, rather, for personal inspiration.  Picking up right where he left 
off fourteen years earlier at the conclusion of Finite and Infinite, Farrer argues that the  
impossibility of deducing the form of God’s personal dealing with us from the 
mere notion of a supreme personal Being personally known, is a logical aspect 
of Revelation itself as Christendom understands it.  To believe in God is 
doubtless to believe in a supreme personal Cause; yet His ‘personality’ is 
subject to negative qualification, and conviction dissolves in ambiguity when 
we try to decide how deep the qualifications go.  But (our religion holds) 
while we are immobilized by logical mist, God sends us his Logos.  We cannot 
fit our human similitudes on God, but God can, and does, take the human 
similitude on Himself, and in that form deal humanly with human creatures.17 
 
Rhetoric aside, this, of course, is just the standard Thomistic claim that revealed 
theology takes us far beyond the limited deliverances of natural theology into the 
intentions, actions, and inner nature of the Godhead.  But, again, why should we 
accept the claims of Christian (or any other) revelation?  While Farrer discusses 
various methods of testing revelation-claims according to different criteria, he admits 
that they are all inconclusive.  For example, in considering the evidence for the 
Resurrection of Christ, ‘it will always remain open to the unbelieving historian to 
weigh the improbability of delusion or fraud on the part of the witnesses against what 
is to him the supreme improbability of the miracle, and to find the second 
improbability the greater.  The believer’s mental scale tips the other way.’18  This is 
reminiscent of Farrer’s claims in Finite and Infinite that there can be no conclusive 
demonstration of the existence of God, partly because positivistic and Thomist or 
Idealist philosophers have different understandings of reason.  But here there is just 
the shared norm of objective historical scholarship—only interpreted through two 
entirely different conceptions of the universe.  Believer and unbeliever look at the 
same evidence, but see it differently. 
                                                 
17 Farrer, ‘Revelation,’ 98. 
18 Ibid., 101.   
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But again, why is this?  Ultimately, and rather surprisingly, Farrer traces the 
answer back to the claim that believers are among the ‘spiritual’ rather than the 
‘natural’: like St Paul, they have ‘the mind of Christ’.  And so, Farrer concludes—
perhaps remarkably, in a philosophical essay, in this cultural context—that ‘apart 
from a claim, however modest, to a divine gift, the Christian can say nothing rational 
about the fact that he believes, while his perhaps equally well-instructed neighbour 
does not.  If the Gospel is credible to him it is that some touch of the supernatural 
presence which the Gospel describes acts in his mind.’19  Thus, religious belief is not 
a matter of either clearer thinking or better information: it is a gift of God.  While 
Farrer may well have received full marks for honesty, hostile readers would have 
undoubtedly concluded that his admission here is viciously circular and—hence—
purely fideistic.  If the Christian ‘can say nothing rational’ about her belief other than 
that a divine gift or supernatural presence acts in her mind, and so inclines her to 
believe in the face of inconclusive and perhaps even questionable evidence, then it 
seems as though critical reason has been totally abandoned.  Again, as with the 1927 
‘breakthrough’ letter, Mitchell did not need to wait until 1967 to wonder if Farrer had 
become ‘a sort of fideist’: it seems that Farrer blatantly articulated a form of fideism 
in 1957, in a book that Mitchell himself edited!     
This acceptance of the Pauline distinction between the ‘natural’ and the 
‘spiritual’ mind finds a close parallel in a ‘memorable dictum’ preserved by Farrer’s 
own disciples in the oral tradition until Philip Curtis committed it to print: ‘He 
remarked with great seriousness on the difference between the orthodox and the 
heretical mind: the orthodox tried to understand revealed truth so far as possible, and 
then beyond that point just adored God, while the heretical mind was determined to 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 104 (emphasis added).  This discussion begins on 103 and continues to the end of the chapter 
on page 107. 
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accept only what it could master.’20  Interestingly, this piece of oral tradition is 
presented in the chapter on Farrer’s period at St Edmund Hall, from 1931 to 1935, and 
so provides evidence for such an attitude later than the undergraduate letters yet 
earlier than Finite and Infinite.  Likewise, in an essay published in 1937, we find 
Farrer saying that ‘spiritual realities become unintelligible in so far as they are 
expressed in an unredeemed universe: for their explanation we must look to their end 
and consummation.’21  All three of these statements, whatever their provenance, point 
toward a fideistic tendency in Farrer’s thought that cannot be denied.  Referring back 
to Brian Hebblethwaite’s implicit definition of fideism as discussed in Chapter One, 
Section II.B, they indicate that Farrer held—at least occasionally—that faith is a 
necessary precondition for appreciating the rationality and/or intelligibility of 
religious belief.  And, even more strongly, Farrer’s view in ‘Revelation’ suggests that 
faith itself is a gift, and so not something either fully answerable to or derivable from 
human reason alone. 
Returning to the period currently under consideration, this fideistic tendency 
also finds explicit expression in Farrer’s next major work, Love Almighty and Ills 
Unlimited.22  Originally delivered as the Nathaniel Taylor Lectures at Yale Divinity 
School in 1961, this book primarily deals with the perennial and painful topic of 
natural evil in relation to divine providence.  Over the course of eight chapters, Farrer 
sets out an insightful, innovative, and sophisticated theodicy, explaining how the two 
elements of the title can be reconciled without contradiction.  As with The Freedom of 
the Will, the primary concern of this book is not religious epistemology, and yet the 
                                                 
20 Philip Curtis, A Hawk Among Sparrows: A Biography of Austin Farrer (SPCK, 1985), 86. 
21 Austin Farrer, ‘Eucharist and Church in the New Testament’, in A. G. Hebert (ed.), The Parish 
Communion: A Book of Essays (SPCK, 1937), 86 (emphasis added). 
22 Austin Farrer, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited: An Essay on Providence and Evil (Collins, 1962). 
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implications of natural evil for the rationality of religious belief still clearly provide 
the underlying motivation of the lectures. 
It is thus something of a shock to reach the penultimate page of the final 
chapter to read: 
The inquiring mind is not to be turned back from its chosen path.  Speculative 
questions deserve speculative answers; and so in this book we have tried to 
satisfy those whom the riddle of providence and evil intrigues or torments.  
But the value of speculative answers, however judicious, is limited.  They 
clear the way for an apprehension of truth, which speculation alone is 
powerless to reach.  Peasants and housekeepers find what philosophers seek in 
vain; the substance of truth is grasped not by argument, but by faith.23 
 
This is not, admittedly, the extreme fideism that denies all value to reason: ‘the 
inquiring mind’ has a place, albeit a limited place, and its concerns are rightly heard.  
But it is at least a forthright declaration of a moderate fideism that places greater 
value on faith than reason, and that indeed sees the simple faithful ones as not just 
preceding the philosophers into the Kingdom of Heaven, but as actually achieving 
what philosophers qua philosophers ‘seek in vain’—that is, without any success at all.  
Here, faith is not just prior to reason, it is superior to it in every way.24 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 187.  This chapter, and thus this passage, may also be found as ‘Griefs and Consolations’ in 
Loades and MacSwain (eds.), The Truth-Seeking Heart, 220-227, with this citation on page 226.  
Interestingly, Thomas Aquinas expressed an almost identical thought in a sermon on the Creed, 
probably delivered in Naples in 1273: ‘None of the philosophers before the coming of Christ was able, 
with all of his effort on the task, to know as much about God…as a little old lady knows, after the 
coming of Christ, through her faith.’  Cited in Fergus Kerr, Thomas Aquinas: A Very Short Introduction 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), 35. 
24 Again, as with The Freedom of the Will, I am not here interested in the details of Farrer’s theodicy, 
as interesting and important as they may be.  For some contemporary reviews, see J. G. Davies, joint 
review of Karl Heim, The World: Its Creation and Consummation, Austin Farrer, Love Almighty and 
Ills Unlimited, and Harry Johnson, The Humanity of the Saviour, in The Expository Times 73 (1961-
1962), 296-297; Adam Fox in Church Quarterly Review CLXIII (1962), 500-501; and G. F. Woods in 
Theology LXVI (1963), 375-377.  For essays that deal with Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, or with 
other aspects of Farrer’s theodicy, see Brian Hebblethwaite, ‘Freedom, Evil and Farrer’, New 
Blackfriars 66 (1985), 178-187; Ann Loades, ‘Austin Farrer on Love Almighty’, in Eaton and Loades 
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II. Faith and Evidence 
 Readers of the previous section may well be somewhat bemused or 
nonplussed—at least, they should be.  In 1957, Farrer delivered a set of Gifford 
Lectures arguing that the divine will can only be ‘conjectured’ (or conjured?) from the 
human will, and yet also published a philosophical essay stating that the only 
difference between believer and non-believer is that the ‘spiritual’ believer has ‘the 
mind of Christ’.  In that essay, he stated that putative revelation must be ‘proved’ in 
life and yet conceded that this never can be done.  He admitted that believers and non-
believers saw the same evidence differently.  He asserted that ‘we should not find 
revelation intrinsically convincing if everything else made nonsense of it, and it made 
nonsense of everything else’25 (and so apparently held out for an objective rationality 
and standard of intelligibility common to believer and unbeliever alike), but then also 
wrote a few pages later that the only thing that will convince us of revealed truth is a 
special act of God in the mind.  Four years later, he delivered a set of lectures at Yale 
on ‘providence and evil,’ arguing that Almighty Love is not incompatible with 
unlimited ills, only to say at the very end of the last lecture that the path to truth is not 
argument but faith, and that peasants are thus in a better epistemic position than 
philosophers. 
                                                                                                                                            
(eds.), For God and Clarity, 93-109; Robert MacSwain, ‘Imperfect Lives and Perfect Love: Austin 
Farrer, Stanley Hauerwas, and the Reach of Divine Redemption’, in Natalie K. Watson and Stephen 
Burns (ed.), Exchanges of Grace: Essays in Honour of Ann Loades (SCM Press, 2008), 142-154; 
Simon Oliver, ‘The Theodicy of Austin Farrer’, in The Heythrop Journal XXXIX (1998), 280-297; and 
William McF. Wilson and Julian N. Hartt, ‘Farrer’s Theodicy’, in David Hein and Edward Hugh 
Henderson (eds.), Captured by the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer (T & & Clark 
International, 2004), 100-118.  See also the chapter ‘The Problem of Evil’ (38-49) in Robert Boak 
Slocum, Light in a Burning Glass: A Systematic Presentation of Austin Farrer’s Theology (University 
of South Carolina Press, 2007). 
25 Farrer, ‘Revelation,’ 102. 
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It is therefore easy to see why Farrer is widely regarded as an exasperating and 
elusive thinker.  The previous section, covering just five years of his life, contains so 
many claims and counter-claims, statements and modifications thereof, balancing acts 
and acrobatics, fascinating ideas inconclusively defended, strains of rationalism and 
fideism intertwined, that it is tempting to dismiss him for sheer inconsistency.  Just 
what, exactly, is he trying to say?  What philosophical / theological position is he 
seeking to occupy?  Farrer seems to be a classic example of someone who wants to 
have his epistemic cake and eat it too.  But in regard to the specific focus of this 
dissertation, his essay ‘Revelation’ is an undoubted watershed.  If we accept 
Henderson’s claim that the 1957 Giffords mark a ‘crucial turning point’ in Farrer’s 
general epistemology, with a decisive shift from apprehension to interaction, I would 
argue that the 1957 essay on revelation also marks a ‘crucial turning point’ in Farrer’s 
religious epistemology, one which pointed away from the lingering rationalistic core 
of Finite and Infinite towards an increased openness to faith and the supernatural 
element in Christian belief. 
However, to claim that we ‘can say nothing rational’ about our belief other 
than that it is a divine gift and supernatural act in our minds is obviously a highly 
unsatisfactory answer to those looking for a more robust apologetic.  And it still fits 
uneasily with various other claims Farrer made during this period, and indeed in this 
same essay, claims which suggest a greater commitment to ‘reason’ and a less blatant 
fideism after all.  Farrer himself seemed to be aware of the need for a more systematic 
and consistent statement of his evolving position on faith and reason, and he finally 
provided it in the first chapter of Saving Belief.26  This book is the closest thing Farrer 
ever wrote to a systematic theology, although as its subtitle and brevity indicate it is a 
                                                 
26 Saving Belief: A Discussion of Essentials (Hodder and Stoughton, 1964). 
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‘discussion of essentials’ rather than anything approaching a comprehensive treatment 
of Christian doctrine.27  It was originally delivered as a lecture series for Oxford 
undergraduates, probably in 1962, and was eventually published in 1964.28  Due to the 
highly controversial and widely discussed release of John A. T. Robinson’s Honest to 
God in 1963, Saving Belief appeared during a time of great public debate and 
uncertainty regarding the relation between Christian belief and human knowledge.  In 
the Church of England it seemed as though old lines were being erased and everything 
was ‘up for grabs’.29   
                                                 
27 As this is one of Farrer’s ‘popular’ books it was not widely reviewed in the academic journals, but 
was mostly discussed in secular and ecclesial newspapers.  Box 10 of the Farrer Papers include 
clippings of several such reviews, including one by Alasdair MacIntyre from The Guardian, 12 
February 1964, and an anonymous review from The Times Literary Supplement, 16 April 1964 
(probably written by Eric Mascall).  See also J. G Davies, Joint Review of Daniel Jenkins, The 
Christian Belief in God, Austin Farrer, Saving Belief, Eric C. Rust, Towards a Theological 
Understanding of History, and H. A. Hodges, Death and Life Have Contended, in The Expository 
Times 75 (1964), 231.   For a useful summary of the book’s contents and its significance in 1960s 
British theology, see Susan Howatch’s introduction to Austin Farrer, Saving Belief: A Discussion of 
Essentials, edited and with an introduction by Susan Howatch (Mowbray / Morehouse, 1994), vii-xi.  
See also Curtis, A Hawk Among Sparrows, 213-225. 
28 In the preface, dated ‘Easter, 1963,’ Farrer says that the book ‘was performed for a non-specialist 
audience of undergraduates’ (5-6).  Curtis says that the lectures were delivered in 1963 (A Hawk 
Among Sparrows, 182), but this seems to be an error.  Box 4 of the Farrer papers contains a letter from 
Farrer to his friend Martyn Skinner, written (by chance) on the back of a flyer announcing the lectures, 
here titled ‘A Plain Examination of Christian Belief’.  Although the year is not given, they were all 
delivered in October and November, which thus must have been in the year before the preface date—
that is, in the Autumn of 1962.   
29 See John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (SCM Press, 1963).  The probable date of the actual 
lectures somewhat complicates Mascall’s claim, apparently based on personal conversation with Farrer, 
that Saving Belief ‘was considered by him, though this is nowhere stated, as his reply by implication to 
Honest to God’ (see Mascall’s obituary notice of Farrer in Proceedings of the British Academy LIV 
(1968—Oxford University Press, 1970), 440.  While the book was indeed published the year after 
Honest to God, if the lectures on which it is based were delivered in 1962 then Farrer could not have 
composed them with Robinson’s book in mind.  However, it is still likely that by publishing the 
lectures for a wider audience, Farrer hoped to provide a different interpretation of Christian belief than 
Robinson’s, one that was both more ‘orthodox’ and in conversation with the mainstream of empirical 
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Farrer thus opens the book with a provocative question: ‘Can reasonable 
minds still think theologically?’30  Just this question alone indicates that Farrer has not 
embraced a wholesale extreme fideism.  Although he almost immediately states that 
theology can and must be done without knowing the answer to this question, he 
obviously regards it as one worth asking.  Indeed, it is striking that he formulated it 
the way he did, rather than the more fideistic version: i.e., ‘Can theological minds still 
think reasonably?’  In opening the book with the emphasis thus placed on ‘reason,’ 
with the question of whether reasonable minds can cope with theology rather than 
whether theological minds can cope with reason, Farrer indicates that he still thinks 
that (for good or ill) ‘reason’ has the right to make the first move, or at least to make 
claims that cannot simply be ignored.  And this indication is amply confirmed by the 
first chapter, ‘Faith and Evidence’.31  Rather than a theological prolegomena dealing 
with Revelation, or Scripture, or Tradition, or Ecclesia, Farrer begins his ‘discussion 
of essentials’ with general epistemological considerations.  However, it is equally 
striking that although Farrer begins the book by dealing with the claims of reason, he 
does so from within a primary commitment to faith.  Masterfully weaving together all 
of the epistemic strands surveyed thus far by this dissertation into a single, brief, 
accessible document, ‘Faith and Evidence’ is a brilliant, deeply subtle but deceptively 
                                                                                                                                            
British philosophy rather than Robinson’s neo-orthodox existentialism.  For an essay on Robinson that 
compares his work—rather unfavourably, it must be said—to Gregory Dix, Austin Farrer, and Eric 
Mascall, see ‘Honest to God and the 1960s’ in Rowan Williams, Anglican Identities (Darton, Longman 
and  Todd, 2003), 103-120.  For Robinson’s controversial career, see Eric James, ‘Robinson, John 
Arthur Thomas (1919-1983)’, in The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Volume 47 (Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 371-372. 
30 Farrer, Saving Belief, 5.      
31 Most of the lecture titles are identical to the published chapter titles, but according to the flyer 
mentioned in note 28, the first lecture—delivered on 17 October (1962)—was titled ‘Belief and 
Evidence’ rather than ‘Faith and Evidence’.  This chapter (Saving Belief, 11-34) has been reprinted in 
The Truth-Seeking Heart, 168-184, and I will cite from this version.   
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simple, comprehensive expression of moderate fideism.  Expressing the position of 
what I call the ‘middle Farrer,’ it deserves to be better known than it currently is.32 
Farrer begins the chapter by observing that ‘the key of entry’ to the Christian 
religion is faith.  How then can it be obtained?  And what of those who can’t seem to 
find it?  He explains that, in this context, by ‘faith’ he simply means ‘an attitude of 
mind’—the human mind, that is, not the ‘mind of Christ’—and we will hear more 
about this in a moment.  But first, it is important to note that Farrer claims that this 
‘attitude of mind’ and the beliefs that accompany it properly precede any critical 
reflection on the attitude or the beliefs.  And this is the case not just for religion but 
for any other epistemic matter as well, such as adherence to the beliefs of a specific 
political party (Farrer’s standing example is the now defunct Liberal Party).  Faith (in 
this very general sense) precedes reason.  Specifically in regard to religion, faith 
begins ‘with our hearing about God or, if we are clever enough, thinking thoughts 
about him for ourselves.  If anything is importance is to follow, the thought we think, 
                                                 
32  Henderson, for example, just gives Saving Belief a brief mention in his article on Farrer’s religious 
epistemology (note 5), and it gets passed over by most commentators, who are more interested in 
Farrer’s ‘big’ books.  Glasse (note 4) mentions it in an interesting footnote that also considers Ninian 
Smart’s response to Farrer’s ‘Revelation’ (see note 17) in the narrative of Farrer’s epistemological 
development: Glasse comments that ‘Farrer’s discussion of faith and evidence, in chap. I. of Saving 
Belief (1964), seems to exhibit a softer, more Augustinian stance than did [Finite and Infinite] (1943)’ 
(Glasse, 343 note 51).  I previously wrote about this chapter in the context of an article on Farrer’s 
Anglican theology: see Robert MacSwain, ‘Above, Beside, Within: The Anglican Theology of Austin 
Farrer’, in Journal of Anglican Studies 4 (2006), 33-57, especially 48-51.  But for helpful 
commentaries on ‘Faith and Evidence’ I am indebted to two works of Diogenes Allen that I discussed 
in Chapter One: ‘Faith and the Recognition of God’s Activity’, in Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward 
Henderson (eds.), Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer (T & 
T Clark, 1990), 197-210, and Christian Belief in a Postmodern World: The Full Wealth of Conviction 
(Westminster / John Knox Press, 1992), 11-16.  See also Eaton, The Logic of Theism, 44-51, and Eric 
O. Springsted, The Act of Faith: Christian Faith and the Moral Self (Eerdmans, 2002), 236-239 (both 
Eaton and Springsted were two of Allen’s doctoral students at Princeton Theological Seminary). 
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or the tale we are told, must be initially persuasive.’33  Or, as he puts it elsewhere, 
‘The believer in Liberalism, like the believer in God, is first captured by a story.’34  
So, despite his mischievous nod in the direction of Descartes, Farrer here 
acknowledges that most people’s religious and political beliefs come to them from 
their family, community, or cultural tradition.  They are first inherited before they are 
examined.   
It is only after we have received these religious or political beliefs that we then 
consider their epistemic credentials.  This is a proper and necessary activity for 
rational beings: ‘being reasonable people we ask ourselves what is the basis of our 
feeling or persuasion that such things are at all true.’35  So we start looking about for 
reasons to either justify or discredit our previously-accepted beliefs.  And, unless our 
beliefs are completely irrational, we are indeed likely to find some reasons to support 
them, good or bad.  However, we are also likely to encounter negative ‘opposing 
reasons’ for our positive supporting reasons, and so we then look for some way to 
adjudicate the debate between these conflicting reasons to determine which ones 
should exercise jurisdiction over our beliefs.  Unfortunately, ‘there seems to be no 
simple logical method for deciding conclusively between the pros and the cons.  No 
simple logical method, no, nor any advanced logical method, either.’36  In terms of 
theism, Farrer references the debate between ‘those famous philosophical twins, 
Russell and Whitehead, the co-inventors of mathematical logic and the joint authors 
of an epoch-making book.  One of them turned out an atheist, the other a theist; and 
                                                 
33 Farrer, ‘Faith and Evidence,’ 169.  Previous citations in this paragraph are from 168 and 169. 
34 Ibid., 170.  This reference to ‘story’ links up interestingly with contemporary narrative theology, but 
aside from a note below which mentions Farrer’s influence on the so-called ‘Yale School,’ I will not 
explore that connection further in this dissertation. 
35 Ibid., 169. 
36 Ibid., 169-170. 
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neither could show the other the error of his ways.’37  Pure logic, it seems, is not of 
much use here.  Apparently, the power of philosophy is insufficient to conclusively 
rule out one position or another.  Both seem equally, or at least adequately, rational. 
So if we are faced with a philosophical or evidential stalemate, if ‘sheer logic, 
or plain evidence’ cannot settle the disagreement, then ‘what it is that decides our 
minds for, or against, religious conviction’?  It is important to note that Farrer seems 
to believe that this is in fact the epistemic situation in which we find ourselves: one of 
studied ambiguity, without obvious truth or falsehood staring us in the face.  If one of 
these positions is in fact ‘more rational’ than the other, its superior rationality is not 
immediately or universally apparent.  But Farrer then replies that the answer to this  
question (‘what it is that decides our minds for, or against, religious conviction’) can 
only be faith—the same faith that was there from the beginning, before epistemic 
questions were raised.38 
In some cases such initial faith survives the trial by reason, in some cases it 
does not.  If it survives, however, it survives because the person is genuinely 
persuaded of its truth, not because she is believing perversely against overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary.  Indeed, it is precisely at this point that the believer 
discovers that she, in fact, has faith and what such faith means.  Farrer says that such 
faith ‘becomes self-conscious in exerting itself against the counter-persuasions; but it 
was there already….Either we are persuaded or not persuaded, that is the starting-
point.  If we are persuaded, some element of faith is there; it is just a matter of 
maintaining itself or not against rival persuasions.’39  But, crucially, what truly 
persuades the believer is not faith itself, but evidence.  Faith is neither belief against 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 170. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 171. 
  
201
nor belief without evidence, but rather ‘a subjective condition favourable to the 
reception of the evidence.’40  And again we will hear more about this in a moment. 
However, at this point Farrer complicates this basic epistemic picture, which 
applies across the board to all our beliefs whatsoever, by candidly admitting that the 
real ‘difficulty about faith is not a difficulty about faith in general, or about the 
enormous part it plays in every department of life.  The difficulty about faith is a 
difficulty about religious faith in particular, because it is so unlike other examples of 
faith; not because it resembles them.’41  And that is because religious faith entails 
belief in the existence of its (admittedly very odd) object, not just in its 
trustworthiness (as, for example, with the policies of the Liberal Party).  And here 
Farrer makes the claim we heard in Chapter One, Section I.D from Basil Mitchell, 
who duly credited it to Farrer himself: ‘God is trustworthy, by definition, always 
supposing that he exists....I can trust him if he exists, how can I trust him to exist?’42  
Farrer accepts that this type of fideism seems both impossible and absurd, and he says 
that the recognition of this impossible absurdity is what motivates those who would, 
by contrast, deny ‘any faith-element in a conviction of God’s existence.’43 
And here the Anglican Warden of Keble College explicitly engages with the 
Roman Catholic tradition of religious epistemology and natural theology that we 
discussed in Chapter Two, which he finds almost as mistaken in its rationalism as 
‘trusting God to exist’ is in its fideism.  Bearing in mind that the Second Vatican 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 176. 
41 Ibid., 171. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  However, ‘trusting God to exist’ does seem to be more or less what Rowan Williams is 
suggesting we try to do in Tokens of Trust: An Introduction to Christian Belief (Canterbury Press, 
2007).  See my review in Foundation: The Annual Periodical of the St Chad’s College Foundation IV 
(2007), 115-118, which compares Williams to Farrer on this issue. 
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Council had literally just started when he gave the lecture on which this chapter was 
based, and that the Anti-Modernist Oath was still in full effect, Farrer says that 
denying the element of faith in our conviction of God’s existence 
used to be almost the official Roman Catholic view.  We believe in God (it 
was said) by force of reason; by faith we trust the promises he gives us 
through accredited channels of revelation, once they are accredited; our 
acceptance of the channels as authoritative cannot itself repose on faith.  Such 
is, or was, the high and dry scholastic doctrine.  As a positive account of the 
matter, it is utterly useless, and we have already shown why.  It is useless, 
because it involves us in accusing all well-informed atheists either of mental 
imbecility or of intellectual dishonesty, or of both….Now I am simply not 
prepared to bring an accusation of this kind against my godless friends.  Since 
I myself believe, I must suppose that they suffer from some bias in 
disbelieving; but it is not the sort of bias that turns away from cogent reasons.  
It is just that subtle and elusive bias which leads to misjudgement in matters of 
faith.44   
 
 Farrer has some interesting things to say about why atheists may be drawn to 
atheism, but the main point is that, in his view, atheism is a rational position to hold: 
‘You can run a plausible line in atheist propaganda, to persuade us that nature, 
without God, is the sufficient cause of our existence.’45  The interpretation of faith, on 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 172.  The Second Vatican Council opened on 11 October 1962, and if I am correct in my 
dating of these lectures (see note 28 above), ‘Belief and Evidence’ was delivered in Oxford just six 
days later on 17 October.    It is interesting that even in 1962-64 Farrer was aware that determining the 
exact contours of the Roman epistemic tradition was perhaps more complicated than it seemed, but it is 
doubtful that he could have imagined how much change the Council would unleash, on epistemic as 
well as on many other matters.  However, for an example of a Roman Catholic writer from the previous 
generation who does indeed seem to make some of the claims Farrer attributes above to the Church, see 
C. W. O’Hara’s contribution in Science and Religion: A Symposium (Gerald Howe, 1931), 107-116.  
This is the same ‘Fr O’Hara’ famously chastised by Wittgenstein in his lectures on religious belief, and 
(not quite so famously) defended by Brian Davies in ‘Scarlet O’Hara: A Portrait Restored’, Philosophy 
57 (1982), 402-407.  I am not convinced by Davies’s intervention on O’Hara’s behalf, as I think Davies 
fails to acknowledge the dubious extent of O’Hara’s rationalistic confidence that Catholic doctrines 
‘are reached by the very same intelligence that is operative in science and with the same certainty’ 
(O’Hara, 112). 
45 Ibid., 174.  Here Farrer agrees with Basil Mitchell, Brian Hebblethwaite, Diogenes Allen, and 
Richard Swinburne, as we saw in Chapter One.  See 178-179 for Farrer’s speculations about possible 
noetic factors contributing to atheism. 
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the other hand, is ‘natural’ and thus likewise plausible, and indeed well supported by 
objective evidence, as we shall see in a moment.  But it too, like atheism, is not 
rejected on pain of irrationality.  Again, the point is that when it comes to belief in 
God’s existence, Farrer rejects what he describes as the ‘scholastic’ view which says 
that ‘faith only comes in later, when we trust the explicit promises of God.  There is 
some element of faith there from the start.’46 
Recalling that Farrer has always rejected demonstrative theistic arguments, 
and also recalling that Abbé Bautain (1796-1867) was forced to assert that 
• ‘Human reason is able to prove with certitude the existence of God’ 
and that 
• ‘The use of reason precedes faith and, with the help of revelation and grace, 
leads to it’ 
we can see that Farrer’s position here is clearly fideistic from the traditional Roman 
Catholic perspective.47  However, since Farrer also rejects what even he regards as 
the overly fideistic idea that we can ‘trust God to exist,’ he is led to stake out a middle 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 For the theses against Bautain, see Chapter Two, Section I.A.  It is of course possible, and indeed 
certain, that what Farrer means by this general ‘faith’ is not equivalent to the ‘heavenly gift’ described 
in these 19th century Roman Catholic documents.  That is, Farrer’s general faith is not the theological 
virtue of faith (1 Corinthians 13.13), nor Peter Lombard’s ‘faith formed by love’ (fides formata 
caritate).  And this becomes explicitly clear in Farrer’s imminent distinction above between ‘initial 
faith’ and ‘saving faith’.  But making this distinction and deliberately applying ‘initial faith’ to 
questions about belief in God is itself part of Farrer’s (Anglican) argument against the ‘scholastic’ 
Roman Catholic epistemology: by interpreting ‘faith’ only in such supernatural terms and by denying 
its relevance to general belief-formation, the Church is led to the mistaken view that arguments for 
God’s existence can only be construed in strictly rationalistic, demonstrative terms.  And this, Farrer 
thinks, is untenable for the reasons discussed above.  For a brief but useful survey of the historical 
development of the concept of faith and the different definitions that have been applied to it, see ‘faith’ 
in F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Third 
Edition (Oxford University Press, 1997),  595-596.  And for a book-length treatment, see Springsted’s 
text cited in note 32.  
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position (a via media) that draws a distinction from scholastic practice between ‘two 
operations of faith’.  The first is the ‘implicit’ or ‘initial faith’ he has been exploring 
so far, and the second is the full-blown ‘saving faith’ of Christian commitment. 
To further illustrate what he means by ‘initial faith’—which he describes as ‘a 
deeply felt personal attitude, even if it not exactly an attitude of trust’48—Farrer asks 
us to consider a child brought up as an orphan who suddenly wonders if his mother is 
still alive.  This unexpected possibility produces a reaction in the child; he ‘alternates 
between hope and resignation.’49  Farrer says, ‘The suggestion that there might be a 
mother is not an isolated factual hypothesis; it is a picture of the world, with an 
attitude built in; it is filial existence in place of orphan existence.’50  The possibility 
has a profoundly affective quality to it, appealing not just to the child’s reason, but 
also to his imagination and heart.  It is, as Farrer’s quotation above implies, 
existential.  And the same situation obtains, Farrer insists, when human beings 
consider the existence of God. 
In an acute and sensitive manner, Farrer thus argues that rationalistic 
evidentialism and extreme fideism are both inadequate responses to the possibility of 
God’s existence.  To the rationalist evidentialist (whether theist or atheist) he says: 
We are too much inclined to think of a disputed idea as a drawing over there 
on the blackboard, a bloodless diagram about which you and I are calmly 
deliberating whether to fill it in with the colours of real existence, or not.  
Such an account is always misleading, but not always equally misleading.  It is 
supremely misleading in cases like those we are considering.51 
 
That is, the question of God’s existence is not an abstract intellectual puzzle, but 
analogous to the orphan’s personal interest in the possibility of a living parent: 
                                                 
48 Farrer, ‘Faith and Evidence,’ 172. 
49 Ibid., 173. 
50 Ibid.   
51 Ibid. 
  
205
For the child, to think of a possible mother is to experiment in having a 
mother; to try filial existence.  The experiment takes place in the realms of 
imagination, but it is real enough to the heart.  And similarly to think of a 
possible God is to experiment in having God.  The attitude of creature to 
Creator, of doomed mortal to immortal saviour, is built into the very idea.  The 
heart goes out to God, even to a possible God; whether we should call the 
attitude ‘faith’ or something else, is a question of little consequence.52 
 
Farrer acknowledges that this imaginative ‘experiment in having God,’ even if 
it does result in a longing of the heart for the reality of God, even if it does evoke the 
‘deeply felt personal attitude’ of openness to the existence of God, it does not as yet 
justify such belief.  We may be like orphans who try filial existence, and like it—and 
yet are truly orphaned.  As Farrer says bluntly, ‘The orphan’s painful interest in the 
idea of a possible mother is no evidence that he has a mother.’53 
Thus, having laid the groundwork in ‘initial faith,’ the next step is to apply this 
faith to the evidence.  That is, after insisting on the necessity of faith to the rationalist 
evidentialist (again, whether theist or atheist), Farrer then turns to the extreme fideist 
and insists on the necessity of evidence: ‘A God could show himself through his 
creation, and it is the simple conviction of believers that God does.’54  Farrer thus 
rejects the anti-evidentialist line (associated, for example, rightly or wrongly, with 
Barthianism and so-called ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’) which says that such concerns 
are completely irrelevant or inappropriate when considering religious beliefs.  But 
even here faith is still required, for God ‘shows through the evidence more than hard-
headed calculation could build out of the evidence; and the readiness to accept that 
“more” will be faith, or the effect of faith.’55 
                                                 
52 Ibid.  As with ‘story,’ the link with ‘imagination’ is suggestive and could connect in interesting ways 
with the Farrer-inspired work of David Brown cited in note 171 of Chapter Three, and likewise with 
the similarly-cited essay by Douglas Hedley and his Living Forms of the Imagination. 
53 Ibid., 174. 
54 Ibid., 176 
55 Ibid. 
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What is distinctive and appealing about Farrer’s moderate fideism in this 
chapter is the intimacy with which he intertwines the ‘faith and evidence’ of the title: 
the attitude of faith is required to subjectively interpret the evidence which is 
objectively present and compelling.  Thus, he says that without   
the readiness of faith, the evidence of God will not be accepted, or will not 
convince.  This is not to say that faith is put in place of evidence.  What 
convinces us in not our faith, but the evidence; faith is a subjective condition 
favourable to the reception of the evidence….[T]he evidence is intrinsically 
and of itself convincing, but only under conditions which allow it to be 
appreciated.  Faith supplies the conditions.56 
 
 But if faith supplies the conditions, what is the evidence that is then 
considered?  The brief answer is ‘everything’; the more specific, distinctively 
Farrerian answer is ‘human nature.’  Perhaps bearing in mind his original 
undergraduate audience, Farrer now presents a far more conventional version of the 
cosmological argument than those analysed in Part III of Finite and Infinite.  He 
reluctantly concedes that we can indeed, in merely formal terms, argue from the world 
to God, but then unrepentantly insists—as we saw in the Chapter Three, Section 
III.B.(2), with perhaps a lingering Cartesianism—that, since we only know what 
‘existence’ is through our own being, ‘if we take ourselves out of the picture, the 
evidence vanishes.’57  However, the main point here is that Farrer not only appeals to 
some version of the cosmological argument to support our belief in the existence of 
God, but that in ‘Faith and Evidence’ the argument actually seems to do some work, 
                                                 
56 Ibid.  Eaton helpfully juxtaposes this chapter from Saving Belief with Farrer’s contribution to Hans 
Werner Bartsch (ed.), Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate (SPCK, 1953), a symposium which 
centres around Rudolph Bultmann’s famous essay, ‘The New Testament and Mythology’.  On page 
220 of his chapter, ‘An English Appreciation’ (212-223), Farrer makes an almost identical statement 
about the relation between faith and evidence as the one cited above, although in this earlier context his 
concern is not religious epistemology (belief in God) but religious history (belief in the resurrection of 
Christ).  However, this chapter still provides evidence that Farrer gave a crucial epistemic weight to 
faith eleven years before Saving Belief.  See Eaton, 158 and 169. 
57 Ibid., 180. 
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unlike in Finite and Infinite.  As stated above, and as the title of the chapter clearly 
indicates, while faith is necessary, evidence is equally essential. 
 The interactionist epistemology that Henderson says comes to the fore after 
1957 is indeed present in this lecture / chapter, but in a rather muted way.  Farrer tells 
his listeners / readers that both ‘the scandal of faith, and the force of it, lie in the fact 
that the (possible) God of our belief must be my God to each of us.  Apart from the 
implied relationship, there is no field in which the peculiar action of faith can be 
deployed.’58  So, again, faith is contextualised in a relationship with a deity with 
whom we do more than just think.  And in a summary of this chapter, Farrer 
remarkably manages to convey in just a few lines both the consistency and the 
development in his religious epistemology from 1943 to 1964, although only those 
who know his earlier work would catch the allusions:  
it is in ourselves that we sample that existence, of which we see the cause in 
God [Finite and Infinite]; and in ourselves that we sample that personality 
which furnishes the idea of God [The Freedom of the Will].  The basis of 
theology comes down to this: human existence has a superhuman creator; the 
God of my belief can only be my God, and the attitude of faith is necessary to 
any genuinely theological contemplation [Saving Belief].59 
 
Farrer’s final step, however, is to say that simply believing in God (or not) is 
not the actual issue.  And this is when the open attitude of ‘initial faith’ may finally 
develop into the devout commitment of ‘saving faith’.  It is no good to conclude that 
God exists and then pretend that it makes no difference.  Rather, we must ‘honour our 
belief in God by giving God his due; and God’s due is our life.  Indeed we shall not 
achieve full intellectual belief unless we live by it.  Who can go on believing in a 
supreme Good which he makes no motion towards embracing?’60  And the rest of the 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 179. 
59 Ibid., 182. 
60 Ibid., 183.   
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book thus presents the essential doctrines of Christian theology, according to which 
we may embrace this supreme Good which has already embraced us.61 
In terms of its ‘sort’ of fideism, ‘Faith and Evidence’ marks a certain step-
back from the Pauline epistemology articulated a few years earlier in ‘Revelation’.  
Now Farrer has replaced the divine gift of faith as a special action in the mind of the 
‘spiritual’ believer with a more general and psychological ‘initial faith,’ one that fits 
in well with Basil Mitchell’s openness to Kuhn (and family resemblance to Gadamer) 
noted in Chapter One, Sections I.C and I.D.  ‘Faith and Evidence’ is indeed very close 
to the perspective Mitchell defends in Faith and Criticism.62  However, what seems 
new to Farrer’s epistemology in this period and what still separates it from 
Mitchell’s—and even more from Hebblethewaite’s—is the strong emphasis on the 
priority and necessity of faith.  While even in Finite and Infinite one of the tasks of 
rational theology was to ‘show how far down in our common thinking the question of 
faith enters,’ in Saving Belief not only does Farrer begin with faith, but he further 
insists that without faith ‘the evidence of God will not be accepted’.  This is precisely 
                                                 
61 Several paragraphs in this section were taken or adapted from my article ‘Above, Beside, Within: 
The Anglican Theology of Austin Farrer,’ cited in note 32 above.  This article also considers the more 
doctrinal content of Saving Belief, specifically Farrer’s rather binitarian view of the Trinity, as well as 
two other texts.  Relatively little has been written on Farrer’s forays into systematic theology.  For 
some exceptions, in addition to my article and Robert Slocum’s book cited in note 24, see Brian 
Hebblethwaite, ‘The Doctrine of the Incarnation in the Thought of Austin Farrer’ in his collection The 
Incarnation: Collected Essays in Christology (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 112-125; David 
Hein, ‘Austin Farrer on Justification and Sanctification’, The Anglican Digest 49 (2007), 51–54; 
Edward Henderson, ‘Incarnation and Double Agency’, in Julius J. Lipner (ed.), Truth, Religious 
Dialogue, and Dynamic Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Brian Hebblethwaite (SCM Press, 2005), 
154-164; M. P. Wilson, ‘Austin Farrer and the Paradox of Christology’, in Scottish Journal of Theology 
35 (1982), 145-163; and ibid., ‘St John, the Trinity, and the Language of the Spirit’, in Scottish Journal 
of Theology 41 (1988), 471-483. 
62 (Clarendon Press, 1994).  See Chapter I, notes 46 and 62, the latter of which includes my 
qualification of Douglas Hedley’s comparison of Farrer and Mitchell. 
  
209
the position that Hebblethwaite fears and rejects (Chapter One, Section II.B).  Faith is 
now both the starting point and the epistemic grid without which the evidence for God 
is not convincing.  And yet, complementing the requirement of faith, Farrer still 
insists that faith needs evidence to interpret: to adapt the well-known verse, faith 
without evidence is dead.  So, in answer to the question, ‘Can reasonable minds still 
think theologically?’, the answer is ‘yes’—so long, that as, as ‘reason’ is understood 
to include the initial faith that is open to the possibility of God.  Otherwise, the answer 
seems to be ‘no’. 
If we recall the definitions of fideism canvassed in Chapter Two, it seems 
clear that what I call the ‘middle’ Farrer is now defending, not just conventional 
Anglican semi-fideism, but moderate fideism: ‘reason is not antithetically opposed to 
faith, but plays an auxiliary role in formulating or elucidating what must first be 
accepted by faith.’63    And so, on the basis of the evidence surveyed thus far in this 
dissertation, particularly this first chapter of Saving Belief, I judge that Diogenes 
Allen’s interpretation of Farrer’s epistemology is more accurate than Brian 
Hebblethwaite’s, not least because it acknowledges change and development in 
Farrer’s thought (Chapter One, Section III.B).  According to Allen, from the time of 
Saving Belief, ‘Farrer takes the believer’s faith to be essential for a proper assessment 
of the grounds of Christian theism.’64  That unquestionably seems to be the case, 
although the transition appears to have occurred several years earlier. 
In regard to Mitchell’s concern as to whether Farrer had become ‘a sort of 
fideist’ in 1967 (Chapter One, Section I.B), we have already established in both 
Chapter Three and this chapter that Farrer went through an extreme fideist phase as an 
                                                 
63 A Dictionary of Philosophy, editorial consultant, Anthony Flew (Pan Books, Second Revised 
Edition, 1983), 120. 
64 Allen, ‘Faith and the Recognition of God’s Activity, 198. 
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undergraduate in the late 1920s; that even his ‘rational theology’ of Finite and Infinite 
in 1943 would still be classified as semi-fideism by traditional Roman Catholic 
standards; that in 1957 Farrer expressed the Pauline view that only those who have the 
‘mind of Christ’ will believe the Gospel; that in 1961 he preferred peasants to 
philosophers; and finally that in 1962 he defended moderate fideism in the lectures 
which were eventually published as Saving Belief in 1964.  Thus, the real question we 
should be asking is, ‘Was Farrer ever not “a sort of fideist”?’  And, on the basis of the 
evidence surveyed so far, the only time when it seems he may have been a thorough-
going rationalist was between 1923 and 1927: that is, after going up to Oxford and 
before his ‘breakthrough’ experience in March 1927.  According to his own report, 
during this time he felt himself ‘the slave of Reason’ and was consequently miserable 
and inhibited on multiple levels.  So I would strongly dissent from Mitchell’s recent 
claim that ‘Farrer in all of his writings remains an out-and-out rationalist.’65  Rather, I 
would argue that it was only when Farrer rejected rationalism—but not reason—in 
1927 that he finally felt himself free to actually pursue the true and the good, if not the 
beautiful.  And, as he then wrote to his father, ‘You don’t know how happy I am…’    
 
III. ‘Your ideas keep expanding in my head’ 
 
Near the end of Chapter Two, I suggested that this dissertation could be 
construed along the analogy of a legal trial.  Austin Farrer has been, as it were, 
accused of fideism by a key witness, Basil Mitchell.  The two questions before the 
court are: ‘Is he guilty as charged?’ and ‘Is it even a crime?’  I am the judge presiding 
over the case.  My readers are the jury.  For the defence we have Brian 
Hebblethwaite, and for the prosecution Diogenes Allen.  I added that while this 
                                                 
65 Basil Mitchell, ‘Introduction’, in Hebblethwaite and Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in God’s 
World, 5.   
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analogy is somewhat fanciful, it clearly identifies the issues at hand and the primary 
dramatis personae according to their roles in the investigation. 
In terms of the first question before the court, I have already passed my 
verdict: granting the various definitions surveyed in Chapter Two, Farrer definitely 
exemplified several variants of fideism over the course of his career.  The question of 
whether his fideism is a ‘crime’ remains to be seen.  As I argued in Chapter Two, 
fideism as such should not automatically be considered a pejorative term or concept.  
There are various sorts and conditions of fideism, and some may be right and 
beneficial whereas others may be false and pernicious.  To establish that Farrer was 
indeed ‘a sort of fideist’ is not ipso facto to convict him of a crime against reason, or 
of intellectual irresponsibility. 
The witness, Basil Mitchell, thought that he might have observed Farrer 
committing an act of fideism in 1967, but our investigation revealed that he was in 
fact a serial fideist and that the first documented case occurred forty years earlier.  
While we have gathered sufficient evidence for our verdict, we still need to consider 
Faith and Speculation.  In terms of both Mitchell’s concern and the debate between 
Hebblethwaite and Allen, it is the primary ‘bone of contention’.  And, as Mitchell’s 
response to the manuscript of this book suggests, it is indeed possible that Farrer’s 
fideism is even more pronounced in the first chapter of this book, and thus perhaps of 
greater concern for those worried about fideism’s possible negative characteristics and 
consequences than the works we have considered thus far. 
However, before we reach Faith and Speculation itself we need to explore a 
crucial and yet almost entirely neglected influence on this final phase of Farrer’s 
religious epistemology.  And here it turns out that our legal analogy may be deeply 
problematic, for—as I already indicated in the Introduction—Diogenes Allen 
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functions in this dissertation not only as an interpreter of but also an influence on 
Austin Farrer.  So, rather than running the prosecution in this case, perhaps Allen 
should be up there in the dock as well. 
A. From New Haven to Oxford 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Section III, Diogenes Allen ended his academic 
career as Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton Theological Seminary.66  He was 
born in Kentucky in 1932, but his parents were Greeks who had been expelled from 
Turkey (along with over a million of their fellow co-nationalists) a decade earlier and 
who then immigrated to the United States.  After completing a BA in philosophy at 
the University of Kentucky, Allen began postgraduate studies at Princeton University.  
However, when he was awarded a Rhodes scholarship in 1955, he left Princeton for St 
John’s College, Oxford.  There he read Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from 
1955 to 1957, and was tutored by H. P. Grice.67  After Oxford he went to Yale 
Divinity School in New Haven, Connecticut, for the degree of Bachelor of Divinity 
and to train for ordained ministry in the Presbyterian Church.  While at Yale he 
studied with Julian Hartt, Paul Holmer, George Lindbeck, and Hans Frei—all of 
whom are associated with the so-called ‘Yale School’ of ‘postliberal’ theology.68  
After ordination and two years of parish ministry, Allen returned to Yale in 1961, but 
                                                 
66 The biographical information in this section is drawn from the published sources cited in note 110 of 
Chapter One, personal correspondence with Professor Allen, and the interview cited in the 
Acknowledgements.  
67 For Grice’s career and thought, see Barry Stroud and G. J. Warnock, ‘Grice, (Herbert) Paul (1913-
1988)’, in The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Volume 23 (Oxford University Press, 2004), 
903-904.  An influential philosopher in his own right, he also taught many leading figures, including 
Peter Strawson. 
68 For some discussion of these figures and this movement, see James Fodor, ‘Postliberal Theology’, in 
David F. Ford with Rachel Muers (eds.), The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian 
Theology since 1918, Third Edition (Blackwell, 2005), 229-248; and Paul J. DeHart, The Trial of the 
Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology (Blackwell, 2006). 
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this time to the Graduate School for a doctorate in philosophy.  He particularly 
wanted to continue his work with Hartt, but was soon strongly influenced by 
Holmer’s more Wittgensteinian approach as well. 
Although Allen spent two years in Oxford in the 1950s (while Farrer was 
Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity), he had no contact with him then; and although Allen 
returned to Yale in the Autumn of 1961 for his doctoral studies, this was just after 
Farrer had given the Nathaniel Taylor Lectures there in the Spring of that year.  Allen 
was thus first introduced to Farrer’s work by Hartt at Yale in 1959, in a year-long 
seminar that was half on Barth’s Church Dogmatics and half on Farrer’s Finite and 
Infinite.  After passing his comprehensive exams in 1962, Allen began work on his 
dissertation, on religious epistemology, which included a chapter dealing critically 
with both Finite and Infinite and John Hick’s Faith and Knowledge.69  Because 
Allen’s Rhodes scholarship still provided a third year of study, he decided to return to 
Oxford and finish the dissertation there.  Hartt suggested that he do so under Farrer’s 
supervision, and Allen agreed.  So Hartt wrote to Farrer to introduce Allen and 
propose the arrangement, and Allen went back to Oxford in 1963, during Farrer’s 
third year at Keble.70 
                                                 
69 Hick’s book was cited in note 1 above, along with Farrer’s review of it. 
70 This episode is just part of a broader and fascinating story, which I cannot explore further here, 
regarding Hartt’s role in introducing American theology to Farrer’s thought, not only through teaching  
Finite and Infinite to several generations of students at Yale and (later) at the University of Virginia, 
but also through supervising several doctoral dissertations on Farrer, writing two articles on his work, 
and inviting Farrer to Yale in 1961 for the Nathaniel Taylor lectures (Farrer’s first visit to the United 
States).  In addition to Allen, Hartt also brought Farrer to the attention of Hans Frei, Stanley Hauerwas, 
and several other prominent American theologians.  John Glasse of Vassar College, mentioned in the 
Introduction and whose article on Farrer has been cited several times, was also one of Hartt’s students.  
See Curtis, 165; DeHart, 5-6; and William M. Wilson, ‘A Different Method, a Different Case: The 
Theological Program of Julian Hartt and Austin Farrer’, The Thomist 53 (1989), 599-633.  Hauerwas 
discusses his first-hand encounter with Hartt and second-hand encounter with Farrer in his forthcoming 
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According to Allen, when he first met with Farrer they simply had a casual 
conversation about various topics, including Robinson’s Honest to God (‘which 
distressed both of us’) and Allen gave him a copy of his dissertation-in-progress, 
which contained the critique of Finite and Infinite.71  As this was the autumn of 1963, 
Farrer had already delivered the lecturers that became Saving Belief and submitted 
them to the publisher, but the book itself had not yet appeared.  In their next meeting, 
which was a proper supervision session, Farrer responded to Allen’s critique of his 
earlier work.  Farrer stated that, according to Allen’s dissertation, in Finite and 
Infinite he had confused a necessary condition for the rationality of theism for a 
sufficient condition.  That is, in Finite and Infinite Farrer had argued that theism 
required the metaphysical doctrine of substance, and yet seemed to regard this 
doctrine as not only required but adequate in itself to establish theism’s rationality.  
Rather to Allen’s surprise, Farrer fully conceded the legitimacy of this critique.  
Moreover, before the end of the session he provided Allen with proof-pages of the 
forthcoming Saving Belief and told him that this represented his current thinking.72 
However, after granting Allen’s critique of Finite and Infinite and before 
giving him the proofs of Saving Belief, Farrer subjected the constructive proposals of 
Allen’s dissertation to a very thorough analysis, which Allen says lasted over an hour.  
                                                                                                                                            
autobiography, Hannah’s Child, and Frei cites Farrer sporadically throughout his essays: see, for 
example, ‘Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal,’ in Hans W. Frei, Theology and 
Narrative: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 1993), 34-35; and ‘Appendix A: Theology in the 
University’, in Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, edited by George Hunsinger and William C. 
Placher (Yale University Press, 1992), 120.  Frei clearly liked Farrer’s description of Christ as God’s 
‘self-enacted parable’ (in Farrer, ‘Revelation’, 99), calling it an ‘eloquent phrase’ and quoting it several 
times, as in ‘The “Literal Reading” of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does It Stretch or 
Will It Break?’, Theology and Narrative, 145.  Farrer is thus undoubtedly part of the genealogy of 
postliberal / Yale School theology, and this connection deserves to be more thoroughly investigated.   
71 E-mail from Diogenes Allen to Robert MacSwain, 15 November 2004. 
72 Ibid., and e-mail from Diogenes Allen to Robert MacSwain, 17 November 2004. 
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They continued to meet regularly until the Christmas holiday, and Farrer wrote Allen 
several letters from November 1963 until May 1967, many of which deal directly with 
the developing dissertation and the ideas Farrer encountered therein (see Appendix 
B).  In February 1964, Farrer invited Allen to present the pith of his argument about 
faith and reason to the Metaphysicals.  Allen recalls that those present were Basil 
Mitchell, Helen Oppenheimer, J. L. Lucas, I. M. Crombie, and G. C. Stead.  He 
reports that while one member was resistant and ‘took it as Barthianism,’ another was 
‘quietly interested,’ and that Farrer was ‘very lively and defending the position.’73 
For, as Allen’s recollections and Farrer’s letters to him both bear witness, 
although Farrer had strong reservations about certain aspects of Allen’s dissertation, 
regarding them as overly fideistic, in general he found it immensely stimulating and 
helpful.74  Thus, in his first letter to Allen, Farrer wrote, ‘Your ideas keep expanding 
in my head’ (Letter 1), and in later note he said, ‘I do not altogether agree with you 
but I think what you say is very important’ (Letter 6).  And, as I stated in the 
Introduction, within a few years Farrer publicly confessed to ‘plundering’ Allen’s 
ideas in the first chapter of Faith and Speculation, and then went on to cite an article 
from American Philosophical Quarterly that expressed the central argument of the 
dissertation.  There is thus no doubt that Allen’s dissertation was a key influence on 
‘The Believer’s Reasons’ in Faith and Speculation.  However, this influence has not 
yet been adequately recognised or investigated.75  The most fulsome statement in print 
                                                 
73 Undated letter from Diogenes Allen to Robert MacSwain, February 2006. 
74 See Allen’s introduction to the letters from Farrer to him, now in the Bodleian, and included in 
Appendix B. 
75 As noted in the Introduction, I have only found three places where Allen’s influence on Farrer has 
even been mentioned: the introduction to Eric O. Springsted (ed.), Spirituality and Theology: Essays in 
Honor of Diogenes Allen (Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 3; Eaton, The Logic of Theism, 68 note 
126 (Eaton was one of Allen’s students and this book is based on his 1979 Ph.D. from Princeton 
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is precisely two sentences from the late Baptist theologian James McClendon, who 
wrote: ‘Already in process of change, Farrer read Allen’s completed dissertation 
while he was at Oxford and found it persuasive.  Behind both stand the influence of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose posthumous influence was felt at Allen’s Yale and 
Farrer’s Oxford during the 1960s.’76  While that is correct so far as it goes, rather 
more could be said.  
B. Motives, Evidence, and Religious Commitment 
Farrer’s letters to Allen express far more eloquently and interestingly than any 
second-hand account the impact the dissertation had on Farrer and his own process of 
thinking through, summarising, and responding to Allen’s argument, so I refer readers 
to Appendix B at this time.  Like Mitchell’s reported reaction to the unpublished 
manuscript of Faith and Speculation circa 1966, Farrer’s reaction to Allen’s 
dissertation in 1963-64 provides an invaluable contemporary window into both his 
own thinking and the general intellectual milieu of British philosophy of religion in 
this period.  With the letters clearly in mind, this segment will look very briefly at the 
dissertation itself rather than Farrer’s reaction to it.77 
                                                                                                                                            
Theological Seminary); and James Wm McClendon, Jr (with Nancey Murphy), Witness: Systematic 
Theology, Volume 3 (Abingdon Press, 2000), 278-281. 
76 McClendon, 279.  He thanks Allen in the preface (along with, among several others, Hartt and 
Hauerwas), and is obviously drawing on personal communication for those details, as am I. 
77 As it happens, the version of the dissertation actually read by Farrer—Motives, Evidence, and 
Religious Commitment (1964)—was not the final version ultimately accepted by Yale for the Ph.D.  
That final version—Faith as a Ground for Religious Beliefs (1965)—is widely accessible through the 
normal methods of accessing unpublished doctoral dissertations.  However, the original version read by 
Farrer and revised by Allen in light of his comments only existed in a handful of typescripts prepared 
for Allen’s supervisors and examiners.  Remarkably, Paul Holmer kept his copy of this original 
version, and it is now deposited in the Special Collections Department of the Henry Luce III Library of 
Princeton Theological Seminary.  I am grateful to Professor Allen and Mr Kenneth Henke of the Luce 
Library for making this document available to me. 
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Allen’s argument is simple.78  Drawing on a distinction made by Wittgenstein 
in The Blue and Brown Books between two different types of reasons, Allen proposes 
a parallel distinction between what he calls ‘motives’ and ‘rationales’.  A motive (or, 
sometimes, ‘motive-reason’) is the actual reason why someone holds a certain belief.  
It is specific to her as an individual, and Allen sometimes refers to it as ‘biographical.’  
For example, ‘I was brought up to accept this religion and not that one.’  A rationale, 
on the other hand, is a possible reason that one could provide, not to justify the belief 
itself as actually held by the person, but as a general reason why the belief might be 
true or even ought to be held.  For example, ‘God exists because only an eternal 
unmoved mover can explain the existence and nature of the universe.’  So whereas 
motives are actual and personal reasons, rationales are possible and impersonal.79  
Allen sometimes refers to rationales as seeking to provide ‘a general case,’ that is, one 
that makes ‘no reference to any specific believers.’80 
In regard to religious beliefs, and specifically in regard to Christianity, Allen 
holds that most people’s motive for belief is faith, aroused biographically.  In some 
rare instances, the actual reason someone believes might indeed be the cosmological 
or some other argument, in which case her motive-reason is in fact an argument, but 
                                                 
78 In the following pages, I will cite from the unpublished manuscript of Motives, Evidence, and 
Religious Commitment, since this is the version read and commented upon by Farrer.  However, as 
indicated previously, in Faith and Speculation Farrer not only mentions Allen in the preface, but also 
cites an article in which Allen presented the basic argument of the dissertation: ‘Motives, Rationales, 
and Religious Beliefs’, American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1966), 111-127.  Allen sent him an 
offprint of the article, and so Farrer read it as well before publishing Faith and Speculation (see Letter 
6 in Appendix B).  Since this article is more accessible than the manuscript, I will, when possible, 
provide references to parallel passages from the article in brackets after the primary citations from the 
dissertation. 
79 Allen, Motives, Evidence, and Religious Commitment, 20-21 [111-112].  He refers to Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’ 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), 14. 
80 Allen, 51 (including note 1 on that page). 
  
218
this is neither normal nor necessary.  Crucial to Allen’s position is the claim that not 
only is it actually the case that most people’s religious beliefs are based on faith 
(which is fairly uncontroversial), but also that this situation is perfectly rationally 
acceptable.  As he puts it, such faith-based ‘biographical’ reasons are ‘a proper basis 
for the affirmation of Christian beliefs.  The motives one has for one’s adherence to 
religious beliefs are not grounds which warrant other kinds of assertions, but they are 
a basis for the assertion of religious beliefs.  To believe on the basis of one’s motives 
is not to act arbitrarily, blindly, or without any reason.’81   
Furthermore, Allen makes the stronger claim that to insist that religious beliefs 
must be based on arguments is to distort their true character: ‘To seek to give 
religious beliefs an evidential basis results in turning them into something else.  In 
particular, it makes religious beliefs appear to be like other kinds of metaphysical 
assertions.’82  This is another crucial distinction.  Metaphysical beliefs (which Allen 
does not reject on principle) are based on reasoning that observes aspects of the 
cosmos and then makes appropriate / valid or inappropriate / invalid inferences about 
realities beyond empirical investigation.  Religious beliefs, on the other hand, while 
they may well imply or even entail certain metaphysical commitments, are not based 
on such reasoning.  Rather, they arise in response to personal confrontation with a 
message about God—‘the gospel’—which one encounters either through growing up 
in the Christian community, or reading the Bible, or hearing a street preacher, etc.83  
Even if a particular metaphysical belief is verbally identical to a particular religious 
belief—for example, ‘God created the world’—they are in fact different beliefs 
because they are held on different grounds and thus are related differently to other 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 2 [111]. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., 3 [112-113].  The first two examples are Allen’s, but he clearly does not limit himself to them. 
  
219
beliefs held by the person.  To insist that the religious belief ‘God created the world’ 
must be justified by argument is to turn it from a religious belief to a metaphysical 
one, and hence into a different belief.84 
Although Allen maintains that to grow up within the Christian community is 
itself a valid motive-reason to hold Christian beliefs (assuming, as we shall see in a 
moment, that one has not encountered insurmountable objections to these beliefs), in 
fact there is more to faith on his account than mere biographical considerations.  
According to Allen: 
The grounds [of religious belief] are that a man has come to have faith in 
response to the witness of the Christian community and in the condition of 
faith he finds his soul nourished.  By praying, by reading the Scriptures, by 
fellowship with other Christians, he finds his life is beginning to conform to 
what Paul described as the new life.  This nourishment is his assurance and 
ground for the condition of faith in which he finds himself; and the very 
response of faith itself (which includes receiving nourishment) is a ground for 
faith.85 
 
Thus, having faith is not merely assenting to a particular set of groundless beliefs just 
because one was taught them as a child, but rather to actively receive what Allen calls 
‘nourishment’ from them—nourishment which itself provides at least part of the 
grounds on which they are rationally held.  Presumably, then, someone who received 
no such ‘nourishment’ from her religious beliefs, or who once received it but ceased 
to do so, or concluded they such nourishment was a psychological illusion or 
otherwise false, might on that very basis cease to hold them.86 
                                                 
84 See ibid., 110-117, and Chapter Seven: ‘Religious Cosmological Beliefs’ (118-142).  This claim is 
interestingly similar to Lindbeck’s well-known assertion that religious beliefs cannot be reduced to 
bald propositions, but that their meaning is part of a cultural-linguistic framework that must be learned. 
85 Ibid., 25 [113]. 
86 This seems to be the case with Michael Goulder.  One of Farrer’s students who became an eminent 
New Testament scholar and a priest in the Church of England, Goulder eventually lost his faith and left 
the priesthood for precisely these reasons: see ‘The Fram Abandoned’, in Michael Goulder and John 
Hick, Why Believe in God? (SCM Press, 1983), 1-30—which also contains much of interest on Farrer. 
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What then of ‘rationales’?  Do they play any role at all in this scheme?  Yes, 
for religious believers often encounter rational objections to their belief, objections 
which arise either internally or externally, which cause them to doubt or perhaps even 
to abandon their faith—nourishment or no nourishment.  Allen explicitly mentions the 
critiques of religion provided by Ludwig Feuerbach, Sigmund Freud, D. F. Strauss, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, and Antony Flew, and we could of course add Karl Marx, 
Bernard Russell, J. L. Mackie, Richard Dawkins, and many others.  Although Allen 
defends a position in which religious beliefs are ‘innocent until proven guilty,’ he 
fully acknowledges that sometimes they do need to be defended.  Thus, Allen accepts 
that 
when actual doubts arise and rationales such as arguments, distinctions, and 
counter evidence are given to rebut challenges, rationales may be employed, 
be useful, and yet not become a part of the motive-reason or serve as the 
foundation of [the] motive-reason.  They may exist alongside [the] motive-
reason as a different kind of reason for belief.  They could be cited as a reason 
for continuing to believe in the face of a challenge and yet not be the reason 
one believes.87 
 
Rationales may thus be a necessary component of the life of faith, answering 
accusations and dealing with doubt.  However, as with metaphysical beliefs, Allen 
insists that rationales still need not—and perhaps even should not—become the 
believer’s actual motive-reason: she should still believe because of the nourishment 
she has actually received from the gospel, not because of an impersonal, objective 
argument, or ‘general case.’ 
 Allen develops this perspective in considerably more detail, but this brief 
summary provides the basic outline of his positive thesis.88  However, in the course of 
presenting his own position, he also critiques a number of other contemporary 
                                                 
87 Ibid., 27 [114]. 
88 An essential chapter that explains his distinctive view of faith is Chapter 6: ‘The Nature of Religious 
Commitment and Affirmations’ (90-117). 
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philosophers, including (as indicated earlier) Austin Farrer.  According to Allen, in 
Finite and Infinite Farrer ‘believes that evidence or a general case for a crucial part of 
the Christian religion must be given.’89  In particular, as we have seen in our own 
discussion of Farrer’s defence of the metaphysical doctrine of substance in Finite and 
Infinite (Chapter Three, Section III.B), Farrer is convinced that ‘Christianity must 
conceive of the constituents of the world as having some connections among 
themselves.  Items must be conceived as real entities.  He therefore sets for himself 
the task of showing that there are connections amongst things in the world and 
degrees of reality amongst finite things.’90  Thus, for Farrer, ‘the view of God 
envisioned in Christianity entails a belief in substances and evidence for the existence 
of substances can be found only from an examination of the constituents of the 
universe.  A case which establishes the existence of substances is necessary for the 
belief that God is creator.’91  However, Allen concludes that ‘Farrer’s position is thus 
contrary to my own.  I have maintained that religious beliefs may be asserted on the 
basis of the motive-reason of faith without evidence to certify or to recommend the 
beliefs.  His view is that an essential part of it cannot be based on faith but must be 
based on evidence.’92 
 Allen proceeds to argue against Farrer’s position here—what I identified in 
Chapter Three as ‘the residual rationalism lurking at the core of Finite and Infinite’—
by advancing three claims.  The first was noted earlier in the account of Farrer and 
Allen’s first supervision session.  Allen argues that Farrer has, at best, mistaken a 
necessary condition for the rationality of Christian theism for a sufficient one (56-60).  
                                                 
89 Ibid., 51. 
90 Ibid., 54. 
91 Ibid., 55. 
92 Ibid.  As a point of clarification, I think Allen has overly ‘Christianised’ Farrer’s position in this text.  
Finite and Infinite is a ‘philosophical essay,’ not a work of Christian theology. 
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The second claim is to go a step further and deny that Christianity is, in fact, 
‘committed to saying that it can be shown or that it must be shown that its view of the 
constituents of the universe are as it claims them to be’ (60-71).93  That is, whether or 
not substances exist, and whether or not they are entailed by Christianity, Allen thinks 
that philosophically establishing a specific doctrine of substance is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the rationality of Christian theism.  Hence, Allen denies Farrer’s 
claim that ‘there are some metaphysical questions which must be settled if we are to 
vindicate the significance of any theological statements whatever of the traditional 
type.’94  Further on in the dissertation, Allen illustrates his counter-claim by 
contrasting Farrer’s insistence that Christianity is committed to a specific 
metaphysical doctrine of substance with what Allen takes to be the actual situation.  
He observes that when Christians affirm that God is the Creator they typically make 
statements ‘which speak of him as creator of the sun, moon, light, animals, plants, and 
men.  The objects that are said to have been created are objects of our daily life.  [This 
affirmation] does not speak of substances.’95  While not denying that ‘substance’ can 
be a meaningful, useful, and even appropriate term when used informally in Christian 
discourse, and while not denying that substances do in fact exist, Allen nevertheless 
argues that  
if it is meant that Christianity is committed to a belief in substances in the 
sense that the Christian belief in God as creator entails: (1) that its view of 
substance must cohere with philosophical and scientific views of substance 
and matter, and (2) that it must be revised or re-stated to cohere with new 
developments in philosophy and science, then I deny that Christianity is 
committed to belief in substances.96 
 
                                                 
93 Citation from page 61. 
94 Farrer, Finite and Infinite (Dacre Press, 1943), v. 
95 Allen, 125. 
96 Ibid., 125-126. 
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Third and finally, Allen also denies Farrer’s claim that the metaphysical doctrine of 
substance is required to furnish us with our idea of God (71-72).  In short, Allen’s 
threefold critique of Finite and Infinite attempts to show that Farrer was wrong to 
hold that the successful execution of a metaphysical programme is necessary for the 
rational defence of (Christian) theism.  The residual rationalism of Finite and Infinite 
must be exorcised.97 
 
IV. The Believer’s Reasons: Farrer’s Version     
Given the content of Farrer’s letters to Allen between November 1963 and 
May 1967, and given that he explicitly acknowledges Allen in the preface and first 
chapter of Faith and Speculation, it is natural to assume that Farrer’s very next work 
after reading Allen’s dissertation would bear the clear marks of its influence, and thus 
that—having considered Allen’s various arguments—we could now move straight 
from the ‘middle’ Farrer’s pre-Allen articulation of ‘Faith and Evidence’ to the ‘late’ 
                                                 
97 For an article on the relation between Christian theology and metaphysics that draws on this 
dissertation and makes a similar general argument, but which does not focus on the critique of Farrer, 
see Diogenes Allen, ‘Christianity’s Stake in Metaphysics’, Theology Today 24 (1967), 185-202.  Allen 
later published a revised version of his dissertation, which incorporated the substance of both this 
article and the one mentioned in note 78, as The Reasonableness of Faith: A Philosophical Essay on 
the Grounds for Religious Beliefs (Corpus Books, 1968).  Ann Loades’s personal copy was given to her 
by Allen, who wrote on the inside: ‘Ann, this is what kicked off Faith and Speculation.  I revised my 
text before publication on the basis of Farrer’s criticisms.  He never saw this—its final form.’  But from 
the preceding pages, it is obvious that, completely independently of the connection with Farrer, in this 
dissertation and book Allen put forward an important approach to religious epistemology, one that 
bears a striking resemblance to so-called ‘Reformed Epistemology,’ but which was formulated about 
twenty years before the seminal work of Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff.  However, perhaps 
because it was ahead of its time, Allen’s work in this area has been mostly over-looked.  Interestingly, 
Kai Nielsen gave The Reasonableness of Faith a largely positive review: see Theology Today 26 
(1969), 344-346.  The review begins, ‘This significant book deserves careful critical examination by 
both theologians and philosophers.’  I will briefly return to Allen’s thesis, Reformed Epistemology, and 
Kai Nielson in Chapter Five. 
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Farrer’s post-Allen discussion of ‘The Believer’s Reasons.’  This, however, is not the 
case.  In 1966, between his initial encounter with Allen in 1963 and the publication of 
Faith and Speculation in 1967, Farrer released a small book titled A Science of 
God?98  And this text—frustratingly for those seeking a tidy linear progression in 
Farrer’s thought—expresses a view of faith and reason that, despite its typically 
Farrerian elegance, is actually somewhat more rationalistic and empirical in nature 
than even the moderate fideist perspective of Saving Belief. 
Just as the first chapter of Saving Belief seemed to mark a step-back from the 
rather extreme ‘mind of Christ’ view of the earlier essay ‘Revelation,’ so in A Science 
of God? Farrer seemed to return—if only briefly—to a more conventional apologetic 
stance regarding the rational grounds of theistic belief than the view he articulated in 
‘Faith and Evidence.’  Once again we see the fluidity of his thought on these matters.  
While there is no question of demonstrating God’s existence, and while the case does 
indeed become more nuanced and subtle as it goes along, with certain fideistic motifs 
and themes gradually making an appearance, A Science of God? still seems to have 
more in common with the Farrer of Finite and Infinite than with the later texts we 
have considered so far in this chapter: i.e., it is more semi-fideist or soft rationalist in 
character.  It was, perhaps, the title uppermost in Basil Mitchell’s mind when he wrote 
that he was disappointed in Faith and Speculation precisely because it failed to 
present ‘an improved version of the sort of rational theology that Farrer had first 
developed in Finite and Infinite and revised and corrected in various of his occasional 
writings.’99  Although the entire book is germane to the focus of this dissertation, and 
                                                 
98 Austin Farrer, A Science of God? (Geoffrey Bles, 1966).  This book was republished by SPCK in 
2009, with a new foreword by Margaret Yee. 
99 Basil Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ in Eaton and Loades (eds.), For 
God and Clarity, 177. 
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although an exhaustive survey of Farrer’s epistemological development would thus 
need to consider it in more detail, in the interests of space I am forced to acknowledge 
its complicating and somewhat anomalous character in this phase of Farrer’s life and 
then move to the dénouement.100 
In preparing readers for the discussion of Finite and Infinite, I spent ten pages 
looking at the background of that text in Continental Reformed theology, Logical 
Positivism, and Thomism (Chapter Three, Section III.A).  When it comes to Faith and 
Speculation, Charles Conti argues that the primary influence on Farrer at this point 
was the process theology of Charles Hartshorne, mediated via John Glasse of Vassar 
College, New York.  Consideration of these process themes and sources thus occupies 
an important part of Conti’s book, which (rather oddly) does not consider Allen at 
all.101  As I indicated in my Introduction, Conti’s thesis is controversial among Farrer 
scholars.  It is also focused primarily on Farrer’s metaphysics and in particular on his 
metaphysics of God.  However, it is unnecessary for me to engage explicitly with 
Conti on this topic, if only because of the complementary epistemological interests of 
                                                 
100 The book was not well-received initially, and in particular Dorothy Emmet and two of her 
‘Epiphany Philosopher’ colleagues launched a surprisingly hostile attack on it: see Dorothy Emmet, 
Ted Bastin, and Margaret Masterman, Review Discussion of Austin Farrer’s A Science of God?, in 
Theoria to Theory 1 (1966), 55-71, with Farrer’s somewhat exasperated reply on 72-75.  Another 
critical review, by W. S. Boycott, may be found in Theology LXIX (1966), 184-185.  As with Saving 
Belief, Edward Henderson does not consider A Science of God? in his survey of Farrer’s religious 
epistemology.  For contemporary evaluations, see Margaret Yee’s foreword in the 2009 edition (4-7) 
and my forthcoming review in Anglican Theological Review.  But in light of A Science of God?’s 
rather more rationalistic position, it should be clear that describing the ‘late’ Farrer as a fideist 
simpliciter is too simplistic.  Another important text that I cannot discuss further here is Farrer’s essay 
‘The Christian Apologist’, in Jocelyn Gibb (ed.), Light on C. S. Lewis (Geoffrey Bles, 1965), 23-43, 
which sheds interesting light not only on Farrer’s view of Lewis but on his own assessment of the role 
of reasoned argument in the life of faith.  For a critique of this essay, see John T. Stahl, ‘Austin Farrer 
on C. S. Lewis as “The Christian Apologist”’, in Christian Scholars’ Review 4 (1975), 231-237. 
101 See Charles Conti, Metaphysical Personalism: An Analysis of Austin Farrer’s Theistic Metaphysics 
(Clarendon Press, 1995).  ‘Oddly,’ because Conti had actually read Farrer’s letters to Allen.  
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this dissertation.  Nevertheless, as also indicated in my Introduction, it is still 
interesting to observe that Farrer himself specifies precisely which chapters Glasse 
influenced—only three out of twelve—and yet also mentions Allen in regard the first 
chapter.  Thus, as cited previously, in the preface Farrer writes:  
Among the many philosophical friends who have given me food for thought I 
will mention Dr Diogenes Allen of Princeton, and Professor John Glasse of 
Vassar.  The latter persuaded me to do the rethinking of scholastic positions 
which runs through my seventh, eighth, and ninth chapters [‘The Theology of 
Will,’ ‘Justifiable Analogy,’ and ‘First Cause’]; the former I have plundered in 
my first [‘The Believer’s Reasons’].102 
 
Farrer’s self-described ‘plundering’ of Allen in this chapter included both the 
general ideas of the dissertation itself and their published expression in the American 
Philosophical Quarterly article that Farrer cites on page 10.103  This dependence is 
what Farrer was referring to when he wrote to Allen on 12 May 1967, stating with his 
typical self-depreciating wit: ‘The only tolerable part of the book, as you will see, is 
the part I stole from you.  I have made a few grudging acknowledgements’ (Letter 8).  
On the basis of this evidence, both published and unpublished, I thus argue that the 
crucial influence on ‘The Believer’s Reasons,’ at least, was not the metaphysical 
process theology identified by Conti, but rather Allen’s epistemological and 
somewhat anti-metaphysical dissertation discussed in Section III above.  That is the 
long-neglected background necessary to understand the precise source of Farrer’s 
thinking—and possible ‘sort of’ fideism—in this chapter. 
And, if one then turns to Chapter I of Faith and Speculation with Allen’s 
dissertation and article in mind, Farrer’s dependence on Allen is immediately obvious, 
up to and including the specific terms and examples employed.  He begins by 
                                                 
102 Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (A. & C. Black, 1967), 
vi. 
103 See note 19 of my Introduction and note 78 above. 
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admitting that ‘the contemporary mind sees something almost comic in the old 
rational theology.’  Why?  Because we now ‘find it absurd that anyone should pretend 
to discount both the fact and the form of religious belief, while he rakes the universe 
for signs of a First Cause.’104  It is thus with this pre-established ‘fact and form’ that 
we must begin, with actual religion, not with philosophical abstraction.  Striking what 
in retrospect seems like a presciently ‘postmodern’ note, with a keen sensitivity to 
culture and context and interpretation, Farrer asks: 
How could we possibly escape from the cultural history of our race?  How 
experience the theistic suggestiveness of the world, as we might have done if 
there had never been theology?  How experiment with an un-interpreted 
environment, to see whether it prompts the formation of a brand-new 
interpretive concept, the concept—dear me, yes!—the concept of God?  
Whatever the rational theologian may pretend to do, he will in fact be 
considering a question posed to him by religious belief; and he may as well be 
above-board about it.105 
 
Although this was published as early as 1967, Farrer has here already accepted the 
‘rationality of tradition’ and the ‘hermeneutics of finitude’. 
 However, Farrer then states that while he wishes to avoid a ‘neutral approach’ 
that ignores the actual context of actual religious beliefs, he is still concerned with a 
properly philosophical investigation of the grounds for these beliefs.  That is, he is not 
advocating a contemporary ‘religious studies’ approach that focuses sociologically, 
anthropologically, linguistically, and historically on context and content but which 
ignores truth-claims.  No, ‘The philosopher’s concern is whether any theology is true.  
But if it is true, it will not surely be true by accident; it will be true because the 
grounds or motives for such belief have been sound.  So it is the actual motives or 
grounds for religious believing which demand the philosopher’s attention.’106  This 
                                                 
104 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 1. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
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strategy and terminology—e.g., actual religion and actual motives—is drawn directly 
from Allen’s work.  But Farrer then proceeds to interrogate it further, and he now 
divides his voice into a running dialogue between a sceptical ‘philosopher’ and a non-
philosophical ‘believer’ that occupies the remainder of the chapter.107 
This is all well and good, the philosopher says, but what about the evidence?  
We cannot just believe whatever we want: wishful thinking and ‘ascertained fact’ are 
two different things.  Religious belief must thus be based on a respectable ‘cognitive 
activity’ that interprets reality accurately, or at least plausibly.108  But the problem 
with this proposal, counters the believer, is that we typically do not, in fact, offer any 
such ‘rational’ account—even to ourselves—of how we have come to hold our 
religious beliefs.  Such philosophical justifications are, at best, only post factum 
constructions that may or may not relate to the propositional content of our religious 
life.  And so in answer to the question, ‘How did religion get into our heads?’, the 
obvious answer is that we were taught it.109  But, again, the philosopher feels bound to 
reply, citing personal history or corporate tradition does not address the question of 
‘objective truth’.  With Allen’s various distinctions and arguments clearly in view, 
Farrer writes (in the voice of the philosopher) that if such a biographical explanation 
‘claims to express truth or to determine right, the question is not whence it came, but 
why we should accept it; and the second question cannot be answered by merely 
answering the first.’110  Here is Farrer’s lingering worry about Allen’s position. 
                                                 
107 Readers may recall that when Basil Mitchell read this text in manuscript he found himself ‘in 
complete agreement with the protestations of the philosopher in the little dialogues with the believer 
that occur throughout the chapter’ (see Chapter One, Section I.B). 
108 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 2.     
109 Ibid., 2-3. 
110 Ibid., 4 (emphasis added). 
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Farrer continues this dialogue over the next several pages, using Allen’s work 
to form the substance of the believer’s voice and his own concerns to form the 
substance of the philosopher’s (see Letters 2 and 4 in Appendix B for Farrer’s direct 
summaries of and reactions to Allen’s dissertation).  Thus, drawing explicitly from 
Allen, but also echoing his own earlier and thus independent arguments in Saving 
Belief, Farrer writes that he will take as ‘our typical believer a Christian brought up in 
the simple acceptance of his faith, grown up into an awareness of many reasons taken 
to discredit belief, but still persistent in believing.’111  The dependence on Allen 
reaches a crescendo on page 10, and this is indeed the page on which Farrer finally 
cites Allen’s ‘Motives, Rationales, and Religious Beliefs’ from American 
Philosophical Quarterly and so reveals the source of much that has come before.  
Here Farrer brings in Allen’s distinctive epistemic focus on the saving message of the 
(or at least a) ‘gospel’ and consequent ‘nourishment’ (which Farrer re-brands as 
‘blessing’).  Thus, the believer says to the philosopher: 
the Christian faith was preached to me as a gospel of salvation.  Perhaps—
though I do not know—the creedal propositions it contains might be verified 
along various other and more scientific lines, but I cannot claim to have tried 
any line but one—the line directly suggested by the claim of the gospel to be a 
gospel.  It offers to me the blessing of a union of will with the primal Will.  I 
follow the way of union which it prescribes and I find that the blessing 
blesses….The gospel offers God to me as good, not simply as fact.  In 
embracing the good I am convinced of the fact.112 
 
In other words, according to this perspective, when it comes to justifying our 
religious beliefs, natural theology or philosophical arguments are at least unnecessary, 
for the ‘nourishment’ or ‘blessing’ conveyed by ‘embracing’ the ‘good’ of the gospel 
                                                 
111 Ibid., 8. 
112 Ibid, 10.  It is precisely at the end of this sentence that Farrer cites Allen’s article.  I cannot pursue 
this comparison further, but it seems to me that Farrer’s claim here is equivalent to Eleonore Stump’s 
interpretation of Aquinas on faith.  See her ‘Aquinas on Faith and Goodness,’ in Scott MacDonald 
(ed.), Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology 
(Cornell University Press, 1991), 179-207. 
  
230
creates personal conviction as well as enhanced well-being.  But the philosopher 
insists in turn that this response, however moving, remains epistemologically 
inadequate and so asks the believer, with just a touch of sarcasm: ‘perhaps you could 
examine your thoughts, and tell me your reasons for holding, not that the faith-attitude 
is a blessing, but that the object of faith is an existent being.’113  Each position is 
allowed to express itself further, but then towards the end of the chapter Farrer finally 
concludes the dialogue and states that he himself will intervene to ‘strike the balance 
of the debate.’114   
Writing now in his own voice, he says, ‘The philosophical inquiry into the 
grounds for belief in God is neither an examination of the reasons [in the sense of 
Allen’s ‘motive-reasons’] which lead the believer into commitment, nor is it an 
independent investigation unrelated to those reasons.’115  That is, while it is true that 
religious belief does not rest—and does not need to rest—on philosophical arguments, 
metaphysical or otherwise, philosophy may still play a role within the life of faith: 
faith and philosophy are not two entirely disconnected enterprises.  In responding to 
the gospel and receiving its blessings, the believer assumes she is truly in contact with 
God (an actual infinite eternal transcendent personal reality external to the believer).  
Given the resultant blessings, the believer is perfectly entitled to hold this assumption; 
and, given its conceptual oddness, the philosopher is perfectly entitled to question it.  
Philosophy (and here Farrer undoubtedly intends then-contemporary academic Anglo-
American philosophy) does have some rights as an autonomous intellectual activity 
                                                 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 12. 
115 Ibid.  This statement seems somewhat at odds with Farrer’s earlier claim that ‘it is the actual 
motives or grounds for religious believing which demand the philosopher’s attention’ (1).  This slight 
discrepancy highlights the exegetical challenge of teasing out from this chapter exactly what position 
Farrer was intending to assert as his own. 
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which all thinking people at least need to acknowledge.  But if the believer is also a 
philosopher then this dialogue must take place within as well as without.  In other 
words, to be complete, the dialogue between the non-philosophical believer and the 
sceptical philosopher needs yet a third character: namely, the philosophical believer, 
or the believing philosopher.  Farrer’s concluding intervention in the dialogue is 
clearly meant to add the voice of this third character.   
Farrer claims that the believer’s belief ‘is not shown to be groundless by the 
mere fact that he has never questioned his general assumption.’  So philosophy is 
indeed unnecessary, and religious belief may be properly grounded by what Allen 
calls ‘biographical’ considerations or ‘motive-reasons’.  The believer does not require 
a rationalistic foundation of natural theology to justify her beliefs.116  On the other 
hand, Farrer maintains that ‘what is not groundless may still be ill-grounded; and 
when philosophical criticism develops it will torture every assumption it has the 
ability to isolate or define.’ 117   So philosophy still at least has the right—and perhaps, 
in some minds, the duty—to ask all the difficult and probing questions heard in the 
preceding dialogue.  Thus, while religious belief does not need to go to philosophy for 
its justification, on the other hand it does not seem to be the case that religion is either 
‘invulnerable’ or that philosophy is ‘innocuous’ (see Basil Mitchell’s critique of 
‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ in Neutrality and Commitment in Chapter One, Section 
I.C).  So Farrerian fideism, it seems, is not identical with the standard interpretation of 
so-called Wittgensteinian fideism.    
However, Farrer then appears to go one step further.  Religious belief is 
innocent until proven guilty; in embracing its good the believer is convinced of its 
                                                 
116 As will be discussed further in Chapter Five, this claim is equivalent to the classic formulation of 
the ‘Reformed Epistemology’ of Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. 
117 Both quotations in this paragraph from Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 12. 
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fact; and philosophy still has the right to criticise all it wants—yet, ‘Meanwhile the 
believer, convinced of the reality of what he handles, is entitled to the confidence that 
his gold will never be proved dross by logical acid.’118  This is a troublingly 
ambiguous sentence, both in itself and in terms of where it comes in the argument as a 
whole.  Here it does indeed sound as though the ‘gold’ of religion is now resolutely 
(and rightly?) invulnerable to the strangely innocuous ‘acid’ of logical analysis.  The 
believer is entitled to her confidence—but for how long, and under what adverse 
conditions?  Can the acid of reason never prove that religion is mere dross? 
Yet again, Farrer is compelled to qualify the implications of his position, and 
now strikes a more conventionally rationalistic note, balancing out the ambiguously 
open-ended sentence above.  He says that the position he has been articulating  
indicates a starting-point for the philosopher who approaches the theological 
question.  His task is to see whether the believer’s experience of salvation or 
fulfilment in his embracing of an apparent divine Good can intelligibly justify 
his assumption that the blessings which accrue are the work of actual deity.  
But to mark the starting-point is not to limit the field of inquiry.  The 
philosopher who attempts the question from the angle we have suggested will 
be excused none of the topics belonging to traditional discussion.119  
 
And a bit further he amplifies this rationalistic note even more: 
 
Such formulas let us off nothing, philosophically speaking….If the God whose 
name comes into our simple questions is meant as a creative omnipotence, it 
has to be shown that the universe of finites allows of being interpreted as his 
creation, and so forth.  Every one of the old problems remains.  Except, you 
may say, the proof of God from the world.  At least we are rid of that.  Are 
we?  I do not think so.  Can you argue that the finites allow of being read as 
creations of the Infinite, without arguing that they ask to be read as 
such?....And so we shall be obliged to examine the case for the demonstration 
a contingentia mundi, after all.120 
 
                                                 
118 Ibid., 12-13. 
119 Ibid., 13 (emphasis added). 
120 Ibid. (emphasis in the original).  Farrer takes up this argument further on in Faith and Speculation:  
for exposition and analysis, see F. Michael McLain, ‘Austin Farrer’s Revision of the Cosmological 
Argument,’ in The Downside Review 88 (1970), 270-279.  Farrer is clearly using the terms ‘proof’ and 
‘demonstration’ loosely rather than formally: he simply means a plausible philosophical argument. 
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But then, just as Basil Mitchell and Brian Hebblethwaite perhaps begin to feel 
that Farrer has rejoined their ranks and finally turned his back on fideism, he 
immediately continues: ‘We may let ourselves off the claim that the force of the proof 
is evident to an unbelieving mind.  We can say if we like that the existential 
insufficiency of the finites is imperceptible apart from awareness of the Infinite, and 
that such an awareness comes through faith.’  And this claim dashes their hopes, for 
only the believing mind, through faith, can truly see and feel the force of theistic 
argument.  However, and crucially, Farrer then concedes: ‘What we cannot (I suspect) 
say is that the finites could as well have been uncreated, for anything we can ever see 
in them; but that they just do happen to be created by God, for faith assures us of 
it.’121  And with this caveat, we have now at long last reached the furthest edge of 
Farrerian fideism, the point at which the mature Farrer draws the boundary between 
faith and reason, beyond which he is unwilling to go.  Faith can—and even must—
allow us to see realities as they really are (i.e., finite, contingent, created), but it 
cannot impose on them a character they apparently lack (even to ‘the eyes of faith’).  
If that character is either indiscernible or absent, then so is God.   
Here, although he typically never mentions his name, Farrer is alluding to the 
contrary position of John Hick in the first edition of Faith and Knowledge: A Modern 
Introduction to the Problem of Religious Knowledge (cited in note 1 of this chapter), 
which states—in Diogenes Allen’s summary—that ‘theism is an interpretation which 
phenomena are capable of being given, but that an atheistic or naturalistic 
interpretation is equally possible.’122  That is, in Hick’s view the theistic interpretation 
does not ask to be ‘read off’ the character of finite existence (however subtly and non-
demonstratively), but rather allows itself to be ‘read in’ (along with the completely 
                                                 
121 Ibid., 13-14.  
122 Allen, Motives, Evidence, and Religious Commitment, 63 (emphasis added). 
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contradictory interpretation of atheism).  As I indicated in note 1 of this chapter, the 
only philosophical book that Farrer reviewed between 1948 and 1958 was this text, in 
Journal of Theological Studies New Series IX (1958), 410.  Farrer was rather 
dismissive of Hick’s constructive proposals (‘it will be surprising if any critical 
philosopher finds satisfaction on these topics in what Professor Hick has written’), but 
he was apparently moved to reconsider Hick’s position while reading Allen’s 
dissertation, which compares and contrasts Faith and Knowledge with Finite and 
Infinite, and which seems to be more sympathetic to the former than the latter.  
Indeed, Allen explicitly states that he personally does not believe ‘that we must be 
able to “read off” the cosmological idea; rather, it seems to be that all that is necessary 
is that we be able to “read in” the idea.’123  Hence the paragraph in Farrer’s Letter 2 
(written on 2 April 1964) which begins, ‘I think that a long and very subtle discussion 
would be needed to settle the “read in or read off?” issue,’ and then offers Allen a 
‘compromise’—i.e., between Hick’s Faith and Knowledge and Farrer’s own Finite 
and Infinite—in which ‘those who do “read off” are making an incipient move 
towards religious belief, and that the believer really does and can “read off”, just as he 
really does and can interpret his own standing in relation to God’. 
This letter to Allen basically recapitulates Farrer’s position in ‘Faith and 
Evidence’ from Saving Belief (published the same year): the evidence for God is 
objectively there, and so the theistic reading of the universe can be rightly ‘read off’ 
rather than merely ‘read in’—but only by one who has faith.  While Farrer admits—
and indeed, has always admitted—that atheism is a rational position and thus that the 
naturalistic interpretation is indeed possible, he balks at the idea that these readings 
are both equally justified by the evidence.  Recall his comments from ‘Poetic Truth’ 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 61 
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against those such as Russell and Ayer: although they cannot be conclusively defeated 
on the formal level, still the mind ‘rises from the knowledge of creatures to the 
knowledge of their creator,’ but only ‘from the appreciation of things which we have 
when we love them and fill our minds and senses with them, and feel something of 
the silent force and great mystery of their existence.’124  This, again, is the line beyond 
which Farrer will not go.  Faith and Speculation might thus be considered, in part, as 
his later and more considered ‘long and very subtle’ response to Hick’s book, spurred 
on by Allen’s critique.125 
In short, it is essential to see that even the ‘late’ post-Allen Farrer still wants to 
maintain that the theistic interpretation of finite existence is somehow there, actually 
inherent in and even suggested by the very character of the finites themselves.  It is 
not simply projected on to a purely neutral, perfectly ambiguous world that could just 
as well be read atheistically.  The moderate fideistic position which Farrer defended in 
Saving Belief and which perhaps intensified under Allen’s influence in Faith and 
Speculation still has limits, and it does not ever fully shift into extreme fideism.  It 
still is an exercise in ‘rational theology’.  It does, however, provide what both Farrer 
and Allen now regarded as the correct starting point from which to examine such 
problems.  That is, we must begin with the perspective of faith and not expect to work 
our way there by reason alone.  The chapter thus concludes as follows:  
                                                 
124 ‘Poetic Truth’, in Austin Farrer, Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by 
Charles C. Conti (SPCK, 1972), 37-38.   
125 Interestingly, Farrer was one of the examiners of Hick’s 1951 Oxford doctoral dissertation, on 
which this first edition of Faith and Knowledge was based.  Hick reports that Farrer was highly critical 
of his view of faith then, as well!  The other examiner was I. M. Crombie, and (quoting directly from 
his diary) Hick reports: ‘I had a very sticky time at the viva.  Farrer clearly strongly disagreed with my 
theory of faith, whilst Crombie also disagreed but was more friendly disposed….I did very badly in 
answering.  I got confused and made a poor showing.’  Hick thought that he had failed, and so was 
greatly relived to discover a week later that Farrer and Crombie ‘had reported favourably to the Lit. 
Hum. Board’.  See John Hick, An Autobiography (Oneworld Publications, 2002), 72-73. 
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The importance of a proper distinction between saving faith and philosophical 
reflection lies here.  No progress is possible so long as it is supposed that faith 
is or contains an elementary, or an implicit, or any other sort of philosophy 
which believers are bound to defend, since upon it their confidence reposes 
[that is, Farrer now accepts Allen’s claim that successful metaphysical 
arguments are unnecessary]….But if a proper distinction of saving faith from 
pious philosophy is vital, equally vital is a just relation between them.  
Otherwise the philosopher loses his starting point.  He must know that he is 
examining or articulating the assumptions of the believing mind.126 
 
So this is the perspective Basil Mitchell found so distressing when he read it in 
manuscript; this is the perspective he had in mind when he wrote that Farrer ‘had 
become a sort of fideist, content to rest the truth of Christianity upon the believer’s 
sense of being nourished by the tradition in which he had been raised.’127  But what 
‘sort of’ fideism has Farrer articulated in this first chapter of Faith and Speculation?  
And has he, in fact, taken a more strongly fideistic position under Allen’s influence 
than in Saving Belief?  To answer these questions, it is helpful to consider Letter 6 in 
the Appendix, the final comments we have from Farrer on Allen’s project.  Dated 29 
July [1966], and thus after Faith and Speculation had been written but before it had 
been published, Farrer tells Allen that his ideas ‘(not unacknowledged) furnish the 
substance of the first chapter.’  But then Farrer states candidly,  
                                                 
126 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 14-15.  This passage bears close comparison with the conclusion of 
Letter Four in Appendix B (15 June 1964), in which Farrer still seems more committed to probing the 
metaphysical implications of Christian belief.  That is, just as in Finite and Infinite he maintained that 
‘there are some metaphysical questions which must be settled if we are to vindicate the significance of 
any theological statements whatever of the traditional type,’ so likewise in this letter he wrote that  
even granting Allen’s view that faith is its own evidence still ‘implies that a certain metaphysical 
interpretation of finite-experience is true—not in the sense that we are bound to be Thomists, 
Hegelians, or any other brand of metaphysician, but that certain broadly-stated metaphysical positions 
must be asserted, and others must be denied: “must,” logically, of course, not psychologically’.  By 
emphasising ‘implies,’ Farrer is holding out for more than just ‘reading in’ even as he concedes that the 
theistic epistemic situation may not be as strong as ‘reading off’.  It is precisely such metaphysical 
implications of faith that Farrer goes on to explore in the rest of Faith and Speculation, but at least in 
this passage  from 14-15, cited above in the main text, he seems to accept a permissible agnosticism. 
127 Mitchell, ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ 177. 
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I do not altogether agree with you but I think what you say is very important.  
I think it comes to this: The believer, qua believer, rightly says ‘I believe 
because the grace of God’ (or the like) ‘persuades me.’  But the philosopher’s 
business is not (mainly) to say: ‘Quite right, my boy, that’s how believing 
goes’ but to examine the assumptions upon which the facts through which ‘the 
grace of God persuades’ come to be taken as instruments, effects or evidences 
as the Grace of God. 
 
In other words, although he was willing to publish a chapter drawing from and even at 
least partly defending Allen’s position, this letter confirms that Farrer remained 
ambivalent about it.  And the parenthetical ‘mainly’ in regard to defining the 
philosopher’s proper task indicates that—even while writing this letter—Farrer cannot 
quite make up his mind.  This helps explain the dialogue-style of ‘The Believer’s 
Reasons’: Farrer is genuinely thinking through these issues as he writes: he feels the 
force of both voices—the ‘believer’ vs. the ‘philosopher’—and is unsure of his own 
final position. 
 My reading of the situation would thus nuance James McClendon’s comment 
cited earlier: ‘Already in process of change, Farrer read Allen’s completed 
dissertation…and found it persuasive.’128  As Section II above on ‘Faith and 
Evidence’ demonstrated, Farrer had accepted a subtle form of moderate fideism by 
1962.  In terms of his earlier work, he was indeed ‘in process of change’ by the time 
he encountered Allen the following year.  However, I am not sure the total evidence 
supports McClendon’s further claim that Farrer was ‘persuaded’ by Allen.  I think 
rather that—as Allen himself says in his introduction to Farrer’s letters to him (see 
Appendix B)—Farrer was ‘greatly stimulated’ by the dissertation.  It meshed with 
certain currents in his own thinking that stressed the priority of faith, pushed him to 
re-evaluate the ‘residual rationalism’ and metaphysical focus of Finite and Infinite, 
and also perhaps reminded him of his own ‘breakthrough’ letter of 1927 (see 
                                                 
128 McClendon, 279. 
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Appendix A and Chapter III, Section II).  Although there are some differences 
between that early undergraduate letter and the ‘believer’s voice’ in the first chapter 
of Faith and Speculation, the resemblances are remarkable.  Allen’s dissertation, I 
argue, presented Farrer with a fully worked-out and well-defended position on the 
relation between faith and reason, religion and philosophy, a position that Farrer 
found strongly appealing and which resonated with various stages of his own life-long 
attempt to harmonise these realms.  Upon encountering Allen’s position, Farrer 
immediately (and somewhat mischievously) brought it into conversation with the 
other Metaphysicals by inviting Allen to make a presentation (see Appendix B, 
Metaphysicals Letter) and eventually incorporated it into the first chapter of his own 
final book.  In short, Allen emboldened Farrer to make claims he might not have 
otherwise made, to finally say in print (if only in the voice of ‘the believer’) 
something close to what he had written forty years earlier to his father. 
Nevertheless, and this is equally important, at least as late as 1966 (two years 
before his death) Farrer continued to hold back from unqualified acceptance of 
Allen’s position, and even in the published version of ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ the 
ambiguity remains.  Although clearly more fideistic than either Mitchell or 
Hebblethwaite would like, determining the precise ‘sort of fideism’ in the first chapter 
of Faith and Speculation is complicated by the tentativeness of Farrer’s thought and 
by the subtlety of the dialogue.  While the ‘evangelical’ element of the ‘gospel’ and 
its consequent ‘nourishment’ / ‘blessings’ have been brought to the fore, the 
‘conformist’ element of accepting ‘the cultural history of our race’ is present as well.  
It is also difficult to distinguish Farrer’s own view from his interpretation and 
presentation of Allen, and even the conclusion in Farrer’s own voice remains 
somewhat ambiguous.  Without commenting on the intellectual merits of their 
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respective positions, it might justly be said that the ‘middle’ Farrer of ‘Faith and 
Evidence’ and Allen himself both articulated themselves better and stated their 
epistemological convictions more effectively than the ‘late’ Farrer of ‘The Believer’s 
Reasons’.  One gets the sense that the ‘late’ Farrer was still thinking through the 
implications of Allen’s dissertation, was struggling with various aspects of it, and had 
not yet fully integrated it into his own perspective.  And then, alas, he died. 
However, given the reiterated refrain in ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ of how faith 
is the proper ‘starting-point’ of the philosophical examination of religious belief, it 
might be possible to distinguish Farrer’s biographically-final position from all earlier 
formulations by designating it as a moderate methodological fideism with both 
conformist and evangelical aspects.  That is, whether or not this is a stronger sort of 
fideism than previous ones, the concern with determining the proper method by which 
one approaches religion now seems paramount.  It has to be with and by faith, 
‘examining or articulating the assumptions of the believing mind.’129  One might say 
that the ‘middle’ Farrer articulated a de facto moderate fideism, whereas the ‘late’ 
Farrer shifted to a de jure one.  And, without being overly polemical, I would argue 
that, in so doing, Farrer has thus shifted his starting-point from metaphysics (with its 
focus on being) to epistemology (with its focus on belief).  Metaphysical arguments 
may and indeed do follow from this starting point, but they do not rest on a 
metaphysical foundation.  I will briefly consider the implications of this in Chapter 
Five.130 
                                                 
129 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 14. 
130 For relevant philosophical book reviews by Farrer in this period, the Bibliography, I.A.4.  In terms 
of other publications, Farrer’s rejection of papal infallibility is analogous to his earlier rejection of 
demonstrative theistic proofs, in that in both cases he prefers an Anglican probabilistic epistemology: 
see ‘Infallibility and Historical Revelation’, in Austin Farrer, et. al., Infallibility in the Church: An 
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V. Conclusion 
Whereas Chapter Three covered over three-quarters of Farrer’s life and career, 
this chapter has only considered his last decade.  This, however, is the crucial period 
for determining the answers to the various questions driving this dissertation, and in 
particular the alleged fideism of Faith and Speculation.  But, as with Chapter Three, 
some of our findings have been unexpected.  Farrer used his Gifford Lectures—the 
most prestigious venue in the world in which to discuss natural theology—to defend 
the freedom of the will.  Without much fanfare he seemed to shed his Thomist-
inspired framework for one more indebted to mainstream British philosophy.  
Although I argued that even the ‘rational theology’ of Finite and Infinite should be 
construed within the genre of Anglican semi-fideism or British soft rationalism, a 
more overtly fideistic position first emerged in Farrer’s academic work (surprisingly 
enough) in an essay-collection edited by Basil Mitchell himself, Faith and Logic.  
Here Farrer insists that only those who have ‘the mind of Christ’ can accept the reality 
of revelation.  Even Farrer’s theodicy, despite its concern with justifying the ways of 
God to humanity, concludes with the claim that ‘the substance of truth is grasped not 
by argument, but by faith.’ 
The neglected ‘middle’ Farrer then set forth what I regard as his most careful 
and nuanced articulation of moderate fideism in 1964’s Saving Belief.  Although it 
was not published until after he met Diogenes Allen in the Autumn of 1963, it is vital 
to recognise that ‘Faith and Evidence’ was delivered in lecture form in 1962 and 
submitted to the publisher by Easter 1963, and is thus entirely independent of Allen’s 
work: and it is here, I argue, that Farrer shifts from semi-fideism to moderate fideism.  
But then, as both published and unpublished sources confirm, Farrer was ‘greatly 
                                                                                                                                            
Anglican-Catholic Dialogue (Darton, Longman and Todd, 1968), 9-23—an abridged version may be 
found in Loades and MacSwain (eds.), The Truth-Seeking Heart, 81-93. 
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stimulated’ by Allen’s dissertation and moved to reconsider his own position on a 
number of points.  Rather oddly, A Science of God? seems to belong more with the 
texts in Chapter Three than in Chapter Four, but in Faith and Speculation Allen’s 
influence is explicitly acknowledged and immediately obvious to those who have read 
either the dissertation itself or its published versions. 
Although Farrer was intrigued and challenged by Allen’s early work, he was 
not entirely persuaded by it, and so even ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ maintains a certain 
critical distance.  Thus, Farrer did not adopt the more strongly fideistic position 
defended by Allen (at least, at that time: Allen’s own religious epistemology 
continued to evolve, as I will discuss briefly in Chapter Five).  However, in the 
biographically-final, post-Allen, ‘late’ Farrer we see what I have called a moderate 
methodological fideism: that is, one that emphatically and explicitly insists that faith 
is the essential starting point for the evaluation of theistic belief and evidence.  And 
so while I do not concur with Mitchell’s view that this fideistic element first emerged 
de novo in 1967, I conclude that in ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ Farrer does indeed 
defend ‘a sort of fideism.’ 
But I also dissent from Mitchell’s further claim that this sort of fideism is 
‘content to rest the truth of Christianity upon the believer’s sense of being nourished 
by the tradition in which he had been raised’—if by ‘content’ he means that, as in 
extreme fideism, no challenge is ever accepted or no further evidence admitted.  That 
stance may be acceptable for the ‘believer’ but not for the ‘philosopher’—and since 
Farrer opts to be a ‘believing philosopher’ he cannot rest content with faith alone.  In 
short,  Farrer’s moderate methodological fideism begins with faith, and does indeed 
find its primary justification in the ‘nourishment’ or ‘blessings’ of the gospel, but at 
least among the philosophically-awakened the ‘faith-attitude’ must still perceive 
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(‘read off’) a finite, contingent, and thus created universe for such belief to be 
rationally maintained.131  Whether the moderate methodological fideism of this first 
chapter is fully integrated into the interactionist epistemology of the rest of the book 
will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
At the end of Chapter Three, I briefly compared Finite and Infinite with 
another important book published the same year: Eric Mascall’s He Who Is.  It is 
likewise fascinating to compare Faith and Speculation with a contemporaneous text 
that, rather than either Farrer’s or Allen’s work, largely set the agenda for the 
subsequent history of Anglo-American religious epistemology: Alvin Plantinga’s God 
and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God.132  The 
contrast between Farrer’s last book and Plantinga’s first one is best captured by 
recalling I. M. Crombie’s claim that, although Farrer was no Platonist, ‘he perhaps 
had a somewhat Platonic conception of philosophy—that it is essentially dialogue, 
that there can be no formulation of the truth so lapidary that it cannot be 
misunderstood, and that what needs to be said in some context depends on what is 
being misunderstood in that context.’133  In support of this claim, consider Farrer’s 
remarkably forthright declaration in the preface to Faith and Speculation: ‘I wish I 
had written the book better; I do not wish I had written it more formally.  Reflection 
and discussion may permit realities to disclose themselves to us; and I would rather, if 
                                                 
131 And to this extent may indeed still involve metaphysical implications: see note 126 above. 
132 (Cornell University Press, 1967), paperback edition with a new preface by the author, 1990.  
Interestingly, Plantinga’s book was reviewed by both Allen and Mascall, and also by H. D. Lewis 
(whose review of Faith and Logic was considered in note 16 of this chapter): see Diogenes Allen, in 
Theology Today 25 (1968), 263-264; H. D. Lewis, in Journal of Theological Studies XXI (1970), 269-
271; and E. L. Mascall, in Religious Studies 4 (1969), 288-291.  All three were impressed with the 
book’s technical brilliance, but dissented from its constructive conclusions in various ways. 
133 I. M. Crombie, ‘Farrer, Austin Marsden (1904-1968),’ in The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography:  Volume 19 (Oxford University Press, 2004), 121-122.  
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I dared to hope it, provide materials for an exercise in understanding, than formalise a 
chain of argument.’134 
But God and Other Minds, despite being published the same year as Faith and 
Speculation, is a striking example of the philosophical mode which aims at lapidary 
expression and formal chains of argument.  It has a severely logical style, in which 
propositions are numbered and definitions set forth for rigorous scrutiny, with all 
steps in the argument laid out and all possible inferences analysed: e.g.,  
(4) P is an essential property of x if and only if x has P and there is a being y 
identical with x and a property P' identical with P such that y has P' 
necessarily (in the sense of (3)).135 
 
And so on.  In this manner, Plantinga goes through the traditional arguments both for 
and against the existence of God, and—judging them by this highly exacting 
standard—concludes that they all fail, the atheistic as well as the theistic.  He then 
provides his alternative proposal, which is to compare the basis of our knowledge of 
other (human) minds with our (putative) knowledge of God.  Providing a classic 
recent example of what Terence Penelhum calls the ‘Parity Argument’ (see Chapter 
Two, Section I.C), Plantinga concludes that while no rigorous argument can 
demonstrate the existence of other minds, it is still rational to believe in them—and 
thus famously claims that ‘belief in other minds and belief in God are in the same 
epistemological boat; hence if either is rational, so is the other.  But obviously the 
former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter.’136  There is no space here to pursue the 
immensely complicated details of Plantinga’s various arguments, but only to point out 
that it was precisely this style of philosophy which was to remain dominant for the 
next three decades.  Once again, Farrer was moving against the stream. 
                                                 
134 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, vi. 
135 Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 179-180. 
136 Ibid., xvi, and see also 268-271. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ‘SOLVITUR IMMOLANDO’ 
 
This concluding chapter evaluates the significance of Farrer’s ‘moderate 
methodological fideism’ as it relates to several different but interconnected contexts.  
Chapter Four’s conclusions are brought into conversation with other interpretations of 
Faith and Speculation, and the Allen-inspired claims of ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ are 
integrated with the more explicitly interactionist epistemology of the rest of the book.  At 
last moving from past to present, after revisiting the positions of Basil Mitchell, Brian 
Hebblethwaite, and Diogenes Allen as explored in Chapter One, Farrer’s final position is 
then compared to several other contemporary positions in religious epistemology, 
specifically foundationalism, Reformed Epistemology, and Wittgensteinian Fideism.  
Due to the increased recognition of ‘spirituality’ in recent philosophy and theology, 
Farrer’s unusually ‘diaphanous’ mentality now emerges in a new, highly favourable light.  
In conclusion, Farrer distinctively seems to locate theistic evidence not primarily in 
nature or reason, but in notably holy lives and our own more halting attempts to live by 
faith: ‘It is solved by sacrifice.’  
 
I. Striking the Balance: From Past to Present 
In reaching the conclusions first expressed in Sections II and IV and then 
summarised in Section V of the previous chapter, I have answered the historical and 
exegetical questions this dissertation set out to investigate.  In light of Morris’s review of 
Conti’s monograph, and by contrast with most previous studies, I have argued for the 
complementary value of an epistemological approach to Farrer’s philosophical-
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theological legacy, and have demonstrated that the primary influence on the first chapter 
of Faith and Speculation was not Charles Hartshorne but Diogenes Allen.  In light of 
Mitchell’s concern and Hebblethwaite’s denial, I have argued that Farrer was indeed ‘a 
sort of fideist’.  In light of common uses and abuses of ‘fideism,’ I have argued that this 
concept is complex and that its meaning varies from community to community, with 
‘semi-fideism’ being equivalent to a view also known as ‘soft rationalism’ or ‘Anglican 
epistemology’—all three terms referring to the cumulative case or probabilistic approach 
which insists that religious belief is rational but which denies that God’s existence can be 
conclusively demonstrated or proved.  And in light of the many different ‘sorts’ of 
fideism, I have argued that, although the mature Farrer never advocated extreme fideism, 
his final position might be expressed as a ‘moderate methodological fideism’ which holds 
that the correct starting point for the philosophical examination of religious belief must 
always be faith. 
However, although the primary historical and exegetical conclusions of the 
dissertation have been reached in Chapter Four, it still remains to fulfil the claim in the 
Introduction that this work has both historical and constructive ambitions.  We must thus 
round off the arguments of the first four chapters by exploring their significance for 
contemporary religious epistemology.  First, however, it is necessary to pick up where we 
left off and finish our consideration of Faith and Speculation.  For, although my 
interpretation of the Allen-influenced ‘moderate methodological [or de jure] fideism’ of 
‘The Believer’s Reasons’ may well be right, that is still only the first chapter of the book.  
How does Farrer take the argument forward, and does it link up with the interactionist 
epistemology encountered earlier?    
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The second chapter of Faith and Speculation, ‘The Empirical Demand,’ does 
indeed reintroduce the interactionist epistemology that Farrer first developed in Finite 
and Infinite and which Edward Henderson sees as fundamental to understanding Farrer’s 
contribution to philosophical theology.  In this chapter, in keeping with the fideistic 
theme we have been charting throughout this dissertation, Farrer freely admits that ‘a 
strict empirical criterion for truth of fact must condemn theistic belief.’1  Those 
philosophers and theologians who think that they can produce a convincing argument for 
God’s existence on conventionally empirical grounds are thus mistaken.  However, rather 
than resting there, Farrer proceeds to reformulate ‘the empirical demand’ such that its 
proper requirements—which he has no wish to evade—may be met without inevitably 
eliminating any and all theistic claims.  ‘Seeing is believing,’ Farrer says, ‘but contact is 
knowledge.  Physics is not concerned with the way things look but with the way they act; 
and the method of physical discovery is physical interference.’2  Obviously, we cannot 
know God by ‘physical interference,’ but Farrer goes on to insist that, nevertheless,  
to know God is to know, and not to do anything fundamentally different; it is to 
accord to some real being a conscious recognition (always supposing that 
religious conviction has any validity whatever).  And it seems we cannot say even 
so much as this, without implying something about the logic or the structure of 
the thought affirmative of God.  ‘To know,’ or ‘to acknowledge as real,’ when 
used of finites and when used of God, cannot mean two utterly different things.3 
 
And so Farrer then returns, almost verbatim, to the phrase we encountered on page 294 of 
Finite and Infinite and discussed in Chapter Three, Section III.B.2.  Seeking for a 
‘generalisation’ of the empirical principle ‘wide enough’ to include both physical and 
spiritual reality, including the reality of other human persons, Farrer says: 
                                                 
1 Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (A. & C. Black, 1967), 16. 
2 Ibid., 17. 
3 Ibid., 21. 
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[T]o know real beings we must exercise our actual relation with them.  No 
physical science without physical interference, no personal knowledge without 
personal intercourse; no thought about any reality about which we can do nothing 
but think.  Is not this the highest possible generalisation of the empirical 
principle?  Theology must be at least as empirical as this, if it is to mediate any 
knowledge whatsoever.  We can know nothing of God, unless we can do 
something about him.  So what, we must ask, can we do?4 
 
The answer to that question occupies Farrer over the next two chapters, and after 
many twists and turns in the argument it is finally determined to be—not sheer thought or 
even worship—but obedience: ‘What can we do about God?—We can devote ourselves 
to his will; that is, we can place ourselves in his action as we suppose it to be disclosed.’5 
Farrer then immediately links this answer to the idea of the ‘blessings’ of the gospel, 
derived from Diogenes Allen and discussed in Chapter Four: ‘Is there any empirical 
verification of our engagement with the actual will of an actual God?—Only of a general 
kind, in so far as we find “life” or “blessing” in the process, through God’s uniting us 
with his will; and when we say “with his will” we are saying “with himself”.’ 
This claim seems identical to one Farrer made the previous year in A Science of 
God?, in a chapter titled (significantly enough) ‘Experimental Proof’: 
God does not stand alongside us or on a level with us….He is related to us in 
quite another way: as the will which underlies our existence, gives rise to our 
action and directs our aim….How can we have experimental knowledge of the 
will behind our will?  Only by opening our will to it, or sinking our will in it; 
there is no other conceivable way.  We cannot touch God except by willing the 
will of God.  Then his will takes effect in ours and we know it; not that we 
manipulate him, but that he possesses us.6 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 22. 
5 Ibid., 57. 
6 Austin Farrer, A Science of God? (Geoffrey Bles, 1966), 106-107.  ‘Possession’ is an infelicitous term to 
describe the divine contribution to this relationship, as Farrer would still insist that we retain our freedom in 
relation to God, and that our obedience must be continually willed on our part.  I am grateful to J. P. 
Cassidy for clarifying conversations on this topic, and for his contribution to the forthcoming Cambridge 
Companion to C. S. Lewis (which I have co-edited with Michael Ward), in which he makes just this point. 
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Thus, although we cannot know God by ‘physical interference,’ we can yet ‘touch’ God 
by willing God’s will, and in this manner ‘do something about him,’ and so by analogy 
with physical knowledge come to know the divine as well.7  As I indicated in Chapter 
Four, here we see the ‘fideistic’ element finally emerging from the somewhat more 
conventionally rationalistic epistemology prevalent in A Science of God?  If we want 
‘experimental knowledge’ of God, then we must submit our wills to God—‘there is no 
other conceivable way.’  Such knowledge by interaction is not ‘fideistic’ in any irrational 
sense, for it is but the generalisation of the empirical principle as applied to spiritual 
reality.  This is true of all knowledge whatsoever (‘to know real beings we must exercise 
our actual relation with them’), the only difference being that we exercise our actual 
relation with God through obedience rather than physical interaction.  But it is ‘fideistic’ 
to the extent that here obedience is our route to knowledge of God, rather than pure 
thought or reason or argument.   
Back in Faith and Speculation, Farrer reaches this conclusion on page 57, and it is 
precisely on the next three pages of the book, 58-60, that Henderson sees the argument 
coming to fruition.  Henderson’s signal contribution is not just to highlight the 
interactionist character of Farrer’s epistemology, but also to emphasise the additional 
element of what he calls ‘valuation’.  As he puts it, ‘In affirmation of existence evidence 
alone is not enough; there must also be a valuation—and a valuation of a certain kind, 
                                                 
7 Edward Henderson discusses this passage from A Science of God? in his essay ‘The God Who Undertakes 
Us,’ in David Hein and Edward Hugh Henderson (eds.), Captured by the Crucified: The Practical 
Theology of Austin Farrer (T & & Clark International, 2004), 66-99; and Jeffrey Eaton does so on page 
204 of his The Logic of Theism: An Analysis of the Thought of Austin Farrer (University Press of America, 
1980).  The final chapter of Eaton’s book, ‘The Experiment of Faith’ (201-259) is an exceptionally helpful 
treatment of this theme, particularly in the way it draws on Farrer’s sermons as well as his more academic 
work. 
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viz. one which recognises some claim made upon our action by what is there.’8  And for 
such a claim to be made, we must recognise that the reality whose existence we are 
affirming (or not) impacts us on a personal, rather than on a purely physical, level.  
Henderson wants us to see, with Farrer, that ‘experimental science’ is not ‘the standard 
for judging the meaningfulness of all thought,’ but instead that the ‘form of thought to 
which the affirmation of individual existence primarily belongs is the personal form of 
subjects and their actions.’9  This leads Henderson to propose a two-stage process in 
Farrer’s religious epistemology in which both interaction and valuation lead to the 
affirmation of God’s existence as a personal reality with whom we have to do.  The first 
stage is to recognise the epistemic significance of interaction and valuation.  The second 
stage ‘is the qualification of our activity after the evaluative response.  This new evidence 
verifies or falsifies the judgement made in response to the first evidence.’10  Thus, the 
second stage might be called our assessment of our response to the evidence of God 
perceived through interaction and valuation.  But what, in this view, is ‘the evidence of 
God’?  Henderson replies that it is ‘any experience which provokes us to use the name 
                                                 
8 Edward Henderson, ‘Valuing in Knowing God: An Interpretation of Austin Farrer’s Religious 
Epistemology,’ in Modern Theology 1 (1985), 171.  See also his comments on this neglected and 
misunderstood aspect of Farrer’s religious epistemology on 165-166 of this article. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 174.  As implied above, structurally this two-stage process is also how we assert the existence of 
other human persons as well, not just God.  To some extent, therefore, Henderson’s argument may be 
similar to Plantinga’s in God and Other Minds, but their method and style are entirely different.  For more 
on valuation and on the link between affirming personal existence in general as well as divine existence in 
particular, see Henderson’s earlier article, ‘Knowing Persons and Knowing God’, The Thomist 46 (1982), 
394-422.  See also Charles Conti, ‘Austin Farrer and the Analogy of Other Minds,’ in Jeffrey C. Eaton and 
Ann Loades (eds.), For God and Clarity: New Essays in Honor of Austin Farrer (Pickwick Publications, 
1983), 51-91. 
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“God” and to mean by it what theists do….Consequently, basic to all human experience 
as such is evidence for God.’11  In other words, theistic evidence is not limited to 
uniquely ‘religious experience,’ but can be found in every aspect of our lives. 
In an intriguing passage, Henderson explains how Faith and Speculation marks 
the development in Farrer’s thought from Finite and Infinite.  In Faith and Speculation 
the affirmation of God’s existence is not a matter of mind leaping to the 
cosmological intuition as Finite and Infinite had it.  It is a matter of 
acknowledging the claim that impinges, and this is an action of the will pursuing 
value.  The condition of a subject that makes the affirmation of God possible is 
not an extra-rational attitude which some people allow to overwhelm reason.  It is 
a condition of openness to goods which make claims upon us.  Such openness 
belongs to the look-out activity of an agent aspiring for good.  When such an 
agent conceives of God as one who does make the absolute claim that we submit 
and conform our wills to his, then the condition exists which is necessary for that 
agent to appreciate the evidence for God as evidence for God.  To acknowledge 
the claim is to affirm though an act of rational will or practical reason that God 
exists.  Such an act is no leap beyond reason; it is the expression of the very kind 
of reason that is always involved in genuine assertions of existence.12 
 
In another essay, Henderson states that in his view Farrer indeed accepted ‘a kind of 
fideism.’13  But as this above passage makes clear, Henderson does not see Farrer’s 
fideism as anti-rational: it is simply the right response to the realities under discussion, 
and although belief in God may not measure up to the strictly empirical demand of 
experimental science, it is still a proper exercise of ‘rational will’ or ‘practical reason’.  It 
is, however, an exercise of those capacities which requires a particular ‘condition’ for 
their successful operation, namely ‘an openness to goods which make claims upon us’.  
                                                 
11 Ibid., 177. 
12 Ibid., 178.  As noted in Chapter Four, note 112, this bears interesting resemblances to Eleonore Stump’s 
interpretation of Aquinas on faith. 
13 See Edward Henderson, ‘Austin Farrer and D. Z. Phillips on Lived Faith, Prayer, and Divine Reality,’ in 
Modern Theology 1 (1985), 223-243.  However, Henderson is at pains to distinguish Farrer’s ‘form of 
fideism’ from Phillips’s.  I will briefly discuss Phillips below. 
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Although Henderson does not say so, this condition of openness seems analogous and 
perhaps even identical to the ‘initial faith’ Farrer defends in Saving Belief.  
 Henderson provides us an example of a contemporary philosopher who is 
persuaded by at least one interpretation of the religious epistemology Farrer articulates in 
Faith and Speculation.  Without committing myself to all the details of Henderson’s 
particular formulation of this approach to belief in God—an approach which combines 
interaction, valuation, and practical reason—I think his subtle and sophisticated reading 
of Farrer has much to commend it, and it is particularly useful in weaving together the 
interaction epistemology and action theory from Finite and Infinite with the later 
arguments of Faith and Speculation.  My claims in Chapter Four about the moderate (de 
facto) fideism of ‘Faith and Evidence’ in Saving Belief and the Allen-influenced 
moderate  methodological (de jure) fideism of ‘The Believer’s Reasons’ in Faith and 
Speculation are entirely compatible with Henderson’s interpretation, which focuses more 
on the valuation element in pages 58-60 of Faith and Speculation than on the new 
‘starting point’ of the first chapter.  Our views are thus not contradictory, but 
complementary.  However, as indicated above, it might be fair to say that my own 
interpretation ends on page 57, at least in terms of setting out the essential steps of 
Farrer’s argument, whereas Henderson’s picks up on the very next page.  Strictly 
speaking, then, I would thus regard Henderson’s interpretation as supplementary to my 
own, adding an additional nuance to the picture.  He does not, for example, discuss Allen 
or Allen’s influence on Faith and Speculation. 
 Henderson admits that Farrer’s religious epistemology is easily misunderstood, 
not only because the argument in Faith and Speculation assumes familiarity with his 
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earlier work—specifically, the interactionist epistemology of Finite and Infinite—but 
also because ‘the dialogical style prevents a systematic presentation of the epistemology, 
leaving it up to us to put the pieces together.’14  It is thus no surprise that Farrer’s final 
position has been very much a minority report in religious epistemology over the last four 
decades, and has indeed been almost completely neglected.  Like Basil Mitchell, some of 
the initial reviewers of Faith and Speculation were puzzled and bemused by it, and at 
least one was overtly hostile.  Frederick Ferré dismissed it as a ‘philosophical hangover,’ 
‘not really a book at all but a series of fireside chats with an avuncular companion of 
urbane wit and theological whimsy.’15  One gets the distinct impression that Ferré would 
have preferred Plantinga’s formal chain of arguments to Farrer’s attempted exercise in 
understanding.  Ninian Smart was less dismissive, but still saw the book as ‘rather a 
private argument, as though Farrer was discoursing with himself.’16  H. P. Owen, J. 
Heywood Thomas, and Keith Ward were more positive, although of course with certain 
reservations about aspects of Farrer’s overall argument.17 
John Hick, interestingly, reported that he found ‘the opening section, on an 
empirical approach [to religious belief], highly illuminating and valuable, but…fared less 
fortunately with the rest of the book.’18  The first three chapters, which basically cover 
the material I have dealt with in detail, make 
                                                 
14 Henderson, ‘Valuing in Knowing God,’ 171.  See also 165-166. 
15 Frederick Ferré, Review of Faith and Speculation, in Theology Today 25 (1968), 269. 
16 Ninian Smart, Review of Faith and Speculation, in The Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1970), 93. 
17 H. P. Owen, Review of Faith and Speculation, in The Journal of Theological Studies XIX (1968), 699-
702; J. Heywood Thomas, Review of Faith and Speculation in The Expository Times 75 (1967-1968), 173-
174; and Keith Ward, Review of Faith and Speculation, in Scottish Journal of Theology 21 (1968), 224-
225. 
18 John Hick, Review of Faith and Speculation, in Theology LXX (1967), 557. 
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the important point that the claims of religion are to be studied as claims made by 
living people on the basis of their own inheritance and experience….Accordingly 
the proper philosophical approach should be a probing of the actual foundations 
and structure of living and operative beliefs, rather than of theoretical and non-
operative arguments for coming to hold those beliefs.  The apologetic task is not 
to prove, starting from scratch, that God exists, but to show that the religious man, 
given the distinctively religious form of human existence in which he participates, 
is entitled as a rational being to believe what he does believe.19 
 
Hick continues that this claim ‘connects with Dr Farrer’s next contention: that in order to 
know the realities that surround us, both natural and divine, we have to live in relation to 
them’.20  Although Hick then slightly misrepresents Farrer’s argument by limiting our 
relation to divine reality to worship (rather than obedience), this is an accurate enough 
statement of Farrer’s position. 
What makes Hick’s review so interesting is that he then goes on to say, ‘Thus far 
I am able to go in Dr Farrer’s book and to go with real profit and gratitude.  But thereafter 
I am merely puzzled.  I cannot say what the author’s train of thought is, in spite of the 
fact that he supplies his own summaries of it.  So subtle are these later chapters that, to 
my gross eyes at least, the argument becomes ethereal and vanishes from view.’21  And 
this reaction is interesting for at least two reasons.  First, it indicates that Farrer’s 
approach to religious epistemology in this book was illuminating and provocative and 
perhaps even new to Hick.  Given that Hick was at this point the H. G. Wood Professor 
of Theology at the University of Birmingham, having previously taught philosophy at 
Cornell University and been Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton Theological 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 557-558.  It is interesting to note how this passage also perfectly (and yet unwittingly) summarises 
Allen’s dissertation as well. 
20 Ibid., 558. 
21 Ibid.  The summaries of each chapter, and of the book as a whole, may be found on 171-175 of Faith and 
Speculation.  Hick modestly if unconvincingly states that he is ‘fairly certain that my inability to appreciate 
the latter part of the book is my own fault and not the author’s’ (558). 
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Seminary, this is highly significant.22  As with Mitchell’s response to the manuscript of 
Faith and Speculation (read just before he became Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of 
the Christian Religion at Oxford), it tells us how singular a position Farrer was occupying 
in Anglo-American religious epistemology during this period.   
And, second, Hick’s comments on the rest of Faith and Speculation are likewise 
reminiscent of Mitchell’s claim that he returned the entire manuscript to Farrer without 
comment.  As with Ferré’s apparent preference for a more formal approach, Hick’s 
bafflement over the remaining chapters indicate that Farrer’s dialogical method was 
failing to reach his philosophical peers.  What I earlier described in Chapter One as the 
rigid empiricism and logical rigorism still characteristic of British and American 
philosophy in the 1960s—exemplified by texts such as Plantinga’s God and Other 
Minds—made it difficult to take Farrer’s more diffuse and conversational style seriously.  
Faith and Speculation apparently seemed alternatively frustrating and/or fascinating to its 
first readers, but rarely convincing. 
Moving from the past to the present, aside from the work of Mitchell, 
Hebblethwaite, and Allen discussed in Chapter One, and Henderson’s work discussed in 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five, there is an almost complete lack of engagement with 
Farrer’s religious epistemology in contemporary philosophical theology.  Although Farrer 
remains an important voice in current discussions about divine action (in particular) and 
science-and-theology (in general), his epistemic position has been severely neglected.23 
                                                 
22 For Hick’s career, see his autobiography, published by Oneworld in 2002.  Hick briefly taught at 
Cambridge between holding the professorships in Princeton and Birmingham.  As indicated earlier, in 
Chapters One and Four, Allen was his successor in the chair at Princeton Seminary.   
23 But on these other two topics there is a substantial literature, probably the most significant in Farrer 
studies.  In addition to the essays collected in Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson (eds.), Divine 
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A notable exception to this rule is a substantial article by Jeremy Morris, titled 
‘Religious Experience in the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer.’24  Other than 
Henderson’s article on ‘Valuing and Knowing God,’ this is perhaps the most sustained 
analysis of Farrer’s religious epistemology that has appeared to date.  However, although 
there is much of value in Morris’s article, I find myself in strong disagreement with his 
particular reading of the fideistic and voluntaristic character of Farrer’s thought.  While 
Morris, like me, sees the development in Farrer between Finite and Infinite to Faith and 
Speculation as basically a movement from an emphasis on the metaphysics of being to an 
emphasis on the epistemology of belief, he also sees Farrer as moving to a wholesale 
fideism based almost entirely on subjective religious experience disconnected from 
objective evidence or rational argument.25 
Readers of this dissertation or of Henderson’s work will notice that Morris does 
not thoroughly engage with the interactionist character of Farrer’s epistemology, but 
rather seems to think of him in more conventionally rationalistic ‘Cartesian’ terms.  
Reality and our evidence thereof is apparently something we think about rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer (T & T Clark, 1990), readers are 
referred to the Bibliography, Section B.3, which contains a large number of philosophical / theological 
discussions of Farrer on divine action and ‘double agency.’   For recent surveys of the theology-and-science 
dialogue that mention Farrer’s position as a continuing ‘live option’ in regard to divine action, see 
Christopher Southgate, ‘A test case: divine action,’ in Christopher Southgate et. al., God, Humanity and the 
Cosmos, Second Edition (T & T Clark International, 2005), 260-299; and Wesley J. Wildman, ‘The Divine 
Action Project, 1988-2003’, Theology and Science 2 (2004), 31-75. 
24 The Journal of Theological Studies New Series 45 (1994), 569-592.  Although this article was published 
under the name ‘J. N. Morris,’ it is in fact by same ‘Jeremy Morris’ whose review of Conti’s Metaphysical 
Personalism was discussed at length in the Introduction to this dissertation.  
25 For a discussion of religious experience in recent philosophy of religion and theology, see David Brown, 
‘Experience Skewed’, in Kevin Vanhoozer and Martin Warner (eds.), Transcending Boundaries in 
Philosophy and Theology: Reason, Meaning and Experience (Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 157-175. 
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come up against.  Far more seriously, however, Morris also takes Farrer’s insistence on 
the necessity of faith for the proper evaluation of the evidence to be purely a matter of 
choice.26  Rather than the ‘rational will’ or ‘practical reason’ emphasised by Henderson, 
Morris thus commits Farrer to the highly dubious notion that (religious) belief is purely 
voluntary.  Citing precisely some of the same ‘middle’ and ‘late’ Farrer texts that I have 
either discussed directly or in light of Henderson’s work, Morris claims that, for Farrer,  
[t]he ‘empirical’ evidence for God’s existence could not be taken as such without 
the accompanying acknowledgement of the value of God’s existence....The world 
could yield no knowledge of God other than that which followed from the 
believer’s commitment to God’s existence, because there was nothing that could 
be demonstrated empirically of God in the world outside those effects of his 
action which the believer, in faith, chose to regard as such….Farrer’s account of 
verification specified the mode by which belief was confirmed by evidence, but 
hardly resolved the difficulty that its implicit voluntarism yielded no control over 
what the believer might or might not choose to regard as evidence.27     
 
Morris makes these sorts of claims again and again throughout the course of his paper: 
e.g., ‘if the believer chose not to believe, no form of experiential verification of God’s 
activity was possible’; ‘all that can be said is that the believer finds confirmation of faith 
in the experience of God which he or she chooses to undergo,’ etc.28  Thus, according to 
Morris, for Farrer the ‘evidential value of experience ceases as soon as any attempt is 
made to switch the focus of analysis away from the believer’s personal experience to the 
rational grounds of faith in general.’29  In short, rather than the moderate fideism I have 
                                                 
26 Morris, ‘Religious Experience in the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer,’ 572. In fairness to Morris 
(and as already indicated in the Introduction), I should say that in his later review of Conti’s Metaphysical 
Personalism—and indeed under its influence—Morris seems to have modified his interpretation of Farrer’s 
fideism in a less extreme direction, so this article may no longer represent his current thinking.  It remains, 
however, a significant contribution to the secondary literature which needs to be engaged with. 
27 Ibid., 578-579. 
28 Ibid., 584-585. 
29 Ibid., 585. 
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argued for in this dissertation, Morris interprets Farrer as something close to an extreme 
fideist, and says further that if ‘the fideist recognizes that there are criteria of rational 
criticism external to the believer which can be validated by appeal to some universal, 
demonstrable standard, then he or she has abandoned fideism altogether.’30  In other 
words, not only is this the sort of fideist that Farrer is, it is also the only sort of fideism.  
Fideism cannot recognise any objective criteria of rational criticism outside the individual 
believer.  Objecting to such an irrational position, Morris thus concludes that Farrer’s 
religious epistemology is a disappointing, if interesting, failure. 
 However, I think Morris’s interpretation is flawed on several levels.  First, his 
restriction of fideism to an extreme form that denies all claims of reason is sufficiently 
answered by Chapter Two of this dissertation.  There are many types of fideism, and one 
can be a fideist and still accept that reason has a rightful place in our mental lives, 
religious or otherwise.  Second, the question of whether or not—and, if so, to what 
extent—belief is voluntary is a vast and complicated one that I do not intend to enter 
here, as it would require a dissertation in itself.  However, as my presentation and 
analysis of Farrer’s moderate (methodological) fideism in Chapter Four ought to have 
made clear, unlike Morris I do not read even the later Farrer as advocating a purely 
voluntary view of belief in general or religious faith in particular.  Initial faith, and thus 
belief in God, may indeed partly depend on certain voluntary decisions or acts (recall that 
Allen, in Chapter One, said that faith was the result of having an ‘open heart’) but it 
cannot simply be chosen.  One cannot just decide to believe, and the will is not the 
primary factor at work here.  As Farrer argues in ‘Faith and Evidence,’ faith is something 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 588. 
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that we discover we have and then rationally consider in light of the evidence, both pro 
and con: ‘Either we are persuaded or not persuaded, that is the starting-point.  If we are 
persuaded, some element of faith is there; it is just a matter of maintaining itself or not 
against rival persuasions.’31  The religious believer is not a neutral will that just happened 
to adopt a belief for no reason, but someone who has been persuaded, ‘captured by a 
story.’32  But, again, what persuades the believer is not faith itself, but evidence.  Initial 
faith is neither belief against nor belief without evidence, but rather ‘a subjective 
condition favourable to the reception of the evidence.’33  Our wills may indeed be 
involved in whether or not we enter that ‘subjective condition,’ but without the necessary 
evidence the will is insufficient—it cannot create beliefs from scratch. 
So when Farrer says in Faith and Speculation that ‘it has always been recognised 
that faith in God calls for voluntary effort,’34 I interpret this claim in terms of the 
antecedent operations of the will which are necessary for us to grasp any complex or 
obscure reality whatsoever: i.e., attention, concentration, effort, persistence, sympathy, 
‘purification of the heart,’ etc.  I do not think that Farrer is saying that faith can be 
directly willed, and further believe that any interpretation such as Morris’s which 
suggests that this was ever Farrer’s view runs against the entire grain of Farrer’s 
epistemic thought as I have been exploring it in this dissertation. 
Third and finally, and in consequence of the above arguments, I also do not 
interpret Farrer as advocating the sort of extreme fideism that Morris seems to saddle him 
                                                 
31 Austin Farrer, Saving Belief: A Discussion of Essentials (Hodder and Stoughton), 171. 
32 Ibid., 170. 
33 Ibid., 176. 
34 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 59.  This is a key claim in the section that Henderson regards (positively) 
as central to Farrer’s argument.  It is also essential to Morris’s (negative) critique. 
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with, which is basically the ‘read in’ position discussed in Chapter Four.  Despite my 
claim that in Saving Belief and Faith and Speculation Farrer embraced a moderate 
(methodological) fideism, I also took pains to emphasize that in both texts Farrer 
maintained a necessary—if secondary—place for evidence and reasoned argument.  Faith 
may supply the conditions for the evidence to be perceived and the reasons recognised, 
but without such evidence or reason there is nothing for faith to work with (or against).  
And, furthermore, the available evidence and reasons really need to point in a theistic 
direction.  However subtly balanced and finally inconclusive the philosophical debate 
between theists and atheists may be on purely formal or strictly empirical terms, the 
character of the world still cannot be such that it could just as well be read in a 
naturalistic as a theistic manner.  The theistic interpretation of the universe is not simply 
‘read in’ by an (irrational) act of will, but is truly ‘read off’ the nature of things—faith, in 
this sense, is ‘natural’ whereas disbelief is ‘unnatural.’  The perspective of faith allows 
theists to see things, not as they just choose to see them, but as they really are.  As Farrer 
says: 
Sympathy does not create the personal facts it descries, it reveals them; and there 
are many true facts, to which suspicion closes our eyes….The evidence of faith is 
that it convincingly shows us things in their true colours; having once seen man in 
God, we know that we have seen man as he is; we can never again believe another 
picture of ourselves, our neighbours, or our destinies. 
 
This is not the language of choice.35 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 See Farrer, Saving Belief, 23 and 26; for Farrer’s comments on the ‘naturalness’ of faith, see 24-25. 
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II. The Evidence of Faith: Contemporary Voices and Farrer 
 Chapter One of this dissertation primarily focused not on Farrer himself but on 
three different interpretations of his religious epistemology, all set within the context of 
the interpreters’ own understanding of the rationality of religious belief.  This was 
deliberate on my part, and for two reasons.  First, by beginning with Mitchell’s concern 
about Farrer’s possible fideism and the debate between Hebblethwaite and Allen on the 
merits thereof, I introduced the conceptual and exegetical dilemmas this dissertation set 
out to resolve.  Second, I intentionally wanted to bring these three specific figures into 
the conversation, and again not just in regard to their respective readings of Farrer on ‘the 
believer’s reasons’ but also to highlight their own work on this contentious topic.   
As noted in Chapter One, Mitchell, Hebblethwaite, and Allen are all well-
respected scholars, and within the broad range of extant positions in contemporary 
philosophy of religion and religious epistemology they are not themselves that far apart.  
With varying degrees of strength and commitment, they all accept the cumulative case 
approach to the rationality of religious belief.  Mitchell pioneered the revival of this 
previously discredited strategy; Hebblethwaite endorsed, extended, and popularised it; 
and it should be noted that Allen’s Christian Belief in a Postmodern World defends a 
rather more robust epistemology than his Yale dissertation and early work would 
indicate.  Partly under the influence of Farrer, and partly due to changes in his thinking 
brought about by developments in philosophy and science in the subsequent decades, 
Allen’s later work shows a greater confidence that a ‘general case’ can indeed be made 
for the truth of Christian belief, even if he remains more cautious in his conclusions than 
either Mitchell or Hebblethwaite. 
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 However, while indeed well-respected, none of these three figures—not even 
Mitchell—are currently shaping the on-going conversation in religious epistemology.  
Like Farrer himself—and perhaps because of their association or sympathy with his 
work?—his three interpreters have been largely sidelined in philosophical circles by the 
more formal and technical contributions of the analytic philosophers Richard Swinburne 
and Alvin Plantinga, as well as by the more provocative and puzzling contribution of the 
Wittgensteinian philosopher D. Z. Phillips.  The vast majority of work in contemporary 
philosophy of religion deals with these three figures rather than Mitchell, Hebblethwaite, 
or Allen.  Theological circles are both wider and more diffuse than philosophical ones, 
and generalisations consequently more difficult to come by.  But Roman Catholic 
theology is currently still engaged in the post-Vatican II rejection of Neo-Thomism, and 
has only just begun to digest John Paul II’s 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio which calls for 
a renewed faith in reason among Catholic philosophers and theologians.  In Protestant 
theology, perhaps the two most influential figures currently writing in English are Stanley 
Hauerwas and John Milbank: the former’s postliberal ‘Yale School’ narrative approach 
upholds a firmly Barthian rejection of natural theology, while the latter’s ‘Radical 
Orthodoxy’ seeks to transcend the canons of ‘secular reason’.  Feminist and liberation 
theologians are more focused on struggles for social justice and reinterpreting Christian 
doctrine in light of their specific concerns, and consequently tend to avoid 
epistemological and metaphysical issues as a distraction from what they regard as more 
urgent objectives.  And of course there are many, many other voices besides these.36 
                                                 
36 For a convenient collection of liberationist essays from various perspectives, see Susan Brooks 
Thistlewaite and Mary Potter Engel (eds.), Lift Every Voice: Constructing Christian Theologies from the 
Underside, Revised and Expanded Edition (Orbis Books, 1998).  In an interesting and sympathetic critique 
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In short, amidst this welter of conflicting positions and extreme pronouncements, 
the rather more modest assertions of Mitchell, Hebblethwaite, and Allen, advocating a 
patient and non-dramatic cumulative case approach to religious belief, seem to have been 
lost in the shuffle.  And Farrer’s own contribution to these debates has been even more 
neglected.  But is this wise?  I will now very briefly compare and contrast Farrer’s final 
position with three of the movements alluded to above which are currently exercising a 
stronger influence than Farrer on what most scholars think of as ‘the evidence of faith.’  
Readers may recall that in the Introduction I cited Hebblethwaite and Henderson’s 
observation that Allen’s interpretation of Farrer ‘does not claim here to give us a 
complete theological epistemology, of course.  But inasmuch as his and Farrer’s 
Augustinian view appears importantly different from classical foundationalism, from the 
Wittgensteinian view that belief in God is a form of life, and from Plantinga’s view that 
belief in God is properly basic, the effort to develop the idea in the context of a larger 
epistemology would seem well worth making.’37  While I cannot offer the desired ‘larger 
epistemology’ in the very few pages I have left at my disposal, I will at least bring Farrer 
into dialogue with those three movements before concluding the dissertation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the liberationist avoidance of key conceptual issues, Jeffrey Eaton points out that a troubling feature of 
liberation theology ‘for those who have been technically trained in academic theology is its adherence to 
Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, according to which the first priority is not to understand the world, 
but to change it.’  However, Eaton goes on to argue from an explicitly Farrerian viewpoint that unless God 
really does act in the world to liberate the oppressed, ‘liberation theology’ is a misnomer.  Liberation 
theologians, he claims, are thus committed, if only implicitly, to a certain view of divine action and, hence, 
metaphysics.  See Jeffrey Eaton, ‘Divine Action and Human Liberation,’ in Hebblethwaite and Henderson 
(eds.), Divine Action, 211-229 (citation from 211). 
37 Hebblethwaite and Henderson, ‘Introduction’ to Divine Action, 18. 
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The term ‘classical foundationalism’ has been polemically defined by its avowed 
opponents, the Reformed Epistemologists, and so will be discussed later in light of their 
own positive contribution.  In secular epistemology, however, foundationalism is ‘the 
view that knowledge and epistemic…justification have a two-tier structure: some 
instances of knowledge and justification are non-inferential, or foundational; and all other 
instances thereof are inferential, or non-foundational, in that they derive ultimately from 
foundational knowledge or justification.’38  Or, put differently, according to the 
foundationalist model, some knowledge is just immediately present to us and requires no 
further justification (hence it is labelled ‘foundational’), whereas other knowledge is not 
immediately present to us and thus requires some further epistemic labours on our part in 
order to be held reasonably.  As such non-foundational knowledge is not known 
immediately but only by (perhaps dubious) inference, it is regarded as less epistemically 
secure than the foundations themselves.  As Paul K. Moser states: ‘Versions of 
foundationalism differ on two main projects: (a) the precise explanation of the nature of 
non-inferential, or foundational, knowledge and justification, and (b) the specific 
explanation of how foundational knowledge and justification can be transmitted to non-
foundational beliefs.  Foundationalism allows for differences on these projects, since it is 
essentially a view about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification.’39  There 
is thus a variety of foundationalisms, of which classical foundationalism is only one. 
Foundationalism and its close cousin, evidentialism, are both normally associated 
with traditional natural theology.  According to evidentialism, religious beliefs cannot be 
                                                 
38 Paul K. Moser, ‘foundationalism’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), 276. 
39 Ibid., 276-277. 
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foundational, and so to be rational they must be supported by evidence or argument.40  
Thus, expressed in current terminology, traditional natural theology is seen to be 
committed to both foundationalism and evidentialism, in that it holds that while belief in 
God is indeed rational, it is not immediately known to us, but must be inferred from other 
things that we do know immediately (such as that some objects are in motion).  
Furthermore, however, traditional natural theology also holds that such inferred 
knowledge of God is deductively certain.  But, given the various critiques of reason 
discussed in Chapter Two, Section II, there are relatively few public adherents of a 
traditionally foundationalist / evidentialist natural theology in present-day philosophy of 
religion or theology.41 
Denys Turner, however, is a striking example of a contemporary Roman Catholic 
thinker who actually defends, à la Vatican I, the capacity of reason to not simply support 
but demonstrate the existence of God.  Moreover, his Faith, Reason, and the Existence of 
God is simultaneously a restatement and re-conception of the traditional Roman Catholic 
epistemology discussed in Chapter Two, and so may neatly be allowed to speak—if 
somewhat idiosyncratically—on behalf of that enormously influential body of thought as 
well.42  Turner unabashedly endorses the conventional reading of the documents of 
Vatican I, namely the Council’s claim that the existence of God can be ‘formally and 
validly proved by rational argument,’ and that ‘the capacity of reason must be such that 
                                                 
40 For ‘evidentialism’, see the entry by William Hasker in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 253. 
41 David Brown admitted to being a foundationalist in regard to religious belief in 1986, but in light of his 
later work it is less than clear that he would accept this label today.  See his ‘Wittgenstein Against the 
“Wittgensteinians”: A Reply to Kenneth Surin on The Divine Trinity’, in Modern Theology 2 (1986), 262.  
And even the Brown of 1986 was still only committed to the probabilistic approach associated with Basil 
Mitchell rather than traditional demonstrative natural theology.  
42 Denys Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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the certain knowledge of God from creatures lies within its reach strictly as reason.’43  He 
is careful to distinguish this epistemic optimism from a strong foundationalism, since 
although the Council insists that reason does indeed have this capacity, the documents 
‘say nothing at all about having to prove God’s existence by the natural light of reason 
before any Christian theology can get off the ground.’44  However, Turner concedes that 
‘there does appear to be a form of weak “foundationalism” implicit in the Vatican 
decrees’—and thus, by clear implication, in his own project as well.45 
Throughout this monograph, Turner stresses that he does not intend to actually 
produce a valid deductive demonstrative proof of the existence of God, but only to argue 
for the philosophical and theological possibility of such an argument.  Such an argument, 
he says, has three conditions: (1) it ‘must meet the ordinary, secular, conditions for 
inferential validity’; (2) it must ‘demonstrate that there is something which answers to the 
description “God”’ (which Turner here glosses as ‘Creator of all things out of nothing’); 
and (3) ‘the description “Creator of all things” must be shown to be quod omnes dicunt 
Deum’—that is, ‘the God of proof must be “extensionally equivalent” to the God of 
faith.’46  And, finally, the argument itself must centre around the question, ‘Why is there 
anything at all rather than nothing?’47  According to Turner, if someone can be brought to 
acknowledge the intelligibility of this question, they have already accepted theism.48 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 5. 
44 Ibid., 37 (emphasis added). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 226.   
47 Ibid., 233. 
48 Ibid., 242. This is the merest sketch of Turner’s subtle and sophisticated book.  For further analysis, 
including some self-defence against Turner’s critique of his own reading of Aquinas, see Fergus Kerr’s 
review in International Journal of Systematic Theology 7 (2005), 446-449. 
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 If Turner’s foundationalism is largely inspired by the Thomism of Vatican I, 
spiced with something of a postmodern twist, Reformed Epistemology is primarily 
associated with the Calvinists Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, but the late 
William P. Alston (personally Anglican rather than Reformed, but still included under the 
label) and various other philosophers are also numbered among this highly influential 
group.49  Their characteristic claim is that belief in God is rational—in their technical 
term, ‘properly basic’—even in the absence of any philosophical argument to that effect.  
Indeed, they further claim that requiring philosophical arguments on behalf of theistic 
belief is itself a philosophical mistake, entangled in the problematic epistemic 
frameworks of evidentialism and what they call ‘classical foundationalism’.  In their 
view, classical foundationalism is distinguished from foundationalism per se in that it 
specifies the criteria under which a belief may be foundational or properly basic.  
Namely, such a belief must be (1) self-evident, (2) evident to the senses, and/or (3) 
incorrigible.  This entails that for a belief to be rational it must be either properly basic 
(according to those criteria) or derived by valid forms of argument from a properly basic 
belief.  Again we see that (classical) foundationalism is closely allied with evidentialism, 
with foundationalism more concerned with structure and evidentialism with criteria. 
                                                 
49 The classic manifesto remains the essay collection co-edited by Plantinga and Wolterstorff, Faith and 
Rationality (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), which contains seminal essays by Plantinga, 
Wolterstorff, and Alston, among others.  But see also Wolterstorff’s earlier volume, Reason Within the 
Bounds of Religion, Second Edition (Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984) and important article, ‘The 
Migration of Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics’, in Robert Audi 
and William J. Wainwright (eds.) Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the 
Philosophy of Religion (Cornell University Press, 1986), 38-81; Alston’s Perceiving God: The 
Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cornell University Press, 1991); and Plantinga’s ‘Warrant trilogy,’ 
particularly Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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Reformed Epistemology, however, rejects both classical foundationalism and 
evidentialism and replaces them with another form of foundationalism in which different 
criteria for rational belief are in play.  Reformed Epistemology retains a foundationalist 
structure, but widens the criteria under which beliefs may be properly basic by including 
(among others) belief in God within the immediate, non-inferential, foundational beliefs.  
Plantinga, however, also insists that these anti-classical foundationalist and anti-
evidentialist claims do not amount to fideism.  Distinguishing extreme fideism from 
moderate fideism, he goes on to conclude that even though Reformed Epistemology 
rejects evidentialist natural theology, ‘the Reformed epistemologist is not a fideist at all 
with respect to belief in God.  He does not hold that there is any conflict between faith 
and reason here, and he does not even hold that we cannot attain this fundamental truth 
by reason; he holds, instead, that it is among the deliverances of reason.’50  Belief in God 
may not be self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible, but it is a belief that is 
nevertheless a ‘deliverance of reason’ and so therefore not held against or even without 
reason, or fideistically.51  This, however, is precisely what critics of the movement 
contest.  Recall that in Chapter Two I cited Terence Penelhum’s assertion—and Eleonore 
Stump’s denial—that Plantinga was an Evangelical Fideist.52 
                                                 
50 Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God,’ in Faith and Rationality, 90.  His discussion of fideism may be 
found on pages 74 and 87-91. 
51 In an interesting nuance, Plantinga admits that, in fact, ‘it is not wholly accurate to say that it is belief in 
God that is properly basic; more exactly, what are properly basic are such propositions as [‘God has created 
all this,’ ‘God forgives me,’ God is to be thanked and praised’], each of which self-evidently entails that 
God exists.  It is not the relatively high-level and general proposition God exists that is properly basic, but 
instead propositions detailing some of his attributes or actions.’ (81) 
52 See Chapter Two, page 90 and notes 62-63.  There is an endless and still proliferating secondary 
literature on Reformed Epistemology, both appreciative and critical.  The first full-length study (written, as 
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‘Reformed Epistemology’ is a positive, if slightly arch and provocative, self-
designation.  By contrast, the term ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ was coined by the atheist 
philosopher Kai Nielson in 1967 to designate what he regarded as a disturbing trend 
among philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein which aimed to insulate religious belief 
from rational critique.  According to his original article, Wittgensteinian Fideism makes 
the following eight claims (or ‘dark sayings’): 
1) The forms of language are the forms of life. 
2) What is given are the forms of life. 
3) Ordinary language is all right as it is. 
4) A philosopher’s task is not to evaluate or criticize language or the forms of life, 
but to describe them where necessary and to the extent necessary to break 
philosophical perplexity concerning their operation. 
5) The different modes of discourse which are distinctive forms of life all have a 
logic of their own. 
6) Forms of life taken as a whole are not amenable to criticism; each mode of 
discourse is in order as it is, for each has its own criteria and each sets its own 
norms of intelligibility, reality and rationality. 
7) These general, dispute-engendering concepts, namely intelligibility, reality and 
rationality are systematically ambiguous; their exact meaning can only be 
determined in the context of a determinate way of life. 
8) There is no Archimedean point in terms of which a philosopher (or for that matter 
anyone else) can relevantly criticize whole modes of discourse, or, what comes to 
the same thing, ways of life, for each mode of discourse has its own specific 
criteria of rationality/irrationality, intelligibility/unintelligibility and 
reality/unreality.53 
 
Nielson’s construal of Wittgensteinian Fideism was (allegedly) drawn from the 
work of several philosophers, mainly Norman Malcolm, Peter Winch, and G. E. Hughes.  
But the term soon came to be irrevocably associated with the prolific and influential 
Welsh philosopher Dewi Zephaniah Phillips (1934-2006)—very much to his chagrin.  
                                                                                                                                                 
it happens, by an advocate) was Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An 
Introduction to Reformed Epistemology (State University of New York Press, 1991).    
53 Kai Nielson, ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism,’ originally published in Philosophy 42 (1967), 191-209, reprinted 
in Kai Nielson and D. Z. Phillips, Wittgensteinian Fideism? (SCM Press, 2005), 21-38 (citation from 22). 
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Phillips spent much time and energy disavowing the term as applied to him, or as 
anything like an accurate account of what a truly Wittgensteinian understanding of both 
philosophy and religion might entail.  Shortly before his death, Phillips and Nielson 
collaborated on a useful volume titled Wittgensteinian Fideism? which sought 
(unsuccessfully) to conclusively settle the exegetical and conceptual issues in their 
debate. 
In his introduction to this book, although Béla Szabados seems to side with 
Phillips on the substantive matters at hand, he also gently points out that, if not given the 
specific interpretation provided by Nielson in the eight statements above, there is no 
reason why Phillips—or Wittgenstein, for that matter—should abhor being called a 
Wittgensteinian fideist.54  Both Penelhum and Henderson certainly read Phillips as a 
fideist of sorts, with Penelhum seeing him as a Conformist Fideist.55  For good or ill, by 
contrast with more rationalistic thinkers such as Turner or Swinburne, or even Plantinga 
and Wolterstorff, any philosopher of religion inspired by Wittgenstein is going to be 
associated with Wittgensteinian Fideism, whether they like it or not: the term has taken 
on a life of its own.  Rather than rejecting it entirely, Wittgensteinian philosophers should 
attempt to modify its specific meaning and pejorative connotations so that it becomes a 
positive self-designation, like ‘Reformed Epistemology,’ rather than a polemical slur.  
Given my survey and analysis of ‘fideism’ in Chapter Two, this should not be difficult.  
A Wittgensteinian Fideist would thus be any philosopher of religion inspired by the later 
                                                 
54 See Béla Szabados, ‘Introduction: Wittgensteinian Fideism 1967-89—An Appreciation,’ in Nielson and 
Phillips, 14-15.   
55 For Penelhum, see the internal references cited in note 52 above; for Henderson, see his article ‘Austin 
Farrer and D. Z. Phillips on Lived Faith, Prayer, and Divine Reality’ cited in note 13 above. 
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Wittgenstein who, rather like the Reformed Epistemologists but for somewhat different 
reasons, consequently rejects evidentialism and classical foundationalism.  In accepting 
the label, a Wittgensteinian Fideist is in no way committed to accepting Nielson’s eight 
claims or his interpretation of what they mean (for example, the precise nature and range 
of ‘a form of life’).56 
 Obviously, each of these three movements requires far more space to fully 
articulate their significance and nuances, but this abbreviated treatment must suffice for 
now.  Leaving aside the Thomist-inspired Anglican ‘semi-fideism’ of Finite and Infinite, 
where does the religious epistemology of the later Farrer fit into this picture?  As argued 
in Chapter Four, in strict genetic-chronological terms I distinguish between the de facto 
‘moderate fideism’ of the first chapter of Saving Belief (the ‘middle Farrer’) and the 
slightly stronger Allen-influenced de jure ‘moderate methodological fideism’ of the first 
chapter of Faith and Speculation (the ‘late Farrer’).  But if the first chapter of Faith and 
Speculation is then integrated with the interactionist epistemology of subsequent 
chapters, as Farrer clearly intended, then that technical difference vanishes almost to 
nothing, and we can see Farrer’s moderate fideism organically linked to his conviction 
that we only come to know God through exercising our actual relation with God—that is, 
                                                 
56 The literature here is immense.  For a slightly dated but still very helpful start, see Joseph M. Incandela, 
‘The Appropriation of Wittgenstein’s Work by Philosophers of Religion: Towards a Re-evaluation and an 
End’, Religious Studies 21 (1985), 457-474.  And for two more recent conversations, see Stephen Mulhall, 
‘Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion’ (95-118) and Walford Gealy, ‘Wittgenstein and the 
Philosophy of Religion: a Reply to Stephen Mulhall’ (119-143), both in D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin 
(eds.), Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century (Palgrave, 2001); and Cyril Barrett, ‘The Wittgensteinian 
Revolution’ with a ‘Postscript’ by Brian R. Clack, in Harriet A. Harris and Christopher J. Insole (eds.), 
Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 61-75. 
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by obedient engagement with the divine will.  So here I will leave aside my diachronic 
scrupulosity and synchronically conflate just these two texts.  Given the fluidity of 
Farrer’s thought and his elusiveness as a moving target, spreading his final epistemic 
position over Saving Belief and Faith and Speculation seems to be a reasonable 
compromise.  How then would Farrer, so construed, relate to contemporary religious 
epistemology?  I will focus here on Farrer’s moderate fideism, and turn to his 
interactionist epistemology in the next and final section. 
 Again, far more briefly than these matters warrant, I argue that Farrer would 
reject Turner’s attempt to rehabilitate the epistemology of Vatican I as too rationalistic.  
While he would deeply appreciate Turner’s desire to broaden and deepen of the concept 
of ‘reason’ beyond mere ratiocination—which bears some resemblance to Farrer’s own 
earlier, anti-positivistic view in Finite and Infinite—he would part company with 
Turner’s continued insistence on the need for demonstrative, deductive proof or certainty.  
As we saw repeatedly in Chapters Three and Four, Farrer never held that reason could 
offer that degree of certitude, and always thought the quest for it was chimerical at best.  
His late comments about papal infallibility are set within a broader epistemic conviction 
that in our mental lives we must choose between ‘appropriate procedures admitted 
fallible and pretended infallible procedures proved inappropriate.’57  Since all 
‘appropriate procedures’ are fallible, this rules out any deductive certainty, in religion as 
well as all other intellectual matters. 
                                                 
57 From ‘Infallibility and Historical Revelation’, in Austin Farrer, et. al., Infallibility in the Church: An 
Anglican-Catholic Dialogue (Darton, Longman and Todd, 1968), 9-23—an abridged version may be found 
in Ann Loades and Robert MacSwain (eds.), The Truth-Seeking Heart: Austin Farrer and His Writings 
(Canterbury Press, 2006), 81-93.  This citation is from page 89 of the abridged version. 
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Farrer’s relation to Reformed Epistemology and Wittgensteinian Fideism is more 
complex, partly because of his close affinities with certain aspects of each movement, 
and partly because as collective phenomena they are internally more diverse than the 
work of individual philosophers such as Turner.  Reformed Epistemology has gone 
through several stages, and in its current manifestation it is producing ever more 
sophisticated epistemic frameworks.  Perhaps contrary to Hebblethwaite and Henderson’s 
observation cited above, I think that the later Farrer (and early Allen) are extremely close 
to the simpler ‘classic’ position contained in the Plantinga-and-Wolterstorff-edited Faith 
and Rationality which maintained—with less conceptual machinery than their present 
versions—that belief in God is rational without requiring philosophical support.58  
Indeed, I would go so far as to argue that Farrer and Allen put forward an epistemic 
proposal in the late 1960s that was almost indistinguishable from what Plantinga and 
Wolterstorff unveiled in the early 1980s, but that Farrer and Allen were simply dismissed 
out-of-hand due to the stranglehold of classical foundationalism and evidentialism.  It 
took another fifteen years before a very similar proposal was able to receive a fair 
hearing, in a radically different intellectual climate in which the rigid empiricism and 
logical rigorism of Anglo-American philosophy were gradually tempered into something 
more hospitable to soft rationalism and moderate fideism.  This is in fact the explicit 
narrative arc of Mitchell’s essay ‘Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion,’ in 
                                                 
58 For some discussion about the progressive stages of this movement, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
‘Reformed Epistemology’ in Phillips and Tessin (eds.), Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century, 39-63.  
Stephen J. Wykstra’s ‘On Behalf of the Evidentialist—a Response to Wolterstorff’ (64-84) is an able and 
interesting interrogation of Reformed Epistemology from a fellow Dutch Reformed philosopher and former 
colleague of both Plantinga and Wolterstorff on the faculty of Calvin College, Michigan, but one who does 
not share their epistemic commitments. 
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which he describes how he eventually became more receptive to Farrer’s argument in 
Faith and Speculation, and in which he himself goes on to argue for a mediating position 
between Swinburne’s ‘rationalism’ and Wolterstorff’s ‘fideism.’59  And, to the extent that 
both Farrer and Reformed Epistemology appeal to some form of religious experience, 
however that contested concept is understood, they merit Penelhum’s appellation of 
‘evangelical’.60 
Likewise, although Farrer would never assent to the version of Wittgensteinian 
Fideism defined by Nielson, which is equivalent to conceptual relativism, several 
commentators have rightly noted a ‘Wittgensteinian’ character to the later Farrer’s 
thought.61  While this may be due partly to the explicit influence of Wittgenstein on 
Allen’s dissertation, Farrer himself undoubtedly read at least the Tractatus and probably 
Philosophical Investigations as well.62  His descriptions of humanity as talking animals, 
of thought as internal speech, and of the social, cultural, and linguistic context of 
rationality all have provocative echoes in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.63  And Farrer’s 
                                                 
59 In Eaton and Loades (eds.), For God and Clarity, 117-190. 
60 See Brown’s essay, ‘Experience Skewed,’ cited in note 25, for more discussion of the various types of 
religious experience and the diverse appeals to them in contemporary philosophy of religion and theology.   
61 It is interesting to note that Nielson’s article was published in 1967, the same year as Farrer’s Faith and 
Speculation and Plantinga’s God and Other Minds.  It is also interesting to note that two years later Nielson 
wrote a fairly positive review of Allen’s The Reasonableness of Faith, the published version of his Yale 
dissertation, despite its own Wittgensteinian and fideistic tendencies.  See Kai Nielsen, Review of Diogenes 
Allen, The Reasonableness of Faith, in Theology Today 26 (1969), 344-346. 
62 As always, it is difficult to know what Farrer read, aside from the classics of Western philosophy and 
theology.  However, he does mention Wittgenstein in passing in The Freedom of the Will (A. & C. Black, 
1958), 271, and given the date of this volume he was probably referring to the Investigations (1953). 
63 For an essay that offers a Wittgensteinian reading of Farrer, although with anthropological rather than 
epistemic interests, see my ‘Imperfect Lives and Perfect Love: Austin Farrer, Stanley Hauerwas, and the 
Reach of Divine Redemption’, in Natalie K. Watson and Stephen Burns (eds.), Exchanges of Grace: Essays 
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characteristic phrases from Faith and Speculation of ‘life-in-grace’ and ‘life-in-God’ bear 
at least a ‘family resemblance’ to Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life.’64  To the extent that 
Farrer is willing to take ‘the cultural history of our race’ along with a pre-established 
tradition of the theistic interpretation of the world as ‘givens,’ then he—like Phillips— 
merits Penelhum’s appellation of ‘conformist.’65  As I have argued all along, the later 
Farrer is a moderate fideist with both evangelical and conformist tendencies.  He thus 
belongs somewhere between Reformed Epistemology and Wittgensteinian Fideism (as I 
have widened the term).  Where his moderate fideism differs from theirs is perhaps in the 
precise nature of his appeal to some form of religious experience—i.e., interaction with 
God—to which I now turn to conclude. 
    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Honour of Ann Loades (SCM Press, 2008), 142-154.  Henderson’s essays ‘Valuing in Knowing God’ 
and ‘Austin Farrer and D. Z. Phillips on Lived Faith, Prayer, and Divine Reality’ also bring out various 
Wittgensteinian elements of Farrer’s thought.  And as its title indicates, the latter essay compares and 
contrasts Farrer and Phillips on those three topics. 
64 See, for example, Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 47 and 130.   
65 See ibid., 1.  However, in comments on an earlier version of this chapter, David Brown stated, ‘I think it 
is one thing to say that there are parallels with Wittgenstein, quite another to talk of parallels with Phillips.  
I would have thought that Farrer would have been prepared to be revisionist in a way that Phillips scarcely 
allows.  In other words, [Farrer] does not see himself as engaged on a purely descriptive exercise.’  I 
concede this point, and refer readers to Henderson’s second essay above for a more sustained discussion of 
Farrer and Phillips.  Brown’s observation about Farrer’s openness to revision of the tradition is, however, 
an interestingly contested one, in that Farrer is often held up as a champion of conservative (Anglo-
Catholic) orthodoxy.  Instead, I—like Brown—read him as a moderate ‘liberal catholic’.  Farrer’s 
‘conformism’ is thus of a different quality and order from Phillips’s, being less global and thorough-going.  
Although, as I go on to say in the main text, Farrer has both ‘evangelical’ and ‘conformist’ tendencies, they 
are not evenly balanced, but weighted toward the ‘evangelical’.   
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III. Conclusion: ‘It is solved by sacrifice’ 
In Chapter Three I cited both I. M. Crombie’s Platonic description of Farrer: 
‘Though no Platonist, he perhaps had a somewhat Platonic conception of philosophy—
that it is essentially dialogue, that there can be no formulation of the truth so lapidary that 
it cannot be misunderstood, and that what needs to be said in some context depends on 
what is being misunderstood in that context’; and Charles Conti’s comparison of Farrer 
with Wittgenstein: ‘In many respects, the evolution of Farrer’s thought to natural forms 
of belief paralleled Wittgenstein’s movement from the Tractatus to the Investigations, 
allowing for the living functions of religious language in the later work.’66  I then stated 
that although I would develop this comparison with Wittgenstein rather differently from 
Conti, taking it in an epistemological rather than a metaphysical direction, I would 
nevertheless argue in due course that Conti’s Wittgensteinian comparison combined with 
Crombie’s Platonic description points towards perhaps the most fruitful appropriation of 
Farrer’s philosophical legacy.  It is now time for me to conclude this dissertation by 
making this argument explicit. 
 To begin with a mea culpa: a serious omission in this dissertation is any sustained 
attention to the contested concepts of ‘faith’ and ‘reason’ themselves.  Although I 
devoted an entire chapter to fideism and although I have in passing discussed several 
ways in which faith and reason have been, or are, or should be understood, for the most 
part I have worked with implicit definitions of these two foundational terms for both 
philosophy of religion and Christian theology.  If I had more space, I would devote it 
                                                 
66 I. M. Crombie, ‘Farrer, Austin Marsden (1904-1968),’ in The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography:  
Volume 19 (Oxford University Press, 2004), 121-122; Charles Conti, Metaphysical Personalism: An 
Analysis of Austin Farrer’s Theistic Metaphysics (Clarendon Press, 1995), xviii. 
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towards filling this lacuna.  In terms of faith, I would explore the important distinction 
between faith-as-theological virtue (‘saving faith’) and faith-as-epistemic concept (‘initial 
faith’), and so engage more thoroughly with Christian doctrine.  In terms of reason, I 
would return to the section on postmodernism in Chapter Two and Turner’s Faith, 
Reason, and the Existence of God in this chapter and engage more thoroughly with the 
current attempts to redefine, contract, or expand what we mean by this characteristically 
human capacity.67  I would also consider in more detail the relevance of secular studies of 
contemporary epistemology—e.g., debates about foundationalism and evidentialism, 
internalism and externalism, pragmatism and neo-pragmatism—as well as Stanley 
Hauerwas’s theological appropriation of Alistair MacIntyre’s understanding of reason as 
always shaped and normed by a particular tradition.68  But these investigations must wait 
for another occasion.  
 In my Introduction, I said that one goal of this dissertation was to shift the study 
of Farrer away from a predominantly metaphysical bias toward a more epistemological 
one.  I also said that once the fideistic character of Farrer’s thought was taken into 
account, one could see that (contra Conti) the later Farrer fully accepted the prospect of a 
non-metaphysical foundation for philosophical theology, indeed perhaps a non-
                                                 
67 This, I take it, is also at the heart of debates around Fides et Ratio—although I note in passing that, even 
though that papal encyclical technically endorses the epistemology of Vatican I, it does not explicitly 
commit itself to the view that a demonstrative proof or absolute certainty is actually possible, but only that 
belief in God is indeed rational.  Fides et Ratio is thus, arguably, semi-fideistic (and hence Anglican!) in its 
epistemology. 
68 See Hauerwas’s 2000/2001 Gifford Lectures at the University of St Andrews, published as With the 
Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology (Brazos Press, 2001 / SCM Press, 
2002), which are heavily indebted to MacIntyre’s own Gifford Lectures, delivered in Edinburgh in 1988 
and published as Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). 
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foundational position altogether.  This is precisely is what it means to start with faith.  It 
may still be urged, however, that my focus on epistemology rather than metaphysics is 
itself problematic in various ways—and I would entirely agree.  In light of Crombie’s 
Platonic description, I endorse the view that philosophy and theology are both essentially 
dialogue, that lapidary clarity will always elude us, and thus that what needs to be said 
depends in part on what is being misunderstood.  It is an ongoing conversation.  So it 
would be deeply unfaithful to Farrer’s endlessly restless and rethinking mind to say, ‘This 
is the definitive interpretation—stop here.’  While I am convinced that the preceding 
chapters have opened up a new and helpful angle on Farrer’s thought, I would not 
recommend that we simply replace a metaphysical approach with an epistemological one 
and leave it at that.  Rather, we must continue to move on in this direction and see where 
it takes us. 
And so, in light of Conti’s Wittgensteinian comparison, consider Walford Gealy’s 
claim that  
Wittgenstein’s thinking forms part of a wider philosophical movement that 
became ultimately responsible for placing logical considerations at the heart of 
philosophical activity, and that for the greater part of the twentieth century.  What 
this concern with logic displaced was epistemology—a discipline which, in 
Wittgenstein’s earlier work, was relegated to the realm of psychology, while in 
his later work, epistemology is seen to be, as most other philosophical issues, the 
product of conceptual confusion.69 
 
Wittgenstein thus reorients us ‘away from epistemology and towards logic.’70  Fully 
aware that this may be a controversial reading of Wittgenstein (can there be one that 
isn’t?), I would nevertheless follow the flow of Gealy’s argument here and suggest that if 
my dissertation has reoriented Farrer studies away from metaphysics and towards 
                                                 
69 Walford Gealy, ‘Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion: a Reply to Stephen Mulhall’, 120. 
70 Ibid., 121. 
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epistemology, then in these final pages I would encourage a further reorientation away 
from epistemology and towards—not logic—but spirituality. 
 In making this suggestion, I am in fact returning us to the theme of the very first 
monograph ever published on Farrer: Charles C. Helfling Jr.’s Jacob’s Ladder: Theology 
and Spirituality in the Thought of Austin Farrer (still a valuable study).71  After centuries 
of disconnect, the mutual relationships between philosophy, theology, and spirituality are 
now much discussed in academic circles and have become a source of fermentation and 
insight.72  However, as with his metaphysical and epistemological convictions, Farrer was 
decades ahead of his time in this area as well.73  As Stephen Platten put it, alluding to a 
famous passage from The Glass of Vision, Farrer’s thought was ‘diaphanous’ and so 
diverse elements could merge therein.74  Even his later purely philosophical work, as we 
have seen, insists on the necessity of interaction with God as the primary path of religious 
epistemology, and so has an explicitly ‘spiritual’ character.  Farrer would thus escape the 
trenchant critique Harriet A. Harris offers of Reformed Epistemology, namely that 
                                                 
71 (Cowley Publications, 1979). See also Hefling’s article on Farrer in Gordon S. Wakefield (ed.), The 
Westminster Dictionary of Christian Spirituality (The Westminster Press, 1983), 146-147. 
72 For an overview of developments in theology, see Mark A. McIntosh, ‘Theology and Spirituality’, in 
David F. Ford with Rachel Muers (eds.), The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology 
since 1918, Third Edition (Blackwell, 2005), 392-407.  In philosophy of religion, recent examples include 
Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender (Blackwell, 2002) and John 
Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
73 For studies of this aspect of Farrer’s legacy, see Diogenes Allen, ‘Farrer’s Spirituality’, in Hein and 
Henderson (eds.), Captured by the Crucified, 47-65; Richard Harries, ‘“We Know On Our Knees”: 
Intellectual, Imaginative, and Spiritual Unity in the Theology of Austin Farrer’, in Hebblethwaite and 
Henderson (eds.), Divine Action, 21-33; Gordon Mursell, English Spirituality: From 1700 to the Present 
Day (SPCK, 2001), 449-460; and Stephen Platten, ‘Diaphanous Thought: Spirituality and Theology in the 
Work of Austin Farrer’, in Anglican Theological Review 69 (1987), 30-50. 
74 See Platten’s essay cited above.  The passage is The Glass of Vision (Dacre Press, 1948), 7-8. 
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despite its commendable anti-evidentialism, it still ‘wastes the opportunity’ to appeal to 
personal spiritual development and a deeper theological framework when it considers the 
nature and justification of religious belief.  Although she does not mention Farrer as a 
counter-example of a philosopher who does in fact take account of these matters, he 
certainly fits the description.75    
While Farrer wrote several devotional works—the first as far back as 1952—his 
unusual fusion of spiritual and conceptual concerns is perhaps best displayed in his 
sermons.76  Of these, quite a number—particularly those preached to Oxford 
undergraduates—deal explicitly with the relation between faith and reason, belief and 
doubt, in light of then-current philosophical challenges.  While some of these texts 
express in a homiletical mode ideas that Farrer elsewhere discusses almost verbatim in 
his more academic writings, in others he allows himself to venture into new territory.  
And this explorative, imaginative, creative character is perhaps most apparent in his 
comments on the epistemic value of ‘saints’—individuals of notably holy or Christ-like 
lives.  Those familiar with Farrer’s devotional and homiletical works will know that this 
                                                 
75 See her ‘Does Analytical Philosophy Clip our Wings?: Reformed Epistemology as a Test Case’, in Harris 
and Insole (eds.), Faith and Philosophical Analysis, 100-118. 
76 For the early devotional work—itself primarily a collection of paragraph-long homilies—see The Crown 
of the Year: Weekly Paragraphs for the Holy Sacrament (Dacre Press, 1952).  The sermons proper were 
published in five volumes, four of which were posthumous; a convenient collection is Austin Farrer, The 
Essential Sermons, edited and introduced by Leslie Houlden (SPCK, 1991).  For some comments from a 
purely homiletic angle, see O. C. Edwards and David Hein, ‘Farrer’s Preaching: “Some Taste of the Things 
We Describe”’, in Hein and Henderson (eds.), Captured by the Crucified, 173-195; and J. Barry Vaughn, 
‘Resurrection and Grace: The Sermons of Austin Farrer’, in Preaching 9 (1994), 61-63.  Jeffrey Eaton’s 
chapter ‘The Experiment of Faith,’ The Logic of Theism (201-259) deals at length with the theological and 
philosophical content of Farrer’s sermons, and includes a helpful appendix which classifies them according 
to three categories: ‘For Reason,’ ‘For Faith,’ and ‘For Grace’ (258-259).  Eaton also touches briefly on 
what I call ‘the epistemic value of the saints’ in this excellent treatment of Farrer’s work here.       
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theme emerges again and again and was obviously close to his heart.  It is perhaps most 
fully expressed in ‘Narrow and Broad’ and ‘Double Thinking’. 
 In ‘Narrow and Broad,’ Farrer considers the difficulty of how to assess the quality 
of the ‘evidence of faith.’  Is it widely accessible or restricted to only a select few?  Who 
can perceive it, and how?  In order to answer these questions, Farrer replies, somewhat 
obliquely: 
I knew a man whose name, though uncanonized, I shall always silently mention 
when I recall at the altar of God those saints whose fellowship gives reality to our 
prayers; a man who sacrificed in the prime of his age a life which he had never 
lived for himself; a man whose eyes sparkled with all the passions, pity, 
indignation, sorrow, love, delight, but never for himself; unless it is more proper 
to say, Yes, for himself; since he had made God’s loves and God’s concerns his 
own, and had no others that you would greatly notice.77 
 
Farrer then immediately states, rather provocatively: 
Such a life, then, is evidence, and what other evidence could you hope to 
find?....[Humanity] knows God only by yielding to him; we do not know the 
fountain of our being, so long as we are occupied in stopping it with mud.  So the 
saint is our evidence, and other men, of course, for the glimpses of sanctity we see 
in them.78 
 
Indeed, Farrer flatly asserts, ‘The evidence of faith is incorrigibly aristocratic.’79  Here we 
see the familiar theme of knowing God through interaction, and especially through 
obedience, combined with the new conviction that saintly lives are the primary 
                                                 
77 Originally published in Said or Sung: An Arrangement of Homily and Verse (The Faith Press, 1960); 
reprinted in, and here cited from, Loades and MacSwain (eds.), The Truth-Seeking Heart, 187.  This 
uncanonized saint was the Aberdonian Anglican priest and British Army chaplain Hugh Evelyn Jackson 
Lister (1901-1944), of whom Eaton writes that he ‘most fully embodies Farrer’s ideal of the faithful 
person’ (The Logic of Theism, 216).  For an indispensible study of the close friendship between Farrer and 
Lister, Lister’s remarkable life, ministry, and death, and the relevance of all this to the topic at hand, see 
David Hein, ‘Farrer on Friendship, Sainthood, and the Will of God,’ in Hein and Henderson (eds.), 
Captured by the Crucified, 119-148. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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‘evidence’ for such interaction.  Rather than nature or logic, Farrer tells us, ‘the saint is 
our evidence.’ 
 Then in his sermon ‘Double Thinking,’ Farrer makes some candid admissions.  
He confesses that even in sharp debate with an atheistic philosopher his own faith is not 
in danger, for ‘since God has shown me a ray of his goodness, I cannot doubt him on the 
ground that someone has made up some new logical puzzles about him.  It is too late in 
the day to tell me that God does not exist, the God with whom I have so long conversed, 
and whom I have seen active in several living men of real sanctity, not to mention the 
canonized saints.’80  Towards the end of the sermon come two paragraphs worth citing in 
full, both for what they reveal about the nature and extent of Farrer’s ‘fideism,’ and for 
how he believed saints provided the necessary evidence to overcome what he frankly 
regarded as intellectually irresolvable difficulties with Christian belief: 
When the logicians say that there is a certain inevitable division between 
spiritual thinking and natural thinking, they are in a certain sense right.  We can’t 
reconcile the spiritual picture of things and the everyday picture of things 
completely on the intellectual level.  If we claimed to be able to do it, we should 
claim to comprehend the ways of God as well as we comprehend the ways of this 
world, and that would be an exaggerated claim.  We see God in pictures, in 
images only, reflected in a glass and riddlingly says St Paul: and we cannot fuse 
our picture of God perfectly with our picture of the natural world.  There always 
remains a certain discontinuity, a certain incoherence on the intellectual level. 
The saints confute the logicians, but they do not confute them by logic but 
by sanctity.  They do not prove the real connection between the religious symbols 
and the everyday realities by logical demonstration, but by life.  Solvitur 
ambulando, said someone about Zeno’s paradox, which proves the impossibility 
of physical motion.  It is solved by walking.  Solvitur immolando, says the saint, 
about the paradox of the logicians.  It is solved by sacrifice.  I can offer my life to 
the God who has shown me his face in the glass of riddles.  The God who is seen 
in the sphere of religion takes control in the sphere of conduct, and there he gives 
me, unworthy, the help of his holy spirit.81 
                                                 
80 Originally published in A Celebration of Faith, edited by Leslie Houlden (Hodder and Stoughton, 1970), 
here cited from The Truth-Seeking Heart, 197.  
81 Ibid., 199-200. 
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There is an enormous amount of material to unpack in those two paragraphs that I 
must leave largely untouched, but here in just 244 words is the constructive argument of 
this entire dissertation.  Up to this point, my concerns have been primarily historical and 
analytic, trying to understand the development of Farrer’s religious epistemology, clear 
away confusions and misinterpretations, and articulate what he was actually trying to say.  
Any defense or endorsement of Farrer’s views have been only implicit in my attempts to 
take his epistemological contribution more seriously than most previous commentators.  
However, in these final pages I must now finally move into an explicitly constructive 
mode and so will make Farrer’s moderate fideist argument my own—but only when 
augmented by the interaction with God we see in the lives of others and, crucially, 
experience within ourselves.  As Farrer says in Faith and Speculation, and as I likewise 
accept, ‘Our position is that theism must be lived as well as thought; and equally that 
without being thought it cannot be lived.’82  Here we see the essential symbiotic balance 
between life and thought, faith and reason, experience and intellect.  This theme goes all 
the way back to Farrer’s undergraduate correspondence in which—wrestling with 
questions of church membership and vocation—he concluded that some truths can only 
be known from inside, and only verified by life.  He maintained this conviction up to 
Faith and Speculation—and beyond. 
What now follows is of course more assertion than argumentation, and would 
require extensive qualification to stand, but I believe it is worth our consideration.  All 
Christians, at any rate, I contend, must indeed accept ‘a sort of fideism’—that is, 
moderate fideism—because I agree with Farrer that in rightly bringing our rational minds 
                                                 
82 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 130. 
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to bear on the claims of faith there ‘always remains a certain discontinuity, a certain 
incoherence on the intellectual level.’  But in seeking to resolve those inevitable 
paradoxes which the logicians helpfully bring to our attention, I also accept that the 
demonstration of the truth of our faith actually takes place not ‘by logical demonstration, 
but by life.’83  And not just by ‘any old (form of) life,’ but a life freely surrendered to 
God.  As Farrer says, ‘It is solved by sacrifice.’  But the sacrifice of which he speaks, the 
sacrifice of the saints, is not (as the logicians suppose) the sacrifice of their intellect—but 
rather of their will.   
It is clear that Farrer hears the triumphant cry, Solvitur immolando, most vividly 
in Christ himself and the great saints of the Church.  Perhaps Farrer’s most famous 
sermon is titled, ‘Walking Sacraments,’ in which he memorably suggests that someone 
ordained to the priesthood and entrusted with the sacraments of the Church ‘is 
sacramental himself; he is, one might say, a walking sacrament.’84  If priests are walking 
sacraments, then I suggest that, for Farrer, saints are incarnate arguments.  They are 
living instantiations of the truth of our faith.  They are, in short, witnesses.85 
                                                 
83 There is an interesting echo here of Coleridge’s statements in Aids to Reflection about knowing the truth 
of Christianity.  Coleridge asks, ‘How can I comprehend this?  How is this to be proved?  To the first 
question I should answer: Christianity is not a Theory, or a Speculation; but a Life….To the second: TRY 
IT.’  Cited in ‘Not a Theory, but a Life,’  Lucy Beckett’s joint review of Ann Loades and Robert MacSwain 
(eds.), The Truth-Seeking Heart: Austin Farrer and His Writings and Brian Hebblethwaite and Douglas 
Hedley (eds.), The Human Person in God’s World: Studies to Commemorate the Austin Farrer Centenary, 
in Times Literary Supplement (3 August 2007), 23.  In regard to Hedley’s own contribution to The Human 
Person in God’s World—‘Austin Farrer’s Shaping Spirit of Imagination’ (106-134)—Beckett says that ‘the 
connections (or unconscious similarities) between Farrer and Coleridge become clearer and clearer.’ (24)  
84 Preached on 22 December 1968, just seven days before Farrer’s death, and originally published in A 
Celebration of Faith, here cited from The Truth-Seeking Heart, 140. 
85 For a somewhat similar understanding of the value of holy lives in the life of the Church but which uses 
the language of ‘witness’ rather than ‘saint,’ see Hauerwas’s With the Grain of the Universe, Chapter 8, 
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Rowan Williams makes a remarkably similar claim as well.  In a recent All 
Saints’ Day sermon he stated: 
Witnesses establish the truth by giving evidence.  It really is as simple as that.  
When we celebrate the saints, we celebrate those who have given evidence, who 
have made God believable by how they have lived and how they have died.  The 
saints are the people who recognise that arguments will finally not win the day.  
God does not make himself credible by argument [but] by lives and deaths that 
make him credible, that make Jesus tangible here and now.86 
 
Likewise, in Williams’s book Tokens of Trust, he draws from the Jewish martyr Etty 
Hillesum—who died in Auschwitz in 1943 at the age of twenty-nine—the view that 
concrete but fallible human lives, rather than abstract but infallible arguments, must ‘take 
responsibility for making God credible in the world.’87 
But if Farrer sees such incarnate arguments most persuasively in Christ and the 
great saints, he also sees them—albeit less strongly—in the lives of certain people he has 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘The Necessity of Witness’ (205-241).  The epistemic value of such holy lives, while not a major topic in 
contemporary philosophy and theology, has been occasionally discussed.  In addition to David Hein’s 
chapter cited in note 77 above, see, for example, Victoria S. Harrison, ‘Human Holiness as Religious 
Apologia’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 46 (1999), 63-82; Grace B. Jantzen, 
‘Conspicuous Sanctity and Religious Belief’, in William J. Abraham and Steven W. Holtzer (eds.), The 
Rationality of Religious Belief: Essays in Honour of Basil Mitchell (Clarendon Press, 1987), 121-140; and 
Patrick J. Sherry, ‘Philosophy and the Saints’, in The Heythrop Journal 18 (1977), 23-37.  See also the 
interesting, more ethically-oriented exchange between Susan Wolf and Robert Merrihew Adams: her 
‘Moral Saints’, in Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), 419-439, and his ‘Saints’, in The Journal of Philosophy 
81 (1984), 392-401, reprinted in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 164-173. 
86 Rowan Williams, All Saints’ Day sermon at All Saints’ Margaret Street, London (1 November 2009), on-
line at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/2603 (accessed 19 November 2009). 
87 Rowan Williams, Tokens of Trust: An Introduction to Christian Belief (Canterbury Press, 2007), 22.  
Williams’s use of Hillesum raises the vital issue of the evidence of holy lives outside of Christianity, which 
neither Farrer nor I would wish to deny or downplay.  Although I am writing as a Christian and using 
mostly Christian examples in this final section of the chapter, and although I would argue that Christian 
saints may indeed function as part of a larger argument for the truth of Christianity, in more general terms 
the undoubted existence of holy lives as found in various other religions functions as evidence for theism.   
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actually met.  And, indeed, once again, crucially, for such incarnate arguments to be at all 
effective, they must be heard and seen, however faintly, even in our own lives.  In one of 
Farrer’s greatest sermons, ‘The Burning-Glass,’ he says that it is ‘useless to preach unless 
we can claim some taste of the things we describe; just enough taste of them to interpret 
what we hear from the saints, or see in them.’88  He explains that he does not mean 
dramatic religious experiences but something far more mundane—yet still remarkable—
and necessary not just for the preacher but for those who listen as well:  
The saints who have crucified their wills are the visible incarnations of grace.  
Grace triumphs in them during this mortal life; they love the love and will the will 
of God.  And though we are not so, God gives us grace, even to us.  We are 
incorporate in Jesus with all the saints, we eat and drink him in the sacrament.  
And are there no fruits?  Certainly there are fruits.  There is the fruit of continual 
repentance.  Again and again our most uncrucified will is reunited with the cross; 
we are forgiven and accepted as living parts of Christ.  Moreover by grace we 
receive many good desires, and the expulsion of many that are evil.  We pray for 
those whom we dislike, and care for them; we pray to do the duties we detest, and 
delight in them.  Such are the fruits of grace; and to such fruits ordinary Christians 
can testify.89    
 
In short, if ‘the saint is our evidence,’ then we must see that evidence—‘the evidence of 
faith’—in our own lives as well.  Not just externally, in others, but internally, in 
ourselves.  We too must incarnate the argument, or evidence, for God in order for it to be 
persuasive for us.  We too must strive to become saints.90 
But is there, in fact, any such evidence to be found, either in those whom we call 
saints or in our own rather less impressive lives?  Farrer himself has been called a saint 
by his admirers, and certainly he at least tried to be an ‘incarnate argument’ for the truth 
                                                 
88 ‘The Burning-Glass,’ originally published in Said or Sung, here cited from The Truth-Seeking Heart, 
135. 
89 Ibid., 136-137. 
90 As Coleridge says in answer to his second question, cited in note 83 above, the way to prove the truth of 
Christianity is to try it.  
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of God in all that he said and did.91  He would, however, be the first to disclaim any 
attribution of sainthood for himself.  But, whether or not Farrer merits this title, there are 
indeed flesh-and-blood human beings, however rare, whose character and quality of life 
point beyond themselves to a transcendent reality, a reality whose apparent beauty, truth, 
and goodness at least prima facie justifies our faith in its existence.  For example, the 
distinguished analytic metaphysican Peter van Inwagen explicitly appeals to such 
extraordinary lives in an account of his own conversion to Christianity.  Although he 
admits that ‘there is no way I can convey the evidence I am in possession of to you,’ he 
nevertheless asserts that ‘there are five or six Christians I know who, for all the rich 
individuality of their lives and personalities, are like lamps, each shining with the same 
dearly familiar, uncreated light that shines in the pages of the New Testament….When 
one is in the presence of this light—when one so much as listens to one of these people 
speak—it is very difficult indeed to believe that one is not the presence of a living reality 
that transcends their individual lives.’92  Such lives, van Inwagen frankly admits, are 
among ‘the reasons I have for being a Christian.’93  Or, put in Farrer’s words, having 
                                                 
91 See, for example, Susan Howatch’s comments in the introduction to her reprint of Farrer’s Saving Belief: 
A Discussion of Essentials (Mowbray / Morehouse, 1994), vii-xi, especially xi; and her ‘Author’s Note’ in 
Absolute Truths (Fawcett Crest / Ballantine Publishing, 1994), 622-624.  The sixth of her popular 
‘Starbridge’ novels about the Church of England in the 20th century, every chapter of Absolute Truths 
begins with a quote from Farrer, and he is cited several times in the other volumes as well.  Ironically, 
Howatch’s novel has probably brought Farrer’s life and work to the attention of a larger audience than all 
of the scholarly studies over the past forty years put together.  She writes that Farrer’s ‘reputation remains 
high and his admirers rate him a religious genius and even a saint.’ (623)  Philip Curtis’s biography, A 
Hawk Among Sparrows (SPCK 1985), also has a somewhat hagiographical character to it. 
92 Peter van Inwagen, ‘Quam Dilecta’, in Thomas V. Morris (ed.), God and the Philosophers: The 
Reconciliation of Faith and Reason (Oxford University Press, 1994), 57-58. 
93 Ibid., 58. 
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once glimpsed this vision of God-infused humanity, ‘we can never again believe another 
picture of ourselves, our neighbours, or our destinies.’94   
However, one may well ask what, precisely, are Farrer, Williams, and van 
Inwagen appealing to at this point.  First of all, what is it that they are claiming to discern 
in those they call saints or witnesses or lamps?  Is it moral goodness?  Joy?  Endurance?  
Some indefinable numinous quality?  And second, how does what they claim to discern 
lead to the conclusion that ‘God exists’ or ‘Christianity is true’?  In other words, is this 
appeal to the ‘evidence’ of the saints simply a particular type of religious experience, 
with all the normal benefits and problems this category raises?  Likewise, does the 
‘evidence’ of holy lives warrant the theistic or Christian conclusion any more 
convincingly than, say, the cosmological argument?  How far, really, does this take us?95  
For Farrer, at any rate, and also for me, the answer to the first question is ‘all of 
the above’: the value of the saints is not simply moralistic, but a vivid example of ‘life-in-
grace’ or ‘life-in-God’.  They are compelling by their very nature, both fascinating and 
frightening, showing us a glimpse of what our own lives could be like, if we were willing 
and able to make the same total sacrifice of the self.  They show us, ‘proved in action,’ 
the solution to the epistemic dilemmas that beset us.96  For just when they cease to 
conceive their dependence on God, they begin to live it.97  
                                                 
94 Farrer, Saving Belief, 26. 
95 David Brown raised some of these questions in comments on an earlier version of this chapter, and they 
are also canvassed (in regard to general religious experience) in his essay ‘Experience Skewed’.  Victoria 
Harrison, Grace Jantzen, and Patrick Sherry raise similar questions about the epistemic value of saints in 
their articles cited in note 85. 
96 See Austin Farrer, ‘Revelation’, in Basil Mitchell (ed.), Faith and Logic: Oxford Essays in Philosophical 
Theology (George Allen and Unwin, 1957), 90. 
97 See Farrer, The Freedom of the Will, 315. 
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And the answer to the second question—how do such holy lives lead to a theistic 
or Christian conclusion?—is intimately connected to the interactionist epistemology that 
has increasingly come to the fore over the past three chapters.  By themselves, such lives 
fall radically short of any such conclusion.  But again and again it must be stressed:  
[T]o know real beings we must exercise our actual relation with them.  No 
physical science without physical interference, no personal knowledge without 
personal intercourse; no thought about any reality about which we can do nothing 
but think.  Is not this the highest possible generalisation of the empirical 
principle?  Theology must be at least as empirical as this, if it is to mediate any 
knowledge whatsoever.  We can know nothing of God, unless we can do 
something about him.  So what, we must ask, can we do?98 
 
And if the answer given in Faith and Speculation is ‘obey’, the answer which seems 
more prevalent in ‘The Burning Glass’ is ‘taste’.  Taste ‘the things we describe,’ taste 
‘the fruit’ of life-in-grace.  Is there really no fruit to be tasted?  Is there really no 
interaction with God in your life?  Then perhaps you should not believe, no matter how 
good the philosophical arguments may be.  The saints provide vivid external examples of 
incarnate arguments for God, but—as already stated repeatedly above—they are only 
persuasive if we can also discern, however faintly, an answering and echoing incarnate 
argument in our own lives.  Without that echo, the evidence is lost and useless.  In the 
end, if anything is to be ‘solved by sacrifice,’ we must solve it for ourselves, by our own 
self-sacrifice.  The saints may show us the way, but they cannot walk it for us.   
 Moderate fideist or not, Farrer never avoided ‘the empirical demand’—he simply 
expanded what that could possibly mean in order to maintain the possibility of the 
rational truth of theism.  Rather than fit his religious beliefs into a predetermined 
philosophical system, he tried to let them take their natural shape and then test them, not 
                                                 
98 Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 22. 
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merely by rigorous conceptual analysis, but by living them.  His great insight was that 
some things can only be known in this way, from within a commitment to them, a 
commitment which may be called ‘faith’.  But he also recognised that such tests may lead 
to a negative result, in which case faith should be abandoned—and he never flinched 
from that possibility.  ‘We must have no bogus history,’ he claimed, and would certainly 
say the same for philosophy and theology as well.99  On the other hand, he also 
maintained that belief in God, if accepted, called for far more than mere intellectual 
assent, but rather demanded the entirety of our lives.  Indeed, he said, ‘we shall not 
achieve full intellectual belief unless we live by it.  Who can go on believing in a 
supreme Good which he makes no motion towards embracing?’100 
                                                 
99 From the essay, ‘On Credulity,’ originally published in Illuminatio 1 (1947), 3-9; reprinted in The Truth-
Seeking Heart, 190-195 (citation on 195). 
100 Farrer, Saving Belief, 183.   
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APPENDIX: LETTERS OF AUSTIN FARRER 
 
(A) 
AUSTIN FARRER’S LETTER TO HIS FATHER 
ON HIS EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ‘BREAKTHOUGH’ 
REGARDING FAITH AND REASON 
 
This letter, dated 14 March but without indicating the year, is placed by Philip 
Curtis in 1927—i.e., in Farrer’s fourth and final year studying ‘Greats’ at Balliol 
(when he was 22 years old) before proceeding to Cuddesdon later that year to study 
theology and train for ordination.  This proposal finds support below in Farrer’s 
reference to ‘these four years’: he is reflecting on what he has come to understand 
towards the end of his ‘secular’ education.  The letter covers folios 29-30 of Bodleian 
MS. Eng. lett. c.270.  Philip Curtis reproduces most of the letter in pages 30-32 of A 
Hawk Among Sparrows (London: SPCK, 1985), but with several minor mistakes, 
omissions, and alterations, and with at least one major error: in the eighth line of the 
first paragraph he transcribed ‘belief’ instead of ‘disbelief’ (see page 30 of the 
biography), which of course entirely changes the meaning of the sentence, robs it of 
force, and in fact makes it rather nonsensical.  Partly for that reason, but primarily for 
this letter’s great importance in understanding the early Farrer’s thinking on the 
relation between faith and reason, a corrected transcription is here provided (which 
follows Farrer’s usage of underlining for emphasis).  I have received permission to 
transcribe and cite this letter from the Farrer Estate and the Bodleian Library. 
______________________________________________________________ 
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March 14th [1927]      Balliol College, Oxford 
Dear Father 
 You may congratulate me on having just come out of an enormous bout of 
philosophising, which has had tiresome effects on my powers to sleep and do regular 
work, but admirable ones on my general state of mind: especially in establishing faith 
on its own foundations, where the ebb and flow of metaphysical speculations ought 
not to be able to touch it any more.  This is a great gain, since even when you are not 
sure it stands condemned, still you feel its position to be problematical, and dependent 
upon any turn your theories may take in the future: which is just as disastrous as 
disbelief and less progressive.  So now I am going about saying to myself, that if only 
people would think their philosophy out they would discover the scope of its view, 
and realise that it does not touch religion.  This little victory pleases me a great deal, 
because the curse of this intellectualism is, that it destroys desire by challenging the 
grounds of it before it has time to act; and then leaving it hanging on an infinite 
regress of problems to be considered.  All this and how bad it is I see more and more 
through the present example of the people I live with here, whom I am constantly 
envying for their impulses, without seeing a way to liberate my own.  For instance, a 
man ought to desire this or that career: he ought to love God, not think it right to get 
into harmony with the universal values, and that with reservations: he ought to be 
simply dependent on the affection of his friends, and at least be free from the 
miserable fear of being unfelt by and unfeeling of the world of his fellows, a sort of 
moral solipsism.  Hodges encourages me, who having gone (Heaven knows) far 
deeper into his shell than ever I have done, now finds himself coming out through the 
full thinking-through of his philosophy, even to the recovery of a religious sense 
which had run dry for years.  To the great amusement of mankind, he is beginning a 
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campaign against rationalism which he calls ‘the enemy everywhere.’1  Well, with 
such an example before me, I hope to get back freedom inch by inch.  Inter alia, I am 
going to give myself bodily into the hands of the Cowley Community to do with me 
what they can for three days after the Jenks is over, to say the hours with the brethren 
there and be put through a systematic course of meditation between.2  You don’t 
know how happy I am: I feel less the slave of Reason than I have done any time these 
four years I should think.  I tried a great cul-de-sac in religion, of the universal 
‘ought,’ saying to myself that [faith] was a divinely-given thing, and that all the 
recipient could do was to practice those things which on full consideration he believed 
right in religion as much as in other things, since nothing is in our power but our 
moral will.3  Which was, no doubt, St Paul’s view before he was converted.  But ‘full 
consideration’ yields no positive results such as to be a ground for action, still less the 
power to perform them.  Whence this palinode at last.  But don’t suspect me of 
plunging into irrationalism: philosophy is the deliverer and not the chain, and I more 
and more want to go through with it.  It is absurd, that no warnings are any use in 
these things: here have I been living on the simplest fallacies, with warning-boards 
stuck up all over the New Testament against the attempt to live by the good rational 
                                                 
1 H. A. Hodges (1905-1976), one of Farrer’s closest friends at Balliol and afterwards; a fellow Anglo-
Catholic and Christian philosopher; eventually Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading.  
In a much later letter to Curtis, Hodges says that the result of the ‘bout of philosophising’ described in 
this letter was that Farrer ‘was now ready to join me in acknowledging the insufficiency of human 
reason and accepting the light of faith.’  See Curtis, A Hawk Among Sparrows, 33. 
2 ‘Cowley Community’: the Society of St John the Evangelist, also known as the Cowley Fathers: the 
oldest religious order for men in the Church of England, then based in Oxford.  ‘Jenks’: the Jenkyns 
Exhibition, one of Balliol’s classical scholarships, which Farrer sat for at this time and subsequently 
received.  
3 Farrer began a word, scratched it out, and scribbled something over it that is not entirely legible.  
Curtis reads it as ‘faith’ (A Hawk Among Sparrows, 31) which both looks likely and makes good sense 
of the passage. 
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will.  I used to be enormously baffled by our Lord’s sayings, to the effect that good 
deeds must proceed from the heart, from a love of them, and that this Pharisaic 
attempt just to do as an outward thing that which is according to your notion of right 
is a mere hypocrisy, after all.  So Aristotle is proved right against this damned Kant, 
and all the moderns who uphold the latter against the former.4  But I used to ask 
‘Though this is all very well, how does it help us to decide what we ought to do, and 
that is all that is in our power?’  I am most grateful to Joyce for having once defined 
to me what sincerity is, and how it excludes the suspended judgement.5 
 [Farrer here begins a new paragraph, in which he criticises a visiting preacher 
in Balliol’s chapel for his ‘pious rationalism’—i.e., for holding a basic stance of 
agnostic naturalism mixed with a touch of mystical piety.  Farrer concludes his 
critique, and the letter, as follows:] This sort of thing will convince no one.  We must 
(I am a prophet already!) go through with reason and see what it does, and then just 
say of faith, that it too does and says these other (not contradictory but 
supplementary) things. 
 I suppose now I shan’t be home till Friday week.  The Jenks starts tomorrow. 
  Your loving son 
   Austin 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Curtis omits ‘this damned’ here, but whether out of respect for Kant or Farrer is uncertain: see page 
31 of A Hawk Among Sparrows. 
5 Farrer’s older sister (born the year before him, on 31 March 1903). 
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(B) 
AUSTIN FARRER’S LETTERS TO DIOGENES ALLEN 
 
In September 2003 Diogenes Allen sent eight letters from Austin Farrer to the 
Department of Special Collections and Western Manuscripts at the Bodleian Library, 
University of Oxford.  Photocopies of these letters are also held at St Deiniol’s 
Library, Hawarden, Wales.  Allen’s description of this unpublished Farrer 
correspondence—included with the photocopies at St Deiniol’s—reads as follows:  
During 1963-4 Austin Farrer supervised a dissertation that was to be 
submitted to Yale University for a Ph.D. degree.  Its thesis—that the response 
of faith to the gospel was not based on evidence but on the needs it met and 
the nourishment it provided—greatly stimulated Farrer.  In addition, it argued 
that this nourishment was a sufficient reason to affirm the gospel, provided 
that it was possible to rebut various objections to it.  As long as the gospel was 
not shown to be false, it was rational on the basis of the nourishment the 
gospel provided to affirm it as true. 
Farrer invited his student to present his thesis to the Metaphysicals, and 
unbeknown to the student he used it as the jumping off point of his book, Faith 
and Speculation.  Farrer generously acknowledged his use of the material in 
the Preface to the book and in a footnote in Chapter One. 
The first three letters contain several of Farrer’s formulations of the 
thesis in his own words, with some criticisms and reservations 
The fourth letter contains Farrer’s suggestions to meet the objections 
one examiner at Yale raised. 
The fifth letter acknowledges Farrer having written a letter of 
recommendation, and mentions, rather wryly, his forthcoming trip to Texas, a 
placed [sic] he told me that he loved to visit because of its rawness in contrast 
to the over-civilized character of Oxford. 
The sixth letter mentions the receipt of an offprint of an article that 
contains the core of the dissertation he supervised, and which he cited in a 
footnote of Chapter One of Faith and Speculation, and the news that a copy of 
that book was being sent.  Farrer also comments somewhat caustically on the 
former student’s move from one university to a theological seminary.  He 
again mentions his forthcoming visit to Texas. 
The seventh letter concerns the abridgement of his edition of Leibniz’s 
Theodicy by the same former student, explaining why it was a rushed job.  He 
also complains about headaches that were, unknown to him, caused by a brain 
tumor [this diagnosis is uncertain]. 
The eighth letter again mentions his debt for the opening chapter of 
Faith and Speculation, and complains of his weariness with Keble’s Centenary 
Appeal. 
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After submitting these eight letters to the Bodleian, Allen found an additional 
letter which he sent in separately in February 2006.  This letter, although simply dated 
‘3 Feb’ is clearly from February 1964 (both from Allen’s recollection in a personal 
letter to me and also from the sequence of events), and so is included below in due 
chronological order but without re-numbering the sequence outlined by Allen above.  
In this letter, Farrer asks Allen to present a précis of his dissertation to the 
Metaphysicals.  In a personal letter to me, undated but received in February 2006, 
Allen recalls that those present were Basil Mitchell, Helen Oppenheimer, J. L. Lucas, 
I. M. Crombie, and G. C. Stead.  He reports that while one member present was 
resistant and ‘took it as Barthianism,’ another was ‘quietly interested,’ and that Farrer 
was ‘very lively and defending the position.’ 
Letters 5 and 7 as described by Allen are omitted as irrelevant to this 
dissertation, as well as some brief personal passages within the letters transcribed.  
Omitted passages are marked by an ellipsis; the only original ellipsis in the 
correspondence is the long one in point (c) of Letter 3. 
______________________________________________________________ 
Letter 1 
[Allen’s handwriting: ‘written sometime in Nov. 1963’]   Keble College, Oxford 
Dear Mr Allen 
 …Your ideas keep expanding in my head.  One of your main points is, I think, 
that there is no ‘evidence’ for faith because mental and volitional response to God is 
the initial response: Contrast response to physical environment, when the initial 
response is sensory, so that we can appeal from intellectual decisions to self-evident 
‘facts’.  Only, this consideration is general, and does not prove the particular point, 
that this initial (mental and volitional) response is made in answer to a Gospel: it 
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might be made in face of physical existence and moral duty.  I made the general point 
in the 5th lecture of the Glass of Vision, but (however wrongheadedly) separated it 
from the particular point: a point which needs to be commended by particular 
arguments. 
 Starting from here, I find myself articulating your position as follows: 
(1) The apprehension of God (or of our relation to him) is the act, or activity, 
of faith.  (Apprehension is a bad word: all I mean is, that faith here plays 
the sort of part played by sensation + immediate supposition, in physical 
experience.)6 
(2) There are always ‘motives’ leading to faith, since that act arises in a 
context, both subjective and objective; and in relation to that context.  
Motives can be appropriate, they cannot be ‘sufficient reasons’; for faith is 
(in the sense explained) its own evidence. 
(3) Faith may be sound without any rational critique or justification; much as 
our everyday response to our physical environment may be. 
(4) If, however, the question of validity is raised, a critique must be endured 
and justification offered.  The critique, and the consequent justification, 
are of two kinds: a distinction of valid from invalid religion (‘prove the 
spirits’); and an examination of the religious claim as such.  It is with this 
that philosophy is concerned.  Justification ought not to construct bypasses 
to God, but to test the roads by which he comes to us. 
Is this at all what you want to say? 
                                                 
6 These two sentences are cited by Charles C. Conti in his ‘Study Notes’ to Austin Farrer, Reflective 
Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by Charles C. Conti (SPCK, 1972): ‘In using the word 
“apprehension”  in connection with theistic apprehension, Farrer wrote (in a letter to Diogenes Allen, 
sometime in November 1963): … ’ (224).  As the full context makes clear, however, here Farrer is 
expressing Allen’s position, not necessarily his own. 
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  Yours sincerely,  
   Austin Farrer 
 
[Metaphysicals Letter] 
3 Feb [1964]       Keble College, Oxford 
Dear Diogenes, 
May I ask of you an extreme favour?  There is a small group of philosophizing  
Christian dons, the same indeed which produced Faith & Logic, though the 
membership has since altered a little.  We should very much appreciate the 
opportunity of hearing your views about the distinction between motives and 
evidences for belief. 
The group will meet in my study on Tuesday Feb 11th at 8.15 p.m.  Could you 
join us?  We do not wish to burden you with special preparation.  If you have on this 
side of the Atlantic a copy of the first part of your thesis, nothing would be better than 
for you to read us the pages which contain the vital statement of your own position.  
The rest would come out in discussion.  It is not usual in these occasions for the 
opener to read a long formal paper. – If you have nothing ready to read, we can 
proceed Platonically from the very start. 
Supposing you are ready to face this, would it be convenient for you to dine in 
hall here first?  If so, call at our house about seven o’clock. 
Yours sincerely, 
  Austin Farrer 
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Letter 2 
2 April 1964       Keble College, Oxford 
Dear Diogenes, 
 I have read your thesis through.  You have succeeded in bringing the second 
half up to the level of the first, both in cogency and style. 
 May I clear my mind by stating your doctrine in my own way? 
1. Religious belief is one of those immediate interpretations which are their 
own evidence (We ‘just make’ the religious interpretation as we ‘just 
make’ the personal interpretation of our neighbour’s conduct).  It does not 
rest on grounds, like a scientific hypothesis.  (‘Immediate’ merely denies 
this: it does not deny that such a way of interpreting is learnt.) 
2. But an interpretation which is self-evidencing in this sense is open to 
critique (in Kant’s sense).  How do we commend it as a valid form of 
thought, when we are not under the spell of it?  (It is no answer to say, that 
we cannot both practise it and disbelieve it at the same time).  You proceed 
in several stages: 
A. It appeals to us as providing our true ‘form of existence’. 
B. This existence lies in a relation to a believed-in-God, etc (and so 
Braithwaite is refuted). 
C. If God is what our faith asserts him to be, it is proper that we 
should ‘know’ him in responding to him.  (The point can be put in 
terms of either Efficient, or Final, First-Causality.  The wellspring 
of existence is known in being drawn upon; the ultimate good is 
perceived in being embraced.) [Farrer originally wrote ‘responded 
to,’ marked through it and replaced it with ‘embraced’] 
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D. The evidence that we are drawing on that Source is that it enlarges 
our existence: the evidence of our embracing the Good is that it 
blesses us. 
It seems to me that your account of rationales might be better integrated with 
this position, than it is.  It is fair enough to say that any rationale, however bogus, may 
give subjective comfort; also that a believer may do without them.  But if the account 
of belief which you give is the true account, it is the account which you think ought to 
be accepted by (Christian) philosophers: and in that case the rationales which ought to 
be valued are those which are properly related to such a position.  They ought all to 
presuppose your doctrine of faith-assurance and intrinsic evidence: and should deal 
with the peripheral questions which arise on such a supposition (E.g., Will the world 
as we know it bear the religious interpretation—I am livingly related to a living God, 
but what about sticks and stones, sinners, etc?  Do the data of revelation deserve the 
attention and the credit faith accords them?)—I would say that the discussions in 
Finite and Infinite are a proper attempt to show that the whole universe of existents, 
so far as we have any clue to their natures, is fitly seen as dependent on divine 
creativity. 
I think that a long and very subtle discussion would be needed to settle the 
‘read in or read off?’ issue.  St Thomas would begin by pointing out that the very 
nature of things finite must surely be related in fact to their dependence on God (a 
believer must believe): why then is it denied that it can be ‘read off’?—Only on the 
Calvinistic dogma of man’s ‘deformity.’—But if it can be ‘read off’ why do not all 
philosophers achieve the ‘reading’?—Why not compromise, and say that those who 
do ‘read off’ are making an incipient move towards religious belief, and that the 
believer really does and can ‘read off’, just as he really does and can interpret his own 
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standing in relation to God?  But perhaps you would not want to exclude this 
possibility: you only want to deny that the philosophic Christian is necessarily 
committed to it.  Well, but of course he is not: he may be a believer in ‘deformity.’  
That does not prevent us from reasoning with him, and considering which story is 
more true to experience.7 
But this is a side-issue. 
Now I will write to your two Americans: I shall not say a word to them about 
the imperfect organisation of your account of rationales because it is so marginal to a 
strong and original thesis. 
Yours, 
Austin Farrer 
        P.T.O 
P.S. 
 The most naïve and vulnerable page in your whole thesis is (I think) p 150.  
The philosophers have recently spent endless pains on the states of moral judgements 
and are perfectly satisfied that the so-called ‘objectivity’ of standards can be 
accounted for without supposing a cosmic basis.  [Farrer wrote and then marked 
through the following parenthetical comment: ‘(To argue as thought they had not 
written will arouse prejudice against your thesis.)’]  It is the way you put your case, 
which is so odd: no one who is willing to consider your argument seriously will be a 
philosopher who thinks that moral choices are questions of personal taste.  The real 
question involved in your thesis is whether and how far the acknowledgement of a 
‘good’ involves the acknowledgement of a state of affairs.  I.e., what you have to 
                                                 
7 All of this paragraph except the last three sentences is cited by Charles C. Conti in his ‘Study Notes’ 
to Austin Farrer, Reflective Faith, 223.  As argued in the dissertation, they refer to Allen’s discussion of 
the work of John Hick.  
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argue is that seeing the good of the Christian life is like seeing the claims of your 
neighbour on your friendship (he exists!) and not like seeing the advantages of 
forming a lunch-club (it doesn’t!).8 
 I have made a few grammatical and typological corrections on your script. 
 I have now written to your two Professors. 
  AMF 
 
Letter 3 
19 April 1964        Keble College, Oxford 
Dear Diogenes, 
 Thank you for your very fair and reasonable letter. 
 Now what are we to say about publications?  It was very stupid of me to let 
the copy go out of my hands before answering you on this point (for you did ask me).  
Of course you would like to publish it much as it stands….Only…wouldn’t you have 
a wider public and a more effective influence if you pulled it round a bit and made it 
more positive and systematic; roughly in the form 
(a) Belief without extrinsic evidence is justifiable and alone indeed proper 
(b) In the court of Reason it should be and can be justified 
(c) The justifications offered should be appropriate to the nature of belief, and 
would be….. (I.e. you would concentrate on stating or at least sketching the 
rationales you require yourself, showing that the choice of them follows from 
the doctrine of belief which you define). 
                                                 
8 An examination of this page of the 1964 version of Allen’s dissertation indicates that he revised it in 
light of Farrer’s criticism. 
 303
I think you would find that, if you sat down resolutely to your thesis with a 
pair of scissors and a paste-pot, you would get a straight book like this out of it 
without a great deal of actual rewriting. 
…Ever yours, 
 Austin Farrer  
 
Letter 4 
15 June 1964       Keble College, Oxford 
Dear Diogenes, 
 As to the technical points of scholarship or of exactitude which your judges 
raise, it is just a matter of your revising the criticised details with good care.  As to the 
complaint that you shift your ground, when you face the accusation that the truth of 
religious beliefs is irrelevant (according to your theory), this is really equivalent to my 
complaint, that your almost-dismissing account of ‘rationales’ in the early chapters is 
out of line with the later chapters.  I cannot see why you should not state from the 
beginning the position which in the end you are bound to take, i.e., that while 
(a) the believer’s motives are practical, he 
(b) assumes that the life of religion is a contact with the true God, which entails 
that he 
(c) supposes that the case for taking religion to be veridical is sound and that 
(d) it can be properly defended, whether he personally can make the defence or 
not.  Psychologically the believer need never have attended to the question, 
whether adequate rationales can be produced; but logically he is committed to 
the belief that, ideally, they can. 
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The most misleading point in the early part of your thesis is that insistence on 
the purely subjective comfort offered by rationales, good or bad. 
 Put in a nutshell: faith’s being its own evidence implies that a certain 
metaphysical interpretation of finite-experience is true—not in the sense that we are 
bound to be Thomists, Hegelians, or any other brand of metaphysician, but that 
certain broadly-stated metaphysical positions must be asserted, and others must be 
denied: ‘must,’ logically, of course, not psychologically: a person can believe and be 
saved, who (like my daughter Caroline) is quite incapable of abstract argument.9 
 Ever yours, 
  Austin Farrer 
 
Letter 6 
29 June [1966]  
Dear Diogenes, 
 Thank you for the offprint of your very substantial paper, which I have read 
with high appreciation.10  By the time I received it I had completed the MS of a book 
containing the Deems Lectures of 1964, in which your ideas (not unacknowledged) 
furnish the substance of the first chapter.  I do not altogether agree with you but I 
think what you say is very important.  I think it comes to this: The believer, qua 
believer, rightly says ‘I believe because the grace of God’ (or the like) ‘persuades 
                                                 
9 Caroline Farrer (b. 1939), Austin and Katharine’s only child, ‘did not seem to learn’ as she grew older 
(so Curtis, 143), and was eventually diagnosed—rightly or wrongly—as what would now be classified 
as mild mental retardation.  There is some debate among Farrer’s living friends as to the extent of her 
disability. 
10 Here Farrer refers to Allen’s article, ‘Motives, Rationales, and Religious Beliefs’, American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 3, Number 2, April 1966.  Farrer also cites this article on page 10 of 
Faith and Speculation. 
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me.’  But the philosopher’s business is not (mainly) to say: ‘Quite right, my boy, 
that’s how believing goes’ but to examine the assumptions upon which the facts 
through which ‘the grace of God persuades’ come to be taken as instruments, effects 
or evidences as the Grace of God. 
 …Yours sincerely, 
  Austin Farrer 
 
Letter 8 
12 May 1967 
Dear Diogenes, 
 I have told them to send you a copy of a book called Faith and Speculation and 
goodness knows when you’ll get it, but this is to warn you in case a mistaken feeling 
of friendship should have led you to buy it: for one copy is a misfortune but two 
would be a disaster. 
 Nothing much has happened to us lately.  The College is making horribly 
heavy weather over its Centenary Appeal, which will be a damp squib anyhow. 
 The only tolerable part of the book, as you will see, is the part I stole from 
you.  I have made a few grudging acknowledgements. 
 Ever yours, 
  Austin Farrer 
______________________________________________________________ 
Letters 1-4 (marked ‘Keble College’ above) are on official, letter-sized stationery 
which says in the heading: 
From THE WARDEN     KEBLE COLLEGE 
             OXFORD 
             Telephone 59201 
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The Metaphysicals Letter is on different, note-sized stationery which just says: 
KEBLE COLLEGE 
Telephone 59201 OXFORD 
 
As stated above, this letter is simply dated ‘3 Feb’ but is clearly from 1964.  Letters 6-
7 are written on blue aerogrammes.  Letter 6 has the day and month but not the year, 
but is definitely dated to 1966 based not only on the aerogramme postmark, but also 
on internal evidence in an omitted passage described above by Allen (i.e., Farrer’s 
visit to Texas in September 1966).  Farrer used underlining for emphasis and that 
convention has been retained here as opposed to italics. 
I am immensely grateful to the Revd Professor Diogenes Allen for sending me 
photocopies of this correspondence, the originals of which are now located in the 
Bodleian Library.  I am also grateful to the Revd David G. Attfield for his help in 
deciphering some difficulties in Farrer’s handwriting.  One or two words are still 
obscure, but the overall sense is always clear. 
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